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Abstract
The primary aim of this dissertation is to present an analysis for so-called optative
constructions, clauses that express a wish, hope or desire without containing a lexical
item that means 'wish', 'hope' or 'desire'. A secondary aim is to contrast optative
constructions with so-called polar exclamatives, clauses that express surprise, shock or
dismay at a given fact without containing a lexical item that means 'surprise', 'shock' or
'dismay'. The goal is to better understand the way in which syntax, semantics and
pragmatics interact in order to yield the meanings and uses that these constructions have.
The core claim is that we can understand optative constructions by virtue of exploring
three properties that they share. First, I argue that optatives (and polar exclamatives)
contain a generalized exclamation operator EX, which serves to express an emotion
towards the status of the modified proposition on a contextually provided scale. Second, I
argue that semantic mood (including factivity and counterfactuality) is encoded in a
distinguished Mood head, the content of which co-determines both morphological mood
and the material that overtly surfaces in the position of C. Third, I argue for a generalized
analysis of prototypical particles, including non-exclusive ONLY, concessive AT LEAST
and unstressed DOCH. My analysis treats these particles as truth-conditionally vacuous
presupposition triggers, which interact with optativity in three different ways. First, they
convey additional information with respect to the modified proposition. Second, they
eliminate alternative readings for an ambiguous clause, due to incompatibility. Third, this
disambiguating role makes them ideal licensors for a marked utterance type.
Chapter 1 of this dissertation is an introductory chapter that presents the core proposal
in a nutshell. After this coarse overview, chapter 2 reviews some basic definitions and
background on optatives and polar exclamatives. Subsequently, I proceed to a
presentation of my entire system in chapter 3. The following chapters discuss each of the
three core parts in turn, starting with the EX operator in chapter 4, followed by semantic
mood in chapter 5 and finally I discuss particles in chapter 6. Chapter 7 concludes.
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1. Introduction: The Proposal in a Nutshell
Optative utterances express a wish, regret, hope or desire without an overt lexical item
that means wish, regret, hope or desire (cf. Quirk et al. 1972, 1985, Scholz 1991,
Rosengren 1993, Rifkin 2000, Asarina & Shklovsky 2008, Biezma 201 lab), as illustrated
in (1). Optative utterances exhibit variation along several different axes, two of which can
be stated as follows. First, optatives allow for form variation in their left periphery. The
optative in (1 a) is initiated by that, whereas its counterpart in (1 b) is initiated by if
(1) a. Oh, that I had told them both a year ago!
(Martin F. Tupper. 1851. The Twins; A Domestic Novel. Hartford: Silas Andrus.)'
b. If only I had told them both a year ago!
Second, optatives vary in terms of the prototypical particles that they contain; (2a)
contains only, (2b) contains just, and (2c+d) contain but. A large part of this project is
dedicated to the study of only and its cross-linguistic counterparts (e.g. German nur).
(2) a. If I'd only listened to my parents!
b. If I could just make them understand my point of view!
c. If I could but explain!
(Quirk et al. 1985:842)
d. Oh that Apollo would but drive his horses slowly, that the day might be three
hours longer; for it is too soon to depart, [...]
(A. Marsh. 1682. The Ten Pleasures of Marriage. London: The Navarre Society.) 2
A core puzzle arises from the apparent obligatoriness of particles in (2). English speakers
share the intuition that (3), particle-free variants of (2a+b), are not well-formed optatives;
in contrast, they appear to be incomplete conditionals. One goal is to account for this fact.
(3) a.# If I'd listened to my parents!




We face an apparent compositionality problem: For instance, can we derive the core
meaning of an optative like (2a) compositionally from the standard meaning of an if-
clause and the standard meaning of the particle only?
The answer that I propose radically differs from previous approaches to optativity3. I
reject the idea that optativity arises compositionally from the standard meaning of if-
clauses and the standard meaning of particles. In contrast, I argue that optativity is
inherently independent from the presence of such particles. To account for the quasi-
obligatoriness of such particles, I argue that the semantics of the particles conspires with
the semantics of an optative utterance, giving rise to the connection that we observe.
First, I argue that optative utterances are a variant of exclamative utterances, the
meaning of which is due to a null operator EX. EX selects a contextually salient scale and
conveys that the modified proposition exceeds a salient threshold on that scale. (Both if-
and that-clauses can be complements to EX.) In optatives, the relevant scale reflects the
speaker's preferences, cf. (4). Crucially, the lexical meaning of EX is weak. It simply
indicates that the modified proposition is relatively high on a contextually given scale.
(4) a. EXscale:Speaker-Preferences [(oh) that I had told them both a year ago]!
b. EXscale:Speaker-Preferences [if only I had told them both a year ago]!
c. Core meaning (due to EX): [p I told them both a year ago] exceeds the threshold 4
on a scale that reflects the speaker's preferences in the utterance context.
My analysis treats various types of exclamations uniformly, including polar exclamatives
(utterances that express surprise at a fact), cf. (5a). Such exclamatives also contain EX.
Polar exclamatives only differ in the scale they select (roughly: unlikelihood), cf. (5b).
(5) a. That you could ever want to marry such a man! (Quirk et al. 1985:841)
b. EXScale:Speaker-Unlikelihood [that you could ever want to marry such a man]!
Similarly, I argue that particles in optatives involve weaker readings than their standard
counterparts. For instance, while the standard (exclusive) ONLY 1 meaning of only is most
3 For English if only optatives, such a project has been pursued in the past by Rifkin (2000), Asarina &
Shklovsky (2008), Biezma (201 lab).
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aptly paraphrased as 'no more than', I argue that only has a second ONLY 2 reading. ONLY 2
is truth-conditionally vacuous and (on a level of non-truth-conditional meaning) conveys
'lowness' of the proposition that it modifies with respect to a salient scale. I argue that
optatives involve ONLY2, schematized in (6)4.
(6) ||ONLY2($)|| is defined iff 5 is low on a salient scale. If defined, ||ONLY2($)| = 1$11.
It follows that optativity does not compositionally arise from the presence of the particles
only, just or but. I argue that their quasi-obligatoriness is due to the following semantic
conspiracy. As discussed above, EX contributes generalized exclamativity, one shade of
which is optativity, while particles (such as ONLY 2) contribute non-truth-conditional
meaning. The contribution of EX is thus orthogonal to that of the particles. However,
utterances with the shape of an optative typically have various readings, some of which
are more marked than others. Example (7a) has an optative reading, given in (7c).
Nevertheless, the non-optative reading in (7b) is less marked. I propose that the blocking
of (7c) is due to extra-grammatical principles that govern successful communication.
(7) a.# If I'd listened to my parents!
b. unmarked reading: # conditional antecedent (infelicitous, because incomplete)
c. marked reading: voptative utterance (good, but somehow blocked)
I argue that particles bias marked readings, due to implicatures that they trigger or due to
incompatibility with unmarked readings. This reverses interpretive preferences, cf. (8).
(8) a. vIf I'd only listened to my parents!
b. dispreferred unmarked reading: # conditional antecedent
c. preferred marked reading: voptative utterance
I proceed to account for the deviant status of (7a) by making standard assumptions on
rational discourse participants (cf. Lewis's 1969 signaling games). I argue that to warrant
4 Strictly speaking, English only is more specialized (and cross-linguistically less typical) under its ONLY2
reading, in that it restricts the salient scale to a bouletic scale (similar to Nakanishi & Rullmann's 2009
concessive at least). The generalized entry in (6) captures the meanings of cross-linguistic equivalents,
such as German nur 'only' and Czech jen 'only', whose ONLY2 readings are not restricted to bouletic scales.
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successful communication, the speaker will use particles to bias a marked reading
whenever the context is insufficient to eliminate a less marked reading. Correspondingly,
a hearer will interpret particle-free utterances according to contextual bias (i.e. prior
probability). Given that the unmarked readings have a higher probability, (7a) will always
be interpreted (and intended by the speaker) as the conditional fragment in (7b) and not
as the optative in (7c). This derives the quasi-obligatoriness of particles in optatives.
To summarize, I argue against an approach in which the meaning of particles is a
compositional ingredient of the desirability that optatives convey. Opposing such a view,
I argue for a new perspective that can be stated as follows. The core meaning of an
optative is independent from the meanings of particles that it contains, but the two
meaning components conspire to give rise to the quasi-obligatoriness of such particles.
2. Prolegomena: Definitions, Terminology and Other Basic Matters
So-called 'optative constructions' are currently underrepresented in formal linguistic
research. Therefore, this chapter discusses some basic definitions, terminology and other
matters that need to be addressed before investigating the formal syntax and semantics of
such constructions. Section 2.1 introduces the subject matter of this dissertation, defining
a number of relevant descriptive concepts. Section 2.2 focuses on the English if only
construction, which is a familiar optative construction that has been addressed before
(Rifkin 2000, Asarina & Shklovsky 2008, Biezma 201 lab). By reviewing arguments
from Rifkin (2000) and adding a new argument, I dispel the hypothesis that if only is a
lexicalized (idiomatic) expression (one might call this view the 'idiom hypothesis').
However, I also argue against a special status of only as an optativity marker, and I argue
in favor of a set of meanings that correlate with optativity, including the meanings of
only, at least and but.
2.1 Optatives - Definitions and Illustrations
2.1.1 Optative Basics: Introducing if-Optatives, that-Optatives and V1-Optatives
Let me open this discussion with some illustrations of the topic of investigation. Example
(9) illustrates an optative utterance of the type that I investigate (cf. Quirk et al. 1972,
1985, Scholz 1991, Rosengren 1993, Rifkin 2000, Asarina & Shklovsky 2008, Biezma
2011 a). (The translation by means of if only should not obscure the fact that the Latin
original in (9) does not contain a particle that means 'only', and that the Latin original
uses the complementizer that instead of if) I define optative utterance as an utterance
that expresses a wish, regret, hope or desire without containing a lexical item that means
wish, regret, hope or desire (cf. Rifkin 2000, Asarina & Shklovsky 2008). Optatives are
typically perceived to be a type of exclamation (defined as utterances that are
predominantly used to exclaim), cf. Quirk et al. (1972, 1985), Rifkin (2000).
(9) Utinam ne ... tetigissent litora puppes Latin
that not touch.3pl.plup.subj shores ships (Catullus 64.171-172)
'[Almighty Jupiter,] if only the [Attic] ships had never touched the [Knossian] shores!'
(adapted from Palmer 2001:217, translation is mine)
The Latin example in (9) clearly fits the above definition of an optative utterance. The
meaning that is expressed can be roughly paraphrased as in (1Oa) or (lOb). (All
paraphrases are preliminary, and nothing hinges on the choice between the two.)
(10) a. I wish [that the Attic ships had never touched the Knossian shores].
b. It would be good [if the Attic ships had never touched the Knossian shores].
Translating (9) to German, we find a wide range of constructions that comply with the
definition above. They can be described in terms of two factors, illustrated in the
following examples. The first factor is the complementizer that they choose (if versus
that; a third option is the lack of a complementizer); the second factor is their
grammatical mood (counterfactual/subjunctiveS versus non-counterfactual/indicative).
One prototypical property of optative utterances is that they have the distribution of
unembedded utterances but the morphosyntax of an embedded clause6 . I define
(independent) if-optative as an if-clause that expresses a wish without a wish lexical item
and is not accompanied by an overt matrix clause. This is illustrated in (11) for German.
(11 a) is a counterfactual if-optative and (11 b) is a non-counterfactual if-optative.
(1 )a. subjunctive, counterfactual if-optative
Ach, wenn ihre Schiffe unsere Ufer doch nur nie erreicht hstten!
oh if their ships our shores DOCH only never reached had
'Oh, if only their ships had never reached our shores!'
b. indicative, non-counterfactual if-optative
Oh, wenn ihre Schiffe unsere Ufer nur JA nie erreichen!
oh if their ships our shores only JA never reach
'Oh, if only their ships will never reach our shores!'
5 I remain agnostic as to whether there are non-counterfactual subjunctive optatives (but see Scholz 1991).
6 This fact gives rise to the intuitive (but wrong, as I will argue in section 4.1.4) view that optatives involve
an elided matrix clause (cf. Evans 2007).
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In analogy to if-optative we can define (independent) that-optative as a that-clause that
expresses a wish, desire or hope without a corresponding lexical item and is not
accompanied by an overt matrix clause. Example (12) illustrates that-optatives in
German.
(12)a. subjunctive, counterfactual that-optative
Ach, dass ihre Schiffe unsere Ufer doch nur nie erreicht hatten!
oh that their ships our shores DOCH only never reached had
'Oh, that only their ships had never reached our shores!'
b. indicative, non-counterfactual that-optative
Oh, dass ihre Schiffe unsere Ufer nur JA nie erreichen!
oh that their ships our shores only JA never reach
'Oh, that only their ships will never reach our shores!'
Finally, we can define V1-optative as a V1-clause that expresses a wish, desire or hope in
the same way, but employs (V-to-)T-to-C movement instead of an overt complementizer.
Example (13a) illustrates a counterfactual Vi-optative. Example (13b) shows that
indicative Vi -optatives cannot be formed by simply fronting the verb. They require an
additional existential modal, as in (13c) (cf. Gartner 2010). One may call (13c) a may-
optative (see Portner 1997 for reasons to treat mogen 'may' as a mood marker rather than
a verb or modal auxiliary, so (13c) may not technically be a construction that involves T-
to-C movement).
(13)a. subjunctive, counterfactual Vi-optative
Ach, batten ihre Schiffe unsere Ufer doch nur nie erreicht!
oh had their ships our shores DOCH only never reached
'Oh, had their ships only never reached our shores!'
b. ungrammatical indicative, non-counterfactual Vi-optative
* Oh, erreichen ihre Schiffe unsere Ufer nur JA nie!
oh reach their ships our shores only JA never
'Oh, reach their ships only never our shores!'
c. indicative, non-counterfactual may-optative
Ach, mogen ihre Schiffe unsere Ufer nur JA nie erreichen!
oh may their ships our shores only JA never reach
'Oh, may their ships never reach our shores!'
Having thus established some basic definitions, we can formulate the main questions of
this research project as follows. On the one hand, how should the semantics and
pragmatics of optative constructions be analyzed and formalized? On the other hand,
what is their syntax? Specifically, do they have the same structure and meaning as non-
optative embedded clauses or do they have a distinct structure and meaning? Two crucial
questions here are whether the perceived wish is derived compositionally and whether the
particles that occur in optatives trigger that wish (cf. Rifkin 2000, Asarina & Shklovsky
2008). The last question is particularly prominent in English, where optatives typically
require the particle only, illustrated in (14) versus (15); all of the examples in (14) and
none of the examples in (15) have an optative reading.
(14) a. If you only knew the power of the dark side.
(Leigh Brackett & Lawrence Kasdan. 1980. Screenplay for "Star Wars Episode V: The
Empire Strikes Back".)
b. If he only had some one with whom he could talk.
(Brayton Norton. 1929. El Diablo. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company
Publishers.)
c. If only literature could be a cellphone-free zone.
(Matt Richtel. 2009. "If Only Literature Could Be a Cellphone-Free Zone", article for
the New York Times, online edition, April 11, 2009.)
(15) a.# If you knew the power of the dark side.
b.# If he had some one with whom he could talk.
c.# If literature could be a cellphone-free zone.
While we will see that other languages are much more flexible in this regard, English
seems to rely strongly on only, making it useful to define optative particle as a particle
that, when placed into an if-clause (or that-clause or V1-clause), turns it into an if-
optative (or that-optative or V1-optative). This is a purely descriptive definition with no
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theoretical import; I will show that many optative particles do not seem to be 'optative'
on their own7. The problem that optative particles raise is stated by Rifkin (2000) for the
particle only, and can be summarized as follows: Many languages have if-optatives that
involve an if-clause and a particle that means only (see section 2.2 of the present chapter
and section 6.2). Given that neither if-clauses nor only are optative on their own, the
question arises whether if and only compositionally interact in a way that gives rise to
optativity. I adopt this research question as another main question to be addressed in this
dissertation; however, I will extend it to other optative particles, such as particles that
mean at least and but/though (see section 2.2).
For much of this dissertation, I will be focusing on if-optatives and less so on that-
optatives. However, the latter are cross-linguistically well-represented and they also
occur productively in early Modem English, as shown in the illustrations in (16).
Therefore, it would be premature to assume that if-optatives are less marked than that-
optatives. As shown in (16a-c), English that-optatives do not require an optative particle,
and, if there is an optative particle, it is but, as in (16d+e) 8 ; I will come back to but in
section 2.2.
(16) a. Oh, that I had told them both a year ago!
(Martin F. Tupper. 1851. The Twins; A Domestic Novel. Hartford: Silas Andrus.)9
b. "My father!" she added, almost mournfully; "oh, that I had never left you!"
(T.S. Arthur. 1868. After the Storm. Philadelphia.) "
c. "Oh! what a charming creature thou art! What a happy man will he be that first
makes a woman of you! Oh! that I were a man for your sake!"
(John Cleland. 1749. Memoirs of Fanny Hill. Paris: Isidore Liseux.)"
7 English only in optatives seems to be the exception rather than the rule in being a specialized optative
element, cf. section 6.2.2.
8 In fact, it is not clear that but in (16e) acts as an optative particle, as the most natural paraphrase in terms
of a wish-statement would be (i), in which but is replaced by only; in (16d) this is less clearly so.





d. Oh that Apollo would but drive his horses slowly, that the day might be three
hours longer; for it is too soon to depart, and that for fear of a pocky setting of
the Watch.
(A. Marsh. 1682. The Ten Pleasures of Marriage. London: The Navarre Society.)12
e. Oh! that I had but to turn and embrace my kind, good, benevolent, and much
respected grandmother.
(Anonymous. 1836. Sketches by Seymour. London: Thomas Fry.)13
At this point, a discussion of the descriptive link between if-optatives and garden-variety
if-clauses is in place. I address this link in the next section.
2.1.2 If-Optatives are not Optative Conditionals
The purpose of this section is to briefly contrast if-optatives with conditionals that have
optative properties (which I call optative conditionals); the objective is to narrow down
the scope of our discussion to the former. To begin with, Rifkin (2000) gives us reason to
distinguish between two separate types of optative constructions that involve if clauses.
He notices that we should differentiate between independent if-optatives'4 (which he
himself calls if only p! constructions), (1 7a), and optative conditionals (which he calls if
only p, q constructions), (17b). I define optative conditional as a conditional clause with
an antecedent that can also be used as an independent if-optative and appears to convey a
wish (e.g. by virtue of containing an optative particle). I will use the term optative
antecedent to refer to the antecedent of an optative conditional, as illustrated in (1 7b).
(17) a. independent if-optative
If only it would snow!
b. optative conditional
If only it would snow, things would be good.
optative antecedent
12 http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1 3872/13872-h/i 3872-h.htm
13 http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5650/5650-h/p4.htn
14 Independent if-optative and optative conditional are my terminology.
22
The fact that optative antecedents in English express a wish even though they are
embedded in an optative conditional is shown in my examples (1 8a) and (1 8b). (1 8a) has
a non-optative conditional semantics, under which the speaker does not express any
evaluation with respect to the antecedent. In contrast, (18b) only has a reading under
which the speaker expresses a positive evaluation of the antecedent; in other words, (18b)
has an optative reading.
(18) Context: I love snowboarding and I want to go snowboarding as often as possible.
a. If it snowed tonight, we would go snowboarding tomorrow ...
(but I really don't want it to snow, because I hate shoveling the sidewalks).
b. If only it snowed tonight, we would go snowboarding tomorrow ...
(#but I really don't want it to snow, because I hate shoveling the sidewalks).
Rifkin argues that the distinction between independent if-optatives and optative
conditionals is meaningful. To give a first illustration, optative conditionals can be
embedded, (19a), whereas independent if-optatives cannot be embedded, (19b). We will
discuss this distinction in more detail later.
(19) a. Avi thinks that [if only it would snow, things would be good].
b. * Avi thinks that [if only it would snow].
(Rifkin 2000)
Rifkin uses observations on binding to argue that optative antecedents are truly part of the
optative conditional. If an optative conditional is further embedded (as in (19a)), it
becomes possible to bind into the optative antecedent, shown by Rifkin in (20a+b); this
also appears to hold for German, as I show in (20c), where the optative antecedent is
right-peripheral.
(20) a. No piratei doubted [that if only hei had had a map, he would have found the
treasure].
b. Each/Every piratei convinced me [that if only hei had had a map, he could
have found the treasure].
(Rifkin 2000)
c. Kein politisch involvierter Professor7 wurde jemals zugeben, [dass
no politically involved professor would ever admit that
er 7 sich eine Villa kaufen wnrde, wenn er7 doch nur reich ware].
he self a villa buy would if he DOCH only rich were
'No politically involved professor7 would ever say [that he7 would buy a
villa, if only he7 were rich].'
We may thus conclude that there are independent if-optatives as well as optative
conditionals with a (truly embedded) optative antecedent. However, I now briefly review
evidence that if-optatives can never truly be embedded (see also sections 4.1.4 and 4.1.6);
I conjecture that optative conditionals are either paratactic construction or a subtype of
conditional clause that I introduce in section 6.2.2 under the label of minimal sufficiency
conditional. The main focus will be on if-optatives (and that-optatives/V 1 -optatives), and
not on optative conditionals.
The core question with respect to apparent optative conditionals concerns the nature
of the link between an optative antecedent and the conditional that contains it. As
observed by Scholz (1991), it is highly marked to truly integrate an optative antecedent
into its host clause (which can be shown in German, while it is much more difficult to do
so in English). In (21a+b), the if-clause acts as the first constituent in the clause for the
purposes of V2. I take if-clauses in pre-V2 position to be integrated, as opposed to if-
clauses that adjoin to a complete V2 clause, (22) and (23). As shown in (21b), optative
antecedents cannot be truly integrated into their host clause (henceforth: the
unembeddability generalization), contrasting with non-optative antecedents, (21a), which
can be integrated.
(21) a. Wenn ich reich ware, warde ich dieses Haus kaufen.
if I rich were would I this house buy
'If I were rich, I would buy this house.'
b. ??? Wenn ich doch nur reich ware, wnrde ich dieses Haus kaufen.
if I doch only rich were would I this house buy
'If only I were rich, I would buy this house.'
The examples in (22) show that optative antecedents are well-formed in any of the less
integrated adjunct positions, i.e. when left-adjoining or right-adjoining to a complete V2-
clause. It is quite plausible that such constructions are formed by means of parataxis of
two independent clauses (an if-optative and a modally subordinated declarative).
(22) a. Wenn ich doch nur reich ware, dann wairde ich dieses Haus kaufen.
if I doch only rich were then would I this house buy
'If only I were rich, then I would buy this house.'
b. Wenn ich doch nur reich ware, ich wtirde dieses Haus kaufen.
if I doch only rich were I would this house buy
'If only I were rich, then I would buy this house.'
c. Ich wirde dieses Haus kaufen, wenn ich doch nur reich ware.
I would this house buy if I doch only rich were
'I would buy this house, if only I were rich.'
Non-optative counterparts to (22) are given in (23).
(23) a. Wenn ich reich ware, dann wflrde ich dieses Haus kaufen.
if I rich were then would I this house buy
'If I were rich, I would buy this house.'
b. Wenn ich reich ware, ich wiirde dieses Haus kaufen.
if I rich were I would this house buy
'If I were rich, I would buy this house.'
c. Ich wiUrde dieses Haus kaufen, wenn ich reich ware.
I would this house buy if I rich were
'I would buy this house, if I were rich.'
Counterexamples to the unembeddability generalizations can be found. The examples in
(24) are naturally occurring examples, found on google. (Brackets are added to mark the
first constituent in pre-V2 position, i.e. the if-clause.) They have been verified with native
15 For discussion of such "V3-conditionals" see K~nig & Van der Auwera (1988), Reis & Willstein (2010).
Note that a priori there are no reasons why (23b) should differ in any meaningful way from (23a), though
the aforementioned authors point out that the (23b) variant is restricted to the subjunctive and to causal
(non-epistemic) conditionals, where the antecedent proposition is a cause for the consequent proposition
(as opposed to the antecedent proposition being evidence for the consequent proposition).
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speakers and seem to be much more acceptable than other examples, such as (21 a), for
16
reasons that are unclear
(24) a. [Wenn ich doch nur k6nnte] wurde ich die Zeit zuruck drehen und
if I DOCH only could would I the time back turn and
alles anders machen!
all differently machen
'If only I could, I would turn back time and do everything differently!'
b. [Wenn ich doch nur k6nnte], wuirde ich sofort kommen.
if I DOCH only could would I immediately could
'If only I could, I would come immediately.'
c. Ach, [wenn ich doch nur k6nnte] wuirde ich sofort bei dir arbeiten.
oh if I DOCH only could would I immediately with you work
'Oh, if only I could, I would immediately start working with you.'
Note that alternative structures are possible to convey the same content, indicating that it
is not ellipsis in the if-clause that enforces integration; in addition to (24b), all of the
variants in (25) are acceptable.
(25) a. [Wenn ich doch nur k6nnte], dann wurde ich
if I DOCH only could then would I
'If only I could, I would come immediately.'
b. [Wenn ich doch nur k6nnte], ich wurde sof
if I DOCH only could I would imr
'If only I could, I would come immediately.'
c. Ich wurde sofort kommen, [wenn ich
I would immediately could if I











Given the rarity of examples like (24), and their apparent markedness, I will only discuss
them in passing. However, it is worth keeping in mind that a strict version of the
16 The elliptical nature of the antecedents may play a role, but as of now it is unclear why this would be the
case and what the other decisive factors are.
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unembeddability generalization of Scholz (1991) stands challenged in light of such
examples. It is plausible that we are dealing with an interaction of different structural and
non-structural factors that lead to the general degradedness of integrated optative
antecedents1 7 . As for the binding effects in (20), such constructions can plausibly be
treated as some type of minimal sufficiency conditional, a concept introduced in section
6.2.2. Henceforth, the focus will be on if-optatives (as well as that-optatives/V1-
optatives) and not on optative conditionals.
2.1.3 Cautionary Remarks on Optative Mood and Optative Clause Type
To conclude section 2.1, I wish to distance myself from the notions of optative sentence
type / optative clause type on the one hand (though I will briefly come back to this notion
in section 3), and optative mood on the other hand. As regards the former, I do not
assume a theory or framework where 'clause types' or 'sentence types' are primitives
(pace Scholz 1991, Brandt et al. 1992, Rosengren 1992, 1993; see also Altmann 1987).
Therefore, this notion will not be relevant for my investigations. As for (grammatical)
optative mood, this is a descriptive term for specialized morphology, commonly
associated with wishes; we find optative mood in languages like Albanian (Camaj 1984),
Romanian (Nandris 1961) and Ancient Greek (Hansen & Quinn 1987). The following
examples show clearly that there is no one-to-one correspondence between optative mood
and the optativity that I am concerned with.
As a first illustration, consider Albanian. Here, if-optatives seem to select subjunctive
mood, (26a+b), whereas that-optatives select optative mood, (26c).
(26) a. Sikur Beni vetam t-a kishte dagjuar maman8! Albanian
as.if Ben only subj-3sg.cl had listened.to mother
'If only Ben had listened to his mother!' (past perfect + subjunctive mood)
b. Sikur vetem te mos vono-het Beni nesdr!
as.if only subj not get.late Ben tomorrow
'If only Ben doesn't oversleep tomorrow!' (present tense + subjunctive mood)
17 Alternatively, (24) may involve a rare type of parataxis, involving matrix clauses with VI order; see Axel
& W6llstein (2008) and Reis & W6llstein (2010) on the idea that there are true VI clauses in German.
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c. Qe vetrm mos u vono-fte Beni nesdr!
that only not n.act get.late-opt.3sg Ben tomorrow
'That Ben doesn't oversleep tomorrow!' (present tense + optative mood)
Romanian has a different pattern, which loosely appears to be the opposite of Albanian.
Here, if-optatives select optative mood, as shown in (27a+b), whereas complementizer-
less optatives select subjunctive mood, shown in (27c). Given that Romanian does not
seem to have that-optatives, we might analyze (27c) as the Romanian version of a that-
optative 18; with this premise, Romanian is exactly the mirror image of Albanian.
(27) a. Macar dacs ar fi ascultat-o!
MACAR19 if opt be listened-her
'If only he had listened to her!'
b. Macar de-ar fi ascultat-o!
MACAR if-opt be listened-her
'If only he had listened to her!'
c. Ah, si fi ascultat John de Mary!
oh subj be listened John of Mary
'Oh, that John had listened to Mary!'
Romanian
Finally, according to Palmer's (2001) glosses, Classical Greek exhibits an optative /
indicative split within the same construction, namely in if-optatives introduced by Et ydp
(ei gi'r) 'for if, if only'. This is illustrated in (28a+b) versus (28c). Contrasting with
Romanian, the complementizer-less optative in (28d) must be in the optative mood.
(28) a. ei gir tosaite:n d'namin eikh-on20
if for such strength have- 1 sg.impf.indic
'If only I had such strength!' (Eur. Alc. 1072)
Ancient Greek2
18 As a matter of fact, Ammann & van der Auwera (2004) treat sd as a modal complementizer meaning
'that'.
19 Romanian macar can be translated as 'at least' or as 'even' (Andreea Nicolae, p.c.); as will be discussed
in section 2.2, this is commonly assumed to be a cognate of the optative particle makari in Greek.
20 Cf. vtK-o 'I conquer', E-vtK-ov'conquer (1sg, impf., indicative, active)', Hansen & Quinn (1987:652)
21 Palmer (2001) argues that the "optative mood" in Classical Greek is nothing more than a "past
subjunctive", as it is in complementary distribution with "present subjunctive".
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b. ei gir m' hup6 gd:n ... he:k-en
if for me below earth send-3sg.aor.indic
'If only he had sent me under the earth.' (Aesch. P. V 152)
23
c. ei gir gen-ime:n teknon, anti son nekr6s
if for become-lsg.aor.opt child instead.of you corpse
'If only I were a corpse, my child, instead of you!' (Eur. Hipp. 1410)
d. 6: pai gen-oio2 4  patr6s eutukhesteros
0 child become-2sg.aor.opt of.father luckier
'Oh child, mayst thou be luckier than thy father.' (Soph. Aj. 550)
(Palmer 2001:208-217)
We can thus conclude that cross-linguistically, optative mood does not consistently
correlate with any obvious feature of optative clauses. I will however come back to the
idea that (semantic, rather than grammatical) mood plays a role in optative constructions,
in section 5.
2.1.4 Interim Summary and Terminological Clarifications
To summarize the main aspects of this section, I have introduced the concepts of if-
optative and that-optative (in 2.1.1) and clarified the definitions that I will be
presupposing. In 2.1.2, I have reviewed evidence that we should differentiate between
two types of optative constructions that involve if-clauses: independent if-optatives and
optative conditionals, of which I will focus on the former. I have shown that these do not
exhibit the same behavior in all regards and should thus be distinguished. Finally, in
section 2.1.3 I discussed evidence that there is no one-to-one mapping between optative
utterances and so-called optative mood.
Having shown the lay of the land, it is worth defining a few more terms that I will use
in this dissertation. First, optative clause is a descriptive term for the sentence (i.e. the
grammatical construction) that is used in an optative utterance. Second, optative speech
2 Cf. Av-w 'I loosen', e-Avo:-E(v) 'loosen (3sg, aorist, indicative, active)', Hansen & Quinn (1987:658)
23 Cf. #aA-AW'I throw', #aA-tyv 'throw (lsg, aorist, optative, middle)', Hansen & Quinn (1987:660)
24 Cf. paA-Aw'I throw', paA-oto 'throw (2sg, aorist, optative, middle)', Hansen & Quinn (1987:660)
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act is a descriptive term for the perceived exclamation or 'expression of a wish' that is
typical for the use of an optative utterance. Finally, optative and optativity are cover
terms that subsume optative utterances, optative clauses and optative speech acts
whenever vagueness is in order. I will also be speaking of optative readings versus non-
optative readings if an utterance is ambiguous between an optative utterance and
something else that doesn't express a wish.
2.2 Dispelling the Idiom Hypothesis
Looking at English, an intuition that native speakers report is that if only utterances are
idiomatic / formulaic. This can be made precise in the shape of what I call the idiom
hypothesis. The idiom hypothesis assumes that if only is an idiomatic expression encoding
a wish (cf. also Quirk et al. 1972, where if only utterances are considered formulaic). As
an alternative, I formulate the optative hypothesis as follows: Optatives are specialized
utterances that have certain prototypical properties, e.g. the presence of an optative
particle. This section reviews three reasons to reject the idiom hypothesis in favor of the
optative hypothesis; by doing so, it also reviews some of the basic findings on optatives.
Two of the reasons to reject the idiom hypothesis stem from Rifkin (2000); the third has
not been formulated in this way before.
Rifkin's first argument to dispel the idiom hypothesis can be summarized as follows.
If the combination of if and only was idiomatic, we might expect the two elements to
cluster in some sense or other, i.e. it would be plausible that they are obligatorily
adjacent. As Rifkin shows, this is not the case, cf. (29). The particle only can occur in
different parts of the clause (roughly: above negation) without affecting the optative
interpretation. In (29b), only surfaces below the subject; in (29c), it occurs between the
past tense auxiliary had and the negation. As (29d) shows, it cannot occur below
negation, which indicates that its placement is restricted by the syntax or semantics of
optatives (possibly the generalization is that only has to take wide sentential scope).
(29) a. If only he didn't have a gun! (~ I wish he didn't have a gun.)
b. If he only didn't have a gun! (~ I wish he didn't have a gun.)
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c. If he had only not had a gun! (~ I wish he hadn't had a gun.)
d.# If he hadn't only had a gun! (feels incomplete - no optative reading)
(from Rifkin 2000)
Rifkin's second argument against the idiom hypothesis is that optative readings arise in a
variety of languages- if we place counterparts of the particle only into a conditional
antecedent. His examples are given in (30). (See chapter 6.2 for a wider range of data.)
(30)a. Wenn Hans nur reich ware! German
if Hans only rich were
'If only Hans were rich!'
b. Se solo/soltanto Gianni fosse ricco! Italian
if only Gianni be.subj rich
'If only Gianni were rich!'
c. Jesli by ja tol'ko byl bogatym! Russian
if I only be.past rich.inst
'If only I were rich!'
d. ilu/lu rak hayiti ashir! Hebrew
if only be.past. 1 sg rich
'If only I were rich!'
e. Jos vain olisin rikas Finnish
if only be.cond. 1 sg rich
'If only I were rich!'
f. John-i puca-i-ki-man ha-ess-te-ramyun Korean
John-Nom rich.person-be-nmlz-only do-Past-Past-if
'If only I were rich!'
(Rifkin 2000)
Rifkin draws the following conclusion: Given the diversity of languages in which a
combination of if and only gives rise to optativity, this cannot be a coincidence, i.e. these
expressions cannot be idiomatic or formulaic. A possible concern that needs to be raised
here is that optative markers seem to be very prone to becoming loan words. As we will
see, many languages in Europe have a cognate of the Greek optative particle makari,
many languages in South Asia and South-West Asia have a cognate of the optative
particle kash, and Spanish ojala as well as Portuguese oxald seem to be loan words from
Arabic. Without an investigation of when the constructions in (30) emerged historically,
the fact that optative constructions are often loaned into other languages weakens the
force of Rifkin's argument.
Rifkin's argument that only makes a compositional, non-idiomatic contribution to
optatives is however corroborated by the following fact, unnoticed by Rifkin (but noticed
in Quirk et al. 1985). In English, the particle just can also license optativity, as illustrated
in (31).
(31) a. Oh, if he just knew how much we miss him!
(= I wish he knew how much we miss him!)
b. Oh, if just once I could be a guest in such a beautiful house!
(= I wish I could once be a guest in such a beautiful house!)
While (31 a+b) have been constructed and checked with native speakers, written examples
can be found in a corpus search, as given in (32).
(32) Oh, if just once in my whole life I could have even so much as an atticful of
home! Oh, please--please--please, Mr. Barton!
(Eleanor Hallowell Abbott. 1914. Little Eve Edgarton. NY: The Century Co.)2 5
It would be rash to conclude that all elements that roughly mean only can license
optativity, as restrictions do apply. The particle merely does not seem to license optativity
in English, (33), putting it in clear opposition to only and just.
(33) # Oh, if he merely knew how much we miss him! (:A I wish he knew ... )
I now continue my discussion of the idiom hypothesis, as outlined above, and I will come
back to an in-depth discussion of only in chapter 6.2.
As a preamble to the third argument against the idiom hypothesis, a critical evaluation
of Rifkin's observations is in place. While Rifkin successfully dispels the idiom
25 http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15660/15660-8.txt
hypothesis, he implicitly exhibits a bias for a hypothesis that we may call the only-
optative hypothesis and state as follows: Optatives (or at least if-optatives) are utterances
that express a wish by means of placing the particle only into a conditional antecedent.
This is more specific than the optative hypothesis that I proposed above. The following
data argue not only against the idiom hypothesis but also against the only-optative
hypothesis. In a nutshell, it can be observed that cross-linguistically only is not the only
particle that can be used to generate an optative reading. Roughly, I show that the
particles that are prototypical for optative clauses are taken from a semantic field that
subsumes only, at least and but/though.
Focusing on if-optatives, Scholz (1991) shows that nur 'only' is not the only optative
particle in German. The particle doch (roughly: 'but/though') can also act as an optative
particle, cf. (34b).
a. Wenn Otto nur auf
if Otto only to
'If only Otto had listened
b. Wenn Otto doch auf
if Otto DOCH to







Dutch behaves like German in allowing for several different optative particles, including
maar 'only/but', nou 'now' and the cluster toch eens 'but once' 26, illustrated in (35).
a. Als Jan maar naar Marie had geluisterd!
if Jan only/but to Marie had listened
'If only John had listened to Mary!'
b. Als Jan nou naar Marie had geluisterd!
if Jan now to Marie had listened
'If only John had listened to Mary!'
c. Als Jan toch eens naar Marie had geluisterd!
if Jan TOCH once to Marie had listened
'If only John had listened to Mary!'
Dutch











Even more strikingly, 19th century English patterns very much like German and Dutch in
allowing if-optatives with the optative particle but, shown in (36). Particularly interesting
is (36a), which contains an if-optative with but, followed by an if-optative with only. This
shows that only did not replace but (as one might conjecture, also given the exclusive
reading of but which is equivalent to only); rather did they co-exist, as is currently the
case in German (nur 'only' / doch 'but/though') and Dutch (maar 'only' / toch eens 'but
for once').
(36) a. "Oh, if Papa would but give you to me!" exclaimed Miss Inches one day. "If
only I could have you for my own, what a delight it would be!"
(Susan Coolidge. 1875/1893. Nine Little Goslings. Boston: Roberts Brothers.) 27
b. Oh, if I could but once get to yonder house, and but look upon whoever the
happy being is that lives there!
(Herman Melville. 1856. The Piazza Tales. New York: Dix & Edwards.) 28
c. Oh! if Frederick had but been a clergyman, instead of going into the navy,
and being lost to us all! I wish I knew all about it.
(Elizabeth Cleghorn Gaskell. 1854-1855. North and South. Serially in Household
Words.) 2 9
d. Oh, if he could but get down to that stream!
(Charles Kingsley. 1862-1863. The Water-Babies. Serial in Macmillan's Magazine.)3 0
e. Nay, if he could but once see the meanness of this detestable vice; would he
but once reflect that he is one of the most scandalous as well as pernicious
lyars; sure he must despise himself to so intolerable a degree, that it would be
impossible for him to continue a moment in such a course.
(Henry Fielding. 1742. Joseph Andrews Vol.2. Edited by George Saintsbury.)3 1
We can thus safely reject the idiom hypothesis as well as the only-optative hypothesis,








utterances that have certain prototypical 32 properties, e.g. the presence of an optative
particle.
We can also elaborate on the set of particles that can serve as optative particles, to
delimit the range of data that an explanatory theory should cover. As we have seen, only
and but (or possibly though) have a meaning that can be employed by a language to mark
optativity. A third class of optative particles subsumes elements that mean at least.
Scholz (1991) states that an utterance like (37a) should be analyzed as an optative. The
intuition shared by native speakers of German is that (37a) is clearly an independent
utterance that expresses a wish. (37a) differs from (37b) in that (37a) seems to express a
more modest wish, as follows. Example (37b) with nur 'only' conveys that if Otto had
listened to his mother, things would be significantly better. In contrast, example (37a)
with wenigstens 'at least' conveys that if Otto had listened to his mother, things may
strictly speaking not be much better, but things would at least be somewhat better / less
bad than they are.
(37) a. Wenn Otto wenigstens auf seine Mutter geh6rt hatte! German
if Otto at.least to his mother listened had
'If Otto had at least listened to his mother!'
b. Wenn Otto nur auf seine Mutter geh6rt hatte!
if Otto only to his mother listened had
'If only Otto had listened to his mother!'
An example that emphasizes the difference between nur 'only' and wenigstens 'at least'
is given in (38). (38a) is an only-optative that expresses a 'real wish' (i.e. if he hadn't
gone to the demonstration, I would be satisfied); in contrast, the at least-optative in (38b)
seems to express a 'modest wish' (i.e. if he had gone, but not provoked the policemen, I
32 It is controversial whether optative particles are a necessary component of optative clauses. I will address
this matter and follow Rosengren (1993) in assuming that these particles are prototypical rather than
necessary.
3 The translations of (37a) into English and Dutch are not accepted by native speakers of these languages,
but we will see that many languages other than German do allow for at least optatives.
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wouldn't be satisfied, but I would be more satisfied than I am)3 4 ; this distinction is
captured by the (informal) paraphrase in (38c).
(38) Context: My son wanted to participate in a demonstration against the current
government. I told him not to go, as the last demonstrations were always
accompanied by a lot of violence. He decided to go anyway, which would have been
bad enough, as he got into afight and got severely bruised. Furthermore, he
provoked the policemen and got himself arrested.
a. Ach, wenn er nur nicht auf diese Demo gegangen wire!
oh if he only not to this demonstration gone were
'Oh, if only he hadn't gone to this demonstration!'
b. Oder wenn er wenigstens nicht die Polizisten provoziert hatte!
or if he at.least not the policemen provoked had
'Or if at least he hadn't provoked the policemen!'
c. Paraphrase:
Things would be good if he hadn't gone to this demonstration, but given that he
did go, things would be less bad if he hadn't provoked the policemen.
This special property of at least-optatives should be kept in mind when looking for such
constructions in different languages; clearly, at least-optatives require more context than
only-optatives and may thus be less natural in an out-of-the-blue context.
Interestingly, there are languages that can only form optatives with 'at least' and not
with 'only'; these languages include Modern Greek, European Spanish, Brazilian
Portuguese and Catalan, cf. (39)-(42). Notably, these languages all have a specialized
optative marker as well, such as the Modern Greek particle makari, the European Spanish
particle ojald and the Catalan phrase tant de bo 'as much of good'; Brazilian Portuguese
does not seem to use such a specialized marker (Rafael Nonato, p.c.), but European
Portuguese employs oxald. The fact that languages with a specialized optative marker
tend to form if-optatives with 'at least' rather than with 'only' might be more than a
34 Note that reversing the order of (38a) and (38b) seems to lead to semantic and/or pragmatic ill-
formedness. This may be due to different factors. On the one hand, wenigstens 'at least' seems to require a
salient proposition that is better than what is wished for, and thus requires more context than nur 'only',
which does not require such a salient alternative. On the other hand, it may be more natural to downgrade
from a true wish to a compromise than to upgrade from a compromise to a true wish.
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coincidence. In chapter 6.2, I will however derive the non-existence of (39a), (40a), (41a)
and (42a) from an independent property of these languages: The non-existence of truth-
conditionally vacuous only (which I will call ONLY 2, in the spirit of Guerzoni 2003).
(39) a. ?* An mono o John iche akusi tin Mary! Modern Greek
if only the John.nom had.3sg listened the Mary.acc
?* 'If only John had listened to Mary!'
b. An toulachiston o John iche akusi tin Mary!
if at.least the John.nom had.3sg listened the Mary.acc
'If John had at least listened to Mary!'
(40) a.* Si solo Juan hubiera escuchado
if only Juan had.sub.past listened









at least listened to Mary!'
(41) a.* Se s6 / apenas o Joao tivesse
if only only the John had


















(42) a.* Si (en Joan) nomes / solament hagues
if the John only only had.subj
* 'If only John had listened to Mary!'
b. Si (#en Joan) almenys hagues
if the John at.least had.subjunctive









In sum, we have seen that the meanings of 'only', 'but' and 'at least' appear to be linked
to optativity, which we need to explain. I propose an analysis in chapter 6; for now, I










Language change provides evidence that the link between 'only', 'but' and 'at least'
on the one hand and optativity on the other hand is not coincidental. One of the most
pervasive loan words in Southern European languages goes back to Middle Greek
makdrie 'happy, favorable', which is the vocative of makdrios (Diez 1887, as discussed
and evaluated by Buchi 2008). While makari is still a productive optative particle in
Modern Greek, shown in (43a), cognates exist in Italian, Romanian, Serbian, Slovenian,
Old Spanish and Occitan. As shown in (43b+c), Romanian and Serbian still employ
micar / makar as optative particles. However, strikingly, Romanian macar also has the
meaning 'at least, even' and Serbian makar also has the meaning 'at least', cf. chapter
6.3. These meanings must have emerged after makdrie 'happy, favorable' was loaned
into these languages, suggesting a bi-directional link between optativity and 'at least'.
(43) a. Makari o John na akusi tin Mary! Modern Greek
MAKARI the John subj listened the Mary.acc
'If only John had listened to Mary!'
b. Micar daca ar fi ascultat-o! Romanian
MACAR if opt be listened-her
'If only he had listened to her!'
c. Da je Jovan makar poslusao Mariju! Serbian
that be.3sg John MAKAR listened Mary.acc
'If only John had listened to Mary!'
Evidence that the Romanian and Serbian developments are not historical accidents, but
rather systematic, stems from Old Spanish maguer. After ojald (a loan from Arabic, cf.
Montero Cartelle 1992) replaced maguer in its function of optative particle, maguer
acquired a new meaning as a concessive clausal complementizer maguer que '(al)though'
(Rudolph 1996, Buchi 2008). This provides evidence for a bi-directional relationship
between optativity and the concessive meaning expressed by 'but/though', analogous to
the relationship between optativity and 'at least'35 .
35 In section 6.3, we also see evidence from Russian xotja 'at least, although' and Polish chociaz 'at least,
although' that there is a connection between the meaning of at least and the meaning of although, though.
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To summarize, the following types of particles can serve as optative particles,
apparently turning a conditional antecedent into an if-optative: Particles that mean 'only',
particles that mean 'at least', and particles that mean 'but/though'. On the other side of
the coin, designated optative markers like Middle Greek makdrie 'happy, favorable' can
be diachronically reanalyzed as particles that mean 'at least' or 'but/though', and possibly
also as markers of 'only' (although we do not have evidence for the last). This indicates a
strong bi-directional link between the expression of a wish (i.e. desirability) and the
semantic field delimited by but, though, only and at least. The semantic part of this
dissertation attempts to give a formal analysis of this link.
2.3 The Next of Kin - Introducing Polar Exclamatives
At this point, I introduce a different type of construction, which is relevant for the
purposes of this dissertation in that it qualifies as the construction that is most similar to
optatives (see also Scholz 1991), namely polar exclamatives. Polar exclamatives are
utterances that express surprise, shock or amazement at a fact (not at the degree to which
something holds) without a lexical item that means surprise, shock or amazement. While
English only marginally allows for polar exclamatives and typically requires an overt
modal should or could, as in (44), many Germanic languages employ such constructions
quite freely, as illustrated in (45). (I will call constructions like (45) dass-polar
exclamatives when focusing in German, or, more generally, that-polar exclamatives.)
(44) a. That he should have left without asking me! English
b. That you could ever want to marry such a man!
(Quirk et al. 1985:841)
(45) a. Att du hann till m6tet! Swedish
that you reached to meeting.DEF
lit. 'That you reached the meeting!'
'(What a surprise) that you reached the meeting!'
(Delsing 2010:32)
b. Dass die dort gewohnt haben! German
that they there lived have
lit. 'That they lived there!'
~It amazes me [that they lived there]. (I wouldn't have expected that.)
(Rosengren 1992:278)
c. Joss, at du greide a huske det! Norwegian
Jesus that you managed to remember that
lit. 'Jesus, that you managed to remember that!'
~It amazes me [that you managed to remember it].
Polar exclamatives share the following properties with optatives. First, they can take the
shape of unembedded that-clauses (and V 1-clauses, as we see below). Second, they are
typically used to exclaim. Third, they intuitively involve a comparison between the
expressed proposition and its polar opposite: In an optative, the denoted proposition is
what I wish for, whereas its negation is what is the case; in a polar exclamative, the
denoted proposition is what is surprisingly the case, whereas its negation is what I would
have expected. In many regards, these similarities allow us to draw comparisons and fine-
tune our analysis. Moreover, I propose in this dissertation that these similarities are not
coincidental but reflect a core semantics that both types of utterances share.
Discussing optatives from the perspective of polar exclamatives also benefits from
the fact that there is a large amount of literature on exclamatives (though mainly focusing
on degree exclamatives), including McCawley (1973), Grimshaw (1979), Obenauer
(1994), d'Avis (2002), Zanuttini & Portner (2003), Ono (2006), Castroviejo Mir6 (2006),
Rett (2008), the papers in Villalba (2008), Abels & Vangsnes (2010), Delsing (2010),
J6nsson (2010), Yamato (2010), Brandner (2010), Sobo (2010), Abels (2010). Example
(46) applies a diagnostic from Zanuttini & Portner (2003) to a German polar exclamative,
verifying its status as an exclamative. As Zanuttini & Portner (2003:47) observe for
degree exclamatives, the conveyed remarkability of the denoted proposition cannot be
canceled in an exclamative. This is why the continuation in (46a) is ill-formed,
contrasting with (46b) - the well-formedness of (46b) follows, as a canonical root
declarative does not entail or imply remarkability.
(46) a. Dass der wieder verschlafen hat! - # was nattirlich zu erwarten war.
that he again overslept has which naturally to be.expected was
lit. 'That he overslept again!' - #'Which was, of course, to be expected.'
b. Der hat wieder verschlafen! - was naturlich zu erwarten war.
he has again overslept which naturally to be.expected was
'He overslept again!' -'Which was, of course, to be expected.'
A further parallel between optatives and polar exclamatives that is worth considering
concerns the possibility of Vi-polar exclamatives (e.g. Oppenrieder 1987, 1989, and
Batliner & Oppenrieder 1989), illustrated in (47). We note that VI-polar exclamatives
differ from dass-polar exclamatives in that they require certain particles (such as doch or
glatt 'outrightly'). This does not challenge their existence though, given that there are
optatives that require certain particles as well (e.g. only).
(47) a. Kennt der doch glatt den Kaiser von China!
knows he doch outrightly the emperor of China
'[I'm shocked that] he knows the emperor of China!'
b. Dieser Bengel! Hat der doch (tatsachlich / wirklich / glatt)
this brat has he doch indeed really outrightly
wieder seine Zahne nicht mit Blendax-Antibelag geputzt!
again his teeth not with Blendax-anti-plaque cleaned
'This brat! [It's shocking that] he didn't clean his teeth with Blendax-anti-
plaque again!'
c. Hatte der dem doch tatsachlich das Buch gegeben!
had he him doch indeed the book given
'[I'm shocked that] he would have indeed given him the book!'
d. Haben Sie doch (tatsachlich / wirklich) daran gedacht!
have you doch indeed really of.it thought
'[I'm amazed/surprised that] you really remembered it!'
(Scholz 1991:132-133, attributing (47a) to W. Oppenrieder, (47c) to N. Fries)
As Scholz shows, minimal pairs of dass-polar exclamatives and V1-polar exclamatives
can be constructed, illustrated in (48) and (49). Crucially, (48a) and (48b) seem to be
equivalent in their meaning (though we will see that there are some distributional
differences); similarly, (49a) and (49b) seem equivalent.
(48) a. indicative polar exclamatives
Dass Sie (doch /tatsachlich / wirklich) daran
that you doch indeed really of.it
'[It's remarkable] that you really remembered it!'
b. indicative polar exclamatives
Haben Sie doch (tatsachlich / wirklich) daran
have you doch indeed really of.it
'[It's remarkable] that you really thought of it!'






Example (49) illustrates that exclarnatives can be in the subjunctive mood, without losing
their factivity.
(49) a. subjunctive (yet factive) polar exclamatives
Dass die dem doch tatsachlich das Buch gegeben h Otte!
that she him doch indeed the book given had
'[It's remarkable] that she would have indeed given him the book!'
b. subjunctive (yet factive) polar exclamatives
Hatte die dem doch tatsachlich das Buch gegeben thtte!
had she him doch indeed the book given
'[It's remarkable] that she would have indeed given him the book!'
(based on Scholz 1991:132-133)
If we add V 1-degree exclamatives (cf. Rosengren 1992, Brandner 2010), we can establish
the following paradigm of verb-initial exclamations in German. (I only marginally
address degree exclamatives in this dissertation). One of the goals of this dissertation is to
account for the distribution of V-to-C movement and different complementizers in
exclamations, see chapter 5.
(50) a. Hatte er doch nur getanzt! Vi optative
had he doch only danced
'Had he only danced!' ('I wish he had danced!')
b. Hat der doch glatt getanzt! Vi polar exclamative
has he doch outrightly danced
'[I'm shocked] that he danced!'
c. Hat der vielleicht getanzt! Vi degree exclamative
has he maybe danced
'Boy, did he dance!' ('I'm amazed at the extent of his dancing!')
A brief in-depth discussion of the status of V1-polar exclamatives is in place, as the
existence of such clauses is highly controversial. While Scholz (1991) verges towards
treating them as true exclamatives, authors as recent as Brandner (2010) assume that VI -
polar exclamatives do not exist. In what follows, I address concerns that Vi-polar
exclamatives may be Vi -questions or V2-declaratives with SpecCP deletion.
First of all, we can establish that V1-polar exclamatives in German are not
pragmatically reinterpreted yes/no-questions (see also McCawley 1973, Goldberg & Del
Giudice 2005 for a similar issue with respect to English Vi-degree exclamatives). All of
the examples in (47) contain doch, which can, but need not be stressed. Crucially, the
distribution of unstressed doch is severely restricted in questions. Unstressed doch can
only occur in certain types of rhetorical (speaker-directed) wh-questions, as in (51 a), and
is impossible in any type of yes/no-question, (51b). The impossibility of doch in yes/no-
questions indicates that the utterances that I introduced as V1-polar exclamatives above
36are not pragmatically reinterpreted questions
(51) a. Wie bemerkt Goethe doch so treffend?
how remarked Goethe doch so fittingly
'What did Goethe say again that fits so well?'
(Thurmair 1989:117)
b. Hat Goethe das (denn / * doch) gesagt?
has Goethe that denn doch said
'Did Goethe say so?'
36 Vi-polar exclamatives also marginally allow for the unstressed discourse particleja (particularly in the
stringja DOCH noch 'after all'), which is impossible in all types of questions, including wh-questions.
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A second challenge to establishing a class of VI-polar exclamatives stems from their
distribution. It is commonly taken to be an argument against the existence of V1-polar
exclamatives that the relevant examples are more restricted in their distribution than dass-
polar exclamatives. The core example that is often cited is given in (52). The observation
is that presumably exclamative Vl-clauses can be integrated into a text, as in (52a),
whereas dass-polar exclamatives cannot be, (52b).
Ich fahre gerade in Eurasburg den Berg hinunter ...
I cycle just in Eurasburg the hill down
'I'm just cycling downhill in Eurasburg ... '
a. ... Springt mir doch glatt eine Katze ins Vorderrad.
jumps me doch outright a cat into.the front.wheel
'[Shockingly] a cat jumps into my front wheel.'
b.# ... DaB mir eine Katze ins Vorderrad springt!
that me a cat into.the front.wheel jumps
'[It's shocking] that a cat jumps into my front wheel.'
(Oppenrieder 1989:217, fn.42, Onnerfors 1997b:180,182)
Interesting as this contrast may be, it does not show that such VI-clauses are not
exclamatives. In sharp contrast to such a conclusion, V1-degree exclamatives, (53a), and
wh-degree exclamatives, (53b), are both perfectly well-formed in such a context.
Ich fahre gerade in Eurasburg den Berg
I cycle just in Eurasburg the hill
'I'm just cycling downhill in Eurasburg ... '
a. ... Ist das vielleicht eine steile Fahrt!
is that maybe a steep ride
'How steep a ride that is!'
b. ... Wie steil das ist!
how steep that is
'How steep that is!'
hinunter ...
down
The possibility of (53a+b) falsifies an argument from (52a) against treating V1-polar




some reason (which is beyond the scope of this project), dass-polar exclamatives resist
being integrated into a discourse in a sense in which other exclamatives do not.
We can now turn to the strongest challenge for the existence of V1-polar
exclamatives: The possibility that VI-polar exclamatives are simply declarative V2
clauses that contain an elided element in SpecCP position, a possibility pointed out by
Scholz (1991), based on Oppenrieder (1989). (See also Altmann 1987.) The main
candidate would be an elided semi-vacuous situational or temporal pronoun3 7 . This is
illustrated in (54a+b), adapted from (47a+d).
(54) a. (Da) kennt der doch
there knows he doch
'[I'm shocked that] he knows
b. (Jet) haben Sie doch




the emperor of China!'
(tatsachlich / wirklich)
indeed really





It proves difficult to show that this is not the right analysis, but we can consider different
aspects of such VI-clauses, to see which view is supported by the facts. The core
question to review is: Can we attest links between presumable V I-polar exclamatives and
other types of established V 1-clauses that may involve SpecCP deletion? Declarative V1-
clauses in German (and other Germanic languages) include constructions exhibiting
narrative inversion (cf. Sigurdsson 1990), (55a), and constructions involving topic drop
(cf. Cardinaletti 1990, Mrnsj5 2001), (55b).
(55) a. Kommt da pl~tzlich ein Kerl herein.
comes then suddenly a guy inside
'Suddenly, a guy enters.'
(Onnerfors 1997a:299, from Behagel 1932:38)
b. Kommt der Hans? - Kenn ich nicht.
comes the Hans know I not
'Is Hans coming? - I don't know him.'
German narrative inversion
German topic drop
37 Or an expletive element es 'it', as advocated by Altmann (1987) for Vi-clauses of the 'narrative
inversion' type. I take this to be rather implausible in the examples under discussion.
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In both cases, it is conceivable that an element in SpecCP has been elided (though
Onnerfors 1997a advocates a view where narrative inversion clauses are true Vi
clauses3 8), cf. Holmberg (2010).
(56) a. (Dann) kommt da plbtzlich ein Kerl herein.
then comes there suddenly a guy inside
'Suddenly, a guy enters.'
b. Kommt der Hans? - (Den) kenn ich nicht.
comes the Hans him know I not
'Is Hans coming? - I don't know him.'
So, the first question to ask is whether purported V1-polar exclamatives fall into one of
these two categories, i.e. whether they are instances of narrative inversion or topic drop.
If they cannot be argued to fall into either category, this weakens a view that assumes
SpecCP-deletion in German V1 -polar exclamatives, given that empty SpecCP positions
are restricted in German, a verb second language.
We can first argue against a topic drop analysis of V 1-polar exclamatives. First, as
illustrated in (57), topic drop is licensed in the response to a question.
(57) a. Kommt der Hans? - (Den) kenn ich nicht.
comes the Hans him know I not
'Is Hans coming? - I don't know him.'
b. Wie findest du das Flex? - (Da) bin ich noch nie gewesen.
how find you the Flex there am I yet never been
'How do you like Flex (a club)? - I've never been there.'
c. Was passiert dann? - (Dann) schlagt der Otto dem Hans ins Gesicht.
what happens then then hits the Otto the Hans in.the face
'And what happens then? - Then Otto punches Hans into his face.'
38 See also Axel & W6llstein (2008) and Reis & W511stein (2010) for a discussion of Vi-clauses in
German.
Example (58a) illustrates a potential VI-polar exclamative, accompanied by example
(58b), which may be the (elliptical) V2-declarative that underlies the surface form in
(58a).
(58) I enter my dorm room tofindmy hamster cage empty. I remember my room mate
threatening to sell my hamster ifI ever play loud music again late at night.
a. Hat der jetzt doch tatsachlich meinen Hamster verkauft!!
has he now doch indeed my hamster sold




hat der jetzt doch tatsachlich meinen
has he now doch indeed my





The crucial data are given in (59). As shown, (59-B3), which is identical to the polar
exclamative in (58a), with an empty SpecCP position, is infelicitous in response to a
question 39. This contrasts with (59-B1) and (59-B2), where jetzt 'now' and da 'there'
occupy SpecCP.
(59) A: Was gibt's neues von
what gives'it new from
'Are there any news from the
B1: Jetzt hat der
now has he









B2: Da hat der jetzt doch tatsachlich
there has he now doch indeed









B3:# Hat der jetzt doch tatsichlich meinen Hamster
has he now doch indeed my hamster





The pattern in (59) is unexpected if (59-B3) is derived from (59-B1) or (59-B2) by means
of topic drop, since we know that topic drop is fine in response to a question, (57). We
39 A similar argument is made for V 1-degree exclamatives by Brandner (2010).
need to control for the following two possible confounds. First, one might suspect that
situational pronouns like da 'there' cannot be dropped by means of topic drop. As shown
in (60-B2), derived from (60-B 1), this concern is unwarranted. (60-B2) is a non-
exclamative declarative, expressing the same proposition as (59-B3); however, topic drop
is possible here and arguably what underlies the utterance in (60-B2).
(60) A: Was gibt's neues von
what gives'it new from
'Are there any news from the
Bl: Da hat sich jetzt nicht
there has self now not
'Not much happened lately!'
B2: Hat sich jetzt nicht viel
has self now not much




viel getan in letzter
much done in last
getan in letzter Zeit.
done in last time
The second confound that we need to address, particularly in contrasting (59-B3) and
(60-B2), is the following. Could it be that emphatic declaratives (i.e. declaratives that
include doch tatsachlich) are generally ill-formed in response to questions? The example
in (61) (which lacks the 'exclamative feel' of (58b)) suggests that this may not be the
case, corroborating a view that V 1-polar exclamatives do not involve topic drop (though
there are naturally open questions, such as why a topic drop analysis seems to be blocked
in (59-B3)).
(61) Was passiert dann? - (Dann) schlIgt doch tatsschlich der Otto dem Hans
what happens then then hits doch indeed the Otto the Hans
ins Gesicht.
in.the face
'And what happens then? - Then Otto punches Hans into his face.'
Such observations suggest that Vi-polar exclamatives are not derived from V2
declaratives by means of topic drop. Can we also rule out the option that V1-polar
Zeit.
time
exclamatives are a type of narrative inversion (modulo the possibility that narrative
inversion involves something along the lines of topic drop)? Viewing Vi-polar
exclamatives as a type of narrative inversion is supported by Onnerfors's (1997b)
observation that narrative inversion is also bad in response to questions, (62-B3).
(62) A: Was war los?
what was up
'What happened?'
B1: Da stand p16tzlich ein Mann vor der TUr.
there stood suddenly a man before the door
'Suddenly, there was a man standing in front of the door.'
B2: Es stand pl6tzlich ein Mann vor der Tur.
it stood suddenly a man before the door
'Suddenly, there was a man standing in front of the door.'
B3: ?? Stand pl6tzlich ein Mann vor der Tur.
stood suddenly a man before the door
'Suddenly, there was a man standing in front of the door.'
(Onnerfors 1997b:5 1)
Furthermore, narrative inversion and (Vi -)polar exclamatives can occur in an out-of-the-
blue context, which is generally not possible for topic drop constructions. This is a further
argument for grouping V1-polar exclamatives with narrative inversion, and against
treating V I-polar exclamatives as topic drop constructions.
However, the following examples suggest one fundamental difference between
polar exclamatives and narrative inversion. As Onnerfors (1 997a) observes, narrative
inversion exhibits a ban on generic statements, shown in (63), which contrast with typical
(episodic) narrative inversion cases such as (64).
(63) a.* Sind Kritiker Idioten. / /Kritiker sind Idioten.
are critics idiots critics are idiots
'Critics are idiots.' (Onnerfors 1997a:306)
b.* Weinen Kinder leicht. / / Kinder weinen leicht.
cry children easily children cry easily
'Children cry easily.' (Onnerfors 1997a:307)
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(64) a. Kommt Fritzchen in die Apotheke.
comes Fritz-little into the pharmacy
'Little Fritz comes into the pharmacy.' (from ajoke, Onnerfors 1997a:293)
b. Regnet es da p16tzlich ins Haus.
rains it then suddenly into-the house
'Suddenly, it's raining into the house.' (Onnerfors 1997a:302)
Onnerfors presents the examples without context, but even in a context where a generic
statement should be possible with narrative inversion, this ban can be observed. In
example (65a), narrative inversion occurs in the second clause; (65b) is comparable in
terms of the situation that is discussed. However, (65b) does not allow for narrative
inversion; the baseline example of a verb second declarative in (65c) is acceptable.
(65) a. Gestern treffe ich einen Kritiker und eine Journalistin. Ist / Wird
yesterday meet I a critic and a journalist is becomes
der Kritiker aggressiv. Sagt die Journalistin: "Der ist immer so."
the critic aggressive says the journalist he is always thus
'Yesterday I meet (narrative present) a critic and a journalist. The critic is /
starts to be aggressive. The journalist says: "He's always like that."'
b. Ich habe letztes Jahr viele Kritiker und Journalisten getroffen.
I have last year many critics and journalists met
*Sind/*Werden Kritiker (immer) aggressiv.
are/become critics always aggressive
'I met many critics and journalists last year. Critics are always / always get
aggressive.'
c. Ich habe letztes Jahr viele Kritiker und Journalisten getroffen.
I have last year many critics and journalists met
Kritiker sind/werden (immer) aggressiv.
critics are/become always aggressive
'I met many critics and journalists last year. Critics are always / always get
aggressive.'
In contrast, polar exclamatives (on a par with degree exclamatives) do not exhibit such a
ban against generic statements. This is shown for polar exclamatives in (66).
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(66) a. Haben diese Tiere doch glatt vier Beine! polar exclamative
have these animals doch outright four legs
'[It's remarkable that] these animals have four legs!'
b. Mensch, sind Kritiker doch tatsachlich Idioten!
man are critics doch indeed idiots
'Man, [it's schocking that] critics are really idiots!'
It is also shown for degree exclamatives in (67).
(67) a. Haben diese Tiere aber viele Beine! degree exclamative
have these animals but many legs
'How many legs these animals have!'
b. Mensch, sind Kritiker vielleicht Idioten!
man are critics maybe idiots
'Man, what idiots critics are!'
We can thus conclude that German V1 -polar exclamatives do not fall into one of the two
well-established categories of V 1 declarative clauses, clauses with topic drop and clauses
with narrative inversion. On one hand, while topic drop is fine in response to a question,
polar exclamatives are not. On the other hand, while narrative inversion exhibits a ban
against generic predicates, polar exclamatives (and degree exclamatives) do not. This
suggests that V1 -polar exclamatives are not simply declaratives with an elided element in
SpecCP, corroborating the view that V 1-polar exclamatives exist.
A final argument against treating Vi-polar exclamatives as some type of declarative
can be based on the fact that exclamatives imply the remarkability of the denoted
proposition, which is not necessarily the case in declaratives. This diagnostic is slightly
confounded by the obligatoriness of particles (such as doch, tatsachlich 'indeed' etc.) in
Vi-polar exclamatives, which by themselves have an expressive function. However, to
the extent that an effect can be observed, it reproduces the effect in (46). In the
presumable polar exclamative case in (68a), remarkability seems to be entailed in some
way or other, whereas in (68b+c) it can be canceled.
(68) a. Hat der jetzt doch tatsachlich verschlafen! - # wie wir's
has he now doch indeed overslept as we'it
lit. 'Has he overslept indeed now!' - #'as we expected.'
b. Jetzt hat der doch tatsachlich verschlafen! - wie wir's
now has he doch indeed overslept as we'it
'Now he overslept indeed!' -'as we expected.'
c. Der hat doch jetzt tatsachlich verschlafen! - wie wir's
he has doch now indeed overslept as we'it







This further corroborates the claim that Vl -polar exclamatives are not simply a type of
V1 -declarative.
An open question (at this point) is whether V 1-polar exclamatives have a null
operator in SpecCP (e.g. Zwart 1993, Brandner 1994), (69a), or whether they are genuine
VI-clauses, (69b). The latter view is advocated quite generally for German VI clauses in
Onnerfors (1997b); more recently, Axel & W6llstein (2008) and Reis & W511stein (2010)
argue for the existence of genuine V1 clauses in German, which lack a CP specifier
altogether. I will not dwell on this matter, as it is not crucial to the present project.
However, I will briefly come back to the question of what fills the SpecCP position in
VI -exclamations in later sections.
(69) a. [cP Op [c, Kennt [TP der doch glatt den K
knows he doch outrightly the e
'[I'm shocked that] he knows the emperor of China!'
b. [cP Kennt [TP der doch glatt den Kaiser
knows he doch outrightly the emperor







To conclude, I have established in this section that there is a type of V1-polar
exclamatives, which seems distinct from V1 declaratives involving topic drop and
narrative inversion type. While there are many questions that remain unanswered, given
the scope of this project, I will henceforth assume that there are that-polar exclamatives
as well as V1-polar exclamatives. I consider these to be close relatives of that-optatives
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and V1 -optatives, as both construction types are exclamations of sorts, and both involve
an implicit comparison between the denoted proposition and its polar opposite.
2.4 Interim Summary
In this chapter, three goals have been achieved. Section 2.1 has delimited the scope of
this research project and established a common ground that will provide the background
for the entire dissertation. Section 2.2 has affirmatively addressed the most basic of all
questions, which is whether optatives constitute a phenomenon at all. The alternative that
optatives are merely idiomatic/formulaic expressions has been discarded. A view has
been established under which optatives are specialized utterances that have certain
prototypical properties, e.g. the presence of an optative particle. It has also been shown
that the set of elements that can serve as optative particles minimally includes elements
that mean 'only', 'at least' and 'but/though'. It has been demonstrated that such particles
seem to be in a bi-conditional relationship with optativity (i.e. particles that mean 'only',
'at least' and 'but/though' can give rise to optativity and designated optative markers can
be reanalyzed as particles that mean 'at least', 'but/though' or 'only'). Section 2.3 has
broadened the scope of this project slightly, to include polar exclamatives, which can be
viewed as the 'next of kin' to optatives: They are intuitively exclamations, they operate
on polar opposites and they have a similar shape and form to optatives. Starting out with
a discussion of that-polar exclamatives, I have argued for the existence of V1-polar
exclamatives - a controversial matter largely neglected in recent literature.
3. The Core Analysis: A System for Analyzing Exclamations
This chapter gives a complete overview of the system developed in this dissertation. It
starts with a bird's-eye view of my proposal and then proceeds with a more detailed
discussion.
3.1 The EX-Op Analysis: A Bird's-Eye View
3.1.1 The Aim of this Project
I henceforth focus on German - a heuristic strategy, given that German has a richer
paradigm of optatives than English, cf. (70)+ (71), and German further allows for polar
exclamatives much more freely, (72). The aim of this project is to push the idea that we
can account for the constructions in (70) and (71) in a uniform way. Specifically, I
propose a shared core semantics that underlies all of these constructions rather than
relying on extra-linguistic, pragmatic mechanisms to give meaning to them. What we
need to derive is the fact that the examples in (70a-c) seem to express an emotion that can
be paraphrased as in (70d).
(70) subjunctive (and counterfactual) optatives
a. DaB er nur rechtzeitig gekommen wiire!
that he only in.time come were
b. Wenn er nur rechtzeitig gekommen wfire!
if he only in.time come were
c. Ware er nur rechtzeitig gekommen tware!
were he only in.time come
'If only he had come in time!'
d. paraphrase: I wish [he had come in time].
Similarly, we aim to derive the fact that the examples in (71a+b) seem to express an
emotion that can be paraphrased as in (71 c).
(71) indicative optatives
a. DaB er nur rechtzeitig kommt!
that he only in.time comes
b. Wenn er nur rechtzeitig kommt!
if he only in.time comes
'If only he comes in time!'
c. paraphrase: I hope [he will come in time].
The goal of a semantic (and syntactic) theory is to derive complex and seemingly
unrelated phenomena from simple principles, which can then be considered explanatory
(von Stechow 1984; cf. Champollion 2010 for recent discussion). It thus seems appealing
to posit a system that not only accounts for (70)+(71) in a uniform way, but also for the
polar exclamatives in (72a+b), which seem to express the emotion paraphrased in (72c).
(72) indicative polar exclamatives
a. DaB Sie (doch / tatsachlich / wirklich) daran gedacht haben!
that you doch indeed really of.it thought have
b. Haben Sie doch (tatsachlich / wirklich) daran gedacht thaben!
have you doch indeed really of.it thought
'That you really remembered it!'
(Scholz 1991:133)
c. paraphrase: I am shocked that [you remembered it].
I propose a system that uniformly derives all three construction types. The core idea is
given in the next section.
3.1.2 The System in a Nutshell
I propose that optatives and (polar) exclamatives contain a null operator, which takes the
denoted proposition as its complement and serves to express an emotion towards the
denoted proposition. I call this operator EX (mnemonic for expressive and exclamative).
EX is loosely inspired by Gutierrez Rexach's (1996) EXC operator, but retains little
similarity to EXC. Consider first the utterance in (73a); this exclamation is ambiguous
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between an optative reading, (73b), and an exclamative reading, (73c); context
disambiguates.
(73) a. Mein Gott, dass der nicht verschlafen hat!
my God that he not overslept has
lit. My God, that he didn't oversleep!
b. paraphrase of optative reading: I hope [that he didn't oversleep].
c. paraphrase of exclamative reading: I'm shocked [that he didn't oversleep].
I propose that both (73b) and (73c) share the same core semantic, sketched in (74)
(ignoring the interjection Mein Gott 'my God' - I will come back to such elements in
section 4.1.8). The idea is that EX simply conveys that the modified proposition is high
on a scale, and the scale is provided by the context, formalized as a contextually given
scale argument Scalec (or simply S), (74a+b).
(74) a. LF for (73): [[EX Scalec] [dass der nicht verschlafen hatl]!
that he not overslept has
b. EX(Scalec)(p) conveys that p is above a contextually given threshold on Scalec
We can now derive both readings of (73) without assuming different LF structures. The
optative reading arises if the context provides a (speaker) preference scale (or desirability
scale), as shown in (75). The contextually salient threshold on a desirability scale
plausibly corresponds to the cut-off line between intolerable circumstances (which are
lower / less desirable) and tolerable circumstances (which are higher / more desirable).
Therefore, by uttering (75), I express my desire or hope that he (some contextually salient
person) didn't oversleep by virtue of marking circumstances in which he didn't oversleep
as tolerable.
(75) optative reading
[[EX Scalespeaker-preference] [that he didn't oversleep]]
~ The desirability of [p he didn't oversleep] exceeds a contextually salient threshold 5.
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Correspondingly, it is plausible that the exclamative reading of (73) arises from a
(speaker) inverse likelihood scale40 (or surprise scale), as shown in (76). Again, the
contextually salient threshold on an inverse likelihood can be assumed to correspond to
the cut-off line between what is not surprising (lower / more likely) and what is
surprising (higher / more unlikely). By uttering (76), I express an emotion towards the
prior unlikelihood of his not having overslept; again, I do so by virtue of marking
circumstances in which he didn't oversleep as unlikely / surprising.
(76) polar exclamative reading
[[EX Scalespeaker-unlikelihood] [that he didn't oversleep]]
The prior unlikelihood of [p he didn't oversleep] exceeds a contextually salient
threshold .
Crucially, EX does not encode mood information, which allows us to uniformly analyze
all of the examples in (70)-(72), given in (77)-(79). One part of this dissertation (chapter
5) is dedicated to the question of how mood enters the picture. (On a different note, I
argue that particles such as only are not lexicalizations of EX. Chapter 6 is dedicated to an
analysis of the role of particles in exclamations.) The LF representations of different
optatives are given in (77) and (78)41.
(77) subjunctive (and counterfactual) optatives
a. [EX Scalespeaker-preference [Dal er nur rechtzeitig gekommen wiire]!
that he only in.time come were
b. [EX Scalespeaker-preference [Wenn er nur rechtzeitig gekommen wire]!
if he only in.time come were
40 Given that we encounter many language-specific idiosyncracies, it is an open question what the complete
range of scales is that an EX operator can associate with. As discussed in section 4.1.3.4, we minimally find
EXutterances that express desirability, undesirability and surprise. This is covered by my proposal that EX
utterances serve to convey emotion, i.e. they cannot convey a non-emotive attitude, such as certainty. It is
however not clear whether there are languages that use EX utterances to express boredom / ennui (which
we would expect to by possible, as it is an emotion). If such languages do not exist, the relevant restriction
may derive from extra-linguistic universals, as envisioned by Fries (1991) and Rosengren (1993).
41 I discuss the distribution of complementizers and (V-to-)-T-to-C movement in chapter 5.
57
c. [EX Scalespeaker-preference [Wsire er nur rechtzeitig gekommen tware]!
were he only in.time come
'If only he had come in time!'
(78) indicative optatives
a. [EX Scalespeaker-preference [DaO er nur rechtzeitig kommt]!
that he only in.time comes
b. [EX Scalespeaker-preference [Wenn er nur rechtzeitig kommtJ!
if he only in.time comes
'If only he comes in time!'
In the same vein, the LF representations for polar exclamatives are given in (79). Recall
that the left peripheries in optatives and polar exclamatives do not differ in their
semantics. The Scale argument is simply a variable, with its content provided by the
context. The subscripted speaker-preference in (77)+(78) or speaker-unlikelihood in (79)
are merely included for expository purposes, to indicate to the reader which contextual
assignment is intended.
(79) indicative polar exclamatives
a. [EX Scalespeaker-unlikelihood [DaB Sie doch tatsachlich daran gedacht habenI]!
that you doch indeed of.it thought have
b. [EX Scalespeaker-unlikelihood [Haben Sie doch tatsachlich daran gedacht thaben]]!
have you doch indeed of.it thought
'[It's remarkable] that you really remembered it!'
The general structure of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter 4 focuses on the EX
operator, motivating its existence and exploring its implicatures. Chapters 5 and 6 focus
on the properties of propositions in the scope of EX, e.g. how does complementizer
selection work (in chapter 5)? And what do particles contribute (in chapter 6)? I will now
give a more detailed summary of the proposal in section 3.2. Before I do so, let me
discuss more general motivation for an EX operator. By asking for the reason of why EX
exists, we move 'beyond explanatory adequacy', exploring the question of why language
has the properties that we encounter when we study it, rather than simply investigating
these properties (Chomsky 2001, cf. Champollion 2010 for a recent discussion).
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3.1.3 On the Cognition-Emotion Dichotomy
In psychology and the neurosciences, we find a traditional distinction between cognition
(higher-order processes, including memory, attention, problem solving and planning) and
emotion/affect (phenomena such as motivation, evaluation and feeling); see Pessoa
(2008) for a recent review, see also Izard (2009) for an overview. While recent research
indicates that emotion and cognition cannot be treated as separate modules in the brain
(e.g. Phelps 2006, Pessoa 2008), it is rather uncontroversial that human behaviors have
both cognitive and affective component. In other words, human behavior has a cognitive
dimension and an emotional/affective dimension (which are not necessarily orthogonal or
separable).
The idea that I pursue was pioneered in Rosengren (1992, 1993), based on the ideas
of Fries (1991), though my analysis differs fundamentally from Rosengren's proposal. I
argue that EX-utterances are, strictly speaking, expressive utterances and thus distinct
from regular statements, which are descriptive utterances. I define expressive utterances
as utterances that serve to directly express an emotional or affective state; they are thus
either felicitous or infelicitous in a given context, but not true or false. An (informal)
example is given in (80).
(80) An utterance of "If only John had come in time" is felicitous iff the (counterfactual)
proposition John came in time is ranked above a contextually salient threshold on
the speakere's preference/desirability scale.
In contrast, descriptive utterances, the more familiar type, are utterances that express a
truth value. An (informal) example is given in (81).
(81) |I wish John had come in timel|c is true iff the (counterfactual) proposition
John came in time is ranked above a contextually salient threshold on the speakere's
preference/desirability scale.
The core idea is that expressive utterances are linked to emotion/affect in the same way in
which descriptive utterances are linked to cognition; uttering an optative or a (polar)
exclamative is an emotional/affective behavior, whereas uttering a declarative statement
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is a cognitive behavior. The only core differences between the two utterance types is that
expressive utterances contain an EX operator, which descriptive utterances lack. (EX
combines with a truth-conditional statement and yields a felicity-conditional utterance.)
This close connection between the two utterance types is unsurprising given the
interconnectedness of cognition and emotion in the human brain. A schematic summary
of the proposal is given in (82).
(82) Broader Cognition: . Cogniti . notion
Grammar: Utterances without EX Utterances with EX
Notably, the effects of expressive utterances and descriptive utterances can be quite
similar, specifically when a descriptive utterance doubles as the paraphrase of an
expressive utterance, in the sense in which (84a+b) correspond to (83a+b) respectively.
(83) expressive utterance (EX is present)
a. Boy, is this easy! => expresses surprise
b. If only it was easy! = expresses my desire
(84) descriptive utterance (EX is absent)
a. I am surprised at how easy this is. => describes surprise
b. I wish that it was easy. => describes my desire
The relation between (83) and (84) is analogous to the relation between (85a) and (85b).
(85) a. That asshole John is now coming to my party! => expresses dislike
b. I hate John and he's now coming to my party. => describes dislike
To locate this system in a broader context, it can be observed that the distinction between
truth conditions and felicity conditions that I posit directly inherits the distinction
between descriptive and expressive meaning found in Kratzer (1999), Potts (2005) and
related work.
Summarizing this section, there is a non-linguistic motivation for the existence of an
EX operator, which is the perceived need to sometimes directly express an emotion or
affective state (e.g. by saying DAMN!) rather than just describe it (e.g. by saying I am
unhappy right now). The distinction between expressive EX-utterances and descriptive
EX-less utterances serves exactly this purpose.
3.1.4 The Views of Others: How to classify this type of analysis
Before moving on to a brief in-depth discussion of my proposal, it is worth considering
the broader context in which it is situated. Let me first review some background on
clause types (ways of categorizing different sentence forms according to their function).
Grammarians of German and English differ in their views on clause types42 (see Bach &
Harnish 1979, Sadock & Zwicky 1985). One of the most wide-spread views assumes that
there are three universal clause types (or sentence types/moods): declaratives,
interrogatives and imperatives, given in (86a-c). This view has been advocated in
Bierwisch (1980), Altmann (1987), Brandt et al. (1992), and more recently Portner (2005,
2007). Alternative views (particularly for English) assume that exclamatives are also a
basic clause type (or major clause type), cf. Nelson (2001 [20112]), given in (86d). Other
scholars (particularly for German) assume that exclamatives and optatives, (86d)+(86e),
are also basic clause types, e.g. Scholz (1991), see also Onnerfors (1997ab) (for German)
and Lyons (1995) (for English). Some proponents of the view that there are three
universal clause types categorize exclamatives and optatives as minor clause types (e.g.
Akmajian et al. 2001).
(86) a. declaratives: Mary was quiet.
b. interrogatives: Was Mary quiet? / How quiet was Mary?
c. imperatives: Be quiet!
d. exclamatives: Boy, was Mary ever quiet! / How very quiet Mary was!
4I limit the scope of this discussion to declaratives, interrogatives, imperatives, exclamatives and
optatives. Cross-linguistically, scholars have also argued that hortatives and jussives are basic clause types.
I will not be addressing these.
If only Mary were quiet!
Crucially, clause type is, without further formalization, a purely descriptive concept, as
the classification of a clause o- as being of clause type -r does not derive anything apart
from summarizing o's properties as a member of category r (see also Schwager 2006 for
a relevant discussion of clause types).
However, it is worth noting that the existence and special status of exclamatives and
optatives has been noted, so the question arises how to best account for the form-function
pairing that such utterances exhibit. What my proposal achieves is a minimal account for
such "minor clause types", which essentially assumes that there are utterances (those that
contain EX) that directly express an emotion, whereas there are utterances (those that lack
EX) that do not. This system can easily be extended to novel utterance types, such as
(87), which serves to express disgust or dislike and might be aptly called an adversative;
(87) can be transparently treated as an EX utterance with an inverse desirability scale.
(87) Mein Gott! Der Olaf! Wenn ich den schon sehe!
my God the Olaf if I him already see
lit. 'My God! Olaf! If I just see him!'
~ 'It makes me sick [if I see Olaf]!'
(Scholz 1991:48, translation and paraphrase is mine)
The system is schematically summarized in (88).
(88) Schema of the EX-Hypothesis
Utterances without EX 10 declarative statements, etc.
Utterances with EX 0, optatives
polar exclamatives
'adversatives' ([I hate it] if ...)
e. optatives:
By arguing for such a view, I argue against a view that assumes more idiosyncratic
pairings of form and function, as schematized in (89).
(89) Schema of other Hypotheses (which are rather 'taxonomical' / 'cartographical')
Default declarative use 0 declarative statements, etc.
Trigger for DESIRE 1 optatives
Trigger for SURPRISE o polar exclamatives
Trigger for DISLIKE l 'adversatives' ([I hate it] if ... )
One view that assumes a system as in (89) is the matrix clause deletion approach to root
uses of apparently embedded clauses (Evans 2007). Such an approach assumes that (90a)
is underlyingly (90b) under its polar exclamative reading, whereas it is underlyingly
(90c) under its optative reading; in each case, the elided material is assumed to be
structurally represented and present at LF.
(90) a. Mein Gott, dass der nicht verschlafen hat!
my God that he not overslept has
lit. My God, that he didn't oversleep!
b. that-polar exclamative
Mein Gott, [es- berraseht mich, [dass der
my God it surprises me that he
'My God, I'm surprised that he didn't oversleep!'
c. that-optative
Mein Gott, [ieh-heffe, [dass der nicht vc
my God I hope that he not o









I argue against the matrix clause deletion approach on empirical grounds in chapter 4.1.4.
Another approach that may be viewed as representing schema (89) assumes that
optativity (and, presumably, exclamativity) is derived in the pragmatics by virtue of being




review such an approach in section 4.2. In this case, each reading comes about as
response to a specific Question Under Discussion (which thus serves as a specific trigger
for that reading). Such a view can be roughly illustrated as in (91) (my rendering of
Biezma 201 lab).
(91) a. Question Under Discussion (implicit to the discourse, not explicitly stated):
How do we get to catch the bus in time?
b. Appropriate Partial Answer:
Wenn er nur nicht verschlafen hat!
if he only not overslept has
'If he only didn't oversleep!'
=> that he didn't oversleep is a good means to achieve our goals.
=> that he didn't oversleep is desirable. (Optativity is derived.)
A view advocated in Zaefferer (2006), and also in Grosz (2011) is that the meanings of
optatives (and polar exclamatives) correspond to conventionalized uses of the that-, if- or
VI-clauses that are uttered. In other words, we are dealing with conventionalized speech
acts. I view the present system as a generalized implementation of such a view; the EX-
operator determines the use of the denoted proposition, namely to express an emotion,
and the scale that it associates with fine-tunes which emotion is expressed. It is easy to
see how my approach captures the intuitions underlying a Conventionalized Speech Act
approach, as sketched in (92). If we decompose the speech acts in (92b) and (92c) into
an EXPRESS.X component and a {X = DESIRE, X = SURPRISE} component, it is easy to see
that the EXPRESS.X part is captured by EX, whereas the {X = DESIRE, X = SURPRISE} part is
captured by positing a contextually assigned scale argument.
(92) a. Mein Gott, dass der nicht verschlafen hat!
my God that he not overslept has
lit. My God, that he didn't oversleep!
b. optative rule: utterance of [that-clause] => EXPRESS.DESIRE
c. exclamative rule: utterance of [that-clause] => EXPRESS.SURPRISE
Finally, we can conceive of an approach that assumes (in line with ideas presented in
Rifkin 2000) that the prototypical particles that we find in optatives and exclamatives
(which may be covert if there are none) are illocutionary force modifiers (building on
Jacobs 1991). Such a view is sketched in (93), where doch is assumed to be responsible
for turning (93a) into an expression of a wish, plausibly by means of the process in (93b).
(93) a. Wenn er doch rechtzeitig gekommen ware!
if he doch in.time come were
'If only he had come in time!'
b. Speech act modification:
An utterance of doch[if p] has by virtue of the meaning of doch (analyzed as a
speech act modifier) a use of expressing a wish [that pl.
I present arguments against such an approach in chapter 6, by discussing the role of
particles in optatives (and polar exclamatives); I argue that particles essentially act as
modulating and disambiguating elements, thus determining speech acts only indirectly.
To conclude this section, I have argued for a system of the type that is summarized in
(94), omitting analysis-specific details.
(94) The Exclamation-Operator Hypothesis (The EX-Op-Hypothesis):
Optatives, exclamatives and related utterances involve an operator EX (mnemonic
for exclamation) that combines with a truth-conditional statement and turns it into
a felicity-conditional expression of an emotion.
I argue against views that assume optativity or exclamativity to arise on a case-by-case
basis, e.g. due to individualized triggers, such as an optative-triggering particle. In global
terms, such a view can be summarized as follows.
(95) The Hypothesis of Expressive Conspiracies (The Ex-Con-Hypothesis):
Optatives, exclamatives and seemingly related utterances are actually completely
unrelated, and their meanings arise on a case-by-case basis, either for pragmatic
reasons or due to grammaticalized triggers.
Notably, the Ex-Con-Hypothesis does not inherently posit any meaningful relationship
between the that-optative in (96a) and the if-optative in (96b). It is quite possible under
an Ex-Con view that the meaning of (96a) comes about in ways fundamentally different
to how the meaning of (96b) comes about. By contrast, according to the EX-Op-
Hypothesis, the two utterances are quasi-identical, modulo the different (semantic) mood
information potentially associated with wenn 'if as opposed to dass 'that' (cf. chapter 5).
(96) a. DaB er nur rechtzeitig gekommen wfire!
that he only in.time come were
b. Wenn er nur rechtzeitig gekommen wire!
if he only in.time come were
'If only he had come in time!'
Similarly, there may be renderings of the Ex-Con-Hypothesis under which some or all of
the examples in (97a-c) are unrelated to each other, given that they contain different
particles, which may trigger different uses. Again, an EX-Op-Hypothesis assumes that
the core meanings of (97a-c) are identical, modulo fine-tuning by virtue of the particles.
(97) a. Wenn er nur rechtzeitig gekommen ware!
if he only in.time come were
'If only he had come in time!'
b. Wenn er doch rechtzeitig gekommen ware!
if he doch in.time come were
'If only he had come in time!'
c. Wenn er wenigstens rechtzeitig gekommen ware!
if he at.least in.time come were
'If only he had come in time!'
Having thus presented the big picture, as pertains to my dissertation, I now proceed to
present a close-up summary of my proposal in a nutshell.
3.2 The EX-Op Analysis: A Worm's-Eye View
3.2.1 In a Nutshell
The previous system presented the core idea underlying this dissertation project. In this
section, I present a summary of the entire analysis, focusing on a limited set of examples
and how to derive them. Motivating assumptions and exploring their implications need
not concern us now; this will be the main subject of investigation in the subsequent
chapters, 4, 5 and 6. Consider first the utterance in (98).
(98) If only I had brought a sandwich!
To derive the wish that (98) expresses, I propose a system that has three main ingredients:
an operator EX, as discussed in section 3.1; Mood features that are located in C and
responsible for the choice of complementizer (here: if); and a semantic analysis for
different particles (here: only). Schematically, the derivation is given in (99). The role of
EX is to combine with a truth-conditional expression of type <s,t> (i.e. a proposition) and
map it onto felicity conditions that capture the speaker's attitude towards that proposition.
As for Mood features and particles, I propose that they are purely presuppositional; they
are truth conditionally vacuous (i.e. if defined they denote the function Ap.p). On the
presuppositional level (formalized in terms of definedness conditions), they provide
background information on the speaker's belief state (in the case of Mood), or further






only I had brought a sandwich
In the following sub-sections, I briefly discuss each of these three ingredients, starting
with the simplest and most crucial case (EX itself) in section 3.2.2. I then proceed to
introduce the role of particles in section 3.2.3, and I then analyze the role of semantic
mood in section 3.2.4.
3.2.2 Introducing EX
The empirical scope of this sub-section is limited to two core cases of what can be
labeled exclamations, as these are subject to the least confounds: I focus on particle-less,
indicative that-optatives and that-polar exclamatives. Let us start with a few examples
that are ambiguous between an optative reading and a polar exclamative reading in (100).
Each of the unembedded that-clauses in (100) is ambiguous between an optative reading,
under which it expresses some type of desire, and a polar exclamative reading, under
which it expresses some type of surprise. Note that these utterances are, in a sense,
surface-minimal pairs; the context always disambiguates, as follows. Optative readings
require the denoted proposition to be non-factive, whereas polar exclamatives require the
denoted proposition to be factive (on a par with what has been observed for degree
exclamatives, cf. Elliot 1971, 1974; Grimshaw 1979; Zanuttini & Portner 2000, 2003;
Abels 2010). I discuss this discrepancy in chapter 5.2. For now, let us gloss over this
difference, which is orthogonal to my proposal for EX.
(100) a. Dass EIN Mal am Wochenende die Sonne scheint!
that one time on.the week.end the sun shines
lit. 'That once the sun is shining on the weekend!'
opt. reading: [I want] that for once the sun shines on the weekend!
excl. reading: [I'm surprised] that for once the sun shines on the weekend!
b. Mein Gott, dass der heute nicht verschlafen hat!
my God that he today not overslept has
lit. 'My God, that he didn't oversleep today!'
opt. reading: [I hope] that he didn't oversleep today!
excl. reading: [I'm shocked] that he didn't oversleep today!
c. Und dass du dich nicht schamst!
and that you you not be.ashamed
lit. 'And that you're not ashamed!'
opt. reading: [I want] that you are not ashamed!
excl. reading: [I'm shocked] that you are not ashamed!
Focusing on the relatively simple utterances in (100) (simple in the sense that they do not
contain particles or counterfactual mood marking), I propose that such utterances involve
two crucial ingredients: The denoted proposition <p and a null operator EX. For the time
being, let us treat complementizers as semantically vacuous, and ignore optional
interjections (Mein Gott! 'my God' in (100b)) as well as clause-initial coordinators (und
'and' in (100c)).
The meaning of EX can now be given as in (101a) (see section 4.1.2 for auxiliary
definitions), and the two core ingredient are compositionally put together as in (10 1b).
(101)a. For any scale S and propositionp, interpreted in relation to a context c and
assignment function g, an utterance EX(S)(p) is felicitous iff 43
Vq[THRESHOLD(c) >s q --- p >s q]
"EX expresses an emotion that captures the fact that p is higher on a (speaker-related)
scale S than all contextually relevant alternatives q below a contextual threshold."
where THRESHOLD(c) is a function from a context into a set of worlds / a
proposition that counts as high with respect to a relevant scale S.
b. EX(S)(he-didn't-oversleep) is felicitous iff
Vq[THRESHOLD(c) >s q -+ he-didn't-oversleep >s q]
"The speaker expresses an emotion that [he didn't oversleep] is relatively high on S."
EX(S) (that) he didn't oversleep
EX S
4 Strictly speaking, Vq[THRESHOLD(C) >s q -+ p >s q] can be abbreviated as p s THRESHOLD(c). I will
however maintain the non-abbreviated version throughout this dissertation, based on how rankings among
propositions are defined in chapter 4.
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We derive the optative and exclamative reading by means of the scale variable, which is
contextually bound: If S refers to a scale that models the speaker's preferences (i.e. a
bouletic scale), we get an optative reading. If S refers to a scale that models the speaker's
surprise (i.e. an inverse prior likelihood scale), we get a polar exclamative reading. The
details of this analysis are given in chapter 4. Having shown how we will account for the
most simple cases, we can now introduce particles to see how these can be integrated into
the analysis. (For expository reasons, I first discuss particles and then mood, whereas in
the overall structure, I first discuss mood, in chapter 5, and then particles, in chapter 6.)
3.2.3 The Role of Particles in Exclamations
In this section, I argue that particles serve two functions in exclamations: First, they can
modulate the wish, surprise or other emotion that is expressed by an utterance that
contains EX; they do so by triggering different presuppositions with respect to the
modified proposition. Second, particles can disambiguate between different types of
exclamations; by and large, they do so by virtue of being incompatible with other types of
exclamations. On a larger scale, I argue for a system (in section 6.5) that captures the fact
that particles in a language like German play a crucial role in clause typing. In contrast to
approaches that view them as speech act modifiers (cf. Jacobs 1991), I argue that their
clause typing effect arises as a conspiracy, due to their disambiguating nature.
To illustrate their first function in exclamations (modulating the expressed emotion),
consider two different variants of (102a) under its optative reading (I will omit literal
translations unless relevant). The difference between nur 'only' in (1 02b) and wenigstens
'at least' in (102c) is that nur 'only' conveys a general notion of moderation (i.e. 'This is
not much to ask!' / 'I'd be satisfied with this little!'), whereas wenigstens 'at least'
conveys that there is a specific alternative that I would prefer, but that seems to be
unachievable (which is why I'm settling for less).
(102) a. Dass EIN Mal am Wochenende die Sonne scheint!
that one time on.the week.end the sun shines
'[I want] that for once the sun shines on the weekend!'
b. Dass nur EIN Mal am Wochenende die Sonne scheint!
that only one time on.the week.end the sun shines
'If only for once the sun shines (were to shine) on the weekend!'
only conveys: 'This is not much to ask for!'
c. Dass wenigstens EIN Mal am Wochenende die Sonne scheint!
that at.least one time on.the week.end the sun shines
'[I want] that at least the sun will shine on the weekend for once!'
at least conveys: 'There is something else that I want even more!'
I argue that this is the core contribution of particles in optatives. They convey additional
information on the denoted proposition, and they do so at the presuppositional level44. To
derive the examples in (102b) and (102c), we can posit lexical entries in (103a) and
(103b). As indicated, the particles do not change the felicity conditions of an EX-
utterance, i.e. (103c) has the same felicity conditions as (101b). Yet, what the particles
add are additional presuppositions that the desired proposition is 'not much to ask' or
'less than optimal'.
(103)a. Jonly2,c||= XS.Xp : MOST q E g(C) [q>s p]. LOWNESS
p IDENTITY
"only2 is a truth-conditionally vacuous element (different from canonical only), which
triggers a presupposition that the modified proposition is low on a contextually
provided scale."
(loosely based on Guerzoni's 2003 nur2)
b. |lwenigstensc|gc = XS.kp :
S is a bouletic ordering A BOULETIC
3r E g(C) [r >s p] A 3q E g(C) [p >s q] . SECOND CHOICE
p IDENTITY
"wenigstens is a truth-conditionally vacuous element (corresponding to English
concessive at least), which combines with a bouletic scale and presupposes that there is
a contextually salient proposition that is more preferable than the modified proposition,
as well as a contextually salient proposition that is less preferable."
(based on Nakanishi & Rullmann's 2009 concessive at least)
44 It is in principle also conceivable that their non-truth-conditional contribution takes place at the level of
conventional implicature. It is beyond the scope of this project to extensively compare the two options.
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c. EX(S)(he-didn't-oversleep) is felicitous iff
Vq[THRESHOLD(c) >s q -+ he-didn't-oversleep >s q]
"The speaker expresses an emotion that [he didn't oversleep] is relatively high on S."
EX(S)
nur
EX S wenigstens (that) he didn't oversleep
ONLY2 presupposition:
MOST q E g(C) [q >s he-didn't-oversleep]
"[he didn't oversleep] is relatively low on S"
--... . wenigstens presuppositions:
3r E g(C) [r >preference he-didn't-oversleep] A
3q E g(C) [he-didn't-oversleep >preference q]
"[he didn't oversleep] is not optimal but acceptable"
A third particle that I will focus on is German doch, which is limited to counterfactual
optatives and cannot occur in indicative optatives.
(104)a.# Dass doch EIN Mal am Wochenende die Sonne scheint!45
that doch one time on.the week.end the sun shines
b. Dass doch EIN Mal am Wochenende die Sonne geschienen hatte!
that doch one time on.the week.end the sun shined had
'If doch for once the sun had shined on the weekend!'
doch conveys: 'This is in conflict with reality, where the sun is not shining!'
Postponing a discussion of mood to the next section, a lexical entry for doch can be given
as follows, assuming (in the spirit of Kratzer & Matthewson's 2009 analysis of ja) that
doch is simply a presupposition trigger. It is integrated into the clause in the same way
4 This is completely unacceptable under an optative reading. Interestingly, while (104a) is in principle
acceptable under a polar exclamative reading, this particular example is marginal under such a reading as
well, or at least very marked with the given stress pattern. The polar exclamative reading of (104a)
improves if the main stress is placed on doch and ein 'one' is distressed. For more natural polar
exclamatives with unstressed doch, see section 6.4, and particularly examples (783) and (791).
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that nur 'only' and wenigstens 'at least' are, as a truth-conditionally vacuous
presupposition trigger.
(105) ||dochc||'"c= p
3q E g(C) [p A q &- [p(w) A q(w)]] A CONFLICT
p n Doxspeaker(w) = 0 v ,p n Doxspeaker(w)= 0. FAMILIARITY
p IDENTITY
"doch is a truth-conditionally vacuous element, which triggers a presupposition that the
truth/falsity of the modified proposition is established and that the modified proposition
conflicts with some contextually salient proposition."
(based on Grosz 2010, Kratzer & Matthewson 2009)
Having outlined how particles contribute presuppositions that modulate the expression of
an emotion that EX utterances perform, we can now consider the second function that
particles fulfill in such utterances. Particles can disambiguate between different types of
exclamations (and, for what it's worth, between exclamations and utterances that are not
exclamations). It is conceivable that this is connected to their lexical semantics (doch
emphasizing a polar contrast, wenigstens 'at least' requiring a bouletic scale, and nur
'only' conveying moderation on some scale). To illustrate the disambiguating effect of
particles, consider first the examples in (106), which are identical to those in (100) except
for the occurrence of nur 'only' in (106). What we observe is that (106a-c), without nur
'only', are ambiguous between an optative reading and a polar exclamative reading. After
inserting nur 'only', as in (106a-c), the polar exclamative reading disappears. By virtue of
some property of nur 'only', this reading seems to be blocked.
(106) a. Dass nur EIN Mal am Wochenende die Sonne scheint!
that only one time on.the week.end the sun shines
lit. 'That once the sun is shining on the weekend!'
opt. reading: [I want] that for once the sun shines on the weekend!
* excl. reading: [I'm surprised] that for once the sun shines on the weekend!
b. Mein Gott, dass der heute nur nicht verschlafen hat!
my God that he today only not overslept has
lit. 'My God, that he didn't oversleep today!'
opt. reading: [I hope] that he didn't oversleep today!
* excl. reading: [I'm shocked] that he didn't oversleep today!
c. Und dass du dich nur nicht schamst!
and that you you only not be.ashamed
lit. 'And that you're not ashamed!'
opt. reading: [I want] that you are not ashamed!
* excl. reading: [I'm shocked] that you are not ashamed!
Contrastively, to provide a second example of the disambiguating effect of particles,
(unstressed) doch does not always disambiguate between optatives and polar
exclamatives, as shown in (107), which has both an optative reading, (107b), and a polar
exclamative reading, (107c).
(107) a. Hatte die dem doch tatSACHlich das Buch gegeben!
hadsubj she him doch indeed the book given
lit. Hadsubjunctive she indeed given him the book!
b. 'If only she had given him the book!' opt.
c. '[It's shocking that] she would have indeed given him the book!' p. exc.
(adapted from Scholz 1991:132-133, attributing the example to Norbert Fries)
However, while doch does not disambiguate between optatives and polar exclamatives, it
can be shown to eliminate degree exclamative readings in VI-clauses, typically in favor
of polar exclamative readings. Minimal pairs are difficult to construct, but the following
pair comes closest to an acceptable minimal pair. German VI-degree exclamatives
typically contain the particle aber (literally 'but') or vielleicht (literally 'maybe'), cf.
Rosengren (1992), Brandner (2010). As shown in (108a), we cannot replace aber 'but' by
doch without changing the clause from a degree exclamative into a polar exclamative;
conversely, in (108a), we cannot replace doch by aber 'but', without changing the clause
from a polar exclamative into a degree exclamative.
(108)a. Hat der aber / #doch wirklich nochmal Schwein gehabt!
has he but #doch really again pig had
'Boy, was he lucky again!'
(adapted from http://meinews.niuz.biz/d-t584936p2.html)
b. Hat der doch / #aber wirklich nochmal Schwein gehabt!
has he doch #but really again pig had
'[I'm shocked that] he was lucky again!'
degree excl.
polar excl.




a. Mensch, hat der aber getanzt!
man has he but danced
'Man, how he danced!'
b. Mensch, hat der doch glatt getanzt!
man has he doch outright danced
'Man, [I'm shocked that] he danced!'
degree exclamative
polar exclamative
example is given in (110), where vielleicht 'maybe' is used instead of aber
a. Mensch, hat der vielleicht gelogen!
man has he maybe lied
'Man, how he was lying!'
b. Mensch, hat der doch glatt gelogen!
man has he doch outright lied
'Man, [I'm shocked that] he lied!'
degree exclamative
polar exclamative
Alternatively, in some cases, doch can block a degree exclamative reading in favor of an
optative reading. This is illustrated in (111), adapted from Rosengren (1993). Notably,
such utterances are more complex than the examples in (108)-(110), as follows. The
particle doch can only occur in counterfactual, subjunctive-marked optatives. Therefore,
a surface-minimal pair must be in the subjunctive; as polar exclamatives and degree
exclamatives are factive, they cannot be counterfactual - instead, they must be implicitly
conditionalized. This should be clear from the glosses.
(110)
(11) a. Ware ich doch / #vielleicht reich! optative
were I doch #maybe rich
'If only I were rich!' (counterfactual)
b. Ware ich vielleicht / #doch reich! degree exclamative
were I maybe #doch rich
'Boy, would I be rich!' /'How rich I would be!' (non-counterfactual, factive)
However, in short, we can generalize that doch is compatible with optatives and polar
exclamatives, but eliminates degree exclamatives. I propose that this is due to the
inherent polarity of doch - by virtue of its presuppositional meaning it contrasts the
denoted proposition with a single salient, conflicting proposition. In optatives, the
denoted (wishedfor) proposition is contrasted with the proposition that describes what is
the case. In polar exclamatives, the denoted (surprising) proposition is contrasted with
the proposition that describes what was originally expected. We can explain the
incompatibility of doch and degree exclamatives by assuming that such a polar / binary
pairing of two propositions is not directly possible in degree exclamatives. In this sense,
doch blocks a degree exclamative reading, disambiguating towards a polar exclamative or
optative reading.
In sum, to account for particles in exclamations, I have introduced a third ingredient
into the system from section 3.2.2. Particles are typically truth-conditionally vacuous
presupposition triggers, which serve to modulate the proposition in the scope of the EX
operator. What is worth pointing out is that my analysis takes a uniform perspective to
so-called "focus particles" such as nur 'only' and wenigstens 'at least' on the one hand
and to so-called "discourse particles" such as doch on the other hand. The purported
distinction between focus particles and discourse particles is thus implicitly eliminated,
following the presuppositional approach sketched in Kratzer & Matthewson (2009). The
difference between an element like nur 'only' and an element like doch reduces to their
different lexical entry - there is no categorical distinction. (See chapter 6 for the details of
my analysis of particles.) Having given an outline of my analysis for particles, I turn to
the final ingredient that I am concerned with: Mood, by which I mean semantic mood,
not morphological mood.
3.2.4 The Role of Mood in Exclamations
The third core question that I address in this dissertation concerns the connection between
semantic mood (subsuming counterfactuality, factivity, etc) and the overt material that
fills the complementizer position in a language like German. In spite of the way I present
things in the present section, I will discuss this topic before discussing particles, in
chapter 5. The two questions that I address can be stated as follows. First, we want to
understand what constrains the possibility of (V-to-)T-to-C movement, (1 12a), and the
distribution of different complementizers in exclamations, (112b+c).
(112) a. WAre er nur rechtzeitig gekommen tware!
were he only in.time come
b. DaB er nur rechtzeitig gekommen wiire!
that he only in.time come were
c. Wenn er nur rechtzeitig gekommen wire!
if he only in.time come were
'If only he had come in time!'
Second, we want to understand how mood information enters into the computation of an
exclamation. Specifically, if we utter (1 13a), how does the presupposition arise that we
don't yet know whether it has happened (i.e. non-counterfactuality), whereas in (113b), it
is presupposed that we already know that it did not happen (i.e. counterfactuality).
(113)a. Wenn er nur rechtzeitig gekommen ist!
if he only in.time come is
'If only he came in time!'
=> I HOPE THAT [he has arrived in time].
b. Wenn er nur rechtzeitig gekommen wiire!
if he only in.time come were
'If only he had come in time!'
=> I WISH THAT [he had arrived in time].
The core idea that I posit incorporates and implements insights from different lines of
research. Specifically, I incorporate Truckenbrodt's (2006ab) insights on (V-to-)T-to-C
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movement with our knowledge on mood selection (e.g. Portner 1997, Quer 1998,
Giannakidou 1999), and formalize my proposal in a Pesetsky & Torrego (2001) type
system.
Focusing on German, I argue that semantic mood (which I will shortly explain in
more detail) is overtly marked in two locations: On the inflected verb or auxiliary (where
it takes the shape of morphological mood, indicative or subjunctive) and in C, where it
co-determines the possible complementizers (wenn 'if or dass 'that') and the
(im)possibility of (V-to-)T-to-C movement. I implement this by assuming a Mood head
that enters an agreement relation with C. The idea is schematically illustrated in (114).
(114) a. Ach, wenn es geregnet
oh if it rained






More precisely, I implement the above idea by assuming that semantic mood is encoded
in Mood, a head that is located above T. Mood encodes information on the epistemic
status of the modified proposition (e.g. does the speaker believe in its truth, falsity or
neither?). This information is presuppositional in nature, as given in (115).
(115)a. I|iMoodCFc = 1p . kw : p n Doxspeaker(w) = 0 . p(w) COUNTERFACTUALITY
"The speaker presupposes p to be false."
b. ||iMoodDEFc =kp .Aw . p(w) UNMARKED MOOD
(iMoodDEF does not trigger any presuppositions with respect to the truth or falsity ofp)
c. IIiMoodFACTIC = Xp . Xw : DoXspaker(W) 9 p . p(w) FACTIVITY
"The speaker presupposes p to be true."
In addition to interpretable mood in Mood, I assume that mood information must also be
represented in C by virtue of an uninterpretable [uMood] feature in C. I argue that the
choice of overt material in C is co-determined by whether C (and Mood) has the EPP
property or not. If C has the EPP property and Mood does not, (1 16b), Mood undergoes
head movement to C without 'pied piping' (in an informal sense) the T head; I argue that
[C+Mood] is spelled out as wenn 'if', (1 17b). Alternatively, if both C and Mood have the
EPP property, (1 16c), we see (V-to-)T-to-Mood-to-C movement, i.e. V1, (1 17c). If C
lacks the EPP property, (116a), C is spelled out as dass 'that', which is its default spell-
out, (1 17a). The complete proposal is summarized in (116)+(117).
(116)a. C[uMood, -EPP] ... Mood[iMood, uT, +EPP] ... T[iT]
= C[.M.4s ... T[iT] + MoodiMood, ,1. ... (Tti-r)
spell-out: Ct. 4 +> dass 'that'
b. C[uMood, +EPP] ... Mood[iMood, uT, -EPP] ... T[iT]
=> Mood[Mood, o.;. + C.M..ed ... (Mood[iMood, uT]) ... T[iT]
spell-out: Mood[ Mood, .; + C[.M..41 < wenn 'if
c. C[uMood, +EPP] ... Mood[iMood, uT, +EPP] ... T[iT]
=> C[uood, +EPP] ... T[iT] + Mood[iMood, .-T-] ... (T[i])
=> [T[i-r + Mood[iMood, A..] + C[*... ... (T[irj + Mood[iMood, w..) ... (T[iT])
spell-out: [T[iT] + Mood[iMood, A.]] + C[.M..41 < VI
(117) a. dass 'that' spells out C on its own.
b. wenn 'if spells out [C [Mood]].
c. Vi spells out [C [ T [Mood]]].
In its base position, Mood codetermines the morphological mood marking on the verb;
notably, it does not fully determine them, as we find various 'sequence of mood' effects.
For instance, in (118b), the V1 -degree exclamative (Boy, would he have scolded us!) is
just as factive as the V1-degree exclamative in (118a). This is shown in (118b-ii), as
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compared to (118a-ii). Yet, the verb is subjunctive marked, due to the implicit
conditionalization, which marks it as a statement on counterfactual worlds4 6 .
(118) a. Hat der vielleicht geschimpft!
did he maybe scold
'Boy, did he scold us!'
i. expresses: It is remarkable how much he scolded us.
ii. presupposes: It is a fact that he scolded us to a high degree.
b. Stell dir vor, er hatte uns gesehen. HAtte der vielleicht geschimpft!
imagine you PRT he had us seen had he maybe scolded
'Imagine that he'd seen us. Boy, would he have scolded us!'
i. expresses: It is remarkable how much he would have scolded us if he
had seen us.
ii. presupposes: It is a fact that he would have scolded us to a high degree
if he had seen us.
In sum, I argue that presuppositions on the truth or falsity of the modified proposition
arise due to interpretable mood features, which have an overt reflex both in the locus of C
and in their base position. In C, they co-determine which material overtly realizes the
complementizer position. In their base position, mood features co-determine mood
marking on the verb (i.e. subjunctive or indicative). For languages like German and
Dutch, the view that overt material in C is a realization of C, C+Mood or C+Mood+T
derives the complementarity of 'complementizers' and V-to-C movement, originally
observed by den Besten (1983).
3.3 Summary and Road Map
I have presented my system for optative constructions, first focusing on the big picture in
section 3.1, then laying out the details in section 3.2. The idea is that we need three core
46 Precisely, what (1 18b-ii) seems to presuppose is that there are counterfactual worlds such that it is a fact
from the perspective of the actual world that in these counterfactual worlds he (a salient individual) would
have scolded us very much.
ingredients to derive the meaning and specific properties of the utterance in (1 19a), which
contains the proposition (119c) and involves the mood realization configuration in
(1 19b). The ingredients are (i.) a silent exclamation operator EX, (ii.) semantic mood
features, and (iii.) a presuppositional account for particles such as nur 'only'.
(119) a. HAtte es nur geregnet thltte!
had it only rained
'Had it only rained!'
b. Derivation of the Vi spell-out
CP
MoodP
Mood[uT, Mood] C[UMOod, EPP]
TP Mood[uT, iMood, EPP]
T[iTJ Mood[uT, iMood, EPP]
hatte
c. denoted proposition: Xw.it rained in w





Xw.it rained in w
b. felicity conditions:
EX(Sspeaker-preferences)(rain) is felicitous iff
Vq[THRESHOLD(c) >speaker-preferences q - rain >speaker-preferences q]
"The speaker expresses the emotion that [it rained] is above a salient threshold on the
speaker's preference scale / desirability scale."
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c. mood information:
MoodCF triggers the presupposition that
{w : it rained in w} n Doxspeaker(w) = 0
"The speaker presupposes that it is false that [it rained]"
d. particle contribution:
nur triggers the presupposition that
MOST q E g(C) [q >speaker-preferences rain]
where C is a contextually provided set of proposition
"The speaker presupposes that [it rained] is relatively low on the speaker's preference
scale; in other words, asking for rain is not much to ask."
The core of this dissertation consists of detailed argumentation for each of these three
points, and an exploration of the consequences (where applicable). I first focus on the
nature of EX, its motivations, and its consequences, in chapter 4. I then proceed to a
discussion of iMood features and mood agreement between C and Mood, in chapter 5.
Finally, I present a detailed investigation of three prototypically optative particles, nur
'only', wenigstens 'at least' and doch, in chapter 6. Each chapter is self-contained,
presenting the respective analysis, its motivation and the implications of such an
approach.
4. The Source of Desirability in Optatives
This chapter introduces the basic ingredient of my analysis of optative utterances (Scholz
1991, Rosengren 1993, Rifkin 2000, Asarina & Shklovsky 2008, Kyriakaki 2007, 2008,
2009, Biezma 2011 a), as in (121b), and polar exclamative utterances (Thurmair 1989,
Scholz 1991, Rosengren 1992, Truckenbrodt 2006a, Delsing 2010), as in (121c).
(121) a. Mensch! Dass der heute nicht verschlafen hat!
man that he today not overslept has
lit. 'Man! That he didn't oversleep today!'
b. optative reading: [I hope] that he didn't oversleep today!
c. exclamative reading: [I'm shocked] that he didn't oversleep today!
I propose that such utterances involve a covert operator EX, (122), which has the
following properties. First, EX is a scalar operator, conveying that the modified
proposition exceeds a salient threshold on a contextually salient scale, provided by a
scalar argument S (the scale represents speaker preferences in the case of optatives,
(prior) speaker unlikelihood in the case of polar exclamatives). Second, EX is an
expressive element that shifts descriptive content into the domain of expressive content,
in the sense of Potts & Roeper (2006).
(122) a. Dass der heute nicht verschlafen hat!
that he today not overslept has
lit. 'That he didn't oversleep today!'
b. LF: [[EX S] [that he didn't oversleep today]]!
I consider Kyriakaki (2007, 2008, 2009) a predecessor of my proposal, as she assumes
that Greek counterfactual wishes like (123a) involve a covert operator with (roughly) a
wish-reading that is 'exclamative' (and thus unembeddable) in nature; the LF for (123a)
can be schematically given as in (123b) (my strongly simplified rendering), and makdri is
a plausible lexicalization of the wish-operator, according to Kyriakaki.
(123) a. (Makiri) na imun plnsios!
makari na be.imp.1s rich
'If only / I wish I were rich!'
(Kyriakaki 2007:41+48)
b. LF: [WISH [I am rich]]!
My analysis departs from Kyriakaki's analysis in several important respects. First, I
propose a generalized variant of this exclamation operator, which covers both optatives
and polar exclamatives. Second, I argue that the exclamation operator (my EX) is an
expressive operator, which maps truth-functional descriptive content into use-conditional
expressive content (in the spirit of Potts & Roeper 2006). Third, I propose to treat EX as
an inherently scalar element that combines with a scalar argument S, which opens the
possibility of investigating interactions between EX and other scalar particles
(specifically: only and at least). Fourth, I dissociate the counterfactuality presupposition
of counterfactual optatives from their expression of desirability (a possibility that
Kyriakaki 2007 points out in footnote 33). And finally, I present a variety of new
arguments in favor of EX.
An alternative view to Kyriakaki's and my proposal is presented in Biezma (2011 ab).
Biezma, focusing on if-optatives (as opposed to that-optatives), assumes that there is no
covert operator in optatives, and argues that desirability arises from an interaction
between the compositional meaning of a conditional antecedent and the pragmatics of
discourse. I review Biezma's proposal in section 4.2.
In section 4.11 present my own system of deriving desirability in optatives by way of
the generalized EX operator. The structure of this chapter is as follows. I will first briefly
revisit the puzzle in section 4.1.1 and summarize the core proposal in section 4.1.2.
Section 4.1.3 argues that optative clauses share properties with argument clauses,
whereas section 4.1.4 argues against a matrix clause deletion approach. This gives rise to
an apparent dilemma, which is resolved by positing a covert exclamation operator EXthat
serves to express an emotion towards a particular proposition, 4.1.5. I proceed by arguing
that EX is an expressive operator (i.e. it combines with truth-functional descriptive
content and maps it onto expressive content), in section 4.1.6, and that EX is a scalar
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operator, in section 4.1.7. After a brief discussion of the interactions between EX and
overt interjections, in section 4.1.8, I formalize EX in 4.1.9. Finally, I discuss cross-
linguistic variation with respect to EX in section 4.1.10. Section 4.2 reviews Biezma's
(2011 ab) analysis of optatives, which does not assume covert operators.
4.1 On Expressing Emotion, the EX Operator and Generalized Exclamations
4.1.1 Revisiting the Core Puzzle: Attitudes without Attitude Predicates
The core question to be addressed in this section is how to account for the expressive
meaning conveyed by utterances such as optatives and polar exclamatives. Specifically:
How does the wish or surprise arise that is conveyed? The empirical focus will be on
optative constructions as in (124) and (125). The core puzzle can be stated as follows:
How is the meaning that is captured by the paraphrases in (124d) and (125c)
compositionally derived?
(124) subjunctive (and counterfactual) optatives
a. DaB er (doch) nur rechtzeitig gekommen wiire!
that he doch only in.time come were
b. Wenn er (doch) nur rechtzeitig gekommen wire!
if he doch only in.time come were
c. Ware er (doch) nur rechtzeitig gekommen tware!
were he doch only in.time come
'If only he had come in time!'
d. paraphrase: I wish he had come in time!
(125) indicative optatives
a. DaB er nur (JA) rechtzeitig kommt!
that he only JA in.time comes
b. Wenn er nur (JA) rechtzeitig kommt!
if he only JA in.time comes
'If only he comes in time!'
c. paraphrase: I hope he will come in time!
To slightly extend the empirical scope, the assumption can be made that an empirically
adequate proposal will also cover polar exclamatives, (126) and (127) below. This
assumption is justified as the two utterance types share many properties. First, both
optatives and polar exclamatives are orientated towards a fact rather than a degree
(setting them apart from the types of exclamations that so far received most attention,
namely degree exclamatives). Second, both optatives and polar exclamatives involve
emotivity, i.e. they seem to express an emotion rather than describe it (Rosengren 1992,
1993). Third, both optatives and polar exclamatives seem to be exclamations (for
optatives: Quirk et al. 1972, 1985, Rifkin 2000, Kyriakaki 2007, 2008, 2009). Fourth,
both optatives and polar exclamatives involve insubordination, i.e. they typically take the
form of unembedded clauses with the morphosyntax of embedded clauses (cf.
Truckenbrodt 2006a, Reis 2006). Fifth, both optatives and polar exclamatives have a V1
variant (see chapter 2). These parallels motivate a heuristic approach of aiming for a
uniform analysis; alternatively, by pursuing a uniform analysis, we may discover that we
need to generalize to the worst case (i.e. that polar exclamatives and optatives require
fundamentally different analyses) - I will argue that a uniform analysis is possible.
The puzzle that polar exclamatives pose is analogous to the optative puzzle: How
are the intuitive paraphrases in (126c) and (127c) compositionally derived?
(126) indicative polar exclamatives
a. DaB Sie (doch /tatsachlich / wirklich) daran gedacht haben!
that you doch indeed really of.it thought have
b. Haben Sie doch (tatsachlich / wirklich) daran gedacht thaben!
have you doch indeed really of.it thought
'Jesus, that you really remembered it!'
(Scholz 1991:133, who attributes the dass-variant to Wilhelm Oppenrieder)
c. paraphrase: It is remarkable that you remembered it.
(127) subjunctive (yet factive) polar exclamatives
a. DaB die dem doch tatsachlich das Buch gegeben hatte!
that she him doch indeed the book given had
b. Hatte die dem doch tatsachlich das Buch gegeben thatte!
had she him doch indeed the book given
'Jesus, that she would have indeed given him the book!'
(based on Scholz 1991:132-133)
c. paraphrase: It is remarkable that she would have given him the book.
The following section summarizes the core proposal; I will then proceed to motivating
different aspects of that proposal and to exploring its consequences, in sections 4.1.3 to
4.1.10.
4.1.2 Core Proposal
I argue for the following proposal. Optatives contain a scalar, expressive operator EX4 7 .
By scalar, I mean that EX directly operates on scales (e.g. reflecting the speaker's
preferences or expectations). By expressive, I mean that EX yields a semantic that is non-
truth-conditional but rather felicity-conditional (cf. Kratzer 1999, Kratzer & Matthewson
2009 for the use offelicity conditions in this context). EX serves to express an emotion of
the speaker with respect to the denoted proposition being high on a salient scale (in
optatives: speaker preferences); the formalism is loosely based on Villalta (2007)48.
For current purposes, assume the following notion of scale, in (128a+b). Here, scales
are defined as orderings over propositions. The given definition now allows us to model
sample scales such as in (129a+b).
(128) definition of scale (preliminary)
a. A scale S is defined as a set of ordered pairs of propositions (S C p (W) x
p (W)), which are ordered by an ordering relation R, such that for every pair of
propositions <a,b> in S, the relation R(<ab>) holds.
b. For any scale S and corresponding ordering relation R, I use p >s q to mean 'p is
strictly higher than q on S', i.e. R(<p,q>) A -R(<qp>).
(cf. Klinedinst 2005)
47 EX is inspired by Gutidrrez Rexach's (1996) EXC operator, though its semantics differs fundamentally.
48 I argue below that optatives are expressive utterances, cf. Potts & Roeper (2006); I propose that
expressive utterances are non-truthconditional and have felicity conditions instead, see also Kratzer (1999),
Kratzer & Matthewson (2009).
Imagine the speaker prefers a cloudy day over a rainy day, but at the same time prefers a
sunny day over a cloudy day; these preferences give rise to the scale in (129a). Similarly,
if it has been raining for two days and the weather forecast indicates that it will rain for
another two days, a rainy day is more likely than a cloudy day, which is more likely than
a sunny day. This gives rise to the likelihood scale in (129b). Similarly, an inverse
preference scale (or dispreference scale) would look like (129a) with inverted polarity,
and an inverse likelihood scale (or unlikelihood scale) would look like (1 29b) inverted.
(129) a. sample preference scale
imore desirable
p = {w:it rains in w} q = {w:it is cloudy in w} r = {w:it is sunny in w}
b. sample likelihood scale
Smore likely
r = {w:it is sunny in w} q = {w:it is cloudy in w} p = {w:it rains in w}
Having introduced a formal notion of scale, we can now give a first approximation of EX
in (130); what (130) implements is the idea that there is at least one possible alternative q
to the denoted alternative p, which is lower on the relevant scale than p.
(130) First approximation of EX (to be revised)
For any scale S and proposition p, interpreted in relation to a context c and
assignment function g,
an utterance of EXc(S)(p) is felicitous iff 3q[[q # p & q E g(C)] & p >s q]
"EX expresses an emotion that captures the fact that p is higher on a (speaker-related) scale
S than some contextually relevant alternatives q"
where C is a contextually determined variable of type <st,t> (a set of propositions),
which receives its value from g.
An illustration of this meaning is given in (131).
(131) a. Ach, wire ich wohlhabend!
oh were I wealthy
'If only I were wealthy!' (lit. 'Oh, were I wealthy!')
b. LF: [[EXc Sspeaker-preferences] [I am wealthy]]!
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c. felicity conditions:
(131 a) is felicitous iff 3q[[q # wealthy(speaker) & q E~ g(C)]
& wealthy(speaker) >speaker-preference q]
"The speaker expresses the emotion that [p the speaker is wealthy] is higher on a
speaker-related preference scale than some contextually relevant alternative q."
In a context where there are no salient alternatives, it is natural to assume that the salient
q is simply the negation of the denoted proposition. In such a context, the speaker of
(131 a) would simply convey that worlds in which the speaker is wealthy are better than
worlds in which the speaker isn't wealthy. However, my analysis presently also predicts
that (131 a) should be well-formed if my actual preferences are given as in (132). As we
will see, this is crucially the case.
(132) | | more desirable
p = {w:I am poor in w} q = {w:I am wealthy in w} r = {w:I am rich in w}
At this point, two qualifications are in place, which I address in turn. First, we need to
refine the notion of scale that we use in order to derive the right results. Second, we need
to find a way to make EX sensitive to scalar thresholds.
The first issue that arises concerns the implausibility of it being the case that the
scales that we are dealing with rank propositions directly. As it stands, we seem to predict
that (133a) entails (133b), which, as indicated, does not reflect our intuitions. The false
entailment is due to the subset relations in (134). Assume that I, as the speaker, prefer the
set of worlds in which I am wealthy over the set of worlds in which I am poor, as
sketched in (1 33a). It then seems to follow that I prefer worlds in which I am dead and
wealthy over worlds in which I am alive and poor, sketched in (133b). This is clearly
pathological. We thus have to conclude that we are not directly ranking (entire) sets of
worlds with respect to their relative desirability.
(133)a. {w:I am wealthy in w} >speaker-preference {w:I am poor in w}
b. = {w:I am wealthy and dead in w} >speaker-preference {w:I am poor and alive in w}
(134)a. {w:I am wealthy and dead in w} C {w: I am wealthy in w}
b. {w:I am poor and alive in w} C {w: I am poor in w}
Heim (1992) solves this problem by assuming a conditional semantics for predicates such
as want, wish and be glad. The p-worlds that are closest to the evaluation world w are
more preferable than the ,p-worlds that are closest to the evaluation world w. In other
words, p is more preferable than -p, all else being equal. I adopt the alternative view
from Villalta (2007) that scales actually rank worlds, (135b), and propositions are only
ranked by proxy, using Kratzer's (1991) better possibility, (13 5c).
(135) definition of scale (final)
a. A scale S is defined as a set of ordered pairs of worlds (S C W x W), which
are ordered by an ordering relation R, such that for every pair of worlds
<w7,w3> in S, the relation R(<w7 ,w3>) holds.
b. For any scale S and corresponding ordering relation R, I use w7 >S w3 to mean
'w7 is strictly higher than w3 on S', i.e. R(<w7 ,w3>) A R(<w3,wy>).
c. For any proposition p and q, p >s q iff Vw 3 E q 3w7 E p such that w7 >s w3,
and it is not the case that Vw 7 E p 3w3 E q such that w3 >s w7.
(adapted from Villalta 2007:106, using concepts from Klinedinst 2005)
The idea here is that orderings of worlds always establish a scale. To exemplify, take two
worlds, w3 and w7, identical except for the fact that in w7 I am rich and in w3 I am not
rich. If I intend to be rich, w7 will be higher on my preference scale than w3, as in (136).
(136) More desirable 4
Less desirable W3
By means of Kratzer's (1991) better possibility, we can now rank propositions with
respect to such a scale. If there is a p-world that is ranked higher than all q-worlds, p can
be said to be ranked higher on the scale than q, cf. (135b); this is illustrated in (137).
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(137) More desirable More desirable
p ......4
- I -- Wi 3 Wl0
Less desirable Less desirable
The second issue with (130) concerns the fact that our entry for EX is too weak as it
stands. Existential quantification over contextually relevant alternative propositions does
not capture our intuition that the desirability of the denoted proposition in an optative
must be above some salient threshold. For now, it suffices to assume that the choice of
relevant alternatives by means of the contextual variable C achieves this purpose. The
worry is that such a move assigns a rather powerful role to C, and we are losing
explanatory power to the 'black box' that is contextual information. How can we remedy
this issue? On the one hand, if we follow Villalta (2007) in assuming that C must be a
subset of the focus alternatives of the modified proposition, this limits the range of
possible alternatives in the interpretation of optatives. Moreover, it has been observed
that optatives often involve verum focus (cf. Scholz 1991, Rosengren 1993), which will
typically limit the relevant alternatives to the expressed proposition and its negation. On
the other hand, it seems justified to write 'threshold sensitivity' directly into the meaning
of EX (in the same sense in which gradable predicates are usually sensitive to some
contextual standard). This allows us to dispense with a contextual set of alternatives C. I
thus propose the revised lexical entry for EX in (138).
(13 8) Lexical entry for EX (final)
For any scale S and propositionp, interpreted in relation to a context c and
assignment function g,
an utterance EX(S)(p) is felicitous iff Vq[THRESHOLD(c) >s q -- p >s q]
"EX expresses an emotion that captures the fact that p is higher on a (speaker-related) scale
S than all contextually relevant alternatives q below a contextual threshold."
where THRESHOLD(C) is a function from a context into a set of worlds / a
proposition that counts as high with respect to a relevant scale S.
Assume that in order to be in a tolerable world, I need to earn at least $1200 per month.
In a context in which this is the case, THRESHOLD(c) may yield {w : I earn $1200 per
month in w}. Such a situation is described in (139) (where pn abbreviates p = {w : I earn
n per month in w}).
(139) | | | | more desirable
Psio00 psiio0 p1200O PS1300 P$1400 P$is00 P$1600
THRESHOLD(c)
I will come back to a discussion of the formal implementation in some more detail in
section 4.1.9; first, I focus on how to motivate the overall proposal.
To summarize in brief, my proposal rests on the following sub-proposals, which I will
argue for one by one. First, while optative clauses quite generally behave like
complement clauses (section 4.1.3), they do not contain an elided matrix clause (section
4.1.4), which argues against Evans (2007) (and other rendering of a matrix clause
deletion approach). I propose that we can best account for the observations in 4.1.3 and
4.1.4, by assuming a covert operator EX, which takes the optative clause as its
complement but does not have the status of a covert matrix clause, as illustrated in (140).
(140) [EX [cP Da3 / Wenn er doch nur rechtzeitig gekommen wiire!]]
that if he doch only in.time come were
'If only he had come in time!'
As summarized in (141), I make the following further assumptions. First, EX is emotive
and can be generalized to polar exclamatives ((141 i) and section 4.1.5); EX is not part of
the descriptive at-issue content, but expressive in nature ((141 ii) and section 4.1.6); EX is
scalar ((141 iii) and section 4.1.7); and while EX interacts with overt interjections, these
interjections do not express EX ((141iv) and section 4.1.8). I then discuss some more
formal issues in section 4.1.9 and discuss cross-linguistic and language-internal variance
with respect to EX in section 4.1.10.
utterance of EX(<p) conveys:
the speaker at the point of utterance has an emotion e (or at least an evaluative
attitude e) towards qP.
the speaker intends to express e, rather than describe e.
E involves a scale (in the case of optatives: a preference scale)
EX combines with interjections (oh!, man!, ... ) to further refine the
expression of e, but these interjections do not express EX
Topics that I discuss in subsequent chapters include the connection between EX and
semantic mood (e.g. counterfactuality, factivity), which I discuss in chapter 5, as well as
the role of prototypical particles in EX-utterances, which I discuss in chapter 6.
4.1.3 Optative clauses behave like complement clauses
The purpose of this section is to motivate the idea that optatives behave like complement
clauses, even in their if-clause variant. The selectional relation between an operator
(which I will argue to be EX) and its optative complement is schematically given in
(142).
(142) Sub-Claim 1: Optatives are selected by an operator
... Op ... [CP DaB / Wenn er doch nur rechtzeitig
'. that if he doch only in.time





The idea that dapi-clauses (i.e. that-clauses) are complements may be obvious, whereas
the idea that wenn-clauses (i.e. if-clauses) can be complements seems much more
controversial. To argue for such a claim, let me briefly review the typology of if-clauses.
In the literature on conditionals, it is commonly assumed that there are various different
49 Note that the emotivity of EX is not explicitly encoded in the lexical entry in (138). Rather than ascribing
it to the lexical meaning of EX, I assume that emotivity is simply a property of (certain or even all)
expressive elements. (See also Potts & Roeper (2006) on the range of possible expressive small clauses,






types of conditional constructions, including hypothetical conditionals, (143), relevance
conditionals, (144), and factual conditionals, (145), cf. Iatridou (1991), Bhatt &
Pancheva (2006). The differences between them can be described informally as follows.
First, in the hypothetical conditional, (143), the if-clause specifies the circumstances
under which the consequent is true, all else being equal.
(143) hypothetical / event conditional (e.g. Iatridou 1991, Haegeman 2003)
[If the water drops below this line,] the heating will stop working.
Second, in the relevance conditional, (144), the if-clause specifies the circumstances
under which the truth of the consequent is relevant.
(144) relevance / biscuit conditional (e.g. Austin 1956, Iatridou 1991)
[If you really want to know,] I didn't go to school today.
Third, the distinguishing property of the factual conditional, (145), is that it presupposes
that somebody (in English, typically: someone other than the speaker) believes in the
truth of the antecedent proposition.
(145) factual /premise conditional (e.g. Iatridou 1991, Haegeman 2003)
A: I'm really tired.
B: [If you're so tired,] you should go to sleep.
Another type of if clause that we find in English is the interrogative if-clause (cf. Kayne
1991 and Bhatt & Pancheva 2006 for a discussion).
(146) interrogative if-clauses (e.g. Kayne 1991, Bhatt & Pancheva 2006)
I wonder [if the Duke sleeps in this bed].
Finally, it has been proposed that there is a further category, so-called non-logical if-
clauses, (147). This is the category I will be focusing on. While not addressed by Iatridou
(1991) or Bhatt & Pancheva (2006), these have been discussed in Carstairs (1973),
Williams (1974), Fabricius-Hansen (1980), Steriade (1981), Pullum (1987), Schmid
(1987), Pesetsky (1991), Rothstein (1995), Leonarduzzi (2004), Jugnet (2008) and Rau
(2008). Non-logical if-clauses differ from (logical) hypothetical conditionals as follows.
While they do have a 'logical' reading, illustrated in (147b), they have an additional
'non-logical' reading, illustrated in (147c) (though we will see that there are concerns
with the paraphrase in (147c)). This non-logical reading entails that in (147a+c) the
speaker would be happy about Bill being here, i.e. the antecedent proposition is subject
matter of the speaker's happiness. The logical reading of (147a), in (147b), does not
entail that the speaker would be happy about Bill being here; (147b) is compatible with a
scenario where the speaker hates for Bill to be here, but at the same time profits from Bill
being here in some indirect way.
(147) non-logical if-clauses, complement if-clauses (e.g. Williams 1974, Pesetsky 1991)
a. I would be happy [if Bill was/were here].
b. logical reading: If Bill were here, I would be happy as a consequence.
c. non-logical reading: I would be happy that Bill was here, if he were.
(adapted from Williams 1974:157, Pesetsky 1991:60)
The obvious question to be asked is which of the constructions in (143)-(147) is most
similar to an if-optative. Three options can be discarded straightforwardly. First, if-
optatives cannot be interrogative if-clauses. This follows from the fact that cross-
linguistically languages that obligatorily differentiate between interrogative if (i.e.
whether) and conditional ifrequire the latter in optatives. This is illustrated for German in
(148) and (149).
(148)a. Ich frage mich, ob / * wenn er kommt. German
I ask myself whether if he comes





ob / * wenn er gekommen ware.
whether if he come were
'I wonder if he would have come.'
(149)a. Wenn / * ob er
if whether he
'If only he comes!'
b. Wenn /*ob er
if whether he
'If only he had come!'
Similarly, if-optatives cannot be









assimilated to factual conditionals or relevance
(150). The factual conditional in (150a) presupposes
that there is evidence that it was already four o'clock when John left. Clearly, an optative
like (150b) does not presuppose that anyone believes in the truth of the proposition
expressed in the if-clause.
(150)a. If it was already four o'clock when he left, John will never make it.
(Haegeman 2003:322)
b. If only John had left at three o'clock!
Consider now the relevance conditional in (151 a); informally speaking, the if-clause 'if
you need anything' imposes a restriction on the speech act performed by the matrix
clause - the speaker's introducing herself as Jill is only relevant in circumstances where
the hearer needs something. Again, this is not how optatives work; in (151b), the if-
optative does not impose restrictions on some (covert / implied) speech act 0.
(15 1)a. If you need anything, I'm Jill.
(Franke 2007)
b. If only he had needed something/?* anything!
50 As indicated, optatives also differ from relevance conditionals (and other conditionals) with respect to
their licensing of polarity items. I will come back to this observation soon.
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We can conclude that optatives are not if-interrogatives, factual conditionals or relevance
conditionals.
The remaining two candidates are much less easily evaluated. I argue that optatives
are more like non-logical conditionals than like logical conditionals5 1 . As such, they
behave like complement clauses, expressing a subject matter of desire. Consider first the
sample if-optative in (152).
(152) Oh, if I had only not come to Petershof!
(Beatrice Harraden. 1893. Ships That Pass In The Night.) 2
Assuming that (152) expresses a simple wish or positive evaluation, we can paraphrase it
both in terms of a logical hypothetical conditional, as in (153), and by means of a non-
logical if-clause, as in (154). (These are merely examples of what (152) could mean; I do
not attribute any explanatory power to the choice of paraphrase; (154) might just as well
be construed as It would be preferable / better / great / wonderful ...)
(153) sample logical paraphrase of (152)
[If I had not come to Petershof,] everything would be fine.
(154) sample non-logical paraphrase of (152) (based on Williams 1974, Pesetsky 1991)
It would be good [if I had not come to Petershof].
It would be good [that I didn't come to Petershof], if I hadn't.
Another, more concise, example of the two possible interpretations is given in (155).
(155)a. If only I were rich!
b. logical analysis: If I were rich, all would be well as a consequence.
c. non-logical analysis: If I were rich, it would be a good thing that I am rich.
5 The idea to analyze optatives as non-logical conditionals was inspired by a paraphrase (it would be nice if
...) that David Stifter (p.c.) volunteered for an optative construction in German.
5 http://www.gutenberg.org/files/12476/12476-8.txt
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To show that optatives are more appropriately paraphrased as in (155b) (and not as in
(155a)), we can now turn to diagnostics from the literature. The discussion in the
following sections is based on correlations in the behavior of if-optatives and different if-
clauses. I assume the heuristic view that correlations in behavior may reflect parallel
underlying structures.
4.1.3.1 On Polarity in Optatives
In this chapter, I show that negative polarity items are dispreferred in both non-logical if-
clauses that express a positive evaluation and in if-optatives. Consider first the case of
non-logical if-clauses. Pullum (1987) credits Karina Wilkinson for the observation in
(156); while logical if-clauses allow for Negative Polarity Items (and Free Choice Items,
cf. Horn 1972, Ladusaw 1979, Carlson 1981), non-logical if-clauses disallow them.
(156)a. That panel drops down [if anyone pulls this lever]. logical if-clause
b.# It would be preferable [if anyone pulled this lever]. non-logical if-clause
(Pullum 1987)
Pesetsky (1991) corroborates this observation with further examples, pointing out an
asymmetry between right-peripheral and left-peripheral if-clauses. Only the right
peripheral ones disallow NPIs, (157)-(159). I will not be concerned with this asymmetry,
as my main interested is in possible parallels between (157a), (158a) and (159a) and
optatives.
(157) a.* I would like it [if anyone were to ask me about the painting].
b. [If anyone were to ask me about the painting], I would like it.
(Pesetsky 1991:61)
(158) a.* I will love it [if John ever looks at his books again].
b. [If John ever looks at his books again], I will love it.
(Pesetsky 1991:61)
(159)a.* I would appreciate it [if Sue were to budge an inch].
b. [If Sue were to budge an inch], I would appreciate it.
(Pesetsky 1991:61)
Two other caveats that Pesetsky introduces can be stated as follows. The anti-NPI-
licensing effect of non-logical if-clauses is dependent on the it in the matrix clause not
being coreferent with some contextually given entity, as shown in (160). This is
presumably due to the fact that (160) is understood as a garden-variety logical
conditional. When exploring judgments and intuitions, this confound should always be
controlled for.
(160) Q: How do you like the responsei to your painting?
A: I would like iti better [if anyone were to ask me about the painting].
(Pesetsky 1991:61)
Pesetsky also points out that non-logical if-clauses merely fail to license NPIs. They do
not block NPI licensing by a higher negative element, as shown in (161).
(161)a. I would not like it [if anyone were to ask me about the painting].
b. I would hate it [if anyone were to ask me about the painting].
(Pesetsky 1991:61)
The core observation in this section is that optatives behave like right-peripheral non-
logical if-clauses. The observation that optatives do not allow for Negative Polarity Items
is due to Gartner (2010). Gartner does not discuss non-logical if-clauses or draw the
parallels that I am drawing. Relevant examples are given for German in (162). As shown
in (162a), logical if-clauses allow for an NPI such as je 'ever', whereas non-logical if-
clauses disallow je 'ever', (162b). The crucial observation is that optatives, (162c+d),
pattern like non-logical if-clauses and unlike logical if-clauses. Naturally, in optatives that
contain particles such as doch and nur 'only', the particles may conceivably act as
interveners, blocking certain NPIs, such as je(mals) 'ever'. To control for this, I include
example (1 62d), without clause-medial particles.
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(162) a. logical if clause
Wir hatten gefeiert, [ wenn die Red Sox je(mals) gewonnen hatten].
we had celebrated if the Red Sox ever won had
'We would have celebrated [if the Red Sox had ever won].'
b. non-logical if clause
Es ware besser, [ wenn die Red Sox (?*je / *jemals) gewonnen hatten].
it were better if the Red Sox ever ever won had
'It would be better [if the Red Sox had (?*ever) won].'
c. independent ifoptative with particles
Wenn die Red Sox doch nur (?*je / *jemals) gewonnen hatten!
if the Red Sox DOCH only ever ever won had
'[If only the Red Sox had (?*ever) won]!'
d. independent ifoptative without particles
Ach, wenn die Red Sox (??je / ?*jemals) gewonnen hatten!
oh if the Red Sox ever ever won had
'[Oh, if the Red Sox had (?*ever) won]!'
For English, the same contrast can be reproduced. The if-optative in (163c) disallows
NPIs, like the non-logical if-clause in (163b) and unlike the logical ifclause in (163a).
Strikingly, optative conditionals also pattern like independent if-optatives, cf. (163d),
supporting a view where they consist of an if-optative followed by an implicitly
conditionalized declarative clause, cf. section 2.1.2.
(163) Context: For years, John was living in an old house, not knowing that there was a
gremlin in the old decorative box in his room that didn't seem to open. John never
tried to pry it open. One day the gremlin came out and ate John's cat.
a. logical if-clause
If John had (ever) opened that box, he would have noticed the gremlin in it.
b. non-logical ifclause
It would have been good if John had ("ever) opened that box.
c. independent if-optative
If only John had (*ever) opened that box!
d. optative conditional
If only John had (?*ever) opened that box, he would have noticed the gremlin in it.
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Note that the degradation of (163b) is surprisingly less strong than that of (163c+d). This
is presumably due to the fact that constructions with a non-logical if-clause always have a
reading where the if-clause is understood as a logical if-clause (and the matrix it is forced
to refer to something in the context). If this is the right way of interpreting the pattern, the
observed correlation (NPIs are bad in optatives and in non-logical if-clauses) is evidence
that optative if-clauses behave like non-logical if clauses rather than like logical if
clauses, and they do so quite consistently.
Given that only is by and large obligatory in English if-optatives, we cannot exclude
the possible confound that ill-formedness is due to intervention effects in (163c+d), as
given schematically in (164). However, such an intervention analysis seems implausible,
given that only itself typically acts as an NPI licensor, (165).
(164) NPI-licensor ... only(intervener) ... ever
X
(165) a. Only one person said anything.
b.# One person said anything.
Another example that shows the inability of optatives to license NPIs or free choice items
(FCIs) is given in (166).
(166) a. If he had said something/anything, the machine would have recorded it.
b. If only he had said something/?* anything!
The crucial patterns can thus be summarized as follows. While logical conditionals allow
for NPIs and FCIs, optatives and non-logical if-clauses disallow them. The contrast
between non-logical and logical if-clauses seems to be independent from positive
evaluation, as we saw in the contrast between (1 67a) and (1 67b), which both involve
positive evaluation.
(167)a. non-logical if-clause (with non-referential "it')
* I would like it [if anyone were to ask me about the painting].
(Pesetsky 1991:61)
b. logical if-clause (with referential "it')
Q: How do you like the responsei to your painting?
A: I would like iti better [if anyone were to ask me about the painting].
(Pesetsky 1991:61)
This parallel between if-optatives and non-logical if-clauses may thus indicate some
underlying parallels between the two constructions. The question that arises is why these
two types of if-clauses ban NPIs and FCs. It has been observed previously that
embedded factive clauses allow for such elements when the embedding predicate
expresses a negative evaluation, but not when it expresses a positive evaluation.
(168)a. I'm sorry [that I ever met him].
b.* I'm glad [that I ever met him].
(Linebarger 1987:328, brackets are mine)
If we assume that non-logical if-clauses involve complementation in the sense that the if-
clause is at some level of representation a complement of the matrix predicate,
Linebarger's judgments in (168) mirror Pesetsky's in (169).
(169) a. I would hate it [if anyone were to ask me about the painting].
b.* I would like it [if anyone were to ask me about the painting].
(Pesetsky 1991:61, brackets are mine)
If we assume that NPIs are licensed in the complement of negatively evaluative
predicates but not in the complement of positively evaluative predicates, the parallel
between (168) and (169) should follow from a theory in which non-logical if-clauses are
complement if-clauses, (170), as well as from a Pesetsky-Williams style analysis where
non-logical if-clauses undergo some copying process as in (171).
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(170) a. I would hate it [if anyone were to ask me about the painting].
complementation
b.* I would like it [if anyone were to ask me about the painting].
complementation
(171)a. I would hate it [if anyone were to ask me about the painting].
=> I would hate (it) that anyone asks me about the painting if anyone were to
ask me about the painting.
b.* I would like it [if anyone were to ask me about the painting].
=> I would like (it) that anyone asks me about the painting if anyone were to
ask me about the painting.
Similarly, given that optatives appear to express a wish, we could treat optatives as non-
logical if-clauses with a positively evaluative matrix predicate; this is illustrated in
(172b+c), where I WOULD LIKE IT symbolizes the matrix operator that selects the denoted
proposition as its complement. (172b) is the type of analysis that I am arguing for (see
also Kyriakaki 2007, 2008, 2009), positing a generalized EX instead of I WOULD LIKE IT;
an alternative understanding of (172b) would be that I WOULD LIKE IT is an elided matrix
clause; I argue against such a view in section 4.1.4.
(172) a. If only John had (?*ever) opened that box!
b. complementation analysis (sketch):
I WOULD LIKE IT [if only John had (?*ever) opened that box]!
c. Pesetsky- Williams style analysis (sketch):
I WOULD LIKE IT that John (?*ever) opened that box if he had ever opened
that box.
With respect to (1 72c), the data in section 4.1.4 indicate that the positive evaluation in an
optative cannot be in the scope of an adjunct clause; this suggests that such an analysis
(with the if-clause taking scope over EX) is unmotivated.
While it is beyond the scope of this section to provide a general analysis of non-
logical if-clauses, it can be argued that the Pesetsky-Williams style analysis in (171)
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seems to yield an incorrect meaning anyway. For simplicity, assume that (173a) and
(1 73b) are synonymous, which allows us to use a standard lexical entry for be glad from
Villalta (2007), based on Heim (1992).
(173) a. It is good [that Bill is here].
b. I am glad [that Bill is here].
Under the Pesetsky-Williams analysis, (1 74a) would have the LF in (1 74b).
(174) a. It would be good [if Bill were here].
b. [would [if Bill were here] [it be good [that Bill is here]]].
Assuming the (slightly simplified) standard lexical entries in (175a+b), we derive the
truth conditions in (175d).
(175) a. ||it be good that pfl = Xw.Vw' E Doxspeaker(w)
[Simw'(Doxspeaker(w) f P) >speaker,w Simw,(rev_,p(Doxspeaker(w) -p)]
where
- Simw,(W) is the set of worlds contained in W that are maximally similar to w'
- Doxspeaker(w) is the set of worlds compatible with what the speaker believes in w
- >speaker,w means 'more preferable to the speaker in w'
- revp(Doxspeaker(w)) contains all worlds in Doxspeaker(w) as well as the p-worlds most
similar to w
In words: "All p-worlds that are most similar to the actual world according to the
speaker's knowledge and beliefs are better than all of the most similar ,p worlds"
b. |Iwouldl = Xp . Xq . kw . Vw' [w' E Simw(Doxspeaker(w) f p) -+ q(w')]
In words: "All p-worlds that are most similar to the actual world according to the
speaker's knowledge and beliefs are also q-worlds"
c. ||if p| = IpIl
d. Ilwould(if p)(it be good that that p)Il =
kw.Vw'[w'E Simw(Doxspeaker(w) A p) -+ Vw" E DoXspeaker(w')
[Simw-(Doxspeaker(w') P) >speaker,w, Sim,-(revp(Doxspeaker(w)) n -p)]
In words: see (176a)
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In words, (175d) derives a meaning for (174b) that can be paraphrased as in (176a) -
importantly, the positive evaluation only holds in the counterfactual worlds in which Bill
is here. Crucially, what (174a) actually means is (176b), where the positive evaluation
53holds in the actual world, but this is not what we derive
(176) a. All else being equal, if we were in a world in which [p Bill is here], then (and
only then) it would be the case that [p Bill being here] is better than [.p Bill not
being here]. (derived incorrectly by (]75d))
b. It is the case in the actual world, that, all else being equal, if we were in a
world in which [p Bill is here], [p Bill being here] would be better than [,p Bill
not being here]. (not derived by the above analysis)
This problem does not hinge on the lexical entries in (175a+b), but stems from the fact
that the evaluative matrix predicate itself is embedded in the scope of the modal and thus
counterfactual (i.e. the evaluation does not take place in the actual world - it only takes
place in the counterfactual worlds that the modal quantifies over).
(177) [ifp [it would be preferable / good / wonderful [that p]]]
a
would ifp it is preferable/ that p
good/wonderful
The conclusion that it would be good ifp is not equivalent to ifp then it would be good
that p is corroborated by the following contrast. Example (178a) is consistent as I don't
want John to be here in the actual world, while I may benefit from it if he were here in
worlds where he is here. In contrast, example (178b) is contradictory, as the second
clause (it would be nice if he were here) seems to entail that in the actual world I want
John to be here.
5 See also von Fintel & Iatridou (2008) for further discussion of the distinction between desires that hold in
the actual world, as in (176b), and desires that hold in counterfactual worlds, as in (176a).
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(178) a. It's not the case that I want John to be here, but if he were here, it would be nice
that he's here.
b.# It's not the case that I want John to be here, but it would be nice if he were here.
This suggests that such an account may not be on the right track, i.e. more needs to be
said in any case, supporting an alternative view where non-logical if-clauses may after all
be complement if-clauses.
Returning to optatives, I henceforth assume that an analysis like (1 79b) is on the right
track, and, more specifically, I propose the generalized exclamation operator EX as in
(1 79c). (Section 4.1.4 provides evidence against a matrix clause deletion analysis.)
(179) a. If only John had (?*ever) opened that box!
b. I WOULD LIKE IT [if only John had (?*ever) opened that box]!
c. EXs [if only John had (?*ever) opened that box]!
One thing that is important to point out is that the scalar EX operator may not behave
uniformly with respect to NPI licensing. Reconsidering Linebarger's (1987:328)
examples, on which (180) is based on, it is plausible that I'm glad is the scalar antonym
of I'm sorry, i.e. scale orientation seems to matter for NPI licensing.
(180)a. I'm sorry [that I (ever) met him].
=> All else being equal, worlds in which I met him are lower on my
preference/desirability scale than worlds in which I didn't meet him.
b. I'm glad [that I (*ever) met him].
=> All else being equal, worlds in which I met him are higher on my
preference/desirability scale than worlds in which I didn't meet him.
We thus expect EX utterances to vary in their behavior, depending on which scale EX
combines with. As shown in (181), be surprised / amazed / astounded all license NPIs.
These predicates can be assumed to involve an inverse likelihood scale (cf. Villalta
2007).
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(181)a. She was surprised/amazed that there was any food left.
b. I'm / I was surprised that he budged an inch.
c. We were astounded that she lifted a finger to help considering her reputation
for laziness.
(Linebarger 1987:328,340,362)
I have argued that polar exclamatives are EX utterances where EX combines with an
inverse likelihood scale. We thus expect them to differ from optatives in their NPI
licensing behavior. Consider first a baseline example of an utterance that has an optative
reading and a polar exclamative reading.
(182)a. Mensch, dass dieser Kandidat einmal einen Forderpreis erhalten hat!
man that this candidate once a grant received has
'Man, that this candidate has once received a grant!'
b. scenario for optative reading
We are auditioning different candidates for a new job. So far, none of our
candidates has ever received a grant. We are tired and desperate and really hope
that the candidate who is about to enter has received a grant at least once.
paraphrase: '[Let's hope] that this candidate has once received a grant!'
c. scenario for polar exclamative reading
We are auditioning different candidates for a new job. Our last candidate was a
complete disaster and we consider him completely incompetent. However, he
has received a grant once in his career, which shocks us. After he leaves, we
express our shock (and dismay) at this fact.
paraphrase: '[It's shocking] that this candidate has once received a grant!'
Based on the above discussion, we predict the following. If we replace einmal 'once' by
the NPIje(mals) 'ever', the optative reading should disappear, but the polar exclamative
reading should still be possible. This is exactly what we find, as given in (183).
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(183) Mensch, dass dieser Kandidat je(mals) einen F6rderpreis erhalten hat!
man that this candidate ever a grant received has
'Man, that this candidate has ever received a grant!'
* optative reading
/ polar exclamative reading
The observation is supported by the fact that future-oriented statements of this sort
become deviant with an NPI, as future-orientation typically clashes with the factivity
found in polar exclamatives. This is shown in (184).
(1 84)?#Mensch, dass der nachste Kandidat je(mals) einen F6rderpreis erhalten hat!
man that the next candidate ever a grant received has
'Man, that this candidate has ever received a grant!'
*optative reading / ?#polar exclamative reading
The baseline example without NPI is given in (185), which clearly contrasts with (184).
(185) Mensch, dass der nachste Kandidat einmal einen F6rderpreis erhalten hat!
man that the next candidate once a grant received has
'Man, that this candidate has at least once received a grant!'
/optative reading / ?# polar exclamative reading
These facts thus support a view where optatives (and polar exclamatives) involve a covert
EX operator and NPI licensing properties derive from the type of scale that EX combines
with. However, this is a good point to emphasize that these facts are also compatible with
a matrix clause deletion approach (where polar exclamatives contain an elided I'm
surprised that and optatives contain an elided It would be good if). I argue against such
an option in section 4.1.4. Before doing so, I discuss more parallels between non-logical
if-clauses and if-optatives in the following sections, arguing that they further support a
view that treats optatives as some type of complement clause.
4.1.3.2 On Inversion in Optatives
Having argued that optatives, like non-logical conditionals, quite generally do not allow
for NPIs, a second argument can be made in favor of treating optatives on a par with non-
logical conditionals, as cases where the denoted proposition provides the subject matter
of emotion (Pesetsky 1994) for a higher emotive predicate.
The relevant observation for non-logical conditionals is that their potential for V-to-C
movement (conditional inversion, cf. Iatridou & Embick 1994) is limited if they are in
the indicative mood (cf. Reis & W6llstein 2010 for German). Native speakers of Dutch
and German observe contrasts such as the following. Dutch allows for conditional
inversion in indicative conditionals that have a logical reading, shown in (186).
(186) Dutch logical conditional
a. Als het water onder deze lijn zakt, wordt de verwarming uitgeschakeld.
if the water below this line sinks is the heating turned.off
'If the water drops below this line, the heating will turn off.'
b. Zakt het water onder deze lijn, wordt de verwarming uitgeschakeld.
sinks the water below this line is the heating turned.off
'If the water drops below this line, the heating will turn off.'
Contrastively, such conditional inversion is constrained in indicative conditionals with a
non-logical reading, shown in (187).
(187) Dutch non-logical conditional
a. Als Otto vandaag thuis blijft, is het beter.
if Otto today at.home stays is it better
'If Otto stays at home today, it's better.'
b. ?? Blijft Otto vandaag thuis, is het beter.
stays Otto today at.home is it better
'If Otto stays at home today, it's better.'
The same effect can be reproduced for German, shown in (188) and (189).
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(188) German logical conditional
a. Wenn der Wasserstand unter diese Linie sinkt, dann schaltet sich
if the water below this line sinks then turns self
die Heizung aus.
the heating off
'If the water drops below this line, the heating will turn off.'
b. Sinkt der Wasserstand unter diese Linie, dann schaltet sich die
sinks the water below this line then turns self the
Heizung aus.
heating off
'If the water drops below this line, the heating will turn off.'
(189) German non-logical conditional
a. Wenn der Otto heute zuhause bleibt, dann ist es besser.
if the Otto today at.home stays then is it better
'If Otto stays at home today, then it's better.'
b. ?? Bleibt der Otto heute zuhause, dann ist es besser.
stays the Otto today at.home then is it better
'If Otto stays at home today, then it's better.'
Crucially, indicative if-optatives behave like non-logical if-clauses and not like logical if-
clauses. Conditional inversion is impossible, as shown in (190) for Dutch and in (191) for
German. Presumably the reason that the effect is so much stronger here is due to the
possibility of treating the non-optative if-clauses in (187) and (189) as logical
conditionals.
(190) Dutch if-optative
a. Als de sneeuw nou maar lang genoeg blijft liggen!
if the snow PRT PRT long enough stays lie
'If only the snow stays put for long enough!'
b.* Blijft de sneeuw nou maar lang genoeg liggen!
stays the snow PRT PRT long enough lie
'If only the snow stays put for long enough!'
(191) German if-optative
a. Wenn es heute nur JA schneit!
if it today only JA snows
'If only it snows today!'
b. * Schneit es heute nur JA!
snows it today only JA
'If only it snows today!'
This is further evidence that if-optatives behave like non-logical if-clauses rather than like
logical if-clauses, namely as constructions where the denoted proposition is treated as
'complement' to some higher operator (which I implement by positing EX).
The question arises, once again, how to derive the contrast between optatives and
non-logical if-clauses on the one hand, and logical if-clauses on the other hand. I will
discuss these facts in chapter 5. For now, it suffices to state that indicative conditionals
that allow for conditional inversion are marked in that they have specific properties /
restrictions different from other conditionals (cf. Iatridou & Embick 1994, Reis &
Wdllstein 2010).
4.1.3.3 On Morphological Tense and Mood in Optatives
Further support for grouping if-optatives with non-logical if-clauses may be drawn from
mood matching effects (which plausibly relate to sequence of tense effects). German and
English differ in the following way. Only German allows for indicative non-
counterfactual optatives (although Rifkin 2000 and Biezma 2011 ab report that a subset of
English speakers allow for these, too); this is shown in (192).
(192)a. (')* If only it snows today!
b. Wenn es heute nur schneit!
if it today only snows
'If only it snows today!'
In contrast, both languages allow for counterfactual optatives. These can be past-oriented,
like (193), or non-past-oriented, like (194).
(193)a. If only it had snowed yesterday!
b. Wenn es gestem nur geschneit hitte!
if it yesterday only snowed had
'If only it had snowed yesterday!'
(194) a. If only it snowed today!
b. Wenn es heute nur schneien wurde!
if it today only snow would
'If only it would snow today!'
For now, let us make the auxiliary assumption that if-optatives always behave as if they
were embedded under a subjunctive matrix clause, like it would be nice. I will not
literally assume that this is the case, but rather assume that mood choice in if clauses is
sensitive to embedding material (which may come in the form of a matrix clause or in the
form of a higher operator such as EX), see also chapter 5. The difference between English
and German can then be reduced to language specific requirements on mood selection. In
German, (195a) is grammatical, even though the matrix clause is in the subjunctive and
the if clause in the indicative (a 'mood mismatch'). Crucially, the indicative ifoptative in
(195b) is equally grammatical in German.
(195) a. Es wire sch6n, [wenn es heute schneit]!
it were nice if it today snows
'It would be nice [if it snows today].'
b. Wenn es heute nur schneit!
if it today only snows
'If only it snows today!'
In contrast, in English, (196a) is judged ungrammatical or at least degraded. This
correlates with the ungrammaticality of (196b). The fact that some speakers accept
(1 96b) may then correspond to the observation that some speakers accept (1 96a) (though
a thorough investigation of this matter is necessary in future research).
(196)a. "It would be nice [if it snows today].
b.("/*)*If only it snows today!
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Naturally, if the if-clause is in the subjunctive, as in the minimally contrasting example
(197a), no such issue arises, as the two clauses then match in their mood. This correlates
with the grammaticality of (1 97b).
(197) a. It would be nice [if it snowed today].
b. If only it snowed today!
Naturally, the German examples in (198) are equally acceptable. These are given for
completeness' sake.
(198) a. Es ware sch6n, [wenn es heute schneien wu*rde]!
it were nice if it today snow would
'It would be nice [if it snowed today].'
b. Wenn es heute nur schneien wuirde!
if it today only snow would
'If only it snowed today!'
What (195)-(197) show is that the possible mood specifications in optatives correlate
with the mood specifications that are possible in an if-clause that is subordinated to the
subjunctive matrix clause it would be nice. Evidently, this is another correlation between
non-logical if-clauses and if-optatives, supporting the view that if-optatives are some type
of complement clause.
A challenge to this view arises from the stipulation that EX behaves like a subjunctive
matrix clause in terms of the mood that it imposes on its if-clause complement. One
might wonder why EX cannot behave like an indicative matrix clause. Crucially, example
(199) shows that non-logical if-clauses are generally degraded in the scope of indicative
matrix clauses, so even if EX was to pattern on a par with such clauses, the results would
be the same. We can thus conclude that optatives (which I analyze as EX-utterances)
pattern on a par with non-logical if-clauses when it comes to mood selection in the if-
clause.
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(199) a.* It is nice [if it snows today].
b.?? It will be nice [if it snows today].
Logical if-clauses have no restriction of this type, as shown in (200b), which is perfectly
grammatical. These observations thus provide further support for grouping if-optatives
with non-logical if-clauses,
(200) a. [If it snowed today], we would have a lot of fun.
b. [If it snows today], we will have a lot of fun.
Concluding that if-optatives and non-logical if-clauses have similar mood selection
requirements, we can also conjecture that there should be a cross-linguistic correlation
between the absence of mood matching in non-logical conditionals and the possibility of
indicative if-optatives. We predict that only languages that do not require the subjunctive
in non-logical if-clauses allow for indicative if-optatives.
Comparing Serbian/Croatian to Czech, we find evidence that this is a correct
prediction. In Serbian (and Croatian), we observe that non-logical conditionals can be in
the present tense indicative, as shown in (201 b).
(201)a. Bilo bi dobro [da je padala kisha danas]. Serbian
was subj good that is fallen rain today
'It would be good if it rained today.'
b. Bilo bi dobro [da pada kisha danas].
was subj good that falls rain today
'It would be good if it rains today.'
As predicted, indicative optatives are possible, as shown in (202b).
(202)a. Da je samo padala kisha danas! Serbian
that is only fallen rain today
'If only it rained today!'
54 However, compare Pesetsky's (1991:65) example in (i).
i. I will love it [if John never looks at his books again].
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b. Da samo pada kisha
that only falls rain
'If only it rains today!'
Contrastively, Czech







exhibits a behavior like in English; as shown in (203b), present
possible in a non-logical if-clause.
dobre [kdyby dnes
good if today
good if it rained today.'
dobr6 [kdyz dnes
good if today





Again, we predict correctly that Czech does not allow for indicative
(204b+c).
(204)a. Kdyby jen dnes prselo!
if only today rained
'If only it rained today!'
b.# Kdyz dnes jen prsi.
if today only rains
'If it only rains today..' (incomplete statement with narrow focus)
c.* Kdyz jen dnes prsi.
if only today rains
'If only it rains today!'
if-optatives,
Czech
The difference between Serbian/Croatian and Czech thus mirrors the difference between
German and English. These facts support the cross-linguistic generalization that
languages exhibit a correlation between the possibility of indicative if-optatives and the
possibility of indicative non-logical if-clauses in combination with subjunctive-marked
matrix clauses. This is a further parallel between the two types of constructions, which
follows if the mood selection properties of if-clauses are identical in the scope of EX and




4.1.3.4 On the Range of Functions for EX-Utterances
Further motivation for approximating if-optatives to non-logical if-clauses stems from the
fact that non-logical if-clauses typically express some type of Subject Matter of Emotion
(Pesetsky 1991, 1994). This observation goes back to Williams (1974); it is illustrated in
(205) and (206): Evaluative predicates like shame(ful) and sorry can combine with a non-
logical if-clause, but non-evaluative predicates like unlikely and convinced cannot do so.
(205) a. It would be a shame / *unlikely [if Bob left].
b. It is shameful / unlikely [that Bob left].
(adapted from Williams 1974:158)
(206) a. I would be sorry / *convinced [if Bob left].
b. I am sorry / convinced [that Bob left].
(adapted from Williams 1974:158-159)
Pullum (1987) gives a selection of examples that contain a non-logical if-clause and
express a positive evaluation, given in (207).
(207) a. It would be preferable [if Kim were not informed].
b. It might be better [if I were not here when Lee returned].
c. It will be great [if Tracy is there].
d. It would be wonderful [if unicorns existed].
e. I would be grateful [if Kim were not informed].
f. It would be a good thing [if Kim were not informed].
g. I would prefer it [if Kim were not informed].
h. Wendy would appreciate it [if she were left alone from now on].
i. I would really dig it [if you tickled my toes].
j. I wouldn't object to it [if you left early].
k. Lee would be quite happy about it [if you borrowed the car].
1. Would you be comfortable with it [if we stayed an extra day]?
m. I hope you wouldn't have any problem with it [if Dana were invited].
n. The Dean would be appreciative of it [if his desk were returned].
(Pullum 1987)
The link to optatives is obvious, as optatives express a positive evaluation. Example
(208a) seems similar in meaning to example (207d). In the same vein, example (208b)
corresponds to (207h), and example (208c) to example (207n).
(208) a. If only unicorns existed!
b. If only she were left alone from now on!
c. If only his desk were returned!
What is more, in addition to independent if-optatives, we find other types of independent
if-clauses in German, which correspond to the other functions of non-logical if-clauses.
Assuming that optatives express positive evaluation, let us now consider negative
evaluation.
Assume that there is an "anti-optative", or rather, as I will call it, an adversative.
(Again this is a purely descriptive concept.) An adversative utterance can then be defined
as an utterance that expresses disgust, rejection, dislike or reprimand without containing a
lexical item that means disgust, rejection, dislike or reprimand. We can then start looking
for (independent) if-adversatives, defined as conditional antecedents that can be used in
an adversative utterance and are not accompanied by an overt matrix clause. While we do
not find if-adversatives in English, German does seem to have such constructions,
illustrated in (209a) and (209b). Scholz (1991) treats the two types as fundamentally
distinct in function, but for our purposes such a distinction is not motivated; both express
a negative evaluation, as illustrated by means of the paraphrase in terms of a non-logical
if-clause. Example (209a) is used to express a reprimand; example (209b) is used to
express dislike, rejection or disgust.
(209)a. Wenn du ihn halt auch so lange hast warten lassen!
if you him HALT also so long have wait let
lit. 'Well, if you had to make him wait for so long!'
'Of course he'll hate it [if you make him wait for so long]!'
(Scholz 1991:45, translations and paraphrases are mine)
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b. Mein Gott! Der Olaf! Wenn ich den schon sehe!
my God the Olaf if I him already see
lit. 'My God! Olaf! If I just see him!'
~'It makes me sick [if I see Olaf]!'
(Scholz 1991:48, translations and paraphrases are mine)
Non-logical if-clauses that express a negative evaluation are shown in (210).
(210)a. It would be a shame [if Bob left].
(Williams 1974)
b. I would consider it odd [if he left].
c. I'd complain about it [if our coffee break were shortened].
d. Kim would be cut up over it [if our coffee break were shortened].
(Pullum 1987)
In sum, we have so far seen that unembedded if-clauses can express a positive or negative
evaluation, and so can non-logical if-clauses.
To complete the typology of independent if-clauses and non-logical if-clauses, we can
also define admirative utterances as utterances that express surprise, irony, doubt or
sarcasm without containing a lexical item that means surprise or doubt. An (independent)
if-admirative is then an if-clause that acts as an admirative utterance without an
accompanying matrix clause. German seems to have such if-admiratives, as illustrated in
(211), with a paraphrase that employs a non-logical if-clause. (In a way, these clauses
may be just labeled if-exclamatives, which is the label that I will use later on.)
(211) Wenn das mal keine guten Nachrichten sind.
if that MAL no good news are
'Well, if this isn't good news!'
-'It would surprise me [if this isn't good news].'
(Scholz 1991:43, translations and paraphrases are mine)
Non-logical if-clauses that serve the purpose of evaluating whether something is
surprising or unsurprising are found in the literature, as shown in (212).
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(212) a. It wouldn't surprise me [if she came].
(Jackendoff 1977)
b. It would surprise me [if she were able to accept].
(Pullum 1987)
To conclude, I have shown in this section that exclamations (which plausibly all involve
the EX operator) exhibit the same range of variation as non-logical if-clauses. Their
function is to express the subject matter of emotion to some (null) predicate, which I take
to be EX in the case of exclamations.
4.1.3.5 Interim Summary
In this section, I have argued that there is quite generally a correlation in behavior
between if-optatives and non-logical if-clauses (as opposed to logical if-clauses). First,
both types of if-clauses disallow NPI items. Second, both non-logical if-clauses and if-
optatives in Dutch and German disprefer conditional inversion. Third, both types of
constructions correlate in their constraints on mood marking. Fourth, and finally, both
types of constructions are typical for contexts where the ifclause is understood as the
Subject Matter of Emotion (Pesetsky 1991, 1994). I interpret this connection as indicating
that if-optatives are complements of some higher predicate, in the same way in which
non-logical if-clauses may be treated as complement if-clauses. As it stands, there are
different options of how to implement such a view, one of which employs matrix clause
deletion. In the next section, I will show that there is evidence against matrix clause
deletion, i.e. the higher predicate cannot be a null attitude verb. By contrast, I argue for a
generalized exclamation operator EX, which performs the function of semantically
embedding the expressed proposition.
4.1.4 Optative clauses do not involve matrix clause deletion
In this section, I argue that even though optatives behave like complement clauses (see
section 4.1.3), they are not embedded in a larger matrix clause. In other words, they do
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not contain an unpronounced (or 'elided') matrix clause. This means that the embedding
operator (Op in (142)) cannot be an attitude verb in a higher clause, against (213a); by
contrast, I argue that this operator is located in the left periphery of the optative clause
itself, as shown in (213b).
Sub-Claim 2: Optatives are truly unembedded utterances
the wrong analysis:
X [VP ... V [ce DaB / Wenn er doch nur rechtzeitig
that if he doch only in.time
'If only he had come in time!'
b. the right analysis:
[ExcP EX [cp DaB / Wenn er doch nur rechtzeitig
U that if he doch only in.time





Let me first provide some background on the issue at stake. The question of whether
matrix clause deletion exists is a general problem for linguistic theory, which arises
whenever we encounter utterances that have the morphosyntax of embedded clauses (e.g.
an overt complementizer), but the distribution of matrix clauses. Example (214a) (from
Evans 2007:373) is perceived to be an if-optative without an optative particle. (We will
come back to this in chapter 6.) Example (214b) is a corresponding that-optative. Both
clauses have the morphosyntax of embedded clauses (complementizer wenn 'if' or dass
'that', and absence of verb-second movement), but they both can occur without an overt
matrix clause. This phenomenon is descriptively subsumed under the term







ich deine Statur hatte!
I your build had
If [only] I had your build!'
ich deine Statur hatte!
I your build had







Evans (2007) argues that insubordination involves the reconstruction of an omitted
matrix clause. This is illustrated in (215a) (from Evans 2007:373; formatting and glossing
convention are mine) and (215b).
(215) a. [Es wr sehsn,] Wenn ich deine Statur hatte!
it were lovely if I your build had
'[It would be lovely] if I had your build.'
b. [Ieh-wAinsehte,] Dass ich deine Statur hatte!
I wish that I your build had
'[I wish] I had your build.'
The question that is most relevant for our purposes is whether we are dealing with ellipsis
of the familiar type (subsuming different configurations such as VP ellipsis, sluicing or
fragment answers, see Merchant 2001 for an overview). Such ellipsis should have a
structural reflex, which can be detected, i.e. the elided material should be present in the
syntax and simply remain unpronounced at PF. I will call such a view the deletion
hypothesis, which contrasts with the independence hypothesis that if-optatives and that-
optatives do not involve unpronounced material of this type. In the next section, I provide
a novel argument to show that if-optatives and that-optatives do not involve deletion of a
matrix clause at PF. I will then review previous arguments that corroborate my proposal.
I conclude that we cannot be dealing with ellipsis of the familiar type; the facts support
the independence hypothesis and not the deletion hypothesis.
4.1.4.1 The core argument against matrix clause deletion
In this section, I propose a novel argument against a deletion analysis of both if-optatives
and that-optatives. The core premise is that an adverbial clause can take scope over a
matrix clause if and only if that matrix clause is syntactically projected; therefore, if there
is an unpronounced matrix clause in an if-optative or that-optative, any adverbial should
be able to take scope over it that can otherwise scope over its overt counterpart. (This
diagnostic is based on Ross 1970, Lakoff 1970:172-173, see also Levinson 1983:249.)
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Consider first two examples that allow for weil 'because' to take scope over a
conditional clause. (216a) is clearly a logical conditional, whereas (216b) arguably has a
non-logical reading. The weil 'because' clause can take scope over either matrix clause.
(216)a. [Alles wsire gut, wenn Hans gekommen ware,] weil er immer
all were good if Hans come were because he always
guten Wein mitbringt.
good wine brings
'All would be well if Hans had come, because he always brings good wine.'
V because he always brings good wine > [all would be well if Hans had come]
b.[ Es waire besser, wenn Hans gekommen ware,] weil er immer
it were better if Hans come were because he always
guten Wein mitbringt.
good wine brings
'It would be better if Hans had come, because he always brings good wine.'
V because he always brings good wine > [it would be better if Hans had come]
The logic of the following tests is that weil 'because' clauses should be able to take scope
over the positive evaluation component of an if-optative (or that-optative) if the positive
evaluation is encoded by means of an elided matrix clause. These tests can be carried out
independently of whether the if-clause is a logical if-clause, (216a), or a non-logical if-
clause, (216b). I will show that optatives cannot involve matrix clause deletion no matter
whether they are analyzed as logical or non-logical if-clauses, i.e. this proposal is
independent from the proposal in section 4.1.3.
Before carrying out these tests, I consider it necessary to qualify the diagnostic and
show why this diagnostic cannot be straightforwardly applied to English. The problem is
that there is a variant of weil 'because' clauses that occurs much more freely and
unrestricted than what is required by the diagnostic outlined above (easily detectable in
German as it requires verb second); I will call these weil-clauses free adverbials. Such
free-adverbial because-clauses can seemingly modify anything, even secondary speech
acts, as shown in (217a), where the because-clause modifies the secondary speech act (cf.
Levinson 1983 for a discussion) and not the literal meaning; crucially, in German, free-
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adverbial because-clauses require verb-second, as shown in (217a) versus (217b). In
(217b), which is verb final, the free adverbial reading is blocked. For background on
weil-V2-clauses, see Antomo & Steinbach (2010) and references therein.
(217) a. K6nntest du mir bitte meinen Koffer runtergeben?, weil ich
could you me please my suitcase pass.down because I
habe Probleme mit meinem Arm.
have problems with my arm
'Could you please lift down my suitcase?, because I have problems with my
arm.'
/ because I have problems with my arm > [I ask you to [pass me my suitcase]]
b. * Kdnntest du mir bitte meinen Koffer runtergeben?, weil ich
could you me please my suitcase pass.down because I
Probleme mit meinem Arm habe.
problems with my arm have
'Could you please lift down my suitcase?, because I have problems with my
arm.'
Another illustration is given in (218). Again, the verb-second because-clause in (218a)
allows for a free adverbial interpretation, taking scope over the secondary speech act,
whereas the verb-final because-clause in (218b) disallows such a reading.
(218) a. Warum nicht einmal Kant lesen?, weil davon schlift doch
why not once Kant read because from.that sleeps DOCH
jeder ein.
everyone v.prt
'Why not read Kant?, because everyone falls asleep from doing that.'
/ because everyone falls asleep from reading Kant> [I recommend that you
[read Kant]]
b.* Warum nicht einmal Kant lesen?, weil davon doch
why not once Kant read because from.that DOCH
jeder einschlaft.
everyone falls.asleep
'Why not read Kant?, because everyone falls asleep from doing that.'
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Having established this, the diagnostic can be formulated as follows. If a verb-final
because-clause can take scope over the positive evaluation component of an if-clause that
seems to express positive evaluation, we can conclude that there is an unpronounced
matrix clause. If a verb-final because-clause cannot do so, we can conclude that there is
no unpronounced matrix clause. Clearly, this does not work as straightforwardly for
English, as we do not have a way (except for intonational cues) to block a free adverbial
reading".
Reconsider a baseline example of conditionals modified by a verb-final because-
clause; our test examples will be based on this one. Example (219a) is a clear case of a
logical conditional, whereas (219b) can be argued to have a non-logical reading. In both
cases, the matrix clause can be in the scope of the because-clause, as indicated.
(219) a. Die Party wdre ein Erfolg gewesen, wenn Hans gekommen
the party were a success been if Hans come
weil er immer guten Wein mitbringt.
because he always good wine brings
'The party would have been a success if Hans had come, because he alwa:
brings good wine.'
/ because he always brings good wine > [the party would have been a
success if Hans had come]
b. Es ware besser gewesen, wenn Hans gekommen ware, weil
it were better been if Hans come were beca
er immer guten Wein mitbringt.
he always good wine brings
'It would have been better if Hans had come, because he always brings go
wine.'







5s It is conceivable that other adverbials in English behave on a par with German verb-final because
clauses. Two plausible candidates are clauses initiated by contrary (as in contrary to what John said) and
adverbials such asfor obvious reasons.
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Consider now a case of an answer fragment, given in (220). Answer fragments quite
uncontroversially involve deletion of the 'topical part' (i.e. the old information),
Merchant (2004). Example (220a) shows that a verb-final because-clause can combine
with a logical if-clause that is uttered in response to a question; example (220b) shows
that a verb-final because-clause can combine with a non-logical if-clause, also in
response to a question. This is predicted, given our above premise; we can consider this a
confirmation of the proposed diagnostic. (In the LF line, I use strikethrough to mark
unpronounced material present at LF.)
(220) a. A: Unter welchen Umstanden ware die Party ein Erfolg gewesen?
under which circumstances were the party a success been
'Under which circumstances would the party have been a success?'
B: Wenn Hans gekommen ware weil er immer guten Wein
if Hans come were since he always good wine
mitbringt.
brings
'If Hans had come, because he always brings good wine.'
/ because he always brings good wine > [The party would have been a
success if Hans had come]
LF: [The party would have been a success if Hans had come], because he
always brings good wine.
b. A: Was ware besser gewesen?
what were better been
'What would have been better?'
B: Wenn Hans gekommen ware weil er immer guten Wein
if Hans come were since he always good wine
mitbringt.
brings
'If Hans had come, because he always brings good wine.'
/ because he always brings good wine > [it would have been better if Hans
had come]
LF: [it would have ben better if Hans had come], because he always
brings good wine.
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We can thus conclude that verb-final because-clauses can combine with a conditional that
contains an elided matrix clause, taking scope over the entire construction. The same test
can now be applied to if-optatives, in (221). Crucially, I argue that (221) shows that there
is no elided matrix clause, as the because-clause cannot take scope over the positive
evaluation. A possible alternative explanation might of course be that there is an
unpronounced matrix clause that just conflicts with the relevant because-clause.
However, given that positive evaluation makes propositions like 'I would be happy', 'it
would be good' or 'all would be well' salient, these are the most likely contenders for an
elided and contextually licensed matrix clause. All of these should be compatible with the
because-clause, as shown in (220). The burden of the proof is thus on whoever argues in
favor of matrix clause deletion to show that (221) is impossible because of the matrix
clause that is filled in.
(221) Wenn Hans doch nur gekommen ware (#weil er immer
if Hans DOCH only come were because he always
guten Wein mitbringt).
good wine brings
'If only Hans had come (#because he always brings good wine).'
* because he always brings good wine > [I would be happy ifHans had come]
* because he always brings good wine > [it would be good ifHans had come]
* because he always brings good wine > [all would be well if Hans had come]
For completeness, it is useful to point out that the only possible reading for the because-
clause is one where it takes narrow scope over Hans's reason for coming. This reading
for (221) is illustrated in (222), which is clearly bizarre, as Hans's reason for coming can
hardly be that he always brings good wine (though we might conceive of a context where
this is good).
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(222) ??? Wenn Hans doch nur gekommen ware weil er immer
if Hans DOCH only come were because he always
guten Wein mitbringt, und nicht weil er seine Wohnung hasst.
good wine brings and not because he his apartment hates
'If only Hans had come because he always brings good wine, and not because
he hates his apartment.'
/ I wish > because he always brings good wine > Hans had come
'I wish that [Hans's reason for coming had been that he always brings good
wine and not that he hates his apartment]'
These examples show that adverbial clauses that combine with optatives cannot take
scope over the positive evaluation; this indicates that the positive evaluation is not
expressed by means of an unpronounced matrix clause. We can conclude that optatives
do not contain an unpronounced matrix clause.
As a control example, (223) shows that the overt matrix clause in optative
conditionals (defined as conditional clauses that contain a seemingly optative antecedent)
can be in the scope of a because-clause. This may be taken to indicate that the facts in
(221) do not just derive from a constraint that optatives may not be in the scope of
because-clauses. (Alternatively, as I argue, cases like (223) might involve parenthetical
if-optatives as opposed to truly embedded if-optatives, i.e. the because clause attaches
directly to an implicitly conditionalized matrix clause, with a parenthetical if-optative.)
(223) [Alles ware gut, wenn Hans doch nur gekommen ware], weil
all were good if Hans DOCH only come were since
er immer guten Wein mitbringt.
he always good wine brings
'Everything would be alright if only Hans had come, because he always brings
good wine.'
/ because he always brings good wine > [everything would be alright ifHans
had come]
Importantly, the present conclusion carries over to that-optatives. Example (224) shows
that a verb-final because-clause can take scope over a matrix clause of the form I wish.
127
(224) Ich wnnschte, dass Hans gekommen ware, weil er immer
I wished that Hans come were because he always
guten Wein mitbringt.
good wine brings
'I wish Hans had come, because he always brings good wine.
V because he always brings good wine > [I wish Hans had come]
Correspondingly, in the fragment answer in (225) the because-clause can take scope over
an unpronounced matrix clause.
(225) A: Was wurdest du dir wunschen?
what would you you wish
'What would you wish for?'
B: Dass Hans gekommen ware, weil er immer guten Wein mitbringt.
that Hans come were because he always good wine brings
'That Hans had come, because he always brings good wine.'
/ because he always brings good wine > [I wish Hans had come]
LF: [I-wish that Hans had come], because he always brings good wine.
Again, in the that-optative, it is not possible to have a the because-clause with scope over
the positive evaluation / wish, as shown in (226).
(226) Dass Hans doch nur gekommen ware, (#weil er immer guten
that Hans DOCH only come were because he always good
Wein mitbringt.
wine brings
'That Hans had but come, (#because he always brings good wine).'
* because he always brings good wine > [I wish Hans had come]
V I wish > because he always brings good wine > [Hans had come]
As a final note, it is worth pointing out that even nicht-dass-clauses, which are a type of
order/command, seem to be truly unembedded (though they cannot be used as answers to
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any questions, which is why the following paradigm is deficient). The ill-formed example
(227c) contrasts with the well-formed (227a) in that (227a) allows the verb-final weil-
clause to scope over the expression of my desire, whereas (227c) doesn't allow this.
Again, the verb-second weil-clauses in (227b) and (227d) are the control cases.












du wieder soviel trinkst,
you again so.much drink
wieder mit mir schimpft!
again with me scolds
du wieder soviel trinkst,
you again so.much drink
weil die Mama schimpft dann
because the mum scolds then
c. # Nicht dass du wieder soviel
not that you again so.much
weil die Mama dann wieder
because the mum then again
d. Nicht dass du wieder soviel
not that you again so.much
weil die Mama schimpft dann


















'(I) don't (want) you to get so drunk again, because mum always scolds me!'
In brief, we can conclude that German exhibits a broad paradigm of truly unsubordinated
clauses with the syntax of subordinated clauses. Most crucially, we can conclude that
neither if-optatives nor that-optatives contain an unpronounced matrix clause expressing
the positive evaluation that they convey. In connection with the fact that optatives seem
to behave like complement clauses, I proceed to argue that there is an operator (EX) in
the left periphery of an optative clause, which takes the core clause as its complement.
Before doing so, let us however review two previous arguments against matrix clause
deletion, posited by Scholz (1991) and Rifkin (2000), which corroborate the present
claim.
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4.1.4.2 Further evidence against matrix clause deletion: Scholz (1991)
Scholz (1991) quotes several earlier proponents of the deletion hypothesis5 6 (see also
Evans 2007); she points out that their main argument is circular in that the authors base
their arguments for matrix clause deletion on the fact that optatives have the
morphosyntax of embedded clauses. To illustrate, Scholz (1991:7) considers (228c-h) as
possible reconstructed consequents for the if-optative in (228a) and its counterpart with
V-to-C movement in (228b). She attributes (228c+h) to Kasper (1987:108-109)57.
(228) a. Wenn du mir (doch nur) geholfen hatte
if you me DOCH only helped had
'If (only) you had helped me, ... '
b. Hattest du mir (doch nur ) geholfen, ...
had you me DOCH only helped
'Had you (only) helped me, ... '
c. ... dann ware mein Wunsch erfUllt.
then were my wish fulfilled
'... then my wish would have been fulfilled.'
d. ... dann hatte ich, was ich wUnschte.
then had I what I wish
'... then I would have what I wish for.'
e. ... dann ware ich froh.
then were I happy
'... then I would be happy.'
f. ... dann ware es gut.
then were it good
'... then it would be good.'







then could I finally continue,working
'... then I could finally go on working.'
56 Erben (1972:113), Glinz (1971:116-117), Heidolph et al (1981:93), Helbig/Buscha (1981:174),
Schulz/Griesbach (1982:391), Drosdowski (1984:159-160), Jager (1971:205), Flamig (1962:19), Buscha
(1976:275), Kasper (1987:108-109) and Zaefferer (1987:284)
1 As Truckenbrodt (2006a) points out, a matrix clause deletion analysis also suffers from the problem of
recoverability. This problem is particularly clear in (228): How can the elided content be recovered from
the context?
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h. ... dann waren wir endlich allein.
then were we finally alone
'... then we'd finally be alone.'
~ reason-specifying
Scholz's main criticism is that such consequents are actually incompatible with the
particles that are prototypical for optatives. This is illustrated in (229a) versus (229b).
(229) a. Ach, wenn es doch nur mich getroffen hatte!
oh if it DOCH only me hit had
'Oh, if only I had been hit!'
b. Ach, wenn es (*doch nur) mich getroffen hatte, ware
oh if it DOCH only me hit had were
schlimm gewesen.
bad been




Scholz (1991) assumes two independent premises that lead to the same conclusion. First,
discourse particles like doch only occur in unembedded clauses58 , indicating that (229a)
should for this reason alone be considered unembedded. Second, she assumes that if a
construction is elliptical, it should be possible to add the deleted material back in without
complications, in contrast to what we see in (229b). Scholz concludes that optatives do
not involve reconstruction of a consequent. She makes the same argument for that-
optatives, based on the intuitions in (230).
(230)a. Ach, dass es doch nur mich
oh that it DOCH only me





58 Scholz bases this assumption on Thurmair (1989:50), Altmann (1987:28). Scholz also states the more
general assumption that discourse particles diagnose 'syntactic or at least functional' independence. This
seems to be more correct than the assumption that they diagnose an utterance as unembedded, but then the
presence of discourse particles cannot be taken to be an argument against the deletion hypothesis.
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b. Ich winschte, dass es (*doch nur) mich getroffen hatte.
I wish that it DOCH only me hit had
'I wish it had hit me.'
(Scholz 1991:9)
Unfortunately, Scholz's argument has several shortcomings, two of which I here address.
First, there are conceptual problems with the argumentation; specifically, the premises
cannot be accepted as they stand. On the one hand, it has by now clearly been falsified
that discourse particles diagnose a construction as unembedded. Bayer (2001) and
Coniglio (2009) argue that discourse particles are rather characterized as 'root
phenomenon' 59; Bayer (2001), and more extensively Coniglio (2009), show that such
particles can occur in various embedded contexts, such as in the complements of non-
factive predicates. On the other hand, the premise that it must be possible to re-enter
elided material without any problem cannot be upheld either. English VP-Ellipsis, as
illustrated in (231a), is a familiar example where the unelided construction is not
composed of the elided structure plus the missing material, cf. (231b), but rather of a
fusion of the two, cf. (231 c).
(23 1)a. Sue met the president, and Mary did [meet-the-president], too.
b.?? Sue met the president, and Mary did meet the president, too.
c. Sue met the president, and Mary met the president, too.
One may analyze (231) as a case where the marked did licenses the deletion; by analogy,
optatives might just be cases where the particles license the deletion (and must be omitted
in the absence of deletion, where they are uninformative).
The second problem with Scholz's arguments is empirical. There are clear counter-
examples to the generalization that optative if-clauses cannot be integrated into a matrix
clause, shown in (232), which are natural occurrences from the internet.
59 A claim that I do not endorse but that I will not attempt to falsify either, as it is orthogonal to the present
discussion.
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(232) a. [Wenn ich doch nur k6nnte], wurde ich mehr als einen Hund
if I DOCH only could would I more than one dog
zuhause haben!
at.home have
'If only I could, I would have more than one dog at home!'
b. Ach, [wenn ich doch nur kdnnte] wiurde ich sofort bei dir arbeiten.
oh if I DOCH onlycould would I immediately with you work
'Oh, if only I could, I would immediately start working with you.'
c. [Wenn ich doch nur kinnte], wirde ich sofort kommen.
if I DOCH only could would I immediately could
'If only I could, I would come immediately.'
Naturally, with respect to (232), it is worth ruling out an alternative explanation where
the purported matrix clause in (232a-c) is a verb-first clause (with sentence-initial warde
'would'). An argument against this alternative explanation can be made, based on (233).
If desiderative contexts allowed for verb-first clauses, omission of dann 'then' in the
second clause of (233) should be possible. This indicates that the if-clause in (232a-c)
really occupies the pre-verb-second position60.
(233)Ich wnnschte, ich k6nnte.*(Dann) wu*rde ich sofort bei dir arbeiten.
I wish I could then wouldv2 I immediately with you work
'I wish I could. I would immediately start working with you.'
Coming to an independent shortcoming of Scholz's discussion, Scholz seems to
presuppose that if-optatives correspond to logical if-clauses (e.g. (234a)) rather than to
non-logical if-clauses (e.g. (234b)) 61.
(234)a. [If you had helped me], then my wish would have been fulfilled.
b. It would be nice [if you had helped me].
60 But see Axel & Wdllstein (2008) and Reis & W6llstein (2010) who argue for true VI clauses in German.
61 Scholz does consider the option in (i), extracted from (228f) above. However, this is a case where the if-
clause that may be non-logical is left-peripheral. As Pesetsky (1991) shows, such if-clauses do not exhibit
one of the landmark features of non-logical if-clauses, namely the ban against Negative Polarity Items. This
might indicate that again we are dealing with a normal logical if-clause after all.
i. [If you had helped me], then it would be good.
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This is not as such a problem for Scholz's argument, as non-logical if-clauses are
incompatible with optative particles as well, (235), but it is important to make this
explicit.
(235)Es ware sch6n, [CP wenn du mir (*doch nur) geholfen hattest].
it were nice if you me DOCH only helped had
'It would be nice, if (*only) you had helped me.'
In any case, while Scholz's argument corroborates my own argument against matrix
clause deletion, it is necessary to raise awareness of the conceptual problems and the
existing counter-examples. I will now review Rifkin's arguments against matrix clause
deletion in English and show that it also corroborates my own proposal.
4.1.4.3 Further evidence against matrix clause deletion: Rifkin (2000)
Rifkin's (2000) arguments are based on the following premise: If if-optatives contain an
unpronounced consequent, they should be able to do everything that a conditional can do.
Rifkin shows that this is not the case and concludes that if-optatives do not contain a
phonetically null matrix clause.
Rifkin's first argument is that if-optatives cannot be conjoined with regular
conditionals, as shown in (236b), contrasting with (236a). It follows that if-optatives are
not equivalent to conditionals with an unpronounced consequent.
(236) a. [If Sue had time, she would ski Mt. McKinley], and [if she had money, things
would be good].
b.* [If Sue had time, she would ski Mt. McKinley], and [if only she had money].
(based on examples from Rifkin 2000; modified to create a minimal pair)
Crucially, this does not reflect a general prohibition against conjoined optatives, as shown
in (237).
(237) [If only Meg had brought a corkscrew] and [if only Jim had made a decent salad].
(Rifkin 2000)
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We can extend Rifkin's argument as follows. While he does not test his argument for
non-logical conditional constructions, the following examples indicate that these behave
the same way. (238a) shows that the ungrammaticality of (236b) (repeated in (238b)) is
not due to a parallelism constraint on conjoining a logical conditional with a non-logical
conditional. Example (238a) is wellformed in spite of the lack in parallelism (i.e. the first
conjunct is a logical conditional and the second conjunct has a non-logical reading).
(238)a. [If Sue had time, she would ski Mt. McKinley], and [it would be good if she had
money].
b.* [If Sue had time, she would ski Mt. McKinley], and [if only she had money].
Importantly, (239b) shows that an optative cannot be conjoined with a non-logical
conditional either, while two non-logical conditionals can be conjoined, cf. (239a).
(239)a. [It would be good if Sue had time] and [it would be great if she had money].
b.?? [It would be good if Sue had time] and [if only she had money].
Rifkin's second argument against deletion is that if-optatives cannot be embedded under a
higher matrix predicate, unlike regular conditionals, cf. (240b) versus (240a). Again, it
follows that they are not equivalent to conditionals with unpronounced consequent.
(240) a. Avi thinks that [if it would snow, things would be good].
b.* Avi thinks that [if only it would snow].
(Rifkin 2000)
We can now extend Rifkin's second argument by showing that non-logical conditionals
can be embedded without any problem, cf. (241).
(241) Avi thinks that [it would be good if it would snow].
A crucial observation of Rifkin's (2000) is that optative conditionals differ from if-
optatives, as discussed in chapter 1. Example (242) shows that an optative conditional
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can be conjoined with a non-optative conditional. In this regard, optative conditionals
behave like regular conditionals.
(242) a. [If only Sue had money, things would be good], and [if she had time, she would
ski Mt. McKinley].
(Rifkin 2000)
b. [If Sue had time, she would ski Mt. McKinley], and [if only she had money,
things would be good].
(based on (242a))
Similarly, optative conditionals can also be embedded like regular conditionals, cf. (243).
(243) Avi thinks that [if only it would snow, things would be good].
(Rifkin 2000)
Rifkin's arguments can be easily extended to cover other languages, such as German, as
shown in (244). Example (244a) illustrates an optative conditional embedded under sagen
'say'. This contrasts with the impossibility of embedding an independent if-conditional
under sagen 'say', shown in (244b).
(244) a. Kein vern unftiger Mensch 7 wurde jemals sagen, [ dass er7
no sane human would ever say that he
Zeit zuruckdrehen wurde und alles anders machen w
time turn.back would and all different make w
wenn er7  doch nur k6nnte].
if he DOCH only could
'No sane person7 would ever say [that she7 would turn back time and do
everything differently, if only she7 could].'
b. * Kein verninftiger Mensch 7 wtrde jemals sagen, [wenn er7
no sane person would ever say if he
doch nur die Zeit zurtickdrehen und alles anders machen kannt
DOCH only the time turn.back and all different make could









Before critically evaluating Rifkin's proposal, it can be pointed out that overall it
corroborates my own proposal that optatives do not involve matrix clause deletion. The
case of optative conditionals (i.e. conditionals that contain a seemingly optative
antecedent) will have to be treated separately. One intuitive way of analyzing them might
be to assume that the optative antecedent is parenthetical of sorts, i.e. (242), (243) and
(244) involve simple embedding and conjunction of the main clause, which is
parenthetically modified by an optative clause.
Having outlined Rifkin's arguments, concerns need to be raised with respect to the
conclusion that Rifkin draws. Rifkin's data do not probe directly for the presence of
unpronounced structure; a possible alternative explanation for Rifkin's findings is that
contextually licensed deletion is infelicitous in conjunction or embedding structures. This
concern is corroborated by intuitions such as (245) and (246). In (245b), conjoining the
elliptical imperative from (245a) with a non-elliptical imperative seems degraded (as
opposed to (245c)).
(245) Context: The hearer just picked up a poisonous mushroom and wants to taste it.
a. Don't!
b. ?* Don't, and wash your hands!
c. (?)Don't put it in your mouth, and wash your hands!
Similarly, in (246a), embedding the same elliptical imperative is degraded with respect to
its overt counterpart in (246b).
(246) Context: The hearer wants to pick up a white mushroom from John's desk
a. ?? Wait! John said don't!
b. ("")Wait! John said don't touch these mushrooms!
Finally, we notice that true answer fragments cannot be embedded under attitude
predicates either, even though they are clearly elliptical, posing a more significant
problem for Rifkin's theory. This is shown in (247c), which is the elliptic variant of
(247b), as shown in (247a). For some reason, true matrix clause deletion that gives rise to
fragment answers is not possible in embedded answers.
(247) a. A: Under which circumstances would the party have been fun?
B: (The party would have been fun) if John had come.
b. A: Under which circumstances would the party have been fun?
B: Avi thinks that [the party would have been fun if John had come].
c. A: Under which circumstances would the party have been fun?
B: * Avi thinks that [if John had come].
While it is worth noting that Rifkin's proposal has these shortcomings, it is clearly
compatible with my own proposal as outlined above.
Concluding this section, it can be observed that Rifkin (2000) raises an interesting
puzzle, which can be outlined as follows. For some reason, an optative antecedent cannot
be conjoined with a regular antecedent, as shown in (248a) versus (248b).
(248) a.* [If only Sue had money(,) and if she had time], she would ski Mt. McKinley.
b. [If Sue had money and if she had time], she would take up extreme skiing.
(Rifkin 2000)
The data in (248) are puzzling independently of Rifkin's findings. As a baseline, both
examples in (249) are grammatical, and we have seen that optative conditionals can be
conjoined with regular conditionals, cf. (242).
(249) a. [If only Sue had money], she would ski Mt. McKinley.
b. [If she had time], she would ski Mt. McKinley.
Therefore, (249a) and (249b) should be able to act as the input for right-node raising /
backward conjunction reduction, shown in (250). This indicates that (248) must be bad
for reasons not connected to the elliptical / non-elliptical status of the optative if-clause.
(250) If only Sue had money, she would ski Mt. MeKinley,
and if she had time, she would ski Mt. McKinley.
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For now, I conjecture that (250) is impossible (and thus (248) ungrammatical), because
we cannot always do right-node raising across fundamentally different types of meaning
(expressive vs. declarative meaning). While the optative conditional in the first conjunct
is expressive (section 4.1.6), the non-optative conditional in the second conjunct is purely
descriptive; I assume that this causes a conflict. These interactions between optative
utterances and non-optative utterances raise another potential worry with respect to
Rifkin's conclusions, namely that his examples merely reflect constraints on the
combinability of the two types of meaning.
4.1.4.4 Interim Summary
To summarize, I have addressed a fundamental question when dealing with optatives
(and other types of unembedded clauses that have the morphosyntax of embedded
clauses): Do they contain an unpronounced matrix clause or are they truly independent? I
have argued for the latter. Both if-optatives and that-optatives are truly independent and
do not involve matrix clause deletion. This can be shown based on a new argument that I
construed, involving adverbial modification with a because-clause. I concluded that in
German neither if-optatives nor that-optatives allow a verb-final (and thus integrated)
because-clause to take scope over the positive evaluation that they express. This directly
argues against a position where this positive evaluation is contributed by a matrix clause
that is present at LF but unpronounced at PF. I have also critically evaluated Scholz
(1991) and Rifkin (2000) and argued that, while their proposals have shortcomings that
should not be neglected, they clearly corroborate my own proposal.
An interesting fact to be noted in this context (particularly as a follow up to the
discussion of Rifkin 2000) is the following. While we find optative conditionals (i.e.
conditionals that contain a seemingly optative if-clause antecedent), optative if-clauses
cannot actually be part of a non-logical if-clause construction. This is shown in (251 c+d),
which contrast with (251a+b). While (251a+b) are instances of optative conditionals,
(251 c+d) are plainly ungrammatical.
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(251) Context: For years, John was living in an old house, not knowing that there was a
gremlin in the old decorative box in his room that didn't seem to open. John never
tried to pry it open. One day the gremlin came out and ate John's cat.
a. optative conditional with left-peripheral if-clause
[If only John had opened that box], he would have noticed the gremlin in it.
b. optative conditional with right-peripheral if-clause
John would have noticed the gremlin in that box [if only he had opened it].
c. right-peripheral non-logical if-clause
It would have been good [if (?*only) John had opened that box].
d. non-logical if-clause
[If (?*only) John had opened that box], it would have been good.
It may superficially appear as a contradiction that optative antecedents cannot take the
place of a non-logical if-clause even though I argued in detail that optative clauses should
be analyzed on a par with non-logical if-clauses. However, this is actually expected under
an analysis that assumes optatives to be truly independent. Assuming that optatives are
independent utterances with a left-peripheral EX operator, and that they can be
parenthetically linked to a matrix clause (which I mark by a purely descriptive symbol,
'e'), we get the following patterns, corresponding to the facts in (251). The reason for the
ungrammaticality of (251c+d) with an optative (i.e. (252c+d)) is that the parenthetical
optative cannot serve as the subject matter for the matrix clause, i.e. the utterances in
contain an incomplete matrix clause, as given in (253). This is not the case in (252a+b)
(252)a. [EXIf only John had opened that box!] e He would have noticed the gremlin.
b. John would have noticed the gremlin. e [EX If only he had opened that box!]
c. * It would have been good. e [EX If only John had opened that box!]
d.* [EX If only John had opened that box!] e It would have been good.
(253) out-of-the-blue
# It would have been good. (where it is non-referential!)
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These facts are thus not only compatible with my analysis, but in a sense follow from my
proposal. Concluding this section, I propose that optative clauses are clauses that contain
a covert EX operator in their left periphery, which takes the CP as its complement. This
captures the fact that optatives have properties of complement clauses whereas they seem
to be truly independent (i.e. they do not involve matrix clause deletion). A summary is
given in (254).
(254) Sub-Claim 1+2: Optatives contain a null operator in their left periphery
[ExcP EX [cP DaB / Wenn er doch nur rechtzeitig gekommen wiire!]]
U that if he doch only in.time come were
'If only he had come in time!'
The following sections will now outline the properties of EX in some more detail.
4.1.5 Introducing EX- An emotive operator
This section is concerned with the core property of EX that it serves to express an
emotive property of the speaker (similar to the EXC of Gutierrez-Rexach 1996, a loose
predecessor). We can formulate the sub-claim in (255).
(255) Sub-Claim 3:
An utterance of EX(<p) conveys that the speaker at the point of utterance has an
emotion e (or at least an evaluative attitude e) towards q.
By assuming a uniform EX operator across different types of exclamations, I argue
against accounts for insubordination that assume conventionalized form-to-speech-act
assignments, as sketched by Zaefferer (2006:344), who posits (256).
(256) Orphan theory of German verb-final root clauses
The different force potentials of German verb-final root clauses derive from the
semantics of some former matrix structures with speech act participant subject.
(Zaefferer 2006:344)
Zaefferer emphasizes that this is not a matrix clause deletion analysis, but rather a view
under which the meaning of a potential matrix verb has grammaticalized into the force
potential of an insubordinated clause. My discussion is an elaboration on Truckenbrodt's
(2006b) informal rebuttal. The core issue with Zaefferer's view is that such
grammaticalization should be relatively unconstrained. In contrast, exclamations that
involve insubordinated clauses do typically show the constraint for being emotive that I
discuss in this section. In brief, I propose that EX utterances can express meanings similar
to what we find in (257), but not meanings similar to what we find in (258). This follows
if EX is inherently emotive, but it is not predicted by a grammaticization view such as
Zaefferer's.
(257)a. I would prefer it [if Kim were not informed].
b. It would surprise me [if she were able to accept].
(Pullum 1987, paraphrases mine, based on Williams 1974, Pesetsky 1991)
c. I dislike it [that Kim was not informed].
(25 8)a. I am convinced [that John left].
b. I knew [that there had been someone else in the room].
c. I would have known [if there had been someone else in the room].
I consider unembedded that-clauses, if-clauses and Vi -clauses in German, which can be
shown to be compatible with different functions (e.g. an optative use and a use as polar
exclamative). In what follows, I show that none of the functions associated with
exclamations are non-emotional and non-evaluative, i.e. we do not find exclamations that
express a meaning like (258).
Consider first a sample of an ambiguous that-clause, given in (259a). Unembedded
that-clauses in German are quite generally ambiguous between a (polar) exclamative
reading, as in (259b) and an optative reading, as in (259c). The readings are differentiated
by means of the propositional content (e.g. past tense orientation biases an exclamative
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reading over an optative reading), the context (since typically exclamatives are factive 62
and optatives anti-factive, see chapter 5) and certain particles (see chapter 6). In a
situation where we expected someone to oversleep but he didn't, it is appropriate to utter
(259a) as an expression of surprise, (259b). By contrast, in a situation where we are
worried that this person might have overslept, but we have no way to find out if he did, it
is appropriate to utter (259a) as an expression of a wish or hope, (259c).
(259)a. Mein Gott, dass der nicht verschlafen hat! that-exclamation
my God that he not overslept has
lit. My God, that he didn't oversleep!
b. polar exclamative paraphrase: [It's shocking] that he didn't oversleep!
c. optative paraphrase: [I hope] that he didn't oversleep!
Similarly, VI-clauses with certain contrast markers (e.g. tatsdchlich 'indeed', unstressed
doch, the particle glatt 'outrightly'), (260a), have a polar exclamative reading, (260b),
and an optative reading, (260c), see Scholz (1991)63,64. In a situation where we know that
the female subject (e.g. Mary) would have (under certain circumstances, e.g. if we hadn't
stopped her) given someone a book, I can express my shock by uttering (260a) to convey
(260b). In contrast, in a situation where I know that she didn't give someone the relevant
book, I can express that I wish she had done so by uttering (260a) to convey (260c).
(260) a. HAtte die dem doch tatsachlich das Buch gegeben! Vi-exclamation
hadsubj she him doch indeed the book given
lit. Had ubj she indeed given him the book!
(adapted from Scholz 1991:132-133, attributing the example to Norbert Fries)
b. polar exc. reading: [It's shocking that] she would have given him the book!
c. optative reading: [I wish that] she had given him the book!
62 See Elliot (1971, 1974); Grimshaw (1979); Zanuttini & Portner (2000, 2003) for degree exclamatives.
63 Note the difference in mood between (260b), which in the English translation requires the modal would,
and (260c), which in the English translation has simple counterfactual past tense marking.
64 German also has VI-degree exclamatives (Rosengren 1992, Brandner 2010), which I will not discuss.
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For ifclauses we can construct different examples that only differ in the particles that
they use and in their polarity65 . Consider (261 a); in a situation where I hope that someone
will behave like an idiot (because I might end up getting the job that we're both applying
for), I can use the optative in (261 a) to express my desire. By contrast, in a different
situation where someone is currently behaving like an idiot, I can use (261b) to express a
negative evaluation66. A different situation is given in (261c), where the opposite of the
expressed proposition is presupposed to be a fact, and (261 c) is uttered to convey that this
is remarkable in one way or another.
(261)a.Mensch, wenn der sich nur wieder bl6d anstellt! ifoptative
man if he self only again stupid behaves
lit. Man, if only he behaves stupidly again!
'[I sincerely hope that] he will behave like an idiot again!'
context/background: I don't know how he's going to behave this time.
expresses: It would be good for me [if he behaves like an idiot].
b. Mensch, wenn der sich auch wieder bld anstellt! ifadversative
man if he self also again stupid behaves
lit. Man, if he also behaves stupidly again!
'[It is not good that] he's behaving like an idiot again!'
context/background: He's behaving like an idiot again.
expresses: I consider it bad [that he's behaving like an idiot].
c. Mensch, wenn der sich nicht wieder bl6d anstellt! ifexclamative
man if he self not again stupid behaves
lit. Man, if he isn't behaving stupidly again!
'[It's remarkable that] he's behaving like an idiot again!'
context/background: He's behaving like an idiot again.
expresses: I consider it remarkable [that he's behaving like an idiot].
65 Minimal pairs in this domain are difficult to construct and thus always seem slightly stilted, which should
not distract from their admissibility.
66 This interpretation and the paraphrase are very coarse - partly, because this is not the focus of this
dissertation. What (261b) actually conveys is that something bad is happening to the person mentioned in
subject position and that it is unsurprising given that person's bad behavior.
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The fact that such utterances are inherently emotive and evaluative is reflected by the
observation that the perceived emotion / evaluation cannot be easily canceled. To
illustrate, in the polar exclamative in (262a), the surprise that is conveyed cannot be
canceled, and in the optative in (262b), desirability cannot be canceled.
(262)a. Dass der nicht verschlafen hat!
that he not overslept has
'[It's shocking that] he didn't oversleep!'
... # das war sowieso zu erwarten.
that was anyway to be.expected
'That was to be expected anyway.'
b. Wenn der nur nicht verschlafen hat!
if he only not overslept has
'If only he didn't oversleep!'
... # das spielt jetzt auch keine Rolle
that plays now also no roll





In contrast, the following examples show that regular if-clauses and that-clauses do not
convey surprise or desirability in this way. (Note: I use das 'that' as s situational pronoun
anaphoric to the circumstances denoted by the proposition expressed in the that-clause or
if-clause.)
(263) a. Dass der nicht verschlafen
that he not overslept
'That he wouldn't oversleep was to
b. Wenn der nicht verschlafen hat,
if he not overslept has
'If he didn't oversleep, that doesn't
hat, das war sowieso zu
has that was anyway to
be expected anyway.'
das spielt jetzt auch keine
that plays now also no







The crucial evidence for the emotive / evaluative nature of exclamations stems from the
fact that no exclamations seem to have a non-evaluative / non-emotive reading. This is
shown in (264)-(266). Example (264a) is a constructed unembedded that-clause that
expresses the proposition that Bob left. This can be uttered as it stands, but what is crucial
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is that it cannot have one of the two non-emotive paraphrases in (264b+c), while the
paraphrases in (264d-f) are possible. The most plausible use of (264a) is one where the
speaker expresses surprise, (264d), but optative readings are also conceivable, (264e), as
well as adversative readings, (264f). This follows if possible uses must be emotive or
evaluative.
(264) a. Dass der Bob gegangen ist!
that the Bob left is
lit. That Bob left!
b. * intended paraphrase 1: It is likely / unlikely [that Bob left].
c. * intended paraphrase 2: I am convinced [that Bob left].
d.(/ most plausible paraphrase: I am surprised [that Bob left].)
e. (v/ conceivable paraphrase67: I hope [that Bob left].)
f. (v/ conceivable paraphrase68: I am disappointed [that Bob left].)
An analogous example is given in (265). The most plausible readings for (265a) are,
again, a surprise reading, as given in (265c), and an optative reading, as given in (265d).
The non-emotive/non-evaluative reading in (265b) is impossible.
(265) a. Dass sonst noch jemand im Zimmer ist!
that else still someone in.the room is
lit. That someone else is in the room!
b.* intended paraphrase: I know [that someone else is in the room].
c. (v/ most plausible paraphrase69: I am surprised [that someone else is ... ].)
d.(v/ marginally possible70 : I hope [that someone else is in the room].)
67 The positive evaluation paraphrase (I hope...) becomes more salient if we add nur 'only':
i. Oh, dass der Bob nur gegangen ist!
oh that the Bob only left is
'Oh, if only Bob has left!'
68 The negative evaluation paraphrase (I am disappointed...) becomes more salient if we add auch 'also':
ii. Dass der Bob auch gegangen ist!
that the Bob also left is
69 The surprise reading can be supported by a suitable interjection, as in (i):
i. Oh! Dass sonst noch jemand im Zimmer ist! (Ich dachte ich bin allein.)
oh that else still someone in.theroom is I thought I am alone
70 The optative reading can be supported by a suitable interjection and a particle, as in (ii):
ii. Ach, dass nur sonst noch jemand im Zimmer ist!
oh that only else still someone in.the room is
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Counterfactual if-clauses like (266a) are particularly marked, as the intended non-emotive
/ non-evaluative paraphrase in (266b) is impossible, and optative readings, (266b), are
marginal whenever they are not supported by particles, as discussed in chapter 6.
(266) a.# Wenn sonst noch jemand im Zimmer ware!
if else still someone in.the room were
lit. If someone else was in the room!
b.* intended paraphrase: I would know [if someone else was in the room].
c.(# marginally possible: I wish [that someone else was in the room].)
Based on these observations, I argue that exclamations must be evaluative or emotive and
cannot express something that amounts to embedding a that-clause or if-clause under a
non-emotive/non-evaluative predicate such as know, unlikely or convinced.
4.1.6 The EX operator is expressive
In the preceding section, I argued that EX is an emotive operator. This section is
concerned with another core property of the EX operator, namely its expressive nature, as
posited in (267) (cf. Kratzer 1999, Potts 2005, and related work).
(267) Sub-Claim 4:
By uttering an utterance of EX(<p), the speaker intends to express an emotion E,
rather than describe e.
The idea is that EX combines with a truth-conditional argument (of propositional type
<s,t>) and maps it onto felicity conditions; i.e. the resulting denotation is not truth-
conditional, but rather 'felicity-conditional' (in the sense in which expressive meaning is
sometimes assumed to constrain felicity of an utterance, cf. Kratzer & Matthewson
2009). More precisely, the idea is that application of EX to a proposition yields one-
dimensional meaning of type E (defined as the type of expressive meaning). This is
illustrated in (268a), constrasting with (268b).
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a. If only it rained!
b. Option 1:
r
c. Option 2 (rejected):
EXs(rain) : E
ain : <st> EXs: <st, E>
rain : <st>
EXs(rain) : E
ain : <st> EXs: <st, E>
Such onedimensionally expressive utterances have been argued for in Potts & Roeper
(2006), who argue that expressive small clauses onedimensionally convey expressive
meaning (of type E). This is illustrated for self-disapprobation expressive small clause in
(269).
(269) to myself after making a mistake: You fool!
fool(you) : E
you : e fool: <e, E>
(Potts & Roeper 2006)
This section is concerned with arguing both against an account that assigns
(onedimensional) truth-functional meaning to EX utterances, and against an account that




4.1.6.1 On the non-truth-functionality of exclamations
Focusing on optatives, there are various arguments for the expressive nature of the EX
operator. One of the first observation is that optatives are non-truth-functional utterances.
They cannot be denied in the same way in which an assertion can be denied. Consider
first an assertion in the indicative, (270), and then an assertion in the subjunctive, (271).
As indicated, in both cases it is possible to deny or confirm the asserted statement.
(270) A: Otto kommt.
Otto comes
'Otto is coming.'





/ / Das stimmt.
that is.true
'That's true.'
A: Otto ware gekommen
Otto were come
'Otto would have come
B: / Das stimmt nicht.
that is.true not
'That's false.'
(wenn du ihn nicht
if you him not
if you hadn't insulted him).'
/ / Das stimmt.
that is.true
'That's true.'
Optatives do not allow for such denial or confirmation, as shown in (272) and (273) (cf.
Scholz 1991, Rifkin 2000). (I also include the judgmental expression Finde ich nicht 'I
don't agree' in (273), (275) and (277), which would seem suitable in this context.)
(272) A: Wenn Otto nur kommt! - B: # Das stimmt
if Otto only comes that is.true
'If only Otto is coming!' 'That's false.'
nicht. / # Das stimmt.
not that is.true
'That's true.'
(273) A: Wenn Otto nur gekommen
if Otto only come
'If only Otto had come!'
B:#Das stimmt nicht. / # D







stimmt. / # Finde ich nicht.
is.true find I not






This cannot be due to factors such as the fact that (272) and (273) contain if-clauses, as
shown by (274) and (275), which can be denied and confirmed.
A: Es ist besser, wenn
it is better if
'It is better if Otto comes!







/ / Das stimmt.
that is.true
'That's true.'
A: Es ware besser, wenn Otto gekommen
it were better if Otto come
'It would be better if Otto had come!'








/ / Finde ich nicht.
find I not
'I don't agree.'
Similarly, answer fragments can be denied or confirmed (by a third party), indicating that
this is not the problem either.
(276) A: Was ist besser?
what is better
'What's better?'
C: / Das stimmt
that is.true
'That's false.'





/ / Das stimmt.
that is.true
'That's true.'
A: Was ware besser
what were better
'What would be /








B: Wenn Otto gekommen
if Otto come
'If Otto had come!'













The examples in (278) and (279) show that that-optatives cannot be denied or confirmed
either. Given that the modified clause expresses a wish, I also include Ich nicht 'I don't'
with the intended meaning of 'I don't wish for that.' / 'I don't want that.'
(278) A: Dass Otto nur rechtzeitig kommt!
that Otto only in.time comes












(279) A: Dass Otto nur rechtzeitig gekommen
that Otto only in.time come






/ # Das stimmt.
that is.true
'That's true.'
/ # Ich nicht.
I not
'I don't.'
It is worth noting that polar exclamatives cannot be denied or confirmed either, as shown




heute nicht verschlafen hat!
today not overslept has












As shown in (281) and (282), corresponding paraphrases can be denied and confirmed.
(281) A: Es ist Uberraschend, dass der Hans heute
it is surprising that the Hans today












B:V Das stimmt nicht. / / Das stimmt.
that is.true not that is.true
'That's false.' 'That's true.'
(282) A: Es berrascht mich, dass der Hans heute nicht verschlafen hat!
it surprises me that the Hans today not overslept has




It can be inferred that optatives and polar exclamatives are not assertions, i.e. they are not
truth-functional statements. I argue that, in fact, they are expressive utterances (as
opposed to descriptive utterances). In terms Potts & Roeper (2006), I propose that the
role of EX is to remove its complement from the level of descriptive at-issue meaning and
shift it to the level of expressive meaning, i.e. an exclamation does not have descriptive
content, (283b), but rather expressive content, (283c).
(283) a. If only I were rich!
b. descriptive content (informal paraphrase): 0
c. expressive content (informal paraphrase): It would be good if I were rich.
Note that at this point, the observed facts are compatible with a view where the
descriptive content of the optative utterance is truth-conditional, but simply not of type
<s,t> (or t), as posited by Biezma (2011 a), who treats optatives as <st,t> type expressions.
It is thus worth turning to further arguments for the expressive nature of EX utterances
4.1.6.2 Non-Embeddability: A Hallmark of Expressive Content and Exclamations
Showing that optatives and polar exclamatives cannot be affirmed or denied by a hearer
supports a view under which such utterances are independent in the sense of Potts (2005,
2007), see also McCready (2009), i.e. such utterances contribute content at a level
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different from descriptive at-issue meaning. Another hallmark of expressive meaning is
non-embeddability, which is connected to Potts's criteria of nondisplaceability and
perspective dependence - expressive meaning is tied to an utterance situation and to
somebody's perspective (which is typically the speaker's perspective).
Potts & Roeper (2006) present data like (284b) and (285b) to argue that 'expressive
small clauses' are onedimensional expressive utterances.
(284)a. towards myself You fool!
b.* I consider [you fool] / [me fool].
(cf. Potts & Roeper 2006)
(285)a. (What,) Me worry?
b.* I wonder / doubt [me worry].
(cf. Potts & Roeper 2006)
Rifkin's (2000) example in (286b) shows parallel behavior: if-optatives, on a par with
expressive small clauses, cannot be embedded.
(286) a. If only it would snow!
b.* Avi thinks that [if only it would snow].
(cf. Rifkin 2000)
This issue deserves some further discussion, which the rest of this section is devoted to.
First of all, we have already observed that answer fragments, which are clearly truth-
functional and not expressive, cannot be embedded either, as repeated in (287).
(287) a. A: Under which circumstances would the party have been fun?
B: (The party would have been fun) if John had come.
b. A: Under which circumstances would the party have been fun?
B: Avi thinks that [the party would have been fun if John had come].
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c. A: Under which circumstances would the party have been fun?
B: * Avi thinks that [if John had come].
The second issue that arises is that we have already seen that optative conditionals can be
embedded, as in (288a).
(288)a. Avi thinks that [if only it would snow, things would be good].
b.* Avi thinks that [if only it would snow].
(Rifkin 2000)
A third issue that needs to be addressed is the following fact. A uniform approach to
exclamations may be threatened by the observation that degree exclamatives can
apparently be embedded (cf. Elliot 1971, Grimshaw 1979, Zanuttini & Portner 2000,
2003, and many others); Abels (2010) shows that the range of embedding constructions is
rather large, as illustrated in (289). While an extension of the EX-Operator Approach to
degree exclamatives is not in the scope of this dissertation, the possibility of such an
extension seems conceptually desirable.
(289) a. Gun nuts can't even wait for the shooter's barrel to cool off before they jump
in to assert [how very, very important it is that everybody get to have as many
guns of any variety that they desire].
b. People shake their heads and go on about [what a great tragedy the whole
situation is].
c. Now its time for a BBQ with Beer, Friends and lots of lies about [what a bad
ass I am].
(Abels 2010:146,153,155, crediting online sources; emphasis and brackets
mine)
Let me first discuss the first two issues, i.e. the question to what extent if-optatives differ
from other utterances in that they cannot be embedded, and the question to what extent
optative conditionals are 'embedded optatives'. I will then proceed to the third issue.
The logic that underlies the idea that expressive meaning cannot be embedded is that
expressive meaning is commonly assumed never to be an argument with respect to
functional application (Potts 2005, 2007), as shown in (290). Crucially, it follows from
(290i-v) that there is no semantic type that has an expressive type in its domain. This
entails that expressive meaning can never be in the scope of anything else in a clause - it
cannot be truly integrated.
(290) i. e and t are regular types.
ii. E is an expressive type.
iii. If a and b are regular types, then <a,b> is a regular type.
iv. If a is a regular type, then <a,E> is an expressive type.
v. Nothing else is a type.
(Potts & Roeper 2006)
If we turn to German, we observe that if-optatives indeed cannot be truly integrated into
another construction. Quite generally, if-clauses in a conditional can occupy the pre-verb-
second position, thus satisfying the verb second requirement (that the position preceding
the fronted verb must be filled). Notably, optative antecedents cannot do so, as observed
by Scholz (1991). This is shown in (291b), for the if-optative in (291a). Notably,
appositives, which Potts (2005) analyses as expressions that yield multidimensional
meaning, do not lead to ill-formedness, (291c). The observation in (291b) thus shows that
the application of EX to a proposition in an optative removes the proposition from the
level of descriptive content (mapping it to the expressive level), confirming the
unembeddability of optative clauses.
(291) a. Ach, wenn es doch nur mich getroffen hitte!
oh if it DOCH only me hit had
'Oh, if only I had been hit!'
7 Note that I assume that the EX operator combines with a scale and a proposition and yields expressive
meaning, i.e. it requires an extension of (290) to include <a,<st,E>> type expressions; however I concur in
that there are no <E,a> type expressions.
b. Ach, wenn es (*doch nur) mich getroffen hatte, ware das halb so
oh if it DOCH only me hit had were that half as
schlimm gewesen.
bad been
'Oh, if only I had been hit, it would be half as bad.'
(Scholz 1991:9)
c. Ach, wenn es mich getroffen hatte, was ich mir sehr wUnsche,
oh if it me hit had which I me very wish
ware das halb so schlimm gewesen.
were that half as bad been
'Oh, if I had been hit, which I wish very much, it would be half as bad.'
We now have to address the residual question of how to deal with the exceptions to this
generalization (which one may call Scholz's unembeddability generalization, see above).
First, I have observed that there are rare instances of optative antecedents that are truly
integrated into an optative conditional (meaning that they can occupy the pre-verb second
position), one of which is given in (292) (a natural occurrence, found on google).
(292) [Wenn ich doch nur k6nnte], wurde ich sofort kommen.
if I DOCH only could would I immediately could
'If only I could, I would come immediately.'
Second, it has been suggested that optative conditionals (i.e. conditionals that appear to
contain an optative antecedent) can be truly embedded, as observed by Rifkin (2000) for
English, shown in (293).
(293) Kein verninftiger Mensch 7 wtirde jemals sagen, [ dass er 7 die
no sane human would ever say that he the
Zeit zurtickdrehen wurde und alles anders machen wurde,
time turn.back would and all different make would
wenn er7 doch nur k6nnte].
if he DOCH only could
'No sane person7 would ever say [that she7 would turn back time and do
everything differently, if only she7 could].'
156
To deal with these counter-examples, I propose that such clause actually involve either a
parenthetical use of an if-optative or a construction that I will call the minimal sufficiency
conditional in chapter 6. These minimal sufficiency conditionals are conditionals that do
not contain an EX-operator, but contain nur 'only' in a purely presuppositional reading.
For now, I postpone this discussion to chapter 6, and I would rather like to emphasize the
markedness of the counter-examples.
First, consider a number of optative conditionals from Asarina & Shklovsky (2008)
and Rifkin (2000).
(294) a. If only I was rich (now), I would have a Porsche.
b. If only it rained tomorrow, my roses would bloom.
(Asarina & Shklovsky 2008:2+9)
c. If only I had beaten Kasparov, I would have won 10000 dollars.
d. If only I were rich, I would travel around the globe.
(Rifkin 2000)
In German, none of these examples allows for the purported optative clause to be truly
integrated into the matrix clause, in the sense that it could fill the pre-verb second
position.
(295) a. Wenn ich (doch) nur reich ware, *(dann) hatte ich einen Porsche.
if I doch only rich were then had I a Porsche
'If only I was rich, *(then) I would have a Porsche.'
b. Wenn es morgen (doch) nur regnen wnrde, *(dann) wurden meine
if it tomorrow doch only rain would then would my
Rosen blihen.
roses bloom
'If only it would rain tomorrow, *(then) my roses would bloom.'
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c. Wenn ich Kasparov (doch) nur geschlagen hatte, *(dann) hatte
if I Kasparov doch only beaten had then had
ich 10000 Dollar gewonnen.
I 10000 dollars won
'If only I had beaten Kasparov, *(then) I would have won 10000 dollars.'
d. Wenn ich (doch) nur reich wire, *(dann) wnrde ich urn die
if I doch only rich were then would I around the
Welt reisen.
world travel
'If only I were rich, *(then) I would travel around the globe.'
In fact, the non-integration of optative antecedents must be even stronger than indicated
by the punctuation in (295). As shown in (296), where '-' marks a complete intonational
break, the optative antecedent must be followed by a rather long intonational break. This
is not necessary in regular conditionals.
(296) a. Wenn ich (doch) nur reich ware! "(-) Dann hatte ich einen Porsche.
if I doch only rich were then had I a Porsche
'If only I was rich ???(-) then I would have a Porsche.'
b. Wenn ich (doch) nur reich ware! ???(-) Ich hatte einen Porsche.
if I doch only rich were I had a Porsche
'If only I was rich ???(-) then I would have a Porsche.'
I propose that apparent optative conditionals as in (294)-(296) typically involve two
separate clauses, namely an if-optative and an (unconnected) implicitly conditionalized
declarative clause (see also Kyriakaki 2007, 2008, 2009, who shares the core idea that the
overt 'antecedent' and the overt 'consequent' are actually not connected). This view is
supported by Rifkin's (2000) insight that if-optatives can co-occur with a second overt
antecedent, (297), something that is impossible in a regular conditional, (298).
(297) a. If only I had gotten there sooner ... if I had, I could have saved him.
b. If only I had gotten there sooner ... because if I had, I could have saved him.
(Rifkin 2000)
(298) a. * If I had gotten there sooner ... if I had, I could have saved him.
b. * If I had gotten there sooner ... because if I had, I could have saved him.
(Rifkin 2000)
Rifkin's observation follows from my proposal. I assume that the second overt antecedent
is the implicit antecedent of an unconnected declarative, which in his examples is simply
made overt. In other words, I assume that the examples in (294) simply have the structure
in (299).
(299) a. If only I was rich (now)! (Because if I was rich,) I would have a Porsche.
b. If only it rained tomorrow! (Because if it did,) my roses would bloom.
c. If only I had beaten Kasparov! (Because if I had,) I would have won 10000
dollars.
d. If only I were rich! (Because if I were,) I would travel around the globe.
Returning to (292), repeated in (300a), which I analyze as a minimal sufficiency
conditional (see chapter 6), it's markedness becomes apparent when we modify it
slightly; for instance, if we drop nur 'only' but keep doch, the construction degrades
significantly, shown in (300b). This would be unexpected if (300a) was an unmarked










ich doch nur k6nnte], wirde
I DOCH only could would
I could, I would come immediately.'
ich doch k6nnte], wurde ich
I DOCH could would I
I could, I would come immediately.'
ich doch k~nnte]! Ich wnlrde
I DOCH could I would












We can thus conclude that true optatives are unembeddable and apparent cases of
embedded if-optatives can be explained either as some type of conditional (which I will
come back to in chapter 6) or as an illusion, where two unconnected clauses appear to be
connected.
The third concern that I raised above is that, of course, degree exclamatives have
often been argued to be embeddable, which seems to entail that an analysis of optatives
and polar exclamatives as expressive EX utterances would fail to extend to such
constructions. Alternatively, this observation may even be taken to challenge the idea that
optatives are exclamative-like, as optatives are unembeddable whereas the most familiar
type of exclamatives seems to be embeddable. In what follows, I briefly show that degree
exclamatives are not always embeddable and that those cases that are embeddable are the
ones that have the syntax of embedded clauses to begin with. It is thus desirable to
assume that such 'embedded degree exclamatives' are actually simply 'embedded wh-
clauses' (without exclamative properties) that contain specialized lexical items, which
carry exclamative implicatures. Such a view is developed by Castroviejo Mir6 (2008) and
Sobo (2010) and I refer the readers to these authors for details.
German has a comparatively broad paradigm of degree exclamatives, illustrated in
(301). Examples (301a+b) are unambiguously exclamatives, as they contain vacuous
nicht 'not', which is a hallmark of German wh-exclamatives and cannot occur in
questions (see Roguska 2007 for discussion). Examples (301c+d) are unambiguously
exclamatives when they carry an exclamative accent (on the subject or on the gradable
predicate) and contain one of the exclamative-specific particles aber (literally 'but') and
vielleicht (literally 'maybe'), cf. Rosengren (1992).
(301) a. Wen der nicht alles kennt! wh Vpn exclamative
who he not all knows
'How many people he knows!' (lit. 'Who all he doesn't know!')
b. Wen kennt der nicht alles! wh V2 exclamative
who knows he not all
'How many people he knows!' (lit. 'Who all doesn't he know!')
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c. Ist die (aber/vielleicht) sch6n! Vi exclamative
is she but/maybe beautiful
'Boy, is she beautiful!' (lit. 'Is she (but/maybe) beautiful!')
d. Die ist (aber/vielleicht) schin! V2 exclamative7 2
she is but/maybe beautiful
'Boy, is she beautiful!' (lit. 'She is (but/maybe) beautiful!')
(Rosengren 1992:266, 272, 281)
What we observe is that only a subtype of exclamatives can be embedded, namely the
one that have the structure of prototypical embedded clauses, (302a). Other types of
degree exclamatives can not be embedded, as shown in (302b-d). This corroborates the
idea that possibly true exclamations cannot be embedded, as proposed by Rifkin (2000),
who also seeks to unify optatives and exclamatives (see also Quirk et al. 1985).
a. Hans ist uberrascht, wen der nicht
Hans is surprised who he not
'Hans is surprised who all he knows.'
b.* Hans ist uberrascht, wen kennt der
Hans is surprised who knows he
'Hans is surprised who all he knows.'
c. * Hans weiB / glaubt / ist tiberrascht is
Hans knows believes is surprised is
'Hans is surprised who all he knows.'
d.* Hans weiB / glaubt / ist Uberrascht di
Hans knows believes is surprised st




















Unsurprisingly, we find a parallel behavior with polar exclamatives. On the one hand,
dass-polar exclamatives, which have the shape of an embedded clause, can apparently be
embedded, (303a), whereas V1-polar exclamatives are unembeddable, (303b). Again, I
argue that apparent embedded exclamatives are not exclamative to begin with and rather
72 Brandt (2010) differs from Rosengren (1992) in that Brandt only views the V1 -variants as exclamatives,
and analyzes the V2-variants as declaratives with a surprise implicature.
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(302)
achieve an exclamative effect (if they do) by virtue of lexical items that they contain
and/or by virtue of their similarity to corresponding exclamatives.
(303) a. (Hans ist tiberrascht,) dass du doch tatsachlich an mich gedacht hast.
Hans is surprised that you doch indeed at me thought have
'Hans is surprised that you really remembered me.'
b. (*Hans ist uberrascht,) hast du doch tatsichlich an mich gedacht.
Hans is surprised have you doch indeed at me thought
'Hans is surprised that you really remembered me.'
I conclude that true exclamations are unembeddable, which supports a view that assumes
an expressive EX operator (historically preceded by Gutidrrez Rexach's 1996 EXC and by
Kyriakaki's 2007, 2008, 2009 exclamative wish operator) in all types of exclamations.
4.1.6.3 A brief review of other markers of expressive meaning
Let us briefly review other markers of expressive meaning, according to Potts (2005,
2007) (see also McCready 2009). First of all, Potts proposes that it is impossible to state
what expressive elements actually mean (his notion of descriptive ineffability). Optatives
do seem to comply with this observation. In the same way in which we are hardpressed to
say what damn means (e.g. (304b) does not satisfactorily paraphrase (304a)), we are
hardpressed to say what optative utterances mean. We know that they express a wish or at
least a positive evaluation, but neither (305b) nor (305c) seems to satisfactorily
paraphrase (305a), indicating that this observation alone does not equip us with an
understanding of what (305a) means.
(304) a. That damn John is now coming to my birthday party.
b. I dislike John and he is now coming to my birthday party.
(305) a. If only he were handsome!
b. I wish he were handsome.
c. It would be good if he were handsome.
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Potts also argues that expressive elements have the property of immediacy, meaning that
uttering them alone is sufficient to fulfill one's communicative goal. Immediacy clearly
holds in exclamations, given that uttering an optative and polar exclamative directly
expresses desire and surprise respectively. It is not necessary for the hearer to respond in
any way, which is necessary in response to assertive utterances.
Finally, Potts observes that expressive meaning is strengthened under repetition
(repeatability). While this is not an exclusive property of expressives (Kai von Fintel,
p.c.), shown in (306), optatives do exhibit this property, consistent with a view that treats
them as expressive utterances.
(306) A: He doesn't know anything about semantics.
B: But he does! He does! He does!
Example (307) shows naturally occurring optatives from forum discussions and reviews
on Yelp (which I anonymized by changing names and omitting the URLs). In each case,
repetition of an entire utterance is possible, strengthening the expression of desire.
(307) a. A: I know you, you're Bob, right? - B: If only I were, if only I were.
b. If only they knew ... Christ, if only they knew ...
c. If you only knew, if you only knew.
Another example from a 1913 novel is given in (308).
(308) "If he only knew-if he only knew!" he muttered to himself. "He must know
soon, or there won't be half the pleasure in it for me."
(Frank Williams. 1913. The Wilderness Trail. New York: Grosset and Dunlap.)
I take these facts to corroborate the proposal that optatives (and polar exclamatives) are
expressive utterances, which follows if the EX operator has the function of shifting its
argument from the level of descriptive at-issue content to the level of expressive content.
In the following sections, I discuss the semantic content of EX.
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4.1.7 The EX operator is scalar
I argue that another core property of EX is its scalar nature, i.e. EX conveys that the
denoted proposition has a particular rank on a relevant scale, cf. (309). An alternative
view would maintain that the optative operator expresses (absolute) positive evaluation.
(309) Sub-Claim 5:
When uttering an utterance of EX(<p), in order to express an emotion e, the
emotion e is connected to a scale (in the case of optatives: a preference scale).
In the present case, evidence for scalarity can be derived from scalar implicatures, as
discussed by Zanuttini & Portner (2003). Zanuttini & Portner (2003) argue that degree
exclamatives convey information that is noteworthy or surprising; in their analysis, this
follows from the assumption that the denoted proposition is at a scalar extreme. Evidence
for such a scalar implicature (and thus for scalarity) can be gained from examples such as
(310). Following a declarative statement, an implied extreme status of the expressed
proposition can be canceled, (31 Ob). This is not possible after a wh-exclamative, (31 Oa).
(310) a. ?? How very cute he is! - though he's not extremely cute.
b. He's quite cute! - though not extremely cute.
(Zanuttini & Portner 2003:47)
This diagnostic has been applied to Icelandic degree exclamatives in J6nsson (2010), as
given in (311a).
(311)a. Rosalega er hann flj6tur! # a6 kemur b6 ekki a' 6vart.
extremely is he quick that comes yet not in surprise
'How extremely quick he is! That is not surprising, though.'
b. Hann er rosalega flj6tur! ba6 kemur b6 ekki a' 6vart.
he is extremely quick that comes yet not in surprise
'He is extremely quick. That is not surprising, though.'
(J6nsson 2010)
Brandner (2010) applied it to German VI degree exclamatives, (312a).
(312)a. Spricht der ein Deutsch! - # Aber so gut ist es auch wieder nicht.
speaks he a German but so good is it also again not
'What a German he speaks - but it is not really good'
b. Er spricht ein gutes Deutsch! - Aber so gut ist es auch wieder nicht.
he speaks a good German but so good is it also again not
'He speaks a good German - but it is not really good'
(Brandner 2010:94)
We can now apply this diagnostic to optatives. First we can show that optatives have a
goodness implicature (or entailment), which is why (313a) is illformed.
(313)a. Ach, hatte ich doch kein Trinkgeld gegeben! - # Aber das ware schlecht.
oh had I doch no tip given but that were bad
'If only I hadn't left a tip. - That would be bad though.'
b. Ich wunschte ich hatte kein Trinkgeld gegeben! - Aber das ware schlecht.
I wish I had no tip given but that were bad
'I wish I hadn't left a tip. - That would be bad though.'
Crucial further evidence for scalarity can be gained from (314). The contrast between the
illformed (314a) and the wellformed (314b) can be explained in terms of the assumption
(similar to Zanuttini & Portner's) that the denoted proposition must be relatively high on
the speaker's preference scale. If the speaker is merely content (but not necessarily
satisfied) if the denoted proposition holds, it is possible to follow up with a wish for
more, as given in (314b). This is not always possible in the case of the optative in (314a),
indicating that the denoted proposition must (at the point of utterance) be desirable to a
substantial extent.
73 Changing aber das wdre schlecht 'but that would be bad' to aber das wdre schlecht gewesen 'but that
would have been bad' does not alter the reported judgments.
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(314) a. Ach, wenn ich doch den Mindestlohn bezahlt bekommen wurde!
oh if I doch the minimal.wage paid get would
'Oh if only I received the minimal wage.'
-# Aber ich will nattirlich eigentlich ein tolles Einkommen.
but I want naturally actually a great income
'But naturally I actually want a great income.'
b. Ich ware zufrieden, wenn ich den Mindestlohn bezahlt bekommen wdrde.
I were content if I the minimal.wage paid get would
'I would be content if I received the minimal wage.'
- Aber ich will nattirlich eigentlich ein tolles Einkommen.
but I want naturally actually a great income
'But naturally I actually want a great income.'
However, we can show that the absolute desirability of the expressed proposition that we
observe in (314a) is an implicature, as opposed to an entailment, of optative utterances. If
we add wenigstens 'at least' (see chapter 6.3), this implicature disappears, as shown in
example (315).
(315) Ach, wenn ich doch wenigstens den Mindestlohn bezahlt bekommen wdrde!
oh if I doch at.least the minimal.wage paid get would
'Oh if only I received at least the minimal wage.'
- Aber ich will nattirlich eigentlich ein tolles Einkommen.
but I want naturally actually a great income
'But naturally I actually want a great income.'
Similarly, we can observe that optatives do not always express a wish for the best
possible scenario (i.e. the most desirable situation). This is shown in (316). Imagine I
have broken my right arm, and I am right-handed. Clearly, in the most desirable
situations I haven't broken any arm; yet (316) is possible74 . In the same situation, scalar
statements like (317), which involve a comparison of situations, are possible, whereas
absolute statements like (318), which do not involve such a comparison, are odd. This
follows if optatives express that the denoted proposition is sufficiently desirable to be
74 Thanks to David Pesetsky, who suggested an example of this type to me.
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satisfactory in some relevant sense (accounting for (313a) and (314a)), but it is not
necessarily the best possible case (accounting for (315) and (316))1.
(316) Context: I broke my right arm and I'm right-handed
Oh, if only I had broken my left arm!
(317) a. It would be preferable [if I had broken my left arm].
b. It would be better [if I had broken my left arm].
c. I would prefer it [if I had broken my left arm].
(318) a.# It would be great/good/nice/ideal [if I had broken my left arm].
b.# It would be wonderful [if I had broken my left arm].
c.# It would be a good thing [if I had broken my left arm].
We can thus conclude that optatives involve scalarity just as much as other exclamatives
do, motivating a view under which exclamations always involve some scale or other. I
implement this by assuming that EX takes a scalar argument and quantifies over scalar
alternatives.
To finish up this section, we can point out (in view of a uniform EX-based analysis of
optatives and polar exclamatives) that the scalar diagnostic also applies to polar
exclamatives. Again, canceling the surprise effect in (319a) is not possible, due to the
inherent scalarity of the expression, whereas this is possible in (319b).
75 A natural question that arises here is whether degree exclamatives sometimes have a meaning that does
not involve an extreme degree. Possibly the contrast between (i) and (ii) intuitively instantiates a possible
distinction between slight surprise (or even simple doubt), in (i), and extreme surprise, in (ii).
i. Was du nicht sagst!
what you not say
'What you are saying!' =>'I'm somewhat intrigued by what you're saying!'
ii. Was du fur Geschichten kennst!
what you for stories knows
'What fascinating stories you know!' => 'Im surprised at all the stories that you know!'
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(319)a. Dass der heute gar keinen Kater hat!
that he today absolutely no hangover has
'[It amazes me] that he doesn't have a hangover at all today!'
- ... # was naturlich nicht uberraschend ist.
what naturally not surprising is
'which of course isn't surprising.'
b. Der hat heute gar keinen Kater!
he has today absolutlely no hangover
'He doesn't have a hangover at all today!'
-... was natirlich nicht tiberraschend ist.
what naturally not surprising is
'which of course isn't surprising.'
These data are thus consistent with a view under which both optatives and polar
exclamatives contain EX, an inherently scalar element.
4.1.8 On the role of interjections and other prototypical elements
As Scholz (1991) observes, optatives prototypically contain particles, such as doch, nur
'only' and wenigstens 'at least' in (320a). Alternatively, they can contain interjections,
such as ach 'oh' or oh 'oh', as in (320b). Notably, they can also be licensed marginally
by verum focus, as in (320c) (Rosengren 1993). Optatives without any of these
prototypical markers are generally deviant, (320d), but it is possible to find exclamations
that seem acceptable without any of these prototypical features and express a positive
evaluation, as in (321), indicating that none of these features is absolutely obligatory.
(320)a. Ware ich doch / nur / wenigstens REICH! typical particle
were I doch only at.least rich
b. Ach, ware ich REICH! typical interjection
oh were I rich
c. WARE ich reich! typical intonation
were I rich
d.# Ware ich REICH! no marking whatsoever
were I rich
'If only I were rich!'
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(321)a. Wenn ich deine Statur hitte!
if I your build had
'[Oh!] If [only] I had your build!'
(adapted from Evans 2007, most natural stress marking is indicated by me)
b. Rico schaute die Blumen an und dachte:
'Rico looked at the flowers and thought:'
"Wenn Stineli diese sehen k~nnte!"
if Stineli these see could
'If Stineli could see these!'
und stand lange unbeweglich am Zaun.
'and stood at the fence for a long time without moving.'
(Johanna Spyri (1878): Heimatlos. Discussed in Grosz 2011)
I will discuss the role of particles in exclamations in chapter 6. However, in the present
section it is worth briefly addressing the role of interjections in optatives. I propose that
these interjections do not realize EX (as one might conjecture), but rather combine with
EX to strengthen or refine the emotion that is expressed, (322).
(322) Sub-Claim 6:
In an utterance of EX(<p), uttered to express an emotion e, EX combines with
interjections (oh!, man!, ... ) to further refine the expression of e.
It is a familiar feature of English Vl -exclamatives that they almost obligatorily require an
interjection, which can be drawn from a set including Boy, Wow, My, and Gee (Elliot
1971, McCawley 1973).
(323) a. Boy, can you make delicious coffee!
b. My, is this cookie delicious!
(McCawley 1973:371)
Similarly, Scholz (1991) observes that in (German) optatives, interjections are a
prototypical feature, drawn from a set including Ach 'oh', Herrje 'criminy', Oh Gott 'oh
god' and Mein Gott 'my god'.
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(324) a. Ach ware er doch gekommen!
oh were he doch come
'Oh, if only he had come!'
(Scholz 1991:116)
b. Mein Gott, hatten wir doch mehr solche Kunden wie die gerade!
my god had we doch more such customers like those just.now
'My God, if only we had more customers like the ones that were just here!'
(Scholz 1991:114)
This gives rise to an intuitive hypothesis that such interjections are overt realizations of
EX. However, there is a good reason to reject this hypothesis.
There are two plausible renderings of such a hypothesis. One possibility is that
interjections are simply realizations of EX; under such a view, any EX utterance should
be compatible indiscriminately with any interjection that is ever found in an EX utterance.
The other possibility is that interjections realize a particular EX+ Scale combination. For
instance, one might conjecture that man or boy realize an EX operator that combines with
an inverse likelihood scale (as in polar exclamatives and degree exclamatives), whereas
oh realizes an EX operator that combines with a preference scale.
The second hypothesis (that interjections lexicalize particular EX + Scale
combinations) is easily rejected. This would predict a complementary distribution of
interjections, in that some should only occur in optatives and others should only occur in
polar exclamatives or degree exclamatives. We do not find such a complementary
distribution. In German, mein Gott 'my God' can occur with all three utterance types,
shown in (325).
(325) a. optative
Mein Gott, hatten wir doch mehr solche Kunden wie die gerade!
'My God, had we only more customers like the ones that were just here!'
(Scholz 1991:114)
b. polar exclamative
Mein Gott. daB der aber auch so furchtbar schimpfen kann.




Mein Gott! Stell' ich mich heut' vielleicht duBlig an!
'My God! Am I behaving clumsily today!'
(Scholz 1991:40)
Similarly, the more general interjection ach 'oh' can occur with all three utterance types
as well, as shown in (326).
(326) a. optative
Ach hatte er das doch nur gemacht!
'Oh if only he had done this!'
(Scholz 1991:115)
b. polar exclamative
Ach, daB der Mensch so haufig irrt und nie recht weiB, was kommen wird!
'Oh, [it's shocking] that humans are wrong so often and never know what's
coming!'
(Wilhelm Busch. 1904. Dunkle Zukunft.)
c. degree exclamative
Ach, ist der aber suss.
'Oh is he ever sweet!'
(naturally occurring example from the internet)
These examples show that there cannot be a one-to-one relationship between the type of
exclamation and the choice of interjection. This leaves us to consider the alternative
option, that interjections lexicalize EX itself indiscriminately.
I argue that this cannot be quite right either, as different interjections bias different
types of exclamations. Specifically, based on an informal corpus search for English, it
can be conjectured that oh biases an optative use (as opposed to a degree exclamative
use), whereas boy biases a degree exclamative use (as opposed to an optative use) 76. For
the pilot study, I used google to search for certain strings on the website www.yelp. com (a
76 The reason I test this for English, rather than for German, is that English is more rigid in the different
strings that it allows for, making search results more easy to mine (e.g. searching for the string if only in
English almost always yields optatives, whereas no corresponding string exists in German).
171
social reviewing website). I looked through all of the results, verified that the utterances
were grammatical and eliminated duplicates. The search strings that I used were
INTERJECTION if only (e.g. "oh if only") and INTERJECTION would I (e.g. "boy would
I") - these strings were chosen to narrow down the results to a manageable size. Four
modified examples of possible hits are given in (327) and (328).
(327) Oh if only I could give zero stars.
Boy if only I could give zero stars.
optative
Oh would I love to take all my friends here.
Boy would I love to take all my friends here.
degree exclamative
The table in (329) summarizes the number of entries for a selection of 9 interjections that
one may expect to find in exclamations. What is obvious is that degree exclamatives with
would I are comparatively rare, which means the total number of hits is much lower. (I
picked would I as the search string, as this is something that one may expect to see in
reviews). What is clear from table (329) is that certain interjections (of which I would
like to focus on oh) are more frequent with if only exclamations (i.e. optatives) and others
(specifically boy) are more frequent with would I exclamations (i.e. degree exclamatives).
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The patterns that I observed in my corpus study are summarized in (330) and (331),
where superscripted '«' marks possible but dispreferred.
(330) a. Oh(,) if only I could give zero stars.
b. "Boy(,) if only I could give zero stars.
(331) a. "Oh(,) would I love to take all my friends here.
d. Boy(,) would I love to take all my friends here.
A pilot study on a different corpus (here: a google search restricted to www. nytimes. com)
confirms these patterns.
(332) INTJ if only INTJ would I
oh 88.8% (120) < 0.5% (0)
boy 11.1%(15) 100%(29)
total 100%(135) 100%(29)
Informally, these preference patterns seem to point in the direction that oh is typically
associated with something bouletic, whereas boy is typically associated with an indication
of unlikelihood. A formalization of the semantics of interjections is beyond the scope of
this dissertation, but I conjecture that in the spirit of McCready (2009), they can be
analyzed as expressive elements in their own right. In EX utterances, the main effects of
using different interjections are then, first, to block readings that are incompatible (or
dispreferred) with the interjection that is used and, second, to strengthen the emotive /
evaluative attitude expressed by the exclamation.
4.1.9 Formal matters: What is in EX and what isn't.
In the preceding sections, I have argued for the existence of an EX operator in
exclamations, subsuming optatives and polar exclamatives (and possibly degree
exclamatives), cf. sections 4.1.3 and 4.1.4. I have argued that EX is emotive (4.1.5),
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expressive (4.1.6) and scalar (4.1.7). To capture its meaning, I have proposed the
semantics in (333) with the auxiliary definition in (334).
(3 3 3) Lexical entry for EX (final)
For any scale S and propositionp, interpreted in relation to a context c and
assignment function g,
an utterance EX(S)(p) is felicitous iff Vq[THRESHOLD(c) >s q -* p >s q]
"EX expresses an emotion that captures the fact that p is higher on a (speaker-related) scale
S than all contextually relevant alternatives q below a contextual threshold."
where THRESHOLD(c) is a function from a context into a set of worlds / a
proposition that counts as high with respect to a relevant scale S.
(334) definition of scale (final)
a. A scale S is defined as a set of ordered pairs of worlds (S C W x W), which
are ordered by an ordering relation R, such that for every pair of worlds
<w7,w3> in S, the relation R(<w 7,w3>) holds.
b. For any scale S and corresponding ordering relation R, I use W7 >s W3 to mean
'w7 is strictly higher than w3 on S', i.e. R(<w 7,w3>) A , R(<w3,w 7>).
c. For any proposition p and q, p >s q iff Vw3 E q 3w7 E p such that W7 >S w 3,
and it is not the case that Vw 7 E p 3W3 E q such that w3 >s w7.
(adapted from Villalta 2007:106, using concepts from Klinedinst 2005)
Two illustrations are given in (336) and (337), different readings of the ambiguous (335).
(335) Mein Gott, dass der Otto nicht verschlafen hat! that-exclamation
my God that he Otto not overslept has
lit. My God, that he didn't oversleep!
(336) optative reading
a. LF: [[EX Sspeaker-preferences] (dass) der Otto nicht verschlafen hat!]
that he Otto not overslept has
b. an utterance of (336a) is felicitous iff Vq[THRESHOLD(c) >speaker-preferences q
-> Otto-didn't-oversleep >speaker-preferences q]
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c. in words:
The speaker expresses an attitude that at least some world in which Otto didn't
oversleep is more preferable than all of the worlds compatible with relevant
alternative propositions. => conveys: 'I hope Otto didn't oversleep!'
(337) polar exclamative reading
a. LF: [[EX Sspeaker-unlikelihood] (dass) der Otto nicht verschlafen hat!]
that he Otto not overslept has
b. an utterance of (337a) is felicitous iff Vq[THRESHOLD(c) >speaker-unlikelihood q
-+ Otto-didn't-oversleep >speaker-unlikelihood q]
c. in words:
The speaker expresses an attitude that at least some world in which Otto didn't
oversleep are less likely than all of the worlds compatible with relevant
alternative propositions. => conveys: 'I'm surprised Otto didn't oversleep!'
What (336b+c) and (337b+c) do not address is the apparent precondition that (336a) is
non-factive whereas (337a) is factive. I address this matter in chapter 5.
The present analysis implements the intuitions that I report in (33 8b+c). EX always
conveys that the modified proposition is sufficiently high on a salient scale to trigger an
emotion (of desire or surprise, respectively), and the scale is provided by the context.
(338) a. Mensch! Dass der Otto heute nicht verschlafen hat!
man that he Otto today not overslept has
lit. 'Man! That Otto didn't oversleep today!'
b. optative reading:
LF: [EXspeaker-preference [that Otto didn't oversleep today]]
interpretation: worlds in which Otto didn't oversleep are higher than a salient
threshold on the speaker's preference scale, where marks the boundary
between intolerable worlds (below ) and tolerable worlds (above ).
c. polar exclamative reading:
LF: [EXspeaker-unlikelihood [that Otto didn't oversleep today]]
interpretation: worlds in which Otto didn't oversleep are higher than a salient
threshold on the speaker's inverse likelihood scale, where marks the line
between unsurprising worlds (below ) and surprising worlds (above ).
Focusing on optatives, two aspects of this analysis need to be motivated: First of all, is it
necessary to make reference to alternative propositions (Villalta 2000, 2007) rather than
simply to the denoted proposition and its polar opposite (Heim 1992, applied to optatives
by Kyriakaki 2007, 2008, 2009)? Secondly, if optatives compare the denoted proposition
to alternatives, which alternatives is it compared to (i.e. all of them, some of them, etc.)?
Consider Heim's (1992) analysis of want7 7 (based on Villalta's 2007 non-dynamic
rendering), in (339), contrasting it with Villalta's (2007) analysis, in (340)78.
(339) desire as polar comparison of a proposition and its opposite (cf Heim 1992)
a. ||want||(p)(a)(w) = 1 iff Vw' E Doxa(w): Sim,'(p) >DESa,w Simw'(-p)
where
b. For any propositionp, any similarity relation < and any world w:
Simw(p) = {w': p(w') = 1 & Vw": p(w") = 1 -> w' , w"}
c. For any worlds wi, W2 and for any ordering relation g E D<st,t>,
wi >g w2 iff {p: p E g & p(wi)= 1} C {q: q E g & q(w2) = 1}
d. For any worlds w E W and sets of worlds X C W, Y W,
X >g Y iff Vw'[w' E X -> Vw"[w" E Y -- w' >g w"]].
e. Doxa(w) contains all the worlds that are compatible with what a believes in
the world w to be true (i.e. the worlds that are candidates for being the actual
world, according to a's beliefs in w).
d. In words: "All of the p-worlds that are closest to the actual world according
to the speaker's beliefs are more preferable to the speaker than all of the
closest -p-worlds."
(based on Villalta's 2007 non-dynamic rendering of Heim's 1992 definition)
7 Heim (1992) develops an intuition from Stalnaker (1984), assuming a conditional semantics in the
tradition of Lewis (1973) and Stalnaker (1968).
78 For a different view on how to model preferences, see Condoravdi & Lauer's (2011) preference
structures.
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(340) desire as a comparison of a proposition and salient alternatives (cf Villalta 2007)
a. ||wantc||8(p)(a)(w)= 1 iff Vq: q f p & q E g(C): p >DESa,w q
where:
b. C is a contextually determined set of propositions (plausibly identical to the
set of contextually salient focus alternatives, Rooth 1985, 1996).
c. For any worlds w, w7 and W3, W7 >DESa,w W3 iff w7 is more desirable to a in w
than w3 .
d. For any proposition p and q, p >DESa,w q iff Vw 3 E q 3w7 E p such that w7 >,,
W3, and it is not the case that Vw 3 E p 3w7 E q such that W7 >,, W3.
e. In words: "The modified proposition p is more preferable to the speaker than
all contextually salient alternatives."
(adapted from Villalta 2007:106)
In words, (339) states that x wants p is true if and only if, all else being equal, p-worlds
are more desirable for x than -p-worlds. This accounts for the fact that we can want
something that's not optimal, as (341) can be a true statement in a context like (342).
(341) I want to teach Tuesdays and Thursdays next semester.
(Heim 1992, Villalta 2007:96)
(342) a contextual ranking of desires (from Heim 1992, discussed in Villalta 2007)
a. First choice: I don't teach at all.
b. Second choice: I teach Tuesdays and Thursdays.
c. Third choice: I teach on other days.
In contrast, (340) states that x wants p is true if and only if there is some p-world that is
more desirable for x than all of the worlds compatible with each of the salient alternative
propositions q. Villalta proposes this modification in order to account for situations in
which different alternatives differ in their likelihood but we still care about the best
possible option. Consider the scenario in (343a), schematically given in (343b).
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(343) a. Sofia may bring a chocolate cake, apple pie or ice cream to Victoria's picnic.
It is extremely unlikely that Sofia brings chocolate cake, whereas it is most
likely that she brings ice cream and somewhat less likely that she brings apple
pie. Victoria prefers the chocolate cake to the apple pie by far, and she hates
ice cream.
b. preferences beliefs
most desirable *...... chocolate cake -. most unlikely / least likely
&...... apple pie .....
least desirable &.----.ice cream --------.......-------- most likely / least unlikely
(adapted from Villalta 2007:102+103)
Villalta (2007) argues that the statement in (344) is judged false in a context like (343)
even though Heim (1992) predicts (344) to be true, as follows. If we compare the apple-
pie worlds that are closest to the actual world to the -apple-pie worlds that are closest to
the actual world, all of the closest -apple-pie worlds are ice-cream worlds (given that
chocolate-cake worlds are too remote). A simple comparison between closest apple-pie
worlds and closest -apple-pie worlds should thus render (344) true. If, however, we
compare apple-pie worlds to salient alternatives, we can contextually restrict alternatives
to include chocolate-cake worlds. Conversely, in (341), the worlds in which I don't teach
at all would already be excluded from the set of contextually relevant alternatives.
(344) # Victoria wishes Sofia would bring an apple pie.
(adapted from Villalta 2007:102+103)
Under Villalta's view, comparison between p-worlds and -p-worlds is then a subcase of
the more general comparison between p-worlds and contextually salient q-worlds.
Notably, Villalta remarks that in the context in (343a+b), if Sofia ends up bringing an
apple pie, (345) seems to be a true statement. Under the assumption of Heim (1992) that
want, wish and be glad have the same core meaning, this possibility clashes with
generalized universal quantification over salient alternative propositions and thus
prompts Villalta (2007) to relativize glad to the entry in (346).
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(345) Victoria is glad that Sofia brought an apple pie.
(Villalta 2007:127)
(346) Ilbe gladc||g(p)(a)(w) = 1 iff 3q: q # p & q E g(C): p >DESa,w q
"p is more desirable to a in w than some contextually relevant alternatives q"
(Villalta 2007:128, paraphrase mine)
The question is what the correct meaning is for the EX operator. First of all, does the EX
operator simply compare the denoted proposition and its polar opposite or does it
compare the denoted proposition to salient alternatives?
Looking at Villalta's picnic scenario, what we observe is that the choice of particle
(i.e. nur 'only', doch, wenigstens 'at least' in German) influences the acceptability of an
optative with respect to different alternatives. Consider first a wish for chocolate cake
(after the fact), expressed in (347). While such a wish is felicitous with the particle doch,
it is ill-formed in the relevant context if we use the particle wenigstens 'at least'. This is
due to the fact that doch simply marks a conflict, whereas wenigstens 'at least' makes a
better alternative salient (see chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of these particles). The
particle nur 'only' seems wellformed, but slightly more marked than doch.
(347) Jetzt kommt die mit Vanilleeis daher! ...
now comes she with vanilla.ice.cream here
'Now she arrives with Vanilla ice cream!'
Ach, wenn sie doch / ?nur /#wenigstens einen Schokokuchen gebracht hatte!
oh if she doch only at.least an chocolate.cake brought had
'If only she had brought an chocolate cake!'
Now contrast (347) with (348), which expresses a wish for apple cake. Here, wenigstens
'at least' becomes the most natural, whereas doch seems slightly more marked, indicating
that doch in the absence of nur 'only' and wenigstens 'at least' may by default bias a
reading where the denoted proposition is the optimal option as compared to contextual
alternatives. (These judgments are very subtle due to the flexible nature of contextual
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alternatives and other contextual information; only the illformedness of wenigstens 'at
least' in (347) is a categorical, strong judgment.)
(348) Jetzt kommt die mit Vanilleeis daher! ...
now comes she with vanilla.ice.cream here
'Now she arrives with Vanilla ice cream!'
Ach, wenn sie "doch /nur /wenigstens einen Apfelkuchen gebracht hatte!
oh if she doch only at.least an apple.cake brought had
'If only she had brought an apple cake!'
The contrast between (347) and (348), coupled with the assumption that the source of
desirability (i.e. EX) is uniform across different optatives, suggests that we are indeed
comparing alternatives, and not just the expressed proposition to its negation; we find
some cases, like (348), where the optative marks the denoted proposition as better than
some alternative, and other cases, like (347), where the optative marks the denoted
proposition as better than all alternatives. What is crucial for distinguishing between
Heim (1992) and Villalta (2007) is the issue that wishing for something other than the
best should sometimes be deviant, as indicated for doch in (348). As the judgments are
subtle, it is worth considering another example. Moving from counterfactual cases to
non-counterfactual cases, we can establish a contrast similar to (347) and (348). In the
absence of any particle, the default interpretation seems to bias universal quantification
over the salient alternatives, as shown in (349), whereas wenigstens 'at least' enforces
existential quantification over salient alternatives, as shown in (350).
(349) Oh, dass Sofia dieses Mal Schokokuchen / ??Apfelkuchen mitbringt!
oh that Sofia this time chocolate.cake apple.cake brings
'Oh that Sofia brings chocolate cake / "apple pie this time!'
(350) Oh, dass Sofia dieses Mal wenigstens #Schokokuchen / Apfelkuchen mitbringt!
oh that Sofia this time at.least chocolate.cake apple.cake brings
'Oh that Sofia at least brings #chocolate cake / apple pie this time!'
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What the contrast in (349) suggests is that in the default case an optative requires that the
denoted proposition is more preferable than all alternatives (as in the case of the
chocolate case, but not in the case of the apple pie). It doesn't simply compare the
expressed proposition to its polar opposite all else being equal. At the same time, the
meaning of the EX operator needs to be flexible in the sense that (350) becomes possible,
where the speaker is explicitly settling for a less than optimal option, indicated by the use
of wenigstens 'at least'.
Consider now the two options that directly follow from Villalta (2007), in (351).
(35 1)For any scale S and propositionp, interpreted in relation to a context c and
assignment function g,
a. universal EX analysis (cf Villalta's 2007 wish)
an utterance EXc(S)(p) is felicitous iff Vq [[q # p & q E g(C)] -+ p >s q]
b. existential EXanalysis (cf Villalta's 2007 be glad)
an utterance EXc(S)(p) is felicitous iff 3q [[q # p & q E g(C)] -+ p >s q]
The option in (351 a) must be rejected straight away, given that we have seen cases like
(350), where it is crucial that we are not quantifying over all alternatives. This leaves us
with the question of whether (35 1b) is a viable option. This option does not seem to work
either. If we take into account the fact that Sofia in Villalta's context may forget / have
forgotten to bring anything, there are four salient alternatives, given in (352) (flattening
out the probabilities, which are irrelevant for this point). Assume (as indicated) that Sofia
brought apple pie. If optatives always expressed existential quantification over
alternatives, (353) should be a wellformed exclamation, contrary to fact. This is the case,
as (Sofia brought) nothing would be a salient, contextually relevant alternative to (Sofia
brought) ice cream, and ice cream would be preferable over nothing.
(352) preferences
most desirable chocolate cake
... = what actually happened
.... ice cream
least desirable ... nothing
(353) # If only Sofia had brought ice cream!
To solve this issue, I propose that optatives (like other scalar expressions) are sensitive to
a contextually given standard or threshold, (354), thus arriving at the final analysis of EX
as presented above. On a preference scale, the threshold would mark the boundary
between what is preferable and what is not. On an unlikelihood scale, the threshold would
mark the boundary between what is unlikely and what is not.
(354) For any scale S and propositionp, interpreted in relation to a context c and
assignment function g,
an utterance EX(S)(p) is felicitous iff Vq[THRESHOLD(c) >s q -+ p >s q]
where THRESHOLD(c) is a function from a context into a set of worlds / a
proposition that counts as high with respect to a relevant scale S.
In any context, the threshold will now covary with whatever the speaker considers
preferable (or possibly: tolerable) or unlikely (and thus surprising). To illustrate, in (355),
the contextually given threshold would be set as in (356).
(355) Jetzt kommt die mit Vanilleeis daher! ...
now comes she with vanilla.ice.cream here
'Now she arrives with Vanilla ice cream!'
Ach, wenn sie doch / ?nur /#wenigstens einen Schokokuchen gebracht hatte!
oh if she doch only at.least an chocolate.cake brought had
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kommt die mit Vanilleeis daher!
comes she with vanilla.ice.cream here
she arrives with Vanilla ice cream!'
Ach, wenn sie ??doch /nur /wenigstens
oh if she doch only at.least
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Positing such a view, we can now ask how thresholds can be shifted in a context, and the
following contrast gives rise to an interesting generalization. While thresholds can be
shifted downwards (indicating willingness to compromise), shown in (359), they cannot




kommt die mit Vanilleeis
comes she with vanilla.ice.cream
she arrives with Vanilla ice cream!'
Ach, wenn sie
oh if she
'If only she had
daher!
here
doch einen Schokokuchen gebracht hitte!
doch an chocolate.cake brought had
brought an chocolate cake!'
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---ice cream ...... most likely / least unlikely
(358) beliefs
(356)
Oder wenn sie wenigstens einen Apfelkuchen gebracht hatte!
or if she at.least an apple.cake brought had
'Or at least if only she had brought an apple pie!'
(360) Jetzt kommt die mit Vanilleeis daher! ...
now comes she- with vanilla.ice.cream here
'Now she arrives with Vanilla ice cream!'
Ach, wenn sie wenigstens einen Apfelkuchen gebracht hatte!
oh if she at.least an apple.cake brought had
'If only she had at least brought an apple pie!'
# Oder wenn sie doch einen Schokokuchen gebracht hatte!
or if she doch an chocolate.cake brought had
'Or if only she had brought an chocolate cake!'
Intuitively, assuming threshold-sensitivity also accounts for the surprise that is felt in
polar exclamatives. If I am Victoria and I expect Sofia to bring ice cream, it seems
possible to utter both (361a) and (361b) sincerely/felicitously, whereas (361c) seems
insincere and thus infelicitous. This is because both (361a) and (361b) violate prior
expectations, given that vanilla ice cream was the most likely. (361a) is compatible with
the threshold for surprise being chocolate cake or apple pie. (361b) requires the threshold
for surprisingness to be as low as apple pie.
(361) a. When Sofia arrives with chocolate cake:
Mei, dass du dieses Mal Schokokuchen mitgebracht hast!
my that you this time chocolate.cake brought have
'[I'm surprised] that you brought chocolate cake this time!'
b. When Sofia arrives with apple cake:
Mei, dass du dieses Mal Apfelkuchen mitgebracht hast!
my that you this time apple.cake brought have
'[I'm surprised] that you brought apple cake this time!'
c. When Sofia arrives with vanilla ice cream:
# Mei, dass du dieses Mal Vanilleeis mitgebracht hast!
my that you this time vanilla.ice.cream brought have
'[I'm surprised] that you brought vanilla ice cream this time!'
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4.1.10 Two Types of Optatives: EX-Optatives and Adv-Optatives
So far, I argued that optatives contain an operator EX, which is expressive and thus
makes them unembeddable; see in particular section 4.1.6. In this section, I broaden my
empirical scope and suggest that cross-linguistically there may be two types of utterances
that express a desire without a word that means desire: Those that involve an EX-operator
(which are correspondingly unembeddable), and those that bring about optativity by
means of some idiosyncratic speech act adverbial. That speech act adverbial may by itself
be expressive, but does not shift the propositional content of an utterance into the
expressive domain. I will correspondingly call the first type of utterance EX-Optative,
and the second type of utterance Adv-Optative.
A language that seems to have both types of utterances is Spanish. Spanish allows for
if-optatives as in (362b), but it also allows for ojald-optatives, as in (362a). Notably,
ojald-optatives simply have the structure of a declarative matrix clause (and do not
involve a complementizer si 'if).
(362) Context: The witches at the witchcraft school are desperately waiting for their
broomsticks and wands to arrive in the mail. Once again, neither has arrived
a. iOjali mi escoba estuviera aqui!
OJALA my broom were here
'If only my broom were here!'
b. iSi al menos mi escoba estuviera aqui!
if at least my broom were here
'If at least my broom were here!'
I propose that ojald-optatives differ from if-optatives in that their overall type is not
expressive, which makes them embeddable. They do not contain an EX-operator; in
contrast, the desirability is encoded by virtue of ojald, which should be analyzed as a type
of speech act adverb on a par with English hopefully. A sentence with hopefully is
illustrated in (363a), and (363a) seems to be equivalent to (363b) and not to (363c)
(which is a contradiction).
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(363) a. Hopefully, he will come back; maybe he won't.
(Joe Nocera: 'Steve Jobs and Apple: Here We Go Again', June 23, 2009,
New York Times Online)
b. I/We hope that he will come back; maybe he won't.
c. #He will come back; maybe he won't.
As shown in (364), there is no constraint against embedding utterances with hopefully.
Again, (364) expresses a hope on part of John and not a commitment of John's to come
back.
(364) John said that hopefully he would come back.
For Spanish, we thus expect that the if-optative (which purportedly contains EX) is
unembeddable, whereas the ojald-optative may be embeddable. This is indeed what we
find, as given in (365) and (366). Example (365) shows that a quantifier can bind into an
ojald-optative from a superordinated matrix clause; similarly, (366) shows that wh-
movement is possible from within an embedded ojald-clause.
(365) Context: The witches at the witchcraft school are desperately waiting for their
broomsticks and wands to arrive in the mail. Once again, neither has arrived
a. Cada brujai dice que ojald sul escoba estuviera aqui.
each witch said that OJALA her broom were here
'Each of the witches said that she wished her broom were here.'
b.* Cada bruja1 dice que si al menos sui escoba estuviera aqui.
each witch said that if at least her broom were here
'Each of the witches said that she wished (at least) her broom were here.'
(366) a. ,Que dijo Juan que ojali hubieras comprado?
what says Juan that OJALA you.had bought
'What does Juan say that he wishes you had bought?'
b.* ,Que dijo Juan que si al menos hubieras comprado?
what says Juan that if at least you.had bought
'What does Juan say that he wishes you had bought (at least)?'
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Candidates for languages that have such Adv-Optatives are clearly languages that use
elements that look like specialized speech act adverbs to express desirability; some
obvious candidates are given in (367). (What is remarkable is the degree to which such
adverbs seem to be loaned into other languages.)
(367) a. Makari o
MAKARI the
'If only John
John na akusi tin
John subj listened the
had listened to Mary!'
b. Magari Maria avesse ascoltato
MAGARI Maria had listened








/Kash / Ey-Kash John beh
KASH EY-KASH John to










had listened to Mary!'
e. Kaash John-ne apnii maa-kii baat
KAASH John-erg self.f mother-gen.f talk.f
'If only John had listened to his mother!'
f. Kaash John Mary-ne joi
KAASH John Mary-acc seen













h. Tant de bo jo pogues donar-los una resposta
as.much of good I could give-them a answer





As expected, some of these languages allow for Adv-optatives to be embedded. A first
example is given in (368), showing that kaash-optatives in Hindi can be embedded.










(368) Kisi-ne7  nahi kaha ki [kaash Kareena-ne uskii7 kitab
anyone-erg not said that KAASH Kareena-erg his book
'Nobody 7 said that he wishes Kareena had read his7 book.'
paRh-ii ho-tii].
read-pfv.f be-cf.f
Similarly, in Greek, makari-optatives can be embedded, though this is slightly marked
(against the judgments in Kyriakaki 2007, who argues that makari-optatives can never be
embedded; this variability may suggest inter-speaker variations with respect to whether
makari-optatives also contain an EX-operator or not).
(369) ?I Maria3 lei [oti makari o Kostas na tin3  akusi].
Maria says that MAKARI Kostas subj to.her listened
'Maria says she wishes that Kostas had listened to her.'
Interestingly, Turkish never allows for embedded keke-optatives (Stileyman Ulutas,
p.c.), and Italian speakers do not pattern on a par with Spanish speakers. While Spanish
exhibits a split between embeddable ojald-utterances and unembeddable si-utterances,
such a split is absent in Italian (though one out of six speakers accepts (370b)).






dice che [se solo Maria avesse ascoltato suo 7
said that if only Maria had listened to.his
said that if only Maria had listened to his brother.'
dice che [magari Maria avesse ascoltato suo7
said that MAGARI Maria had listened to.his
said that he wishes Maria had listened to his brother.'
To summarize, contrasts such as presented in (365) and (366) argue for a second type of
optative construction, which is different from the EX-optatives that I focus on. I have
argued that these other optatives may simply contain a speech act adverb, like English
hopefully, and shown additional evidence in (368) and (369) that such Adv-optatives can
be embedded. While I maintain that the adverb in Adv-optatives may have a similar core
semantics to the EX-operator, it is crucial that such adverbs operate on the propositional






seem to be a wish on part of the speaker, but rather a wish on part of the matrix subject.
In this sense, such Adv-optatives have neither properties of expressives (which should
project to the speaker) nor of exclamations (which I conjecture would be unembeddable).
I will thus no longer be concerned with Adv-optatives in the following sections.
Before concluding my discussion of Adv-optatives, it is however useful to discuss one
open question, namely the restrictions that can be observed with respect to possible
embedding predicates. If we look at Greek, we instantly notice a restriction to verbs of
saying; in (371), based on (369), we see that anafoni 'exclaims' can embed a makari
utterance, whereas xeri 'wishes' or pistevi 'thinks' cannot do so. This indicates that Adv-
optatives may have a special status after all.
(371) I Maria 3 ?anafoni / *xeri / *pistevi [oti makari o Kostas na tin3  akusi].
Maria *exclaims *wishes *thinks that MAKARI Kostas subj to.her listened
'Maria exclaims / wishes / thinks that hopefully Kostas had listened to her.'
Judgments in Spanish seem to be less strong than in Greek, but the overall tendency also
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seems to favor verbs of saying over different attitude predicates
(372) Cada brujai dice / ?piensa / ??insiste en /??espera / ??desea / *quiere
each witch said ?thinks "insists "hopes ..wishes *wants
que ojalA' sui escoba estuviera aqui.
that OJALA her broom were here
'Each of the witches said that she wished her broom were here.'
A similar preference has been claimed to hold for embedded imperatives in Crnic &
Trinh (2009), who argue that imperatives can be truly embedded under say but not under
predicates such as know (or even claim, which strictly speaking qualifies as a verb of
saying). This is illustrated in (373).
80 While piensa 'thinks' seems possible in (372), native speakers report that it strongly favors a quotative
reading of the embedded clause (as opposed to a truly embedded reading); this contrasts with dice 'says',
which does not seem to have this property; cf. also (365) and (366).
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(373) a. John said [call Mary]
b.* John claimed (that) [call Mary]
c. * John knows (that) [call Mary]
(Crnie & Trinh 2009:110+120)
Future explorations of this topic may thus focus on the parallels between Adv-optatives
and imperatives.
4.1.11 Summary
In this chapter, I have argued that the desirability in optatives (and the surprise in polar
exclamatives) arises by virtue of a generalized exclamation operator EX. I have argued
against a matrix clause deletion approach, and shown that EX is an emotive, expressive
and scalar operator that essentially conveys that the modified proposition is above a
salient threshold on a contextually provided scale (e.g. speaker's preferences).
Subsequently, I have shown that there are other optatives that may not involve EX, but
rather an optative-meaning-inducing speech act adverb. While EX-optatives are
unembeddable, such Adv-optatives can sometimes be embedded. In the following section,
I provide a brief review of Biezma (2011 ab), a recent alternative approach to optatives.
4.2 An Alternative Approach: Deriving Desirability from the Pragmatics
4.2.1 Biezma (2011ab) in a nutshell
Biezma (2011 ab) is dedicated to English if-(only)-optatives. The core questions that she
aims to answer are the following. First, how is desirability derived in (374a+b)? Second,
does (374b) have the structure of a conditional or not?
(374) a. If only I had been taller, I would have played in the NBA.
b. If only I had been taller!
(adapted from Biezma 2011 a)
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Biezma (2011 ab) argues for an analysis of optatives that incorporates the following
proposals. First, optatives are conditionals with an elided consequent. Deletion is
modeled by means of a silent <st> type variable qj in consequent position, which is
abstracted over. As such, they have a structure as in (375). What surfaces as the if-
optative in (374b) is an expression of type <st,t>, i.e. a set of propositions. ('=>' is a
place-holder for the semantics of the conditional modal V.)
(375) 4.p =* q
i
qi
antecedent (Biezma 201lb: 116)
The second part of Biezma's proposal is that optatives are conditionals with reverse
topicality . She observes that in regular conditionals, the antecedent is the topic and the
consequent is focus (an idea Biezma adopts from Haiman 1978, Reinhart 1981, Ebert,
Endriss & Hinterwimmer 2008). This entails that the antecedent can be elided, (377).
(376) A: What would happen after the fall of the dictatorial Government?
B: If the government fell, a democratic system would be established.
(Biezma 201la)
(377) A: What would happen after the fall of the dictatorial Government?
B: (If the government fell,) A democratic system would be established.
On analogy, Biezma argues that optatives are mention-some answers to a question of how
to bring about some salient consequent.
(378) schematic representation of the information structure of an optative
A: How would I have brought it about that I played in the NBA?
B: If only I had been taller(, I would have played in the NBA).
81 A similar view has been maintained for German dass-optatives and dass-polar exclamatives by Schwabe
(2007:109), cf. Schwabe (2006), who assumes that such unembedded dass-clauses are the focused part of a
larger construction involving an elided, backgrounded matrix clause.
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Biezma then proceeds to argue that desirability arises because contexts in which optatives
are felicitous involve an Immediate Question under Discussion (abbreviated as IQuD)
that asks for sufficient conditions to bring something about. In such a context, optatives
are then presented as mention-some answers as opposed to mention-all answers, which
favors a goal-oriented question, (379), over a neutral question, (380). The mention-some
nature of optatives is argued to be due to the semantics of only, which (in the spirit of
Beaver & Clark 2008) marks the modified statement as the strongest answer to the IQuD
(as opposed to an exhaustive answer to the IQuD).
(379) a. How do we bring P about?
b. How would we have brought @ about?
c. How do I get to [, the supermarket / play in the NBA / 4die]?
=* desire for p is implied/entailed
(partially adapted from Biezma 2011 a)
(380) What are the circumstances that would bring about @?
(Biezma 2011 a)
=> desire for P is not implied/entailed; P can be negative/neutral
Biezma aims to thus derive the intuition that what is desired in an optative is the implied
consequent and not the denoted proposition (as Biezma 2011 a argues, cf. Rifkin 2000,
Asarina & Shklovsky 2008). I will review each of her sub-proposals in turn, arguing that
there are problems with each of them, which need to be resolved in order to maintain
such an analysis.
4.2.1 Are optatives conditionals?
One core assumption of Biezma's (2011 a) is that optatives are truly conditionals, where
the consequent can be elided, cf. (381).
(381) 2.p => q
qi A- elided consequent
(would) antecedent
if only I had been taller
Though Biezma assumes that utterances like (382a) have a "conditional structure" and
that "conditionals and optatives have the same underlying logical form", she assumes that
(382a) has the [Xq.p => q] type denotation in (382b) via abstraction over the consequent
(i.e. an optative denotes a property of propositions). She argues that this derives the
unembeddability of if-optatives as well as the fact that they cannot be conjoined with
propositions (cf. Rifkin 2000).
(382) a. If only it had rained!
b. Xq.rain => q
A concern with respect to Biezma's analysis is that it seems to predict that optatives
should behave like answer fragments. While we have seen that this is indeed true with
respect to embedding and conjunction (e.g. (247c)), this is not true with respect to
modification by an adjunct clause. It is unclear how we could account for the asymmetry
in (383a) vs (383b). Naturally, Biezma could assume that the optative in (383b) involves
abstraction over a propositional variable in consequent position, as in (381), whereas a
fragment answer like (383a) would simply involve deletion of a non-pronominal
consequent. However, it is unclear what would motivate such a distinction, provided the
purported similarity of the two constructions.
(383) a. A: Unter welchen Umstanden wire die Party ein Erfolg gewesen?
under which circumstances were the party a success been
'Under which circumstances would the party have been a success?'
193
B: Wenn Hans gekommen ware weil er immer guten Wein
if Hans come were since he always good wine
mitbringt.
brings
'If Hans had come, because he always brings good wine.'
/ because he always brings good wine > [The party would have been a
success if Hans had come]
LF: [The party would have been a sueeess if Hans had come], because he
always brings good wine.
b. Wenn Hans doch nur gekommen ware (#weil er immer
if Hans DOCH only come were because he always
guten Wein mitbringt).
good wine brings
'If only Hans had come (#because he always brings good wine).'
4.2.2 Do optatives involve reversed topicality?
Biezma argues that while regular conditionals have the topic-focus structure in (384b)
and may serve to answer an implicit question as in (384b), optatives exhibit the inverse
pattern, i.e. (385b), which can partially answer the implicit question in (385a). (The
underlying assumption is that the Focus always answers the IQuD.)
(384) a. Immediate Question under Discussion:
What would happen if p was the case?
b. [Topic (If p)], [Focus then q]
(385) a. Immediate Question under Discussion:
How would we get to be in a q situation?
b. [Focus If only p], [Topic (then q)]
Biezma views the core function of particles such as only in optatives to mark focus on the
entire proposition in the antecedent proposition, thus indicating the proposed reversal of
topicality. The idea is that the particle must takes a proposition-denoting complement (a
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view that I largely share, cf. chapter 6) and associate with focus on the entire proposition
in order to license optativity.
(386) a. If only [mom invited grandpa]F (... he wouldn't come).
b. If only [MOM]F invited grandpa #(... he wouldn't come).
(adapted from Biezma 2011 a)
Particles are assumed to give rise to a reversal of information structure at the sentence
level; optativity is thus licensed by the presence of a focus particle and not from its
semantic content. (See chapter 6 for my own view on this matter.)
Concerns for this view arise as follows. On the one hand, it is not clear that these
claims can be maintained when we look beyond English. It appears that an optative
reading, as glossed, is still available in (387), even though both clauses involve narrow
focus on einer 'one'. (It is relevant for the point that I make that nur 'only' is read in its
non-exclusive ONLY2 reading, see chapter 6.2.)
(387) Context: Hans came alone, which is why the event was canceled
a. Ach, wenn Hans mit nur [EINER]F Begleitperson gekommen ware!
oh if Hans with only one guest arrived were
b. Ach, wenn Hans nur mit [EINER]F Begleitperson gekommen ware!
oh if Hans only with one guest arrived had
'Oh, if only Hans had brought at least one guest!'
(not intended: 'Oh, if only Hans had not brought more than one guest!')
Similarly, in the following example, the focus that doch associates with indicates which
aspect of the present situation the speaker would have liked to change (cf. Grosz 2011).
Wide sentential focus does not appear to be necessary for an optative reading. These
examples thus raise concern with respect to the assumption that focus particles in
optatives serve to mark the entire antecedent asfocus.
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(388) a. Wenn doch nur [OTTO]F die Nachtschicht mit Anna geteilt hatte!
if doch only OTTO the night.shift with Anna shared had
'If only it had been Otto who shared the night shift with Anna!'
b. Wenn Otto doch nur [die NACHTschicht]F mit Anna geteilt hatte!
if Otto doch only the night.shift with Anna shared had
'If only it had been the night shift that Otto shared with Anna!'
c. Wenn Otto die Nachtschicht doch nur mit [ANNA]F geteilt hatte!
if Otto the night.shift doch only with Anna shared had
'If only it had been Anna that Otto shared the night shift with!'
On the other hand, it is not clear in which respect optatives and co-occurring
'consequents' really behave like focused elements and topics respectively. Reis &
W511stein (2010) show that regular conditionals typically only contain one focused
constituent, which marks the new information. The examples in (389) are from Reis &
W611stein (2010:148); I have added the context question, brackets, focus diacritic, glosses
and translations.
(3 89) a. Under which circumstances would you drive a Bentley?
[Wenn ich MillioNAR ware]F, wtirde ich es tun.
if I millioNAIRE were would I it do
'If I were a millionaire, I'd do it.'
b. What would you do ifyou were a millionaire?
Wenn ich Millionar ware, [wIrde ich BENTley fahren]F.
if I millionaire were would I BENTley drive
'If I were a millionaire, I'd drive a bentley.'
Biezma's analysis predicts that optatives with overt consequents should behave like
(389a), i.e. it should be possible to deaccent the purported consequent. This does however
not seem to be the case. We have already seen that optatives in German resist being truly
integrated into a 'consequent', (390a). If we construe a grammatical example where the
'consequent' contains initial dann 'then' or a verb second configuration, both clauses
seem to require a focus, as indicated in (390b+c). In terms of Reis & W611stein (2010)
this indicates that both clauses have a separate focus-background structure, and they are
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not parts of a superordinate focus-background structure. I consider this a serious issue for
Biezma's analysis.
(390)a.* Wenn ich doch nur MillioNAR ware, wUrde
if I doch only millioNAIRE were would
'If only I were a millionaire, I'd drive a bentley.'
b. Wenn ich doch nur MillioNAR ware, ich
if I doch only millioNAIRE were I v
'If only I were a millionaire, I'd drive a bentley.'
c. Wenn ich doch nur MillioNAR ware, dann
if I doch only millioNAIRE were then











Further evidence that optatives and their consequents are not parts of a larger focus-
background structure stems from the (im)possibility of deaccenting the backgrounded
part. As illustrated in (391b), where small font marks deaccentuation, deaccentuation of
the consequent does not seem possible in an optative conditional. This contrasts with a
regular conditional in (391 a), where deaccentuation is allowed.
(391)a. Under which circumstances would you drive a Bentley?
Wenn ich MillioNAR ware, dann wurde ich
if I millioNAIRE were then would I
'If I were a millionaire, I'd drive a Bentley.'
b.* Wenn ich doch nur MillioNAR ware, dann wurde
if I doch only millioNAIRE were then woul




I I Bentley drive.
This strongly suggests that an if-optative and its apparent consequent have separate topic-
focus structure, in the sense that each of them must contain a separate focus. This calls
the idea in question that if-optatives are 'focus constituents' themselves, with an optional
overt consequent marking the background.
In fact, in the case of seemingly truly integrated if-optatives (which I presented above
as counterexamples to Scholz's unembeddability generalization), the matrix clause
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requires an additional focus stress (and in fact the if-optative itself seems to require
deaccentuation), shown in (392a); this further argues against a view of if-optatives as
elements that are focused in Biezma's sense.
(392)a. [Wenn ich doch nur konnte], wnirde ich soFORT kommen.
if I DOCH only could would I immediately could
'If only I could, I would come immediately.'
b.* [Wenn ich doch nur KONnte], wurde ich sofort kommen.
if I DOCH only could would I immediately could
'If only I could, I would come immediately.'
4.2.3 Can we derive desirability from the discourse?
Biezma (2011 a) further argues that the desired proposition in an optative is not the
antecedent, but the consequent (also suggested in Rifkin 2000, and assumed in Asarina &
Shklovsky 2008). The antecedent that is expressed in an optative is assumed to be the
best means to bring about the consequent, and is thus marked by virtue of only. To back
up her claim that the speaker actually desires the consequent and not the antecedent,
Biezma provides the following example.
(393) A: If only I had been taller, I would have played in the NBA
B: That would not have been necessary, you were such a great player!
What would have made a difference was if you had been in a better college
team.
A: Yeah...!, you are right..., If only I had played for UCLA, I would have
played in the NBA
(Biezma 2011 a)
In brief, Biezma argues for the following points. Optatives provide an answer to an
implicit context question, which could a priori be (394a) or (394b).
(394) a. How would we get to be in a q situation? (goal oriented)
=> desire for q is implied/entailed
b. Under which circumstances would a q situation arise?
=> desire for q is not implied/entailed; q can be negative/neutral
Due to the presence of only, the answer that an optative provides is marked as the best
answer (i.e. as the strongest sufficient way of bringing about the desired q), based on
Beaver & Clark (2008). Given that the answer to the contextual IQuD is non-exhaustive,
a mention-some IQuD like (394a) is preferred over a mention-all IQuD like (394b),
which would require an exhaustive answer. It follows that optatives are uttered in
response to a goal oriented question. Goal-oriented questions entail desirability, which
accounts for the difference between (395a) and (395b), missing in (396a) and (396b).
This is how Biezma derives desirability in optatives.
(395) a. How do I get to arrive in NYC on time? (goal oriented)
b.# How do I get to be arrested and tortured?
(396) a. Under which circumstances would I arrive in NYC on time? (neutral)
b. Under which circumstances would I be arrested and tortured?
Schematically, an example for how to derive desirability in an optative is given in (397),
a brief summary of Biezma's (201 lab) own example.
(397) Background knowledge: John's car broke down. He called his mechanic friend
Tom, but Tom came too late to fix the car in time for John to get to his job
interview in time.
a. optative Tom: If only I had arrived earlier!
is a response to a goal oriented mention-some question
b. inferred IQuD: How would John have gotten to his interview on time?
this implies desirability due to its goal-oriented nature
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Let me now review a few problems with this approach. First, an obvious conceptual
problem concerns the issue that optatives cannot be used in response to an overt question,
as shown in (398) and (399).
(398) A: How would we have brought it about that John made it to his interview on
time?
B:#If only Tom had arrived earlier.
(399) A: How would we have made it to the theater in time?
B-1: If we had taken the number 7 bus.
B-2: # If only we had taken the number 7 bus.
If we grant that this is a difference between overt questions and implicit IQuDs, the
following issue arises.
Biezma's analysis is based on the assumption that the speaker of an optative p
actually desires the implicit consequent q and not necessarily the proposition p itself. Let
us review Biezma's argumentation for this claim. Take Biezma's example in (400a).
Logically, there are three possible locations of the origin of the perceived wish. The
speaker may wish for the antecedent, as shown in the paraphrase in (400b); the speaker
may wish for the consequent, as shown in the paraphrase in (400c); and the speaker may
wish for both, as shown in the paraphrase in (400d).
(400) a. If only I had been taller, I would have played in the NBA.
(Biezma 2011 a)
b. I wish I had been taller. Then I would have played in the NBA.
c. If I had been taller, I could have played in the NBA, and I wish I could have
played in the NBA.
d. I wish I had been taller. Then I could have played in the NBA, and I wish I
could have played in the NBA.
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Biezma and I differ in that she assumes (400c), whereas I assume (400b). Neither of us
argues directly for (400d), which may be conceptually motivated, as there seems to be no
reason to assume that desirability is conveyed twice (though Rifkin 2000 may be seen as
a proponent of (400d), as he argues that both antecedent and consequent must be
desirable).
It can easily be shown that Biezma's argument for (400c) and against (400b) is not
convincing. Consider the evidence that she presents in (401). The idea is that the content
of the optative hinges on our expectations of it being a good means to achieve the
consequent.
(401) A: If only I had been taller, I would have played in the NBA
B: That would not have been necessary, you were such a great player!
What would have made a difference was if you had been in a better college
team.
A: Yeah...!, you are right..., If only I had played for UCLA, I would have
played in the NBA
(Biezma 201la)
The problem that arises for this argument is that the variant in (402), in which the
optative is replaced by a wish statement, seems to behave accordingly. Our wishes can be
as contingent on fulfilling some greater purpose as optatives can, challenging the
conclusion that Biezma draws. If we drew the same conclusion from (402) that Biezma
draws from (401), it would follow that a statement of I wish p does not actually express a
wish for p. This is evidently an undesirable result.
(402) A: I wish I had been taller. Then I would have played in the NBA
B: That would not have been necessary, you were such a great player!
What would have made a difference was if you had been in a better college
team.
A: Yeah...!, you are right..., I wish I had played for UCLA. Then I would
have played in the NBA.
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Quite generally, it seems that wish-statements trigger the desirability of a following
proposition in just the same contexts in which optatives do. Example (403b) is just as
illformed as (403a), and (404a) is just as acceptable as (404b). So Biezma's examples do
not bear on the question as to whether the denoted proposition in an optative if-clause is
the locus of desirability or not.
(403) a.# If only I had gone to the party last night... (then) I would have overslept.
b.# I wish I had gone to the party last night... (then) I would have overslept.
(404) a. If only I could have gone to the party last night... but I would have overslept.
b. I wish I could have gone to the party last night... but I would have overslept.
In contrast, the following example, in (405), strongly challenges Biezma's premise that
the locus of desirability is outside of the optative if-clause. Biezma's analysis predicts
that the ill-formed continuation in (405b) should be well-formed, because (405b) should
not entail a wish for snow per se. In this sense, (405b) should behave on a par with (405c)
and no different from (405a). In contrast, it appears that (405b) cannot be continued as
indicateds2
(405) Context: I love snowboarding and I want to go snowboarding as often as possible.
a. If it snowed tonight, we would go snowboarding tomorrow ...
but I really don't want it to snow, because I hate shoveling the sidewalks.
b. If only it snowed tonight, we would go snowboarding tomorrow ...
#but I really don't want it to snow, because I hate shoveling the sidewalks.
c. If it snowed tonight, we would go snowboarding tomorrow, and I wish we
would go snowboarding tomorrow ... but I really don't want it to snow, because
I hate shoveling the sidewalks.
82 The contrast between (405b) and (405c) is a special instantiation of what we may call Condoravdi &
Lauer's generalization (cf. Condoravdi & Lauer 2010). Condoravdi & Lauer observe that optatives (like
imperatives) cannot express inconsistent wishes, even though wish statements can be inconsistent.
i. Right now, I wish I lived in New York City and I wish I lived in Los Angeles, because I
love many things about each of them and I'm really sick of living in a small city.
ii. # Oh, if only I lived in New York City and if only. I lived in Los Angeles!
iii. # Oh, if only I lived in New York City! If only I lived in Los Angeles!
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Example (405b), in contrast to (405c), suggests that the locus of desirability is in fact in
the if-clause, and not in the implied consequent. This observation supports my view and
challenges Biezma's view. The fact that desirability is not defeasible in (405b) further
suggests that desirability is an entailment of optative utterances, and not simply an
implicature.
Note that examples like (406a) do not pose a problem to my account (or an argument
for Biezma's account), as wishes can indeed derived from a greater good; (406b) is well-
formed and semantically consistent. In this case, the speaker's death is indeed high on the
speaker's preference scale; why this is the case is secondary (though in this example the
answer is provided immediately).
(406) a. If only I had died instead of my king ... (then) my king would still be alive.
b. I wish I had died instead of my king! Then my king would still be alive.
We can thus conclude that there are several issues for Biezma's approach that my
analysis does not face. This discussion concludes the present chapter, and I will now
proceed to discuss the role of mood in optatives.
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5. On the Role of Mood in Exclamations
This chapter extends the proposal outlined in section 3.2.4 and presents my analysis of
mood in exclamations. I use the term mood to refer to semantic mood (Portner's 1997,
2006 notional mood), including notions such as counterfactuality and factivity; I use the
term m-mood to refer to morphological mood marking (e.g. subjunctive/indicative) on the
verb. I proceed by presenting my core proposal and then focus on integrating my
proposal into our current knowledge with respect to mood.
5.1 The Core Proposal: Connecting V to C via Mood
5.1.1 Two Puzzles
I have argued for a uniform EX-Op approach to optatives and other exclamations, such as
polar exclamatives. What we notice is that German exclamations exhibit variation across
two dimensions, illustrated for optatives in (407) and (408). First, optatives vary more or
less freely in their choice of complementizer (dass 'that' in (407a)+(408a) or wenn 'if in
(407b)+(408b)) or (V-to-)T-to-C movement (in (407c)). (I will henceforth use the
abbreviation VI for (V-to-)T-to-C movement in exclamations.) Secondly, they vary in
their m-mood marking, which correlates with counterfactuality (in the case of the
subjunctive) in (407), and non-counterfactuality (in the case of indicative) in (408).
Under my uniform proposal, each of these utterances contains an exclamation operator
EXs, the meaning of which is repeated from (138) in (409).
(407) subjunctive (and counterfactual) optatives
a. [EXs [DaB er nur rechtzeitig gekommen wfire]!
that he only in.time come were
b. [EXs [Wenn er nur rechtzeitig gekommen waire]!
if he only in.time come were
c. [EXs [Wsre er nur rechtzeitig gekommen twre]!
were he only in.time come
'If only he had come in time!'
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(408) indicative optatives
a. [EXs [DaB er nur rechtzeitig gekommen ist]!
that he only in.time come is
b. [EXs [Wenn er nur rechtzeitig gekommen ist]!
if he only in.time come is
'If only he has come in time!'
(409) For any scale S and proposition p, interpreted in relation to a context c and
assignment function g,
an utterance EX(S)(p) is felicitous iff Vq[THRESHOLD(c) >s q - p >s q]
"EX expresses an emotion that captures the fact that p is higher on a (speaker-related)
scale S than all contextually relevant alternatives q below a contextual threshold."
where THRESHOLD(c) is a function from a context into a set of worlds / a
proposition that counts as high with respect to a relevant scale S.
Two puzzles arise. The first puzzle is what determines complementizer selection and the
possibility of VI (e.g. when do they distribute freely? When are they restricted and
how?). The second puzzle concerns the question of how presuppositions on the status of
the denoted proposition arise in a uniform approach to exclamations. The standard
assumption for predicates like want or wish is that their core semantic meanings are
identical to each other's (and similar to that in (409)), while they lexically differ in their
presuppositions. Villalta's (2007) core semantics for predicates of desire (cf. Heim 1992)
is given in (41 Oa). In addition to this shared truth-conditional meaning, want presupposes
the non-counterfactuality of the modified proposition and its relevant alternatives, (41 Ob),
and wish presupposes the counterfactuality of the modified proposition, (41 Oc).
(410) Villalta's (2007) semantics for want and wish; based on Heim (1992)
a. if defined ||wantc||9(p)(a)(w) = wishc1|9(p)(a)(w) = 1 iff
Vq[[q # p & q E g(C)]-+> p >DESa,w q]
"The speaker prefers the denoted proposition p over all relevant contextual alternatives."
b. ||wantcJ|9(p)(a)(w) is defined iff Vq[q E g(C) -> Doxa(w) f q # 0]
"want is defined iff the denoted proposition p is still a real possibility."
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c. ||wishc||g(p)(a)(w) is defined iff p n DOXa(W) = 0
"wish is defined iff the denoted proposition p is false in the utterance context."8 3
(Villalta 2007:108)
In a uniform analysis of EXs, presuppositions like (41 Ob) and (41 Oc) cannot be part of the
lexical meaning of EXs, given that EXs is compatible both with counterfactual optatives,
(411), and non-counterfactual optatives, (412).
(411) a. subjunctive (and counterfactual) optatives
[EXs [Wenn er nur rechtzeitig gekommen wiire]!
if he only in.time come were
'If only he had come in time!'
b. intuitive paraphrase: 'I wish that he had come in time (and he didn't).'
(412) a. indicative optatives
[EXs [Wenn er nur rechtzeitig gekommen ist]!
if he only in.time come is
'If only he has come in time!'
b. intuitive paraphrase: 'I want that he came in time (and he may have).'
If we were to assume that EXs comes in different flavors, a counterfactual EX and a non-
counterfactual EX, this amounts to positing a null WISH operator (cf. Kyriakaki 2007,
2008, 2009 for such a view) and a null WANT operator, as given in (413). Such a move
amounts to generalizing to the 'worst case scenario', as we could no longer maintain a
uniform analysis to different types of exclamations. Until it becomes clear that this is the
correct approach, I pursue the option in (411)+(412), to see how far it can be pushed.
(413)a. subjunctive (and counterfactual) optatives
[WISH [Wenn er nur rechtzeitig gekommen wsire]!
if he only in.time come were
'If only he had come in time!'
206
83 See also Iatridou (2000).
b. indicative optatives
[WANT [Wenn er nur rechtzeitig gekommen ist]!
if he only in.time come is
'If only he has come in time!'
In brief, the two puzzles we aim to solve are (i.) how to account for what material occurs
in the position of C in an exclamation (dass 'that', wenn 'if or the finite verb), and (ii.)
how to derive the wish/want-type presuppositions that are intuitively present in
exclamations.
5.1.2 One Solution (in a nutshell)
How can we proceed from here? What I propose is that we can derive the presuppositions
of different EXs utterances by proposing an analysis of semantic mood in exclamations.
My proposal is inspired by Truckenbrodt (2006ab) (and the reply by Portner 2006) and
argues that complementizer selection / VI are part of a split-mood-marking system. I
argue that every German clause is anchored to the context by means of semantically
interpreted mood features, one of which is a counterfactual mood feature, given in (414).
Clearly, (414) is tantamount to the presupposition that Villalta (2007) ascribes to the
lexical meaning of wish, in (410c). Therefore, a combination of EXs and MoodCF gives
rise to the desired meaning, as shown in (415). Given that (415) successfully derives the
intuited meaning of such utterances, the analysis seems to be on the right track. But how
do we connect the semantic mood feature (here: MoodCF) to m-mood and to the material
that occupies C?
(414) IMoodCFIc = XP. xw : p n Doxspeaker(w) =0 . p(w) COUNTERFACTUALITY 8 4
"The speaker presupposes p to be false."
84 This is a simplification, as it is an open question whether there are any utterances that ever truly
presuppose counterfactuality, cf. Anderson (1951), Latridou & Embick (1994), von Fintel (1997), Biezma
(2011 b). Scholz (1991) argues that there are even optatives in the subjunctive that are not counterfactual
(her potentialis optatives); as evidence, she provides German versions of (i)-(vi). Given the pragmatics of
wishes, it is not clear that any of these do not presuppose counterfactuality at some level.
i. If only spring would come! iv. If only this car would park here again tomorrow!
ii. If only he would get well soon! v. If only we were to stay well this time!
iii. If only Paul came back home soon! vi. If only I would finish this task soon!
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(415) subjunctive (and counterfactual) optatives (preliminary sketch)
a. [EXpreferences [MoodcF (Wenn) Otto nur rechtzeitig gekommen wire]]!
if Otto only in.time come were
'If only Otto had come in time!'
b. MoodCF => (415a) is defined iff Otto-came-in-time n DOXspeaker(W) = 0
in words: "I presuppose that Otto didn't come in time."
c. EXpreferences => (415a) is felicitous iff
Vq[THRESHOLD(c) >preferences q -> 0-came-in-time >preferences q]
in words: "I express my emotion towards the desirability of Otto having come in time."
I argue for a split-mood-realization system, where complementizer choice / VI and m-
mood are both consequences (or even overt expressions) of a semantically interpreted
mood feature, as sketched (informally) in (416). (A system where mood is realized both
in C and a lower Mood head has been proposed before, cf. Giorgi & Pianesi 1997, 2004,
Kempchinsky 1986 and Quer 1998. The relevant idea is summarized in Giorgi 2009, who
calls this an instance of discontinuous morphology, where mood is realized in a scattered
way, employing both the complementizer and the morphological mood on the verb.)
(416)a. Ach, wenn es geregnet h itte!
oh if it rained had







es geregnet hatte .. ood-C agreement
............................................................................ 
*.................
In what follows, I first motivate the proposed connection between the overt content of the
C position and semantic mood presuppositions, in section 5.1.3. I then argue (in section
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5.1.4 that split-realization of Tense/Aspect/Mood information across the C/INFL-system
(where C and Mood/T distributively spell-out Mood or Tense information) is a more
wide-spread phenomenon, and not idiosyncratic to the configurations that I am looking
at, corroborating the view that I am pursuing. Subsequently, I focus on the syntactic
implementation of my proposal (in section 5.1.5) and discuss additional motivation for
my approach (in section 5.1.6).




the empirical scope of the present discussion: Three types of exclamation
counterfactual optatives, non-counterfactual optatives, and polar
A benchmark example of each construction is given in (417).
(417) a. Dafl Otto nur rechtzeitig gekommen wire! counterfactual optative
that Otto only in.time come were
'If only Otto had arrived in time!'
b. DaB Otto nur rechtzeitig gekommen ist! non-counterfactual optative
that Otto only in.time come is
'If only Otto has arrived in time!'
c. DaB Otto doch glatt rechtzeitig gekommen ist! polar exclamative
that Otto doch outright in.time come is
'[I'm shocked] that Otto has arrived in time!'
The purpose of this section is to argue that in each of these constructions the possible
choices of overt complementizers (wenn 'if vs dass 'that') and VI are connected to the
semantic mood of these clauses8 5. To do so, I first posit an approximation of the mood
85 The idea that V1 is connected to the mood of the clause it occurs in is based on Truckenbrodt (2006ab)
and Portner (2006), but the roots of this idea go back much further. Many authors working on Germanic
verb second (the type of V-to-INFL-to-C movement that is also commonly assumed to underly V1 in
German and other Germanic languages) have linked verb second (short: V2) to tense / finiteness (Thiersch
1978, Koeneman 2000, 2010, Ackema et al. 1993, Bury 2003, 2010, see Jouitteau 2010 for a discussion).
An alternative view maintains that Germanic V2 is connected to illocutionary force (Andersson 1975, den
Besten 1983, Wechsler 1991, Bennis 1998, Gartner 2001, Koster 2003, Brandner 2004, Heycock 2006,
Truckenbrodt 2006ab, Julien 2007, Bentzen et al 2007, Brandner 2010; see Holmberg 2010 for an
overview; Wiklund 2009, Migdalski 2010 for criticism.) Truckenbrodt (2006ab) implements the connection
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that these clauses contain and then I show how such semantic mood co-determines the
possible content in C.
Example (417a) clearly presupposes that Otto did not arrive in time, indicating that
there must be a counterfactual mood marker in this clause, implemented by means of the
lexical entry in (418a). Similarly, (417c) presupposes that Otto did arrive in time, which I
implement in terms of a factive mood marker, (418c). Finally, (417b) is non-
counterfactual and non-factive; whether Otto arrived in time or not is unresolved; we can
assume that this construction contains unmarked mood (or default mood), (418b). The
implicature that Otto may still have made it arises from the competition between (418b)
and (418a); the implicature that it is not yet certain whether Otto has made it arises from
the competition between (418b) and (418c). In the sense of Ritter & Wiltschko (2009,
2010), semantic mood serves to anchor a proposition with respect to the actual world. No
more needs to be said at this point.
(418)a. IIiMoodFI1C = XP .w : p n Doxspeaker(w) = 0 . p(w) COUNTERFACTUALITY 86
"The speaker presupposes p to be false."
b. IliMoodDEFic = Xp. ? w . p(w) UNMARKED MOOD
(iMoodDEF does not trigger any presuppositions with respect to the truth or falsity ofp)
c. I|iMoodFACT C = Xp . %w : Doxspeaker(w) C p . p(w) FACTIVITY 87
"The speaker presupposes p to be true."
to illocutionary force by linking German V-to-C movement to belief states; Portner (2006), in his reply,
argues for a link between German V-to-C movement and (semantic) mood. On the one hand, I see myself
as pursuing the Portner-Truckenbrodt vision of linking V-to-C movement to belief states/mood. On the
other hand, I see myself as continuing the tradition of linking V-to-C movement to something tense-related
(taking into account the Tense-Aspect-Mood connection).
86 The distinction between MoodCF and MoodDEF as the marked and unmarked mood respectively mirrors
the standard view on (marked) subjunctive versus (unmarked) indicative conditionals, cf. Stalnaker (1975),
von Fintel (1997), but criticized in Leahy (2011). There is an open question whether any clauses ever
convey strict counterfactuality, cf. Biezma (2011 b), who argues, against Iatridou & Embick (1994), that
subjunctive conditionals are never truly counterfactual. A slight modification of my system would posit
iMoodPRoTO-CF, which simply indicates remoteness of the modified proposition from the actual world (as
suggested by Schlenker 2004 for counterfactual conditionals), and not falsity of the modified proposition.
For simplicity, I will maintain the analysis in (418a), as it is not crucial to the core of my analysis how this
issue should be resolved.
87 The idea that there is a separatefactive mood that may find expression by virtue of a complementizer is
supported by the observation that Modern Greek has a specialized factive complementizer pu 'that', which
contrasts with the neutral complementizer oti 'that', e.g. Roussou (2010).
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While it is trivial that semantic mood co-determines m-mood (both iMoodDEF and
iMoodFACT employ the indicative, whereas iMoodCF employs the subjunctive), my
proposal holds that semantic mood also co-determines what material shows up in C.
Evidence for this proposal stems from the difference between the three exclamations
with respect to what they allow in their C position. What (419)-(423) show is that
semantic mood correlates with complementizer selection and the possibility of V1. First,
we observe in (419) that exclamations with counterfactual mood (iMoodCF) allow for
dass 'that', wenn 'if and V1.
(419) subjunctive (and counterfactual) optatives
a. DaB er nur rechtzeitig gekommen wfire!
that he only in.time come were
b. Wenn er nur rechtzeitig gekommen wire!
if he only in.time come were
c. Ware er nur rechtzeitig gekommen twere!
were he only in.time come
'If only he had arrived in time!'
The most striking contrast is between (419) and (420). The pattern in (420) suggests that
exclamations with default mood (iMoodDEF) require dass 'that' or wenn 'if and disallow
V1.
(420) indicative (and non-counterfactual/non-factive) optatives
a. DaB er nur rechtzeitig gekommen ist!
that he only in.time come is
b. Wenn er nur rechtzeitig gekommen ist!
if he only in.time come is
c. * Ist er nur rechtzeitig gekommen tis!
is he only in.time come
'If only he has arrived in time!'
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The contrast between (419) and (420) is not trivial, as German does otherwise allow for
VI in indicative conditionals, as shown in (421).
(421) conditional inversion in indicative conditionals
a. Wenn er rechtzeitig gekommen ist, dann hat das Fest schon begonnen.
if he in.time come is then has the party already started
b. Ist er rechtzeitig gekommen tit, dann hat das Fest schon begonnen.
is he in.time come then has the party already started
'If he has arrived in time, then the party has already started by now!'
How to account for the difference between (419) and (420) emerges as a puzzle. Why do
counterfactual optatives allow for V1, while non-counterfactual optatives do not? By
linking C to semantic mood, we now have a solution. Example (419) involves
counterfactual mood features, whereas (420) involves default mood. In exclamations,
these seem to behave differently, giving rise to the generalization in (422). (For indicative
conditionals, I follow Reis & W611stein 2010, who propose that we may be dealing with
an interrogative clause adjoined to a matrix clause, based on Haiman 1978, Traugott
1985, Reich 2009. See section 5.3.1 for a discussion of mood in interrogatives.)
(422) generalization on Cfilling and semantic mood in exclamations (first version)
a. LF: C + [iMoodCF] <* PF: {dass 'that', wenn 'if, Vl}
b. LF: C + [iMoodDEF] < PF: {dass 'that', wenn 'if}
Let us now turn to polar exclamatives, the third type of exclamation that I study. Here,
again, a different pattern emerges, corroborating the view that C selection / VI correlates
with semantic mood. As we see in (423), polar exclamatives allow for dass 'that' and V1,
but not for wenn 'if'. This gives rise to the revised generalization in (424).
(423) indicative (and factive) polar exclamatives
a. DaB er doch glatt rechtzeitig gekommen ist!
that he doch outright in.time come is
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b.* Wenn er doch glatt rechtzeitig
if he doch outright in.time
c. Ist er doch glatt rechtzeitig
is he doch outright in.time









(424) generalization on Cfilling and semantic mood in exclamations (second version)
a. LF: C + [iMoodCF] 4 PF: {dass 'that', wenn 'if', V1}
b. LF: C + [iMoodDEF] < PF: {dass 'that', wenn 'if'}
c. LF: C + [iMoodFACT] <* PF: {dass 'that', Vl}
Notably, we can observe that these patterns really correlate with semantic mood and not
with m-mood. If we interpret a polar exclamative with respect to a counterfactual context,
via implicit conditionalization, the semantic mood would still be factive (given that it is
presupposed to be true that the denoted proposition would hold in the counterfactual
circumstances). The pattern in (425) mirrors the factive pattern in (423) and not the
counterfactual pattern in (419). I propose that this follows, as the selection of material in
C is co-determined by the semantic mood of the clause (and not by the m-mood on the
verb).
(425) (factive) polar exclamatives in the subjunctive
Stell dir vor wir hatten ihn nicht am
imagine you V.PRT we had him not in.the
'Imagine we hadn't stopped him in the end!'
a. DaB er doch glatt rechtzeitig gekommen
that he doch outright in.time come
b.* Wenn er doch glatt rechtzeitig gekommen
if he doch outright in.time come
c. Ware er doch glatt rechtzeitig gekommen
were he doch outright in.time come











Concluding this section, (426) summarizes the distribution of different complementizers
and/or VI in different exclamations.
(426) daB wenn VI structure
iMoodFACT V polar exclamative
iMoodCF V counterfactual optative
iMoodposs X non-counterfactual optative
Having argued that semantic mood co-determines not only m-mood on the verb but also
the nature of overt material in C, the following section argues such split markings of
TAM-information can be found in other areas of grammar as well, indicating that this is
not an isolated phenomenon.
5.1.4 Generalized split-TAM
This section focuses on an analogous phenomenon with respect to tense marking. As we
have seen split-mood-realization, I show that we also find split-tense-realization. This
observation further corroborates the idea that overt material in C is connected to
information in the INFL domain.
In German temporal adjuncts, the temporal non-conditional variant of wenn 'when'
co-occurs with non-past tense marking on the verb, (427a), whereas als 'when' correlates
with past tense marking, (427b).
(427) a. Wenn/*Als du morgen ankommst, schlafe ich wahrscheinlich schon.
when you tomorrow arrive sleep I probably already
'When(/#If) you arrive tomorrow, I'll probably be asleep already.'
b. Als/*Wenn du gestern angekommen bist, habe ich schon geschlafen.
when you yesterday arrived are have I already slept
'When(/#If) you arrived yesterday, I was already asleep.'
Notably, German present tense (on the inflected verb or auxiliary) is ambiguous between
a present progressive, a narrative past and a futurate interpretation. (In this sense, it is the
most unmarked tense form.) What is important is that als 'when' can disambiguate a
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present tense adjunct clause towards a past tense interpretation, whereas wenn 'when'
disambiguates an identical clause towards the future. (Example (428a) is a naturally
occurring example from http://redfoxtravelbox.wordpress.com/ - (428b) is a minimally
contrasting example that I constructed.)
(428) a. Als ich ankomme, ist es wieder Mitternacht.
when I arrive is it already midnight
'When I arrive (narrative present = past), it is already midnight again.'
'When I arrived, it was already midnight again.'
=> There is a past time t, such that I arrived at t and it was already midnight at t.
# #'When I arrive, it will already be midnight again.'
b. Wenn ich ankomme, ist es wieder Mitternacht.
when I arrive is it already midnight
'When I arrive (futurate present =future), it is already midnight again.'
~ 'When I arrive, it will already be midnight again.'
= There is a future time t, such that I arrive at t and it is already midnight at t.
# #'When I arrived, it was already midnight again.'
Here, C alone serves to disambiguate between two distinct temporal interpretations of the
clause (semantically interpreted past and semantically interpreted future). This is
reminiscent of the pattern in section 5.1.3. Based on the above discussion, we can
construct a similar example, where complementizer selection alone serves to
disambiguate semantic mood in optatives. Ignoring for now the correlations between
optativity and non-factivity, and between polar exclamative readings and factivity, (429)
shows that indicative exclamatives are disambiguated towards default mood when they
contain wenn 'if (as wenn 'if is incompatible with factive), (429a), and towards factive
mood when they involve VI (as VI is incompatible with default mood), (429b).
(429)a. Oh, wenn es jetzt nur/*doch tatsachlich geregnet hat!
oh if it now only/*doch indeed rained has
'Oh, if only it rained now!'
/ iMoodDEF (+ optative interpretation)
* iMoodFACT (+ polar exclamative interpretation)
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b. Oh, hat es jetzt doch/*nur tatsachlich geregnet that!
oh has it now doch/*only indeed rained
'Oh, that it really rained after all!'
* iMoodDEF (+ optative interpretation)
=> / iMoodFACT (+ polar exclamative interpretation)
In brief, (428) instantiates a contrast for tense that is similar to the contrast (429)
instantiates for mood. A similar point is made by (430), where, once again, it can be
assumed that different shades of semantic mood may be responsible for the different
likelihood presuppositions that the respective conditional conveys (cf. Reis & W511stein
2010 for a recent discussion of wenn 'if, when' versusfalls 'if, in case').
(430)a. Wenn Otto kommt, gehe ich.
if Otto comes go I
'If Otto comes (which is quite plausible), I'm leaving.'
b. Falls Otto kommt, gehe ich.
if Otto comes go I
'If Otto comes (which I acknowledge to be rather unlikely), I'm leaving.'
To conclude this section, I propose that quite generally C agrees for Tense and Mood
information with the respective heads in the INFL layer. This gives rise to particular
patterns of overt information in the C position.
5.1.5 Syntactic implementation - On Mood movement and V1
I continue to focus on exclamations and propose that the free variation in C that we partly
observe derives from the following assumptions. First, C and Mood/T must always share
information via agreement; what is important for the patterns in exclamations is
agreement between C and Mood. Second, the different options that we observe are
connected to the presence/absence of movement. My proposal is inspired by Pesetsky &
Torrego (2001), who argue that English that and for spell out tense features that have
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moved from T-to-C without the auxiliary 8 . I argue that there are three options that can be
observed in German exclamations, summarized in (431); in words, the material in C
depends on what (if anything) has moved to C from the INFL layer 9 . We can implement
this as in (432).
(43 1)a. dass 'that' spells out C on its own.
b. wenn 'if spells out [C [Mood]].
c. Vi spells out [C [ T [Mood]]].
First of all, Tense always contains interpretable [iT] features and Mood always contains
interpretable [iMood] features, with values as given above (in (418)). Similarly, C always
contains uninterpretable [uMood] features and Mood always contains uninterpretable
[uT] features. Therefore, we always generate an agreement chain between C and Mood,
as well as between Mood and T. Such agreement is sometimes accompanied by
movement, which we can implement by means of an EPP feature, as is common practice.
We can then sketch the relevant aspects of derivations as in (432). (I assume that m-mood
on the tense auxiliary in (432b) is a reflex of Tense agreement between Mood and T.)
(432) a. C[uMood, -EPP] ... Mood[iNood, uT, +EPP] ... T[iT]
=> Cto..e] ... T[iT] + Mood[iNood, ... (T[iT])
spell-out: C[ .. 4 < dass 'that'
b. C[uMood, +EPP] ... Mood[iMood, uT, -EPP] ... T[iT]
=> Mood[iood, .] + C .M..] ... (Mood[iMood, uT]) ... T[iTl
spell-out: Mood[ NoMd, . + C mu..] 4> wenn 'if
c. C[uMood, +EPP] ... Mood[iMood,uT,+EPP] ... T[iT]
SCuMood, +EPP] ... T[iT] + Mood[iMood, .;] - - - (T[iT])
= [T[iT] + Mood[iMood,. ] + CtWo..d ... (T[iT] + Mood[iMood,. ) ... (T[iT])
spell-out: [T[iT] + Mood[iMood, ..T]] + Ct10..0 < V1
88 Especially for the purposes of VI, my proposal is further inspired by Koeneman (2000, 2010) and Bury
(2003, 2010) who assume that Tense (which they believe to be the trigger for Germanic V2 and VI)
originates in a lower and must be brought into a higher position, giving rise to verb movement. I make an
analogous assumption for Mood.
89 See also Bjorkman (2011) for a related account of conditional inversion.
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An illustration of the finished derivations can be given as in (433)90.





{T[iT]} T[iTj Mood[uT, iMood, EPP]






Mood[uT, iMood] C[uMood, EPP]







T[iT] Mood[uT, iMood, EPP]
MoodP
EPPI
TP Mood[uT, iMood, EPP]
... {T[T]} T[iT] Mood[uT, iMood, EPP]
90 These graphs assume the copy theory of movement. As de Vries (2009) shows, an implementation of
head movement is also possible in a theory that assumes internal and external remerge instead.
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Having thus established a system for complementizer selection, we can restate the
generalization from (426) in (434).
434 feature specifications sp ell-out compatible Mood values in exclamations
C-EPP ... Mood+EPP dass CF, DEF, FACT
C+EPP ... MOOCLEPP wenn CF, DEF (*FACT)
C+EPP ... Mood+EPP Verb-First CF, FACT (*DEF)
What we observe in (434) is that dass 'that' seems to be the elsewhere case.
Contrastively, cases where both C and Mood have the EPP property require a
commitment on part of the speaker as to whether the denoted proposition is true (FACT) or
false (CF). Finally, cases where only C has the EPP property disallow certainty (i.e. FACT
is blocked). How can we derive these facts? Let me revisit the pattern from temporal
adjunct clauses.
To do so, consider the following example of Dutch narrative inversion, in (435).
Zwart (1997) conjectures (in footnote 28, page 219) that text-initial clauses (i.e. story
openings) with narrative inversion are typically adjunct clauses, as such opening
sentences require a subsequent main clause. I concur with this view and propose that
temporal adjunct clauses also exhibit a tripartite pattern in C, very much similar to what
we find in exclamations. This is illustrated in (436).
(435) Speel ik een aas, speelt mijn partner opeens troef.
play I an ace plays my partner at.once trump
'I played an ace. Then suddenly my partner trumped.'
(Zwart 1997:219)
To explore the C-INFL link further, we establish the paradigm in (436) for German
(which allows for narrative inversion on a par with Dutch, e.g. Onnerfors 1997ab).
(436)a. Wenn ich ein Ass ausspiele, ubertrumpft mich mein Partner sofort.
when I an ace play trumps me my partner at.once
'When I play an ace, my partner trumps instantly.' (non-past, futurate present)
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b. Als ich ein Ass ausspiele, ubertrumpft mich mein Partner sofort.
when I an ace play trumps me my partner at.once
'When I played an ace, my partner trumps instantly.' (past, narrative present)
c. Spiele ich ein Ass aus + tspiele, Ubertrumpft mich mein Partner sofort.
play I an ace V.PRT trumps me my partner at.once
'When I played an ace, my partner trumps instantly.' (past, narrative inversion)
Without going into the intricacies of temporal adjunct clauses, it seems plausible to
assume that als 'when' is a realization of C on its own, whereas wenn 'when' and VI
involve movement. I will come back to this briefly. First of all, it is worth pointing out
that (as Zwart 1997 observes) generic conditional-like statements are possible with wenn-
clauses, like (436a)+(437a), and with clauses that involve verb-first, like (436c)+(437c).
Temporal als-clauses cannot be used in a generic way, (437b).91
(437)a. Wenn ich ein Ass ausspiele, ubertrumpft
when I an ace play trumps
'Whenever I play an ace, my partner trumps.' (n
b.* Als ich ein Ass ausspiele, ibertrumpft
when I an ace play trumps
'Whenever I played an ace, my partner trumps.'
c. Spiele ich ein Ass aus + tspieie, nibertrumpft
play I an ace V.PRT trumps




















The generalization for such adjunct clauses emerges as in (438). Somewhat
simplistically, I again assume that wenn 'when' spells-out Mood movement, though I
cannot go into the details of how Mood and Tense interact in such adjunct clauses.
(438) feature specifications
a. C-EPP ... Mood+EPP
b. C+EPP ... MOOd-EPP









91 Of course a possible confound here is that it is not clear whether we are dealing with a generic temporal
clause or with a conditional clause that has a quantificational adverb in the matrix clause.
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If we compare this distribution to the one we found in exclamations, we observe a
parallel that may be insightful. Let us gloss over the case where no movement to C takes
place, namely (438a)+(439a), as independent constraints may be at stake here
(exclamations and possibly complement clauses using this as the elsewhere case, while
adjuncts cannot do this). Then we find that the difference between Mood moving on its
own, (438b)+(439b), and Mood moving together with T, (438c)+(439c), shows one
parallel across these two fundamentally different construction types, which I will now
discuss.
(439) feature specifications spell-out compatible Mood values in
exclamations
a. C-EPP ... Mood+EPP dass CF, DEF, FACT
b. C+EPP ... MOOLEPP wenn CF, DEF
c. C+EPP ... Mood+EPP Verb-First CF, FACT
While genericity and counterfactuality in the respective construction type is compatible
with both movement of Mood and movement of Mood+T (indicating, for exclamations,
that counterfactual iMood can come with or without an EPP property), this is not the case
for other Mood values. Specifically, we observe that the future-oriented Mood values
(e.g. DEF) come without an EPP property and the past oriented Mood values (e.g. FACT)
come without an EPP property (unless C lacks the EPP property as well, in which case T-
to-Mood movement may be enforced in order to avoid auxiliary proliferation) 92 . The
crucial insight is summarized in (440). We can establish the generalization in (441).
(440) feature specifications spell-out in exclamations in adjunct clauses
a. C+EPP ... MOOd-EPP wenn DEF, *FACT FUTURE, *PAST
b. C+EPP ... Mood+EPP Verb-First FACT, *DEF PAST, *FUTURE
(441) (When C has the EPP property,) Mood behaves as follows:
i. When the clause exhibits future-orientation, Mood lacks the EPP property.
ii. When the clause exhibits past-orientation, Mood has the EPP property.
92 I call DEF 'future-oriented', as it implies that the truth of the modified proposition is unresolved, and I
call FACT 'past-oriented', as it presupposes that the truth of the modified proposition is resolved. It is not
entirely clear why CF and FACT do not completely match in their behaviors.
221
The motivating data are repeated below in (442) and (443).
(442)wenn-clauses must be future-oriented (unless they are counterfactual/generic)
a. Wenn ich ein Ass ausspiele, ibertrumpft mich mein Partner sofort.
when I an ace play trumps me my partner at.once
'When I play an ace, my partner trumps instantly.'
b. Oh, wenn mich mein Partner jetzt nur/*doch bertrumpft hat!
oh if me my partner now only/*doch trumps has
'Oh, if only my partner has trumped me now!'
=> future-oriented in the sense that I do not yet know what is the case
(443) Vi -clauses must be past-oriented (unless they are counterfactual/generic)
a. Spiele ich ein Ass aus + tspiele, tibertrumpft mich mein Partner sofort.
play I an ace V.PRT trumps me my partner at.once
'When I played an ace, my partner trumps instantly.'
b. Oh, hat mich mein Partner jetzt doch/*nur ubertrumpft that!
oh has me my partner now doch/*only trumps
'Oh, [I'm surprised] that my partner has trumped me now!'
=> past-oriented in the sense that I already know that this is the case
Further support that wenn 'if, when' is generally future-oriented (modulo its
compatibility with counterfactuality) stems from the following contrast. I can utter the
wenn-clause in (444) if it's still an unresolved question whether the proposition in the
wenn-clause is true or false. In contrast, I cannot utter it once it is already established to
be true, as in (445b). In such a situation, (445a) must be used (as observed by Iatridou
1991 for English since versus if).
(444) I don't know yet ifI'm sick, but I'm feeling a bit odd, so I called a doctor:
In einer halben Stunde kommt der Arzt vorbei.
in a half hour comes the doctor over
'In half an hour, the doctor will drop by.'
Wenn ich krank bin, kann ich heute nicht kommen.
if I sick am can I today not come
'If I'm sick, I cannot come in today.'
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(445) I'm calling in sick:
a. Da ich krank bin, kann ich heute nicht kommen.
as I sick am can I today not come
'Since I'm sick, I cannot come in today.'
b.# Wenn ich krank bin, kann ich heute nicht kommen.
if I sick am can I today not come
'If I'm sick, I cannot come in today.'
So, why would T-to-Mood movement correlate with past-orientation or future-orientation
in this way? I conjecture that the underlying factor is that past tense is non-modal and
future tense is modal, e.g. Abusch (1985); this may entail that in the past tense, Tense and
Mood automatically conflate into a single INFL (via T-to-Mood movement), whereas in
the future tense such conflation is non-automatic (possibly due to the presence of the
future modal woll) and thus blocked in exclamations and adjunct clauses with Mood-to-C
movement. The presence of counterfactuality or genericity in a clause may override such
a distribution (e.g. due to the requirement for fake past tense expression, cf. Iatridou
2000), eliminating the observed asymmetries.
The next step is to integrate my proposal both with the broader literature on semantic
mood and m-mood, and with the broader literature on verb second, specifically
Truckenbrodt (2006ab), who is an indirect predecessor of my proposal. Before I proceed
to do so (in sections 5.2 and 5.3), I will further motivate the idea that dass 'that' and als
'when(past)' are realizations of C, whereas wenn 'if, when' involves Mood-to-C
movement.
5.1.6 On the Content of C
In this section, I briefly discuss the differences and similarities between dass 'that' / als
'when' and wenn 'if, when'. I have argued that wenn 'if, when' involves movement of
Mood, whereas dass 'that' and als 'when' spell out a C head in the absence of Mood
movement. This view is supported by the formal and diachronic relations between these
elements and other functional elements. Specifically, dass 'that' is formally and
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diachronically related to the determiner and relative pronoun das 'the, that', (446), and
als 'when' is related to the prepositional element als 'as, than', (447).
(446) a. Hans mag das Pferd.
Hans likes the horse
'Hans likes the horse.'
b. Ich sehe das Pferd [das Hans mag].
I see the horse that Hans likes
'I see the horse that Hans likes.'
(447) a. Ich kenne F. M., den Sanger von "Schizo", als einen OVP-Politiker.
I know F. M. the singer of Schizo as an OVP-politician
'I know F. M., the singer of the song "Schizo", as a politician in the OVP.'
b. Wir sind anders als die anderen.
we are different from the others
'We are different from the others.'
c. Das Ergebnis war anders als erwartet.
the result was different from expected
'The result was different from what we had expected.'
d. Otto ist grbBer als Maria.
Otto is tallar than Maria
'Otto is taller than Maria.'
e. Als Jugendlicher hat Otto gerne gefeiert.
as youth has Otto with.joy celebrated
'As a young lad Otto used to love to celebrate.'
f. Hans gilt als Spezialist in diesem Gebiet.
Hans counts as specialist in this area
'Hans counts as a specialist in this area.'
g. Sowohl Hans als auch Maria sind gekommen.
both Hans as also Maria are come
'Both Hans and Maria have come.'
In recent literature, it has often been suggested that it is no coincidence that nominal
elements (like das(s) and als) lexicalize complementizer positions (e.g. Roussou 2010 for
Greek). Rather, this is a consequence of the parallel between clauses (CPs) and extended
noun phrases (DPs). It is thus plausible that dass 'that' and als 'when' are true
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realizations of C. Similarly, the assumption that wenn 'if, when' in complementizer
position involves movement stems is motivated by its formal and diachronic relation to
the wh-element wann 'when', as in (448).
(448) a. Wann kommt er?
when comes he
'When is he coming?'
b. Ich weiB, wann er kommt.
I know when he comes
'I know when he's coming.'
Notably, it can be shown that wenn 'if, when' does not involve wh-movement but simply
head movement, provided that it involves movement, as it cannot cross clause boundaries
(as opposed to phrasal wann 'when'). Contrast (449a), with the wh-element wann 'when',
with (449b), containing temporal wenn 'when', and (449c), with conditional wenn 'if.
(449) a. Wann ?(immer) du losfihrst, ( *dann) gehe ich schlafen.
when always you drive.away then go I sleep
'When?(ever) you're leaving, (?*then) I will go to sleep.'
b. Wenn (*immer) du losfahrst, (dann) gehe ich schlafen.
when always you drive.away then go I sleep
'When you're leaving, (then) I will go to sleep.'
c. Wenn (*immer) du losfahrst, (dann) gehe ich schlafen.
when always you drive.away then go I sleep




As shown in (450), wann 'when' allows for low construal in an embedded clause, (450a),
which is not possible for temporal wenn 'when', (450b), or conditional wenn 'if, (450c).
(450)a. Wann immer du gesagt hast, dass du losfahrst, gehe ich schlafen.
when always you said have that you drive.away go I to.sleep
'Whenever you said [that you're leaving], I will go to sleep.'
/ high construal - vlow construal: "I will go to sleep when you're leaving."
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b. Wenn (*immer) du gesagt hast, dass du losfahrst, gehe ich schlafen.
when always you said have that you drive.away go I to.sleep
'As soon as / When / Once you've said [that you're leaving], I will go to sleep.'
/ high construal - * low construal
c. Wenn (*immer) du gesagt hast, dass du losfahrst, gehe ich schlafen.
if always you said have that you drive.away go I to.sleep
'If you've said [that you're leaving], I will go to sleep.'
/ high construal - * low construal
The contrast in (450) indicates that any movement that involves wenn 'if, when' should
involve head movement, as opposed to wh-movement. This is consistent with a view
under which wenn 'if, when' is a spell out of Mood-in-C, due to Mood-to-C movement (a
type of head movement).
5.1.7 Interim Summary
In this section, I presented a proposal for how to analyze different presuppositions (e.g.
counterfactuality, factivity) that we find in exclamations and how to account for
complementizer selection and VI in exclamations. I proposed (in section 5.1.3) that
semantic mood is encoded by means of presupposition-triggering mood features and then
argued (in section 5.1.4) that m-mood on the verb and the realization of material in C are
consequences of a system where mood is overtly marked in two locations, C and INFL
(the latter of which encompasses Mood and T). I presented a syntactic implementation in
section 5.1.5 and reviewed further motivation in section 5.1.6. The larger goal of the
following sections is to contextualize this proposal with respect to the larger literature on
mood and mood selection, in section 5.2, as well as the literature on verb second in
German, in section 5.3.
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5.2 Mood Selection
5.2.1 Out in the Optative Left Field: An Apparent Selection Problem
In the previous section, I argued for a view where complementizer selection and VI in
German are due to the semantic mood that a clause contains, where semantic mood
includes concepts such as counterfactuality and factivity. My analysis covers factive
polar exclamatives, such as (451), counterfactual optatives, such as (452), and optatives
that are neither factive nor counterfactual, such as (453).
(451) indicative (and factive) polar exclamatives
a. DaB Sie (doch /tatsachlich / wirklich) daran gedacht haben!
that you doch indeed really of.it thought have
b. Haben Sie doch (tatsachlich / wirklich) daran gedacht thaben!
have you doch indeed really of.it thought
'[It's remarkable] that you really thought of it!'
(452) subjunctive (and counterfactual) optatives
a. DaB er (doch) nur rechtzeitig gekommen wiire!
that he doch only in.time come were
b. Wenn er (doch) nur rechtzeitig gekommen wi re!
if he doch only in.time come were
c. Wire er (doch) nur rechtzeitig gekommen twqre!
were he doch only in.time come
'If only he had come in time!'
(453) indicative (and non-counterfactual / non-factive) optatives
a. DaB er nur rechtzeitig kommt!
that he only in.time comes
b. Wenn er nur rechtzeitig kommt!
if he only in.time comes
'If only he comes in time!'
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I have argued that all of these utterances contain a generalized exclamation operator EX,
which combines with a contextually provided scale. This scale is a speaker-oriented
preference scale in the case of optatives, and a speaker-oriented inverse likelihood scale
(or unlikelihood scale) in the case of polar exclamatives. A generalization that arises at
this point is that the combination of scale and mood does not seem entirely arbitrary.
Specifically, preference scales (underlying optative utterances) correlate with non-factive
mood, whereas unlikelihood scales (underlying polar exclamatives) correlate with factive
mood, as given in (454).
(454) preference unlikelihood example
factive unattested? / (451)
counterfactual ? unattested? (452)
non-factive non-counterfactual / ? unattested? (453)
The question arises whether there is anything that corresponds to the question marks in
(454). Have we been just ignoring something that exists, or is there something deeply
,93
unnatural about 'factive optatives' and 'non-factive exclamations of surprise'
Let me state the problem more clearly by looking at what my analysis currently
derives. The following two examples recapitulate the meanings that I have proposed for
the counterfactual optative, (452), and the factive surprise exclamation, (451). First, my
analysis currently derives the perceived wish in an optative by virtue of the components
in (455b+c), which give rise to the utterance meaning in (455d), with the communicative
effect in (455e).
(455) subjunctive (and counterfactual) optatives
a. [EXpreferences [MoodCF (Wenn) Otto nur rechtzeitig gekommen wsire]]!
if Otto only in.time come were
'If only Otto had come in time!'
93 A connection between exclamatives and factivity has been at the core of research on degree
exclamatives, as in Elliot (1971, 1974), Grimshaw (1979), Zanuttini & Portner (2000, 2003), Abels (2010).
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(455a) is defined iff Otto-came-in-time n Doxspeaker(w) = 0
in words: "I presuppose that Otto didn't come in time."
c. EXpreferences => (455a) is felicitous iff
Vq[THRESHOLD(c) >preferences q -+ O-came-in-time >preferences q]
in words: "I express my emotion towards the desirability of Otto having come in time."
d. What the speaker conveys:
I express my emotion towards the fact that [p Otto came in time] exceeds a
salient threshold on my desirability scale, which marks the boundary between
tolerable worlds (above) and intolerable worlds (below), and I presuppose that it
is false that [p Otto came in time].
e. What this entails on part of the speaker:
I have an emotion towards the desirability of [p Otto came in time].
It is false that [p Otto came in time].
Therefore, I wish [p Otto came in time].
Similarly, my analysis derives surprise by virtue of the components in (456b+c), which
give rise to the utterance meaning in (456d) to the effect of (456e).
(456) indicative (and factive) polar exclamative
a. [EXunlikelihood [MoodFACT (Dass) Otto glatt rechtzeitig gekommen ist]J!
that Otto outright in.time come is
'That Otto really came in time!'
b. MoodFACT => (456a) is defined iff Doxspeaker(w) E Otto-came-in-time
in words: "I presuppose that Otto did come in time."
c. EXunlikelihood => (456a) is felicitous iff
Vq[THRESHOLD(c) >unlikelihood q -+ O-came-in-time >unlikelihood q]
in words: "I express emotion towards the unlikelihood of Otto having come in time."
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b. MoodCF =>
d. What the speaker conveys:
I express my emotion towards the fact that [p Otto came in time] exceeds a
salient threshold on my inverse likelihood scale, which marks the boundary
between surprising worlds (above) and unsurprising worlds (below), and I
presuppose that it is true that [p Otto came in time].
e. What this entails on part of the speaker:
I have an emotion towards the surprisingness of [p Otto came in time].
It is true that [p Otto came in time].
Therefore, I am surprised that [p Otto came in time].
Now we can state the problem explicitly. Are there utterances that have the combinations
in (457a) or (458a), giving rise to the conversational effect in (457b) or (458b) (note the
unclarity of how best to express (458b), marked by three exclamation marks, '???').
(457) schema of afactive optative
a. [EXpreferences [MoodFACT Q1]!
b. What this entails on part of the speaker:
I have an emotion towards the desirability of [p Otto came in time].
It is true that [p Otto came in time].
Therefore, I am glad that [p Otto came in time].
(458) schema of a counterfactual surprise exclamation
a. [EXunikelihood [MoodCF QiJJ!
b. What this entails on part of the speaker:
I have an emotion towards the surprisingness of [p Otto came in time].
It is false that [p Otto came in time].
Therefore, I am ??? that [p Otto came in time].
To summarize, the puzzle that we face is whether the prototypical combinations of
exclamatory scales (i.e. the scales that EX combines with) and semantic mood should be
considered a true fact about language, and if so, how we could possibly derive them
under a view that does not render EX mood-sensitive.
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5.2.2 Towards a solution
In order to tackle this problem, we could simply stipulate a solution in which different
scales must co-occur with different moods, by virtue of syntactic agreement / selectional
restrictions. This is clearly a last resort, as it lacks insight, which is why I will not be
addressing it in detail. A sketch of how it would be implemented is given in (459).
(459)a. indicative (and factive) polar exclamatives
LF: [[EX Scalespeaker-unlikelihood] [iMOodFACT [p Otto came in time]]]
b. subjunctive (and counterfactual) optatives
LF: [[EX Scalespeaker-preference] [iMoodCF [p Otto came in time]]]
The question arises whether we can exclude certain scale-mood combinations on more
principled grounds - and whether we even need to. Let me first discuss the possibility of
counterfactual exclamations of surprise, as sketched in (460), repeated from (458). For
completeness' sake, it is worth also considering the possibility of non-factive non-
counterfactual surprise, as given in (461). An immediately evident problem here is that
such an expression seems somewhat inconsistent with any conceivable communicative
goals. Why would a speaker wish to convey an emotion towards how surprising Otto's
coming in time is (quite generally) if it is established that Otto didn't come in time, as in
(460a); in fact, as shown in (460b), we are hard-pressed to even come up with a felicitous
paraphrase. The paraphrase I would be surprised if ... does not capture the meaning of
(460a), as EXunlikelihood conveys a current emotion towards the surprisingness of <, not a
'displaced' emotion. The same logic applies to (461). It is thus plausible that non-factive
'exclamations of surprise' are nonsensical from a perspective of communicative goals. It
may then well be that EXuniikelihood and MoodCF can combine, but that they simply fail to
combine, as there is no reason to do so.
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(460) schema of a counterfactual surprise exclamation
a. [EXunlikelihood [MoodCF ljJ!
b. What this entails on part of the speaker:
I have an emotion towards the surprisingness of [p Otto came in time].
It is false that [p Otto came in time].
Therefore, I am ??? that [p Otto came in time].
(461) schema of a non-factive non-counterfactual surprise exclamation
a. [EXunlikelihood [MoodDEF 1]Q!
b. What this entails on part of the speaker:
I have an emotion towards the surprisingness of [p Otto came in time].
It is unresolved whether [p Otto came in time].
Therefore, I am ??? that [p Otto came in time].
This leads us to the other side of the coin, which is much more difficult to account for. A
factive optative would have the communicative effect in (462), repeated from (457).
(462) schema of afactive optative
a. [EXpreferences [MoodFACT l]]!
b. What this entails on part of the speaker:
I have an emotion towards the desirability of [p Otto came in time].
It is true that [p Otto came in time].
Therefore, I am glad that [p Otto came in time].
As opposed to non-factive exclamations of surprise, nothing is inconsistent about (462).
In fact, we can imagine factive expressions of desirability quite easily, as in (463).
(463)a. Phew ... John came in time.
b. Excellent! John came in time.
The question is whether we ever find factive optatives that have the hallmark features of
a typical EX utterance in the language they occur in. In German, we have seen that EX
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utterances typically take the shape of if-clauses, that-clauses and V I-clauses. Can any of
these serve as factive optatives?
As we know that MoodFACT is incompatible with wenn 'if, we need to look at dass-
exclamations and possibly at VI -exclamations. The crucial question may go along the
following lines: Does an utterance like (464a) (or a similar utterance) have an optative
reading as given in (464c)? (I include the South German generalized interjection mei
'my', which often correlates with positive or negative evaluation, to make a possible
optative reading more salient.)
(464)a. Mei, dass es jetzt DOCH geregnet hat!
my that it doch indeed rained has
lit. 'My, that it rained after all!'
b. polar exclamative reading: '[I'm surprised] that it rained after all!'
c. intended optative reading: '[I'm glad] that it rained after all!'
Certainly, (464a) can be paired with an expression of approval, (465a), but it can just as
well be combined with an expression of disapproval, (465b). The most natural view on
(465a+b) is that the dass-exclamation simply expresses surprise without evaluation.
(465)a. Mei, dass es jetzt DOCH geregnet
my that it doch indeed rained
lit. 'My, that it rained after all! That's
b. Mei, dass es jetzt DOCH geregnet
my that it doch indeed rained

















So, can we construct any examples of this type that express positive evaluation and do
not express surprise? As it stands, it is not clear that such constructions exist, so we
cannot easily explain away the observed gap in the paradigm of EXs-Mood combinations
(i.e. the non-existence of factive optatives). It is useful to point out that this is not a
distinguished problem for my account, but a more general problem that arises whenever
we are dealing with root clauses that have the structure of unembedded clauses. For
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instance, a matrix clause deletion approach falls short of explaining the non-existence of
I'm glad exclamations just as much as the EX-Operator account does, as illustrated in
(466).
(466)predicted by a matrix-clause deletion approach
Mei, i e bin frceh dass es jetzt DOCH geregnet hat!
my I am glad that it doch indeed rained has
lit. 'My, [I'm glad] that it rained after all!'
Before moving on, it is worth noting a consequence of my proposal in chapter 6.3 below;
I suggest in chapter 6.3 that exclamations with concessive wenigstens 'at least' may be
restricted to using a preference scale, i.e. wenigstens 'at least' may block a non-optative
reading and require an optative reading. In this sense, the V 1-clauses in (467) (preceded
by the interjection mei 'my') may be instances of factive optatives.
(467) a. Jo mei, hast du wenigstens gleich gesehen wie man bequem
well my have you at.least at.once seen how one comfortably
einen Spannungsteiler baut.
a voltage.divider builds
'Well, my, at least you learned at once how to comfortably build a voltage
divider.'
(http://www.downhill-board.com/51960-alte-installatione-pen-leiter.html)
b. aber mei, hat er wenigstens l5ten getibt
but my has he at.least to.solder practiced
'But, my, at least he practiced soldering!'
(http://www.modding-faq.de/Forum/index.php?action=profile;u=1 769;sa=showPosts)
The following constructed (V1-)example shows that such utterances may imply
desirability of the denoted proposition, as indicated in (468d), without implying its
surprisingness, as shown in (468c). So, these utterances may be true examples of factive
optatives.
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(468) a. A: Die Hochzeit gestern war so fad.
the wedding yesterday was so boring
'The wedding yesterday was so boring.'
b. B: Jo mei, hast du wenigstens den Bruder vom Otto kennengelernt!
yes my have you at.least the brother of Otto met
'Well, [it's good that] at least you met the brother of Otto's!'
c. B: ... also war's eh genau so, wie wir's uns erwartet hatten.
so was'it PRT just so as we'it us expected had
'So it was exactly the way we expected.'
d.# B: ... was natirlich auch schlecht war.
which naturally also bad was
'Which was naturally also bad.'
Notably, the evidence may be slightly inconclusive, as there are many open questions94.
Therefore, let us now take a different perspective, and look at exclamations that
express disapproval (which I dubbed adversatives in chapter 2). Maintaining a uniform
EX-operator analysis to exclamations, it is plausible that (469) is an utterance that
contains an EX-operator, combining with an inverse preference scale (i.e. a scale that
models undesirability with respect to the speaker: the higher on the scale, the more
undesirable). By virtue of EX, the speaker of (469) conveys that the hearer's being
careless exceeds a salient threshold on a scale that represents inverse desirability, i.e. the
hearer's being careless is undesirable.
(469) Dass du aber auch so leichtsinnig bist!
that you but also so careless are
'[It's bad] That you are so careless!'
(Scholz 1991:47,fn.89, who attributes this example to Oppenrieder 1989)
What is important is that such adversatives can typically be factive (though they may also
be non-factive, plausibly combining with MoodDEF, given that the complementizer wenn
'if was licensed in adversatives, as we have seen in chapter 2).
94 For instance, the purported factive optatives in (467) and (468) do not seem to have dass-variants.
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Reconsider Villalta's picnic scenario, from (343), repeated in (470). If Victoria is
standing with a close friend when Sofia arrives, it seems perfectly felicitous for her to
utter the adversative in (471), after they have both acknowledged that Sofia has brought
vanilla ice cream again. In such a context, MoodFACT should (at least) be licensed.
(470) a. Sofia may bring a chocolate cake, apple pie or ice cream to Victoria's picnic.
It is extremely unlikely that Sofia brings chocolate cake, whereas it is most
likely that she brings ice cream and somewhat less likely that she brings apple
pie. Victoria prefers the chocolate cake to the apple pie by far, and she hates
ice cream.
b. preferences beliefs
most desirable - chocolate cake --. most unlikely / least likely
. . ... .. apple pie ......
least desirable &-ice cream ....... most likely / least unlikely
(adapted from Villalta 2007:102+103)
(471) Dass die aber auch immer Vanilleeis mitbringt!
that she but also always vanilla.ice.cream brings
'[I find it bad/disappointing] that she always brings vanilla ice cream!'
The view that (471) merely expresses disapproval (without a surprise component) is
supported by the fact that it would seem odd for Victoria to express surprise in (470), as
indicated in (472). A view that treats (471) as an adversative expression of unsurprised
disapproval is also corroborated by the presence of the particles aber auch 'but also',
which are prototypical of such disapproval exclamations, see Scholz (1991).
(472)In the context described by (470) after Sofia has showed up with ice cream.
a.# I'm surprised that she brought ice cream (again).
b.# I'm surprised that she's always bringing ice cream.
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The fact that constructions like (471) are factive (and thus plausibly contains MoodFACT)
follows from the observation that the modified proposition cannot be called into question.
In the adversative (473a), it is impossible to follow up by saying "which isn't certain
yet", whereas this is perfectly fine in an optative like (473b) (though it may be slightly
unnatural, as the non-certainty of the optative proposition may already follow as an
implicature from uttering an optative).
(473) a. Dass die jetzt aber auch wieder Vanilleeis mitbringt! - # Was
that she now but also again vanilla.ice.cream brings what
natirlich noch nicht sicher ist.
naturally still not certain is
'[I find it bad/disappointing] that she brings vanilla ice cream again! - #which
is, of course, not certain yet.'
b. Dass die jetzt nur wieder Vanilleeis mitbringt! - /Was natUrlich
that she now only again vanilla.ice.cream brings what naturally
noch nicht sicher ist.
still not certain is
'[I hope] that she brings vanilla ice cream again! - /which is, of course, not
certain yet.'
This slightly changes the picture of which EX - Mood combinations are possible. If we
assume that optatives and adversatives use the same scale (a preference scale) with
opposite polarity, we find that preference scales and inverse preference scales are in a
partially complementary distribution with respect to their prototypical mood.
Specifically, positive evaluation seems to be tied to non-factivity, and negative evaluation
seems to be tied to non-counterfactuality. In the cases of default mood, both may be
possible. Scholz (1991) discusses several cases of wenn-adversatives, which, given our
insights from section 5.1, should be non-factive (as wenn 'if, when' is incompatible with






This begs the question of whether we find counterfactual polar exclamatives as well, if
the relevant scale is a likelihood scale (rather than an unlikelihood scale). Recall that
counterfactual polar exclamatives were the other unattested combination type. I propose
that we do. A relevant candidate is example (475), which conveys that the opposite of
the expressed (negative) proposition is the case, and which further conveys that the facts
are surprising95.
(475)a. Mensch, wenn das da driben nicht der Otto ist!
man if this there over not the Otto is
lit. 'Man, if this is not Otto over there!'
b. perceived meaning: 'Man, [I'm surprised] that this is Otto over there!'
c. not: 'Man, [I'm surprised] that this is not Otto over there!'
I suggest that we should explore the idea of whether (475) may involve a likelihood scale
in combination with counterfactual semantic mood (in spite of its indicative m-mood
marking); this is schematized in (476).
(476) schema of a if-not-exclamation
a. [EXikelihood [MoodCF Q!
b. What this entails on part of the speaker:
I have an emotion towards the high expectability of [p Otto is not over there].
It is false that [p Otto is not over there]. => It is true that [p Otto is over there].
Therefore, I am surprised that [p Otto is over there].
95 See also Quirk et al. (1985) for corresponding English examples, illustrated in (i) and (ii).
i. Well, if it isn't the manager himself! ['It is indeed the manager himself!']
ii. Why, if it isn't Susan! ['It is indeed Susan!']
(Quirk et al. 1985:842)
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If the analysis in (476) is on the right track, a revised correlation of EX scales and mood
can be given as in (477).
(477) mood preference likelihood
factive dispreference for $ $ is unlikely
non-factive non-counterfactual (dis)preference for ?
counterfactual preference for $ $ is likely
A tentative conclusion may then be that negatively oriented scales (conveying the
violation of an expectation or preference) preferably combine with factive mood, whreas
positively oriented scales (conveying the satisfaction of an expectation or preference)
combine with counterfactual mood (or possibly with non-factive non-counterfactual
mood). I conjecture that this correlation may reflect a constraint on exclamations that we
tend to exclamatively express an emotion towards a certain proposition if the facts do not
comply with certain ideals or beliefs states (i.e. how things should be according to our
desires and beliefs). If things are the way they should be (according to our desires and
beliefs), exclamations that employ EX may simply not be warranted.
5.3 Mood, Exclamations and the Connection to Verb Second
In sections 5.1 and 5.2, I have formulated a proposal for the role that semantic mood
plays in exclamations, both in co-determining which complementizer is selected /
whether V1 order is possible and in giving rise to the presuppositions typically associated
with an expression of surprise, hope or wishfulness. The purpose of this section is to
integrate this proposal into the larger literature and show how it is compatible with other
views. Most discussions of morphological mood, semantic mood and mood-related issues
(such as the Greek factive complementizer pu 'that', cf. Roussou 1994, Varlokosta 1994)
focus on embedded clauses, cf. Portner (1997), Giannakidou (1999, 2009), Quer (1998,
2001, 2009ab), Roussou (2009, 2010), Giorgi (2009), Giannakidou (2009), Kempchinsky
(2009), Siegel (2009). Unembedded clauses are often covered by side-remarks. A link
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between mood and VI / V2 such as the one that I proposed has only be suggested
recently, in Portner's (2006) response to Truckenbrodt's (2006ab) discussion of
embedded verb second. Most of this section is dedicated to a discussion of how
Truckenbrodt's insights can be translated into my system. I will then briefly review the
difference between V1 and V2.
5.3.1 Truckenbrodt (2006ab) and Mood Management
Truckenbrodt (2006ab) proposes that (V-to-)Infl-to-C movement (i.e. VI and V2) in
German is always connected to (illocutionary) force-related features in C. His force-
related features are the predecessors of my Mood features. From his perspective, they
serve to co-determine illocutionary force potential by means of the presuppositions that
they trigger. I refer to the main paper (Truckenbrodt 2006a) and the response to the
commentators (Truckenbrodt 2006b) separately as Truckenbrodt revises relevant parts of
his theory96. Truckenbrodt (2006a) characterizes the features in C as context indices, one
of which is labeled Epist. Epist is the one that also occurs in embedded clauses; it
requires that the expressed proposition is interpreted relative to some belief context E of
some individual x in a world w, abbreviated as E"(x). Truckenbrodt (2006b) by and large
eliminates the other context indices and reanalyzes Epist as a [+WH] feature with a similar
semantic impact. The impact of [±WH] is given in (478); [±WH] is seen to typically trigger
(V-to-)Infl-to-C movement. Truckenbrodt considers the epistemic interpretation principle
the main result of his investigation.
(478) Epistemic interpretation of [±WH]
A visible specification of [+WH] in C or SpecCP at LF triggers a presupposition
that looks for an epistemic context. The proposition p is embedded in that
epistemic context.
(Truckenbrodt 2006b:395)
96 As I take a different approach to unembedded dass-clauses and wenn-clauses, I will not review
Truckenbrodt's view on such utterances (see Reis 2006 for some relevant criticism of applying
Truckenbrodt's theory to wenn-clauses).
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Rendered in my own approach to mood, we can view this epistemic feature as proto-
assertive mood, which amounts to a presupposition that somebody believes, assumes,
dreams, ... that the modified proposition is true. Let us define proto-assertivity as in
(479).
(479) ||iMoodASSERTC = Xp. Xw: Ec(w) C p . p(w) PROTO-ASSERTIVITY 97
"It is presupposed that there is a salient epistemic context E, (i.e. somebody's beliefs,
assumptions, dreams, ... ), which embeds p."
Where can we see iMoodASSERT at work? Following Truckenbrodt, it is plausible that the
presence of iMoodASSERT always requires (V-to-)T-to-C movement, i.e. in my rendering
both C and Mood would have the EPP property. (Truckenbrodt 2006b assumes that VI /
V2 is triggered by a PF visibility requirement that requires [±WH] to associate with overt
material at PF.)
Truckenbrodt (2006b), whose main objective is to derive the connection between
illocutionary force and VI / V2, posits the root rule in (480) (developed from Zaefferer
2001), which essentially encodes purposefulness and maps an utterance into a speech act.
(Deonts, which is modeled as a context index in Truckenbrodt 2006a, roughly translates
to 'the speaker wants'.)
(480) Root Rule
Utterances (more generally: communicative acts) are interpreted as purposeful,
i.e. expressing a volition on the part of the speaker: CG -+ CG + "Deonts" (...). In
the cases discussed here, the meaning of the utterance is interpreted in the scope
of this volition, i.e. as part of"..." in the preceding formula..
(Truckenbrodt 2006b:394)
97 As Portner (2006) points out, Truckenbrodt's epistemic contexts correspond to Giannakidou's (1999)
models (e.g. MDREAMSjacob), the set of worlds compatible with Jacob's dreams) and Portner's (1997)
modal contexts (e.g. DOXMaggie(W) = the set of worlds compatible with Maggie's beliefs in w). This
correspondence holds for my mood features as well.
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We can now give an illustration of Truckenbrodt's system, for a declarative assertion, in
(481). He assumes that a clause like (48 1a) has the feature [-WH] in C, which triggers V2
movement; the expressed proposition is given in (481b). By virtue of (478), this
proposition is embedded in an epistemic context, given in (481c); the root rule in (480)
then triggers the update of the common ground by means of the embedded proposition, as
in (48 1d).
(481) a. Es [-WH]regnet. 'It is raining.'
b. Xw.rain(w)
c. by Epistemic interpretation of [+WH]
for some x, E in the context:
Xa Ea(x) C Xw.rain(w)
"S / A / ... believes / knows / assumes ... that it is raining."
d. by Root Rule
CG -+ CG + kw' Deonts"(ka Ea(x) 9 kw.rain(w))
"S wants common ground [that it is raining]."
or also: "S wants that A know [that S believes that it is raining]."
For interrogatives, Truckenbrodt (2006b) assumes that they invoke the epistemic
interpretation rule twice; they have a [+WH] feature associated with a question operator,
and a [-WH] feature associated with C (developing an idea from Brandt et al. 1992:3 1f)).
(482) V-to-C interrogatives
a. [SpecCP [+WH]Wen [c' [-WHmag [TP Maria tmag?]]]
'Whom does Maria like?'
b. [SpecCP [+WHI [C' [-WH]Mag [TP Maria Peter?]]]
'Does Maria like Peter?'
(Truckenbrodt 2006b:398)
Both [+WH] and [-WH] simply trigger the search for an epistemic context. As a
consequence of a pragmatic strategy of construing a coherent speech act, [+WH] is
oriented towards the speaker (conveying that the speaker wants the true answer to
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become part of the speaker's knowledge) and [-WH] towards the hearer (triggering the
presupposition that the hearer knows the true answer).
Given the scope and focus of my dissertation, I am mainly interested in the idea that
iMoodASSERT is the relevant mood both in assertions and in questions. In order to derive
the right pragmatic effect, it seems appropriate to assume (in Truckenbrodt's 2006ab
spirit) that iMoodASSERT always contributes the same presupposition, but the effect varies
according to the utterance type. The contribution of iMoodASSERT is always that the
modified proposition is embedded in some epistemic state. In declaratives, this epistemic
state is by default oriented towards the speaker. In interrogatives, this epistemic state is
by default oriented towards the hearer. Such a view is suggested by Zaefferer (2006), as
in (483).
(483) Content-type drivenness of the question-assertion distinction
The difference in structural meaning between declarative and interrogative
sentences is the difference between different kinds of propositional content.
(Zaefferer 2006:345)
I assume with Truckenbrodt (2006ab) that questions denote the true answer, i.e. a
proposition (Groenendijk & Stokhof 1982)98. We can then give an analysis of assertions
and questions as in (484) and (485) respectively, assuming my iMoodASSERT feature.
Hearer/speaker orientation follows from the pragmatics of assertions and questions, cf.
(483). It can be viewed as a precondition that an assertion is only felicitous if the speaker
believes the truth of the asserted proposition; similarly, we will shortly review evidence
that questions trigger a presupposition that someone (typically the hearer) knows the true
answer. As shown in (484), a declarative assertion offers the denoted proposition, (484b),
coupled with a presupposition that the speaker believes it to be true (a precondition for
assertion), (484d).
98 For background on question semantics see also Hamblin (1973), Karttunen (1977), Hintikka (1974),
Bauerle & Zimmermann (1991) and Groenendijk & Stokhof (1997).
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(484) a. [cP Es [c' regnet[iMood:ASSERT] [TP tes [VP tregnet]]].
it rains
'It is raining.'
b. truth-conditional meaning: Xw.rain(w)
c. iMoodASSERT => There is a contextually salient epistemic context Ec, such
that, Ec(w) C p
d. via (483): Ec is identified with Epistspeaker(c) => Epistspeaker(c)(w) C p
Similarly, as shown in (485), when a speaker utters a question, she prompts the hearer to
provide the true answer, (485b), and triggers a presupposition that the hearer knows the
true answer, (485d).
a. [cp Q [c' regnet[iMood:ASSERT] [TP es [VP tregnet]]]?
rains
'Is it raining?'
b. truth-conditional meaning: Xw.rain(w) = rain(w*)
c. iMoodASSERT => There is a contextually salient epistemic context Ec, such
that, Ec(w) C p
d. via (483): Ee is identified with Doxhearer(c) = DOxhearer(c)(W) 9 p
For declaratives, the presupposition in (484d) can be motivated as it is plausible to
assume that belief in a proposition is a pre-condition for asserting it. For V-to-C
questions, Truckenbrodt (2006a) presents an empirical argument that a presupposition
like (485d) is triggered. Truckenbrodt (2006a) observes that unembedded ob-questions do
not expect knowledge on part of the hearer, (486), whereas V1-questions do, (487)99.
This follows if V-to-C movement in questions triggers the presupposition that the hearer
knows the true answer.
99 While rhetorical questions, pedagogical questions, monological questions and exam questions may,
strictly speaking, diverge from this requirement, Truckenbrodt points out that they can still be considered to
involve some expectation for an addressee (real or implicit) to make the right answer common ground.




Stefan: Ich hab seit Jahren nichts mehr von Peter geh6rt.
'I haven't heard from Peter in years.'
Heiner: Ich auch nicht.
'Me neither.'
Stefan: Ob er immer noch kubanische Zi
whether he always still Cuban ci




(487) Stefan: Ich hab seit Jahren nichts mehr von Peter gehrt.
'I haven't heard from Peter in years.'
Heiner: Ich auch nicht.
'Me neither.'
Stefan: # Mag er immer noch kubanische Zigarren tmag?
likes he always still Cuban cigars
'Does he still like Cuban cigars?'
(Truckenbrodt 2006a:274)
Moving on to embedded mood, one of the core contrasts is given in (488) versus (489).
Truckenbrodt (2006ab) takes Epist / [±WH] (my iMoodASSERT) to be responsible for the
possibility of embedded V2 in (488) and the impossibility thereof in (489)100. The idea is
that embedded epistemic features (or mood features from my perspective) cannot project
to the speaker - they have to be evaluated with respect to the matrix subject (possibly by
context shifting or binding of an attitude holder variable; Truckenbrodt views the
embedded clause as a derived context in the sense of Stalnaker 1988). As a consequence,
embedded [iMoodASSERT] in (488a)+(489a) requires that the matrix subject (Hans)
believes / knows / assumes / ... that Peter comes to late. As this is the case in (488a),
iMoodASSERT is licensed, whereas in (489a), iMoodASSERT is not licensed. As a
consequence, it is plausible that (488b)+(489b) contains iMoodDEF which is vacuous and
thus always possible in embedded clauses.
100 The idea that Truckenbrodt (2006ab) is based on is the idea that embedded V2 is connected to proto-















glaubt, [cP Peter [c' kommt [TP
believes Peter comes
believes that Peter will come too late.'
glaubt, [Cp dass [TP Peter zu
believes that Peter too
believes that Peter will come too late.'




bezweifelt, [cP Peter [c' kommt [TP
doubts Peter comes
doubts that Peter will come too late.'
bezweifelt, [Cp dass [TP Peter zu
doubts that Peter too
doubts that Peter will come too late.'
kommt]].
comes




While in complement clauses the choice between iMoodASSERT and iMoodDEF seems
largely optional, we observe that assertional matrix clauses require iMoodASSERT, which
in turn seems to require (V-to-)T-to-C movement (i.e. both C and Mood must have the
EPP property). This may be important due to a maxim such as Heim's (1991) Maximize
Presupposition - in order to assert something the speaker has to believe it to be true,
which may have to be marked by means of iMoodASSERT.
(490) a. Peter geht nach Hause.
Peter goes to home
'Peter is going home.'
b.#Dass Peter nach Hause geht.
that Peter to home goes
intended: 'Peter is going home.'
Similarly, an information question always requires the speaker to use iMoodASSERT as
well, as shown in (491). We can understand this on analogy. If a speaker asks a direct
question, she typically has reasons to believe that the hearer knows the answer, which
must be marked accordingly.
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(491) a. Gehst du nach Hause?
go you to home
'Are you going home?'
b.# Ob du nach Hause gehst?
whether you to home go
intended: 'Are you going home?'
The fact that embedded mood has to be interpreted with respect to the matrix subject and
does not project to the utterance context is supported by observations on embedded
counterfactual mood and embedded factive mood. It is plausible that (492b) contains an
embedded iMoodCF, which has an overt reflex in the presence of subjunctive m-mood
(ware 'were') and in the possibility of embedded verb second' 0 1. Yet, it is not the case
that the speaker believes in the falsity of Maria came. (See also Abels 2010 for the idea
that the factivity presupposition of embedded degree exclamatives does not project - with
the caveat that these clauses may not be embedded exclamatives after all, cf. chapter 4.)
(492)a. Hans glaubt, falschlicherweise, dass Maria nicht gekommen ist.
Hans believes falsely that Maria not arrived is
'Hans mistakenly believes that Maria hasn't arrived.'
b. Er wunscht, sie wfire gekommen.
he wishes she were come
'He wishes that she had come.'
Simply by assuming iMoodASSERT, which can occur in embedded clauses and must then
be satisfied with respect to the derived context, we can derive the contrast between the
examples in (493), which all activate epistemic states that have the matrix subject as
attitude holder, and (494), where this is not the case.
1 This observation may necessitate a modification of iMoodCF as follows.
i. IIMoodCF1C = XP . xw p n Ec(w) = 0 . p(w)
"Somebody believes / assumes / dreams ... p to be false."
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(493) a. Maria glaubt, Peter geht nach Hause.
Maria believes Peter goes to home
'Maria believes Peter is going home.'
(Truckenbrodt 2006a:278)
b. Maria sagt, Peter geht nach Hause.
Maria says Peter goes to home
'Maria says Peter is going home.'
(Truckenbrodt 2006a:287)
c. Maria traumt, sie kauft sich ein neues
Maria dreams she buys self a new




(494) a. * Hans bezweifelt, Peter geht nach Hause.
Hans doubts Peter goes to home
'Hans doubts Peter is going home.'
(Truckenbrodt 2006a:297)
b. * Es ist (un)wahrscheinlich, Peter geht nach Hause.
it is (un)likely Peter goes to home
'It is (un)likely Peter is going home.'
(Truckenbrodt 2006a:288)
c. * Es ist (un)m6glich, Peter geht nach Hause.
it is (im)possible Peter goes to home
'It is (im)possible Peter is going home.'
(Truckenbrodt 2006a:288)
Portner (2006) observes that there is a correlation between the possibility / impossibility
of embedded German V2 and selection of indicative / subjunctive in embedded clauses in
Romance and Greek (Portner 1997, Quer 1998, Giannakidou 1999, Villalta 2000)102. My
analysis follows Portner (2006) in assuming that this correlation is non-coincidental.
In the same way in which Portner (1997) assumes that mood selection reflects the
modal context with respect to which an embedded clause is interpreted (e.g. Maria's
102 See also Farkas (1985, 1992), Portner (1992, 1997), Giannakidou (1997), Giorgi & Pianesi (1997), Quer
(1998), Giannakidou (1999) and Villalta (2000).
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dreams, Maria's beliefs, etc.), it can be assumed that the types of semantic mood features
that I assume need to be licensed with respect to such modal contexts. Concluding this
section, it is worth briefly discussing parallels that we expect to see in the behavior of
embedded V2 and in m-mood marking on embedded predicates. One thing that has been
observed for embedded m-mood is that it is not strictly sensitive to the meaning of the
matrix predicate, but rather to the compositional meaning of the matrix clause. Therefore,
negation affects mood marking in embedded clauses. Quer (2001) notes that (495a) and
(495b) differ in that creu 'believes' in (495a) triggers embedded indicative, whereas no
creu 'doesn't believe' in (495b) triggers embedded subjunctive (provided that the
embedded mood is interpreted with respect to the epistemic models ME(Anna) / ME(jury),
which have the matrix subject as attitude holder).
(495)a. L'Anna creu [que els pinguins volen]ME(Anna)
the-Anna believe.3SG that the penguins fly.jN.3PL
'Anna believes that penguins fly.'
(Quer 2001:85)
b. El jurat no creu [que sigui innocent]MEury)
the jury not believe.3SG that be.SUB.3SG innocent
'The jury doesn't believe that s/he's innocent.'
(Quer 2001:91)
Embedded indicative under negated creu 'believes' is only possible if the embedded
mood is interpreted with respect to the speaker's beliefs, i.e. the epistemic model
ME(speaker), (496).
(496) El jurat no creu [que ds innocent]ME(speaker)
the jury not believe.3SG that be.IND.3SG innocent
'The jury doesn't believe that s/he's innocent.'
(Quer 2001:91)
Quer (1998, 2001) argues that (496) presupposes the truth of the complement proposition,
whereas (495a) conveys it in an assertive way. In my system, this distinction can be
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captured if we posit lexically speaker-oriented iMoodFACT in (496), but context-sensitive
iMoodASSERT in (495a).
(497)a. IliMoodFACT Ic = Xp. %w: DOXspeaker(W) C p . p(w) FACTIVITY
"The speaker presupposes p to be true."
b. IliMoodASSERTI| = Xp . Xw : Ec(w) C p . p(w) PROTO-ASSERTIVITY
"It is presupposed that there is a salient epistemic context Ec (i.e. somebody's beliefs,
assumptions, dreams, ... ), which embeds p."
Given that iMoodASSERT must be locally licensed, it is possible in (495a), where the
relevant epistemic context is entailed by the matrix clause, but not in (495b), where the
epistemic context in the matrix clause does not entail the truth of the complement
proposition. In contrast, iMoodFACT projects, which is why it is possible in (496).
The same sensitivity of iMoodASSERT to its local context is observed in Truckenbrodt
(2006a) (who calls it Epist). The examples in (498) and (499) (based on Truckenbrodt
2006a:295-297) show that glaubt 'believes' is compatible with embedded dass 'that' or
V2, whereas glaubt nicht 'doesn't believe' is restricted to dass 'that' and disallows V2.
(498) a. Hans glaubt, dass Peter geht nach Hause geht.
Hans believes that Peter goes to home goes
'Hans believes that Peter goes home.'
b. Hans glaubt nicht, dass Peter geht nach Hause geht.
Hans believes not that Peter goes to home goes
'Hans believes that Peter goes home.'
(499) a. Hans glaubt, Peter geht nach Hause.
Hans believes Peter goes to home
'Hans believes that Peter goes home.'
103 This is an over-simplification; Quer (1998) shows that the factive presupposition associated with the
indicative in (496) does not project to the actual speaker in the case of multiple embedding - in such cases,
it projects to the next higher subject. See also Quer (2001:92,fn.11) for the observation that sometimes
embedded indicative is possible in a first person statement of 'I don't believe that p'; in such cases, the
truth of the complement must be presupposed by some other agent in the discourse.
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b.* Hans glaubt nicht, Peter geht nach Hause.
Hans believes not Peter goes to home
'Hans believes that Peter goes home.'
This follows if the embedded clause in (498) contains iMoodDEF marking and the
embedded clause in (499) contains iMoodASSERT marking, which must be satisfied within
the local context (Hans's epistemic model ME(Hans)). In (500b), Hans's beliefs do not
embed the proposition that Peter is going home, which is why iMoodASSERT (the trigger
for embedded V2) is not licensed in its local context. In (500a), such licensing is given.
(500)a. Hans glaubt, [Peter geht nach Hause]NE(Hans)
Hans believes Peter goes to home
'Hans believes that Peter goes home.'
b.* Hans glaubt nicht, [Peter geht nach Hause]ME(Hans)
Hans believes not Peter goes to home
'Hans believes that Peter goes home.'
The current proposal thus derives the similarities between complementizer selection /
verb movement on the one hand and mood selection on the other hand. Both are
ultimately due to semantic mood features - presupposition triggers that sometimes must
be satisfied in a local context and sometimes project. I will now conclude this chapter
with a brief discussion of the difference between verb first and verb second in German.
5.3.2 V1 and V2
This section briefly addresses the following two issues. On the one hand it appears that
German exclamations with (V-to-)T-to-C movement are typically verb-initial, (501),
while assertional declaratives have verb-second order, (502).
(501)a. HAtte es doch nur tatsichlich geregnet! optative
had it doch only indeed rained
'If only it had rained indeed!'
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b. Hat es jetzt doch tatsachlich geregnet!
has it now doch indeed rained
'[I'm surprised] that it rained after all!'
polar exclamative
(502)a. Es hat geregnet.
it has rained
'It rained.'
b. Es haitte geregnet.
it had rained
'It would have rained.'
/ * Hat es geregnet.
has it rained
'It rained.'
/ # Hatte es geregnet.
has it rained
'It would have rained.'
indicative declarative
subjunctive declarative
On the other hand, the mood-based analysis that I proposed for complementizer selection
/ T-to-C movement does not derive the obligatory presence or absence of XP-to-SpecCP
movement, which typically gives rise to verb second order, yet cannot occur in the
presence of an 'complementizer' such as wenn 'if or dass 'that'. As shown in (503) and
(504), verb fronting is quite generally accompanied by XP-to-SpecCP movement (here:













glaubt, [Cp hat [T
believes has
believes that it rained.'
glaubt, [cP es [c, hat [T
believes it has
believes that it rained.'
wuinscht, [CP h '' te
wishes had
wishes it had rained.'
winscht, [CP es c haitte
wishes it had
















(505)a. Hans glaubt, [CP dass [TP es geregnet hat]].
Hans believes that it rained has
'Hans believes that it rained.'
b.* Hans glaubt, [cP es [c' dass [TP tes geregnet hat]]].
Hans believes it that rained has
'Hans believes that it rained.'
(506) a. Es ware sch6n, [cp wenn [TP es geregnet hiitte]].
it were nice if it rained had
'It would be nice if it had rained.'
b.* Es ware sch6n, [cP es [c' wenn [TP tes geregnet haitte]].
it were nice it if rained had
'It would be nice if it had rained.'
It is worth pausing for a moment here and considering an insight from the verb second
literature, as summarized by Holmberg (2010): Verb second consists of two processes, a
process of (V-to-)T-to-C movement and a process of filling the specifier of CP, either by
virtue of XP-to-SpecCP movement or via base generation of an adverb or expletive
element. While T-to-C movement and filling of SpecCP tend to co-occur, as in embedded
V2 clauses and in matrix declaratives, there is no reason to assume any deeper functional
connection between the two phenomena. In fact, there is much evidence that German XP-
to-SpecCP movement is far from a homogeneous, uniform process (see Frey 2010 for a
recent discussion). By and large, there seems to be a requirement for SpecCP to be filled
in clauses that have a finite verb in C, but there is much variation in what can fill SpecCP.
So, how can we account for this effect, and how can we derive the V1-V2 distinction?
Reconsider the system that I proposed above in order to derive the distribution of dass
'that', wenn 'if and VI in German. As shown in (507a), dass 'that' emerges whenever C
lacks the EPP property (in which case Mood usually has the EPP property, plausibly in
order to avoid auxiliary proliferation). Contrastively, as given in (507b), wenn 'if is the
consequence of moving Mood to C on its own (i.e. C has the EPP property, but Mood
does not). Finally, as given in (507c), T-to-C movement emerges whenever both C and
Mood have the EPP property. It is (507c) where we typically find the requirement to fill
the specifier of CP, whereas (507a+b) disallow this.
253
(507)a. C[uMood, -EPP] ... Mood[iMood, uT, +EPP] ... T[iT]
=C[.M.. ... T[iTl + Mood[iMood, ".T. ... (T[iT])
spell-out: C . 4 e dass 'that'
b. C[uMood, +EPP] ... Mood[iMood, uT, -EPP] ... T[iT]
Mood[iMood, .T + C.M..43 ... (Mood[iMood, uT]) ... T[iT]
spell-out: Mood[ Mood, "I + C[.M,.dl 4 wenn 'if
C. C[uMood, +EPP] ... Mood[iMood, uT, +EPP] ... T[iT]
=> C[uMood, +EPP] ... T[iT] + Mood[iMood, e- ... (T[iT])
S [iT] + Mood[iMood, *;] + C[.M..4l ... (T[iT] + Mood[iMood, .T.) ... (T[iT)
spell-out: [T[iT] + Mood[iMood,.T] + C[.Mee] < VI / V2
In light of the system proposed here, the most plausible view is one where it is precisely
the fact that both C and Mood have the EPP property that gives rise to a requirement for
SpecCP to be filled. As it stands, it is unclear how this comes about, but whatever
eventually accounts for the EPP property may give us a means to derive said requirement
from accumulating two EPP-bearing heads by means of head movement.
So, how do we account for the VI versus V2 distinction? I propose for German
exclamations and conditional antecedents that VI is a consequence from T-to-C
movement in a clause where the SpecCP position is occupied by a null operator, as given
in (508). This null operator may correspond to the EX operator in the case of optatives
and to the null conditional modal in the case of conditional clauses 0 . Such a view allows
us to account for VI in conditionals and exclamations, as in (508).
(508) a. [SpecCP EXs [c' Warst [TP du doch zuhause]]]!
were you doch at.home
'Were you only at home!'
b. [SpecCP V [c' Wsirst [TP du zuhause]]], wurde ich vorbeikommen.
were you at.home would I drop.by
'If you were at home, I'd drop by.'
104 Example (508b) assumes that wurde 'would' is not the conditional modal itself, but rather an analytic
mood marker, given that modern day German uses analytic wurde + V forms instead of synthetic forms to
express the subjunctive, cf. Scholz (1991).
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Assuming a uniform structure for conditional antecedents and exclamations, we can posit
such an operator also in the cases of wenn 'if', in (509). From a unificatory perspective, it
seems further motivated to extend the proposal to dass-exclamations, as given in (510).
For these two construction types, such a proposal accounts for the fact that SpecCP in
dass-clauses and wenn-clauses not only need not be filled, but actually must not be filled:
They already contain a null operator. (Notably, this idea can however not be extended to
regular complement dass-clauses.)
a. [SpecCP EXs [c, Wenn [TP du doch zuhause wairst]]]!
if you doch at.home were
'If only you were at home!'
b. [SpecCP V [c' Wenn [TP du zuhause warst]]], warde ich vorbeikommen.
if you at.home were would I drop.by
'If you were at home, I'd drop by.'
(510) [SpecCP EXs [c' Dass [TP du doch zuhause wsirst]]]!
that you doch at.home were
'If only you were at home!'
The view that optatives and conditional antecedents contain a null operator in SpecCP
can be motivated as follows. First, it is a common assumption that German is a strict verb
second language, and VI structures contain a null operator (or an elided element) in
SpecCP. For yes/no-questions it is a plausible assumption that this null operator is a
question operator Q. The view that questions contain a null operator as opposed to an
elided lexical item is supported by the fact that nothing can, in fact, be overtly realized in
the SpecCP of yes/no-questions, as shown in (511).
(511) a. [cp Q [c' Bist [TP du denn zuhause
are you denn at.home
'Are you home?'
b. (* Es / *Jetzt / * Dann) bist du denn
it now then are you denn






c. * Du bist tdu denn zuhause tbist?
you are denn at.home
'You are home?'
Exactly the same argument can be made in favor of a null operator in the case of
conditional antecedents, (512), and exclamations, (513): No overt element can possibly
appear in the pre-V1 position (we can test this for optatives, but not so easily for polar
exclamatives, due to their similarity to declaratives, cf. chapter 2).
(512) a. Warst du zuhause, w-urde ich vorbeikommen.
were you at.home would I drop.by
'Were you at home, I'd drop by'
b. (* Es / *Jetzt / * Dann) wirst du zuhause, wurde ich vorbeikommen.
it now then were you at.home would I drop.by
'(*It / *Now / *Then) were you at home, I'd drop by'
c.* Du warst tdu zuhause, wirde ich vorbeikommen.
you were at.home would I drop.by
'You were home, I'd drop by'
(513) a. Wirst du doch zuhause!
were you doch at.home
'Were you only at home!'
b. (* Es / # Jetzt / # Dann) wirst du doch zuhause!
it now then were you doch at.home
'(*It / *Now / *Then) were you only at home!'
c.# Du warst tdu doch zuhause!
you were doch at.home
'You were only at home!' (only reading: 'Of course, you'd be home!')
This leaves us, however, without an explanation for the fact that complement dass-
clauses do not allow for any elements in their SpecCP position either, although they do
not seem to contain a null operator of any sort0.
105 An alternative hypothesis would be to assume that dass-clauses, wenn-clauses and V1-clauses always
contain a MAX operator in SpecCP, which yields the most salient / closest plurality of possible worlds (cf.
Schlenker 2004, Bhatt & Pancheva 2002, 2006, Schein 2003) in which the modified proposition is true. I
leave an exploration of this option open for future research.
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5.4 Summary
In this chapter, I have presented a system for semantic mood, with a focus on
exclamations. The central goal was to try to understand how exclamations achieve the
factivity/counterfactuality presuppositions that they do, and how complementizer
selection and T-to-C movement in exclamations are constrained. I have argued that
factivity/counterfactuality presuppositions in exclamations are due to semantic mood
features, which co-determine the material that surfaces in C and the morphological mood
on the finite verb or auxiliary. I presented an implementation in terms of agreement
between C and Mood, which can give rise to movement from Mood to C, or even
movement from a complex T+Mood head to C. I subsequently discussed the integration
of my proposal into the larger context of literature on mood selection and verb
movement.
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6. Particles and Forces: Modulating EX
This section aims at resolving one of the most puzzling properties of optatives and other
exclamations: The presence of different particles. I first present an overview of my
proposal, starting with the issues that are at stake, in section 6.1.1, and my analysis in
section 6.1.2, followed by a brief discussion of possible predictions in section 6.1.3. I
then focus on three case studies: The particles 'only' (6.2), 'at least' (6.3) and doch (6.4),
which are the prototypical markers of optativity in German and many other languages.
6.1 On the Role of Particles in Exclamations
6.1.1 The Core Puzzles
As a brief reminder, optatives are utterances that express a wish, hope or desire without
containing a lexical item that means 'wish', 'hope' or 'desire' (cf. Scholz 1991,
Rosengren 1993, Rifkin 2000, Kyriakaki 2007, 2008, 2009, Asarina & Shklovsky 2008,
Biezma 201 lab). In this dissertation, I have so far argued for an analysis that derives
desirability in optatives from a generalized exclamation operator EX, which I formalized
as in (514), repeated from (138).
(514) For any scale S and propositionp, interpreted in relation to a context c and
assignment function g,
an utterance EX(S)(p) is felicitous iff Vq[THRESHOLD(c) >s q -i p >s q]
"EX expresses an emotion that captures the fact that p is higher on a (speaker-related) scale
S than all contextually relevant alternatives q below a contextual threshold."
where THRESHOLD(c) is a function from a context into a set of worlds / a
proposition that counts as high with respect to a relevant scale S.
One of the puzzling properties of optatives is the proliferation of particles in such
utterances. In German, the prototypical optative particles are nur 'only', wenigstens 'at
least' and doch 'but, though', cf. Scholz (1991). I focus on these three elements, both in
German and from a cross-linguistic perspective. However, beyond these three elements,
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the goal of this chapter is to lay out a generalized framework for analyzing 'discourse'
particles and their impact on speech act disambiguation. Let me briefly review four
observations on discourse particles in optatives and state the puzzle at the end of this
section.
The first observation on the three particles under discussion is that they can co-occur
quite freely in optatives, as illustrated for a dass-optative in (515). All of the examples in
(515a-h) are acceptable optatives in German.
(515)a. (Ach,) Dass ich doch
b. (Ach,) Dass ich
c. (Ach,) Dass ich doch
d. (Ach,) Dass ich
e. (Ach,) Dass ich
f. (Ach,) Dass ich doch
g. (Ach,) Dass ich
h. (Ach,) Dass ich doch
oh that I DOCH
'Oh, that I had met one
nur wenigstens einen von ihnen getroffen
einen von ihnen getroffen
einen von ihnen getroffen
nur einen von ihnen getroffen
wenigstens einen von ihnen getroffen
wenigstens einen von ihnen getroffen
nur wenigstens einen von ihnen getroffen
wenigstens einen von ihnen getroffen
only at.least one of them met
of them!' /'If only I had met one of them!'
The second observation is that these particles do not obviously seem to modify the
proposition that is wished for in an optative; all of the examples in (516a-c) amount to an
expression of the wish in (516d).
(516) Context: I just had a very embarrassing crash with my snowboard
a. Wenn mich doch niemand gesehen hatte!
if me doch nobody seen had
b. Wenn mich nur niemand gesehen hatte!
if me only nobody seen had
c. Wenn mich wenigstens niemand gesehen hatte!
if me at.least nobody seen had
d. wish paraphrase: I wish nobody had seen me.
As a third observation, we find that, while no single particle is obligatory in an optative
clause, particles are nevertheless prototypical and often quasi-obligatory. One half of this











nevertheless express an optative-like positive evaluation. A selection is given in (517).
(Native speakers differ in the extent to which they accept these particle-less
exclamations.)
(517)a. Dass ich noch einmal Venedig sehen k6nnte!
that I still once Venice see could
'Oh that I could see Venice once more!'
(Truckenbrodt 2006a)
b. Wenn ich deine Statur hatte!
if I your build had
'[Oh!] If [only] I had your build!'
(adapted from Evans 2007, most natural stress marking is indicated by me)
c. Rico schaute die Blumen an und dachte:
'Rico looked at the flowers and thought:'
"Wenn Stineli diese sehen knnte!"
if Stineli these see could
'If Stineli could see these!'
und stand lange unbeweglich am Zaun.
'and stood at the fence for a long time without moving.'
(Johanna Spyri (1878): Heimatlos. Discussed in Grosz 2011)
d. WARE ich zuhause geblieben!
WERE I at.home stayed
'HAD I stayed home!'
(Rosengren 1993:36)
The other half of this observation consists of the following fact. While borderline
examples of wish-conveying exclamations exist, as documented in (517), it seems to be a
default that optatives contain either one of the prototypical particles (nur 'only',
wenigstens 'at least' and doch in German) or a suitable interjection (ach 'oh' or oh 'oh' in
German), cf. Thurmair (1989), Scholz (1991), Rosengren (1993), Coniglio (2009). This
fact is illustrated in (518). The illformedness of utterances like (518e) has lead many
scholars to conclude that particles are, in fact, obligatory in optatives (e.g. Pittner 2007). I
side with Rosengren (1993) in assuming that particles are prototypical rather than
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obligatory for optatives (i.e. optatives do not require particles, but optatives are most































'If only he had come in time!'
Let me briefly elaborate on the present empirical discussion, by showing that German is
not an isolated case. A language that behaves rather similar to German is Italian. Italian
allows for a variety of particle-less optatives (typically without se 'if).
(519)a.Il Signore ci protegga.
the Lord us protect-subj-3sg
'May the Lord protect us.'
(di Lampedusa, Il Gattopardo)
(Portner 2006, quoting Portner 1997 who takes the data from Moretti & Orvieto
1978)
b. Dai nemici mi guardo io. [Dagli amici mi guardi Iddio!]
from.the enemies me protect.lsg.ind I [from.the friends me protect.3sg.subj God]
'I protect myself from my enemies. [(May) God protect me from my friends!]'
(Italian proverb)
c. Potessi venire
can. 1 sg.pres.subj come
'If only I could come too!'
anch'io
also I










d. Ti prenda un colpo!
you take.SUBJ a stroke
'May you have a stroke!'
(Giorgi 2009:1854)
Similar to German, if-optatives typically contain a particle or an interjection, and as in
German, these elements are drawn from a set containing 'only', 'at least' and 'oh'.
(520)a. Se solo/solamente John avesse ascoltato Maria!
if only John had listened.to(past.subj) Mary
'If only John had listened to Mary!'
b. Se John avesse almeno ascoltato Maria!
if John had at.least listened.to(past.subj) Mary
'If John had at least listened to Mary!'
c. Oh, se John avesse ascoltato Maria!
oh if John had listened.to(past.subj) Mary
'Oh, if John had listened to Mary!'
With complementizerless optatives, we also find a variant that employs the optative-
specific particle magari.
(521) Magari Maria avesse ascoltato Gianni!
MAGARI Maria had listened.to Gianni
'I wish Maria had listened to Gianni!'
These observations corroborate the assumption that particles cross-linguistically have a
role of prototypical optative markers (as opposed to a role of obligatory optative
licensors).
This brings us to the fourth and final observation that we should concern ourselves
with. Particles disambiguate between different types of exclamations. Example (522a) is
ambiguous between an optative reading, given in (522b), and a polar exclamative
reading, paraphrased in (522c).
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(522) a. Haitte die dem doch tatSACHlich das Buch gegeben!
hadsubj she him doch indeed the book given
lit. Hadsuiunctive she indeed given him the book!
b. 'If only she had given him the book!' opt.
c. '[It's shocking that] she would have indeed given him the book!' p. exc.
(adapted from Scholz 1991:132-133, attributing the example to Norbert Fries)
As soon as we add the particle nur 'only', the polar exclamative reading disappears, as
shown in (523c). But why?
(523) a. Haitte die dem (doch) nur tatsachlich das Buch gegeben!
hadubj she him doch only indeed the book given
lit. Hadsubiunctive she only indeed given him the book!
b. 'If only she had given him the book!' opt.
c.* '[It's shocking that] she would have only given him the book!' p.exc.
The goal of this chapter is to find answers to the following questions. First, and most
crucially, what type of meaning to these particles contribute to optatives? A solution to
this question should account for the fact that they do not seem to modify the desired
proposition and for the fact that they are freely compatible. Second, why do they
disambiguate between different types of exclamations? And third, why are they
prototypical for optatives and how do they "license" optatives?
6.1.2 The Core Proposal
I argue that particles in optatives are truth-conditionally vacuous elements that act as pure
presupposition triggers, modulating the expressive meaning that is conveyed by means of
EX. Their truth conditions are thus identical (namely vacuous), given in (524). Each
particle maps a proposition to itself, provided that the particle's non-truth-conditional
contribution is licensed in the utterance context. I conjecture that this is a hallmark of the
meaning of discourse particles (see also Kratzer 1999, Kratzer & Matthewson 2009), and
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that nur 'only' and wenigstens 'at least' in this reading should be grouped together with
other, seemingly more elusive discourse particles (cf. Malte Zimmermann forthcoming).
(524) truth-conditional semantics of 'at least', 'only' and 'doch'in optatives
If defined, ||wenigstens 'at least' /nur 'only' /dochll = Xp.p
I now proceed to discuss the non-truth-conditional content of each of the three particles
that I focus on.
First, I propose that the function of only in optatives is to mark that the desired
proposition is comparatively low on the speaker's preference scale, as given in (525).
Essentially, adding nur 'only' into an optative indicates that the modified proposition is
'not much to ask'. In an expression of desire, this is a felicitous move, as it may convey
desperation and/or modesty, depending on the context. The details of my analysis are
given in section 6.2.
(525) a. Wenn Otto nur auf seine Mutter geh
if Otto only to his mother liste
'If only Otto had listened to his mother!'




for (i.e. it's low on some scale).
lonly2,cj|= XS.Xp: MOST q E g(C) [q >s p1- LOWNESS
p IDENTITY
"only2 is a truth-conditionally vacuous element (different from canonical only), which
triggers a presupposition that the modified proposition is low on a contextually
provided scale."
(based on Guerzoni's 2003 nur2, assuming that all cases of only are scalar)
Second, I argue that the function of at least in optatives is to convey a 'settling for less'
attitude. This is appropriate whenever it has already become clear that the speaker
actually wishes for something better than the expressed proposition; it conveys that the
speaker acknowledges that the better option is unachievable and thus lowers the threshold
of what is desirable. The details of my analysis are given in section 6.3.
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(526) a. Wenn Otto wenigstens auf seine Mutter geh6rt hatte! Ger
if Otto at.least to his mother listened had
'If Otto had at least listened to his mother!'
b. presuppositions of wenigstens: This is tolerable but there is a better option.
c. formalization:
||wenigstensc||g''= XS.Xp:
S is a bouletic ordering A BOULETIC




"wenigstens is a truth-conditionally vacuous element (corresponding to English
concessive at least), which combines with a bouletic scale and presupposes that there is
a contextually salient proposition that is more preferable than the modified proposition,
as well as a contextually salient proposition that is less preferable."
(based on Nakanishi & Rullmann's 2009 concessive at least)
Finally, the function of doch is to emphasize the contrast between what is desired and
what is the case. By doing so, doch gives rise to a strengthening effect, i.e. the wish
seems more emphatic. I discuss the particle doch in section 6.4.
(527) a. Wenn Otto doch auf seine Mutter geh6rt hatte!
if Otto DOCH to his mother listened had
'If only Otto had listened to his mother!'
b. presuppositions of doch: This is in sharp contrast (i.e. contradiction) to reality.
c. formalization:
||dochc|''" = Xp:
3q E g(C) [p # q & - [p(w) A q(w)]] A CONFLICT
p n Doxspeaker(w) = 0 v ,p n Doxspeaker(w) = 0. FAMILIARITY
p IDENTITY
"doch is a truth-conditionally vacuous element, which triggers a presupposition that the
truth/falsity of the modified proposition is established and that the modified proposition
conflicts with some contextually salient proposition."
(based on Grosz 2010, Kratzer & Matthewson 2009)
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As shown in (528), my analysis derives the fact that different particles can combine in an
optative without shifting the core expressive meaning in any relevant sense. The particle
that has most impact may be wenigstens 'at least', as it explicitly makes salient a more
preferable alternative. In this sense, particles are modulators, i.e. elements that fine-tune
the expression of a wish that is conveyed by means of the EX operator.
(528)a. Wenn Otto doch nur wenigstens auf seine Mutter gehirt hatte!
if Otto DOCH only at.least to his mother listened had
'If only Otto had listened to his mother!'
b. meaning without particles: I'd be content if Otto had listened to his mother.
c. contribution of wenigstens: I'm settling for a less than optimal option.
d. contribution of nur: This is not much to ask for (i.e. it's low on some scale).
e. contribution of doch: This is in sharp contrast (i.e. contradiction) to reality.
This analysis also correctly predicts that two quasi-synonymous elements can co-occur
under their truth-conditionally vacuous reading, which is illustrated for German nur
'only' and its informal variant bloJ 'only' in (529)106, and for Croatian (and Serbian)
barem 'at least' and makar 'only' in (530).
a. Wenn nur bloB alle
if only only all
'If only all humans were
b. Wenn bloB nur alle
if only only all
















(530) a. Kad bi barem makar danas
when would at.least at.least today
'I wish it would rain at least today.' (lit.
b. Kad bi makar barem danas
when would at.least at.least today
'I wish it would rain at least today.' (lit.
pala kisa! Croatian
fall.part.fem rain
'If it would rain at least today!')
pala kisa!
fall.part.fem rain
'If it would rain at least today!')
106 es, b/oh 'on
106 In optatives, blof 'only' typically has the same distribution as nur 'only'. I omitted it from most of the
discussion in this dissertation, as its meaning is sufficiently covered by discussing nur 'only'.
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(529)
For the prototypicality of particles in optatives and for their disambiguating effect, I
pursue the view laid out in Grosz (2011). As argued above, particles impose different
restrictions on the utterance context and on the utterance that they occur in. They do so
by virtue of the presuppositions that they trigger. Disambiguation amounts to the
elimination of incompatible readings.
To exemplify, we find that doch is incompatible with a subjunctive conditional
antecedent, cf. (532b)/(533b) versus (531b). Similarly, nur 'only' is incompatible with a
polar exclamative reading for a VI clause, cf. (533c) versus (53 1b)/(532b). (I will discuss
these incompatibilities in some detail in section 6.5 and when discussing the isolated
particles.) Therefore, adding doch and nur 'only' to the ambiguous (53 1a) narrows down
the range of possible readings. (Examples based on Scholz 1991:132-133.)
(531) a. Hitte die dem tatSACHlich das Buch gegeben ...
hadsubj she him indeed the book given
lit. Hadsubiunctive she indeed given him the book ...
b. 'If she had given him the book ... ' cond.
c. '[It's shocking that] she would have indeed given him the book ... ' p.exc.
d. 'If only she had given him the book ... ' opt.
(532) a. Haitte die dem doch tatSACHlich das Buch gegeben ...
hadsubj she him doch indeed the book given
lit. Hadsubiunctive she indeed given him the book
b.* 'If she had given him the book ... ' cond.
c. '[It's shocking that] she would have indeed given him the book ... ' p.exc.
d. 'If only she had given him the book ... ' opt.
(533) a. Haitte die dem doch nur tatSACHlich das Buch gegeben ...
hadsubj she him doch only indeed the book given
lit. Hadsubiunctive she only indeed given him the book ...
b.* 'If she had given him the book ... ' cond.
c.* '[It's shocking that] she would have indeed given him the book ... ' p. exc.
d. 'If only she had given him the book ... ' opt.
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We can now argue that prototypicality / quasi-obligatoriness of particles in optatives (and
other exclamations) emerges as a the mirror image of their disambiguation property. The
graph in (534) captures the schema that we observe in (531)-(533). We can incrementally
eliminate unintended readings of a multiply ambiguous utterance like the V1-clause in
(531) by adding different particles.
(534) VI-clause hypothetical conditional
+ doch polar exclamative
+ doch + nur optative
Conversely, it can be inferred from general strategies for successful conversation that
speakers will use particles whenever they can in order to disambiguate, and hearers will
expect this, see section 6.5. As a consequence, a hearer who hears (531) will typically
disambiguate towards a hypothetical conditional, and an intended optative reading will
become deviant as a result of this faulty disambiguation. This gives rise to the quasi-
obligatoriness of discourse particles in exclamations.
6.1.3 A remark on the non-equivalence of different particles
Before discussing the individual contributions of the three particles that I am focusing on,
it is worth pointing out one prediction that can easily be shown to hold: Isolated particles
(i.e. nur 'only', wenigstens 'at least' and doch that do not cluster together) should exhibit
distributional differences. Specifically, I have argued that nur 'only' conveys that the
modified proposition is not much to ask for, wenigstens 'at least' conveys that there is a
better option and I'm willing to compromise, and doch merely marks the sharp contrast
between what is desired and what is the case.
We expect these different presuppositions to entail a different distribution of the
particles; however, any judgments in this area will be most subtle, as it is easy to
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accommodate for one or the other piece of background information. Nevertheless, I
believe that it can be shown that the particles do indeed differ in this respect.
First of all, we have already seen that wenigstens 'at least' contrasts from doch and
nur 'only' in the sense that doch-optatives and nur-optatives are licensed in a broader set
of contexts than wenigstens-optatives. The particle wenigstens 'at least' is bad in (535),
as it presupposes that chocolate cake is not the best possible scenario - which however it
is. The illformedness of wenigstens 'at least' in (535) is correctly predicted; it is due to
the presupposition of wenigstens 'at least' that something else is more desirable.
(535) Sofia promised to bring something to my picnic. My first choice is chocolate cake;
my second choice is apple pie; I absolutely hate vanilla ice cream.
Jetzt kommt die mit Vanilleeis daher! ...
now comes she with vanilla.ice.cream here
'Now she arrives with Vanilla ice cream!'
Ach, wenn sie doch / ?nur I#wenigstens einen Schokokuchen gebracht hatte!
oh if she doch only at.least an chocolate.cake brought had
'If only she had brought an chocolate cake!'
Flipping our perspective, it can also be shown that an optative that explicitly amounts to
a wenigstens-type compromise is hardly compatible with doch or nur 'only', (536c).
Again, this is expected, as Maximize Presupposition (Heim 1991) may require us to use
wenigstens 'at least' whenever we can to convey the compromise that we are agreeing to.
(536)a. Jetzt kommt die mit Vanilleeis daher! ...
now comes she with vanilla.ice.cream here
'Now she arrives with Vanilla ice cream!'
b. Ach, wenn sie doch / nur /#wenigstens einen Schokokuchen gebracht hatte!
oh if she doch only #at.least an chocolate.cake brought had
'If only she had brought an chocolate cake!'
c. Oder wenn sie ?#doch /?#nur / wenigstens einen Apfelkuchen gebracht hatte!
or if she ?#doch ?#only at.least an apple.cake brought had
'Or at least if only she had brought an apple pie!'
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Having shown that wenigstens 'at least' does indeed distribute differently from nur 'only'
and doch, the question arises if we find similar contrasts between doch and nur 'only'. I
believe that we do. Consider the naturally occurring example in (537a), which employs a
nur-optative. I have constructed (537b) by substituting doch for nur 'only'. While
intuitions here are hard to probe, it seems as though (537b) is deviant. This is predicted
by my account as follows: nur-optatives are 'modest wishes', i.e. they presuppose that
whatever is wished for is rather low on the scale of the speaker's preferences; clearly, this
presupposition is satisfied if someone who is ill and about to die expresses a wish to hear
a church bell. I conjecture that doch is here blocked as it does not convey this
presupposition.
(53 7)a. Als dein Oheim Simon einmal vor dem Feinde im Felde lag und krank war, sagte
er, da ich ihn besuchte: 'Vater, wenn ich nur noch einmal das Oberplaner
Glcklein hren k6nnte!' aber er konnte es nicht mehr hren und muBte sterben.
'When your uncle Simon once lay in the field across from the enemy and was
taken ill, he said, as I visited him: 'Father, if only I could hear the Oberplan bell
once again!' but he could not hear it for another time and he had to die.'
(A. Stifter: Bunte Steine)
b.?#Als dein Oheim Simon einmal vor dem Feinde im Felde lag und krank war, sagte
er, da ich ihn besuchte: 'Vater, wenn ich doch noch einmal das Oberplaner
Gl5cklein h5ren k~nnte!' aber er konnte es nicht mehr hdren und muBte sterben.
Can we find the inverse of (537), an example where doch must be used as nur 'only' is
not satisfied? I propose that (538) may be a relevant example. (538a) is, once again, a
naturally occurring example of a doch-optative from the literature. I have constructed
(538b) by replacing the doch-optative with a nur-optative. In the context of this theater
play, it appears that Toni is weary of life and the sole thing she desires at the point at
which she utters this optative is to die. In such a context, a lowness presupposition may
be vacuous, as there are no higher preferences any more. I conjecture that for this reason
nur 'only' is deviant in (538b).
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(538)a. WENDT. Toni!!
TONI. Ach, mir ist ... FaJ3t sich. Ja! ... Wir darfen jetzt nicht mehr - daran
denken! ... Ich habe das nicht nur so - hingesagt! ... Das ist nun - vorbei! ...
TONI: 'Oh, I am ... she composes herself Yes! ... we must now no longer -
think of it! ... I didn't just - say this! ... This is now - over! ... '
WENDT. Ach, du weiBt ja nicht, was du ... Wir wissen ja nicht - jetzt ...
WENDT: 'Oh, but you don't know what you ... we don't yet know - now ...
TONI made, gequdlt. Ach, wenn ich doch tot war! ...
TONI tired, agonized: 'Oh if only I were dead! ... '
(Arno Holz: Die Familie Selicke)
b.?#TONI made, gequalt. Ach, wenn ich nur tot war!
TONI tired, agonized: 'Oh if only I were dead! ... '
The following constructed example also replicates the intuition that doch and nur 'only'
are not always freely exchangeable. In (539), B conveys that having time would be the
most minimal thing that B would require in order to follow A's advice; in such a
situation, doch seems somewhat odd, as it is clear that this is a rather modest wish.
(539) A: Du solltest jeden Tag zum Yoga gehen.
you should every day to.the yoga go
'You should go to yoga classes every day.'
B: Ha! Wenn ich nur / # doch die Zeit dafur hatte!
ha if I only doch the time for.it had
'Ha! If only I had time for it!'
I conclude that evidence can be construed, which shows that doch, nur 'only' and
wenigstens 'at least' are not always freely replaceable. I have shown that there are
contexts where doch/nur 'only' are preferred over wenigstens 'at least' and vice versa. I
have also shown that there are contexts where doch is preferred over nur 'only' and vice
versa. I documented that such restrictions and asymmetries are as predicted by the
analysis I proposed above. Having thus presented and motivated a semantic analysis for
the prototypical optative particles, I will now discuss each of these particles individually.
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6.2 The Only Problem
6.2.1 Only or not Only?
This section discusses a compositionality problem first discussed explicitly by Rifkin
(2000). I first discuss the empirical scope of my analysis, then introduce the puzzle, and
then outline the analysis that I am positing.
6.2.1.1 The Empirical Scope
Starting with the data, Rifkin (2000) observes that the particle only is cross-linguistically
frequently used in optatives. He documents this for typologically diverse languages such
as German, Italian, Russian, Hebrew and Finnish, (540).
(540)a. Wenn Hans (doch) nur reich ware. German
if Hans doch only rich be-subj
b. Se solo/soltanto Gianni fosse rocco. Italian
if only/only Gianni were rich
c. jesli by ja tol'ko byl bogatym Russian
if subj I only were rich
d. ilu/lu rak hayiti ashir Hebrew
if only be-past-1 sg rich
e. Jos vain olisin rikas Finnish
if only be-cond- 1 sg rich
'If only Hans/Gianni/he were rich.'
(Rifkin 2000)
As shown in (541), the particles glossed as 'only' in (540) are the same particles that we
typically find in exclusive contexts.
(541)a. Hans hat nur einen Freund. German
Hans has only one friend
b. Gianni ha solo/soltanto/solamente un amico. Italian
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'Hans/Gianni/Ivan/David/Jussi only has one friend.'
(Rifkin 2000)
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m. (Ah,) law kent bass ghani!
oh if was.1s only rich
'If only I were rich!'
n. Ak, hvis bare alle mennesker var gode!
oh if only all people were good
'Oh, if only all people were good!'
o. Om han bare hadde kjort litt fortere!
if he only had driven little faster




Focusing on German and English, we immediately notice that the ability to occur in
optatives is not limited to a single lexical entry for 'only', but rather seems to be attached
to some meaning component of 'only'. What we find is that while English only is the
most typical element in optatives, (543a), just can also occur, (543b). Other elements that
have the same exclusive reading cannot occur in optatives, as illustrated for merely,
(543c).
(543) Oh, if he only / just / #merely knew how much we miss him!
I only / just / merely have three of his books.
German shows a similar pattern; nur 'only' and blof3 'only, just' (which has a more
pragmatic / casual flavor) can occur in optatives, cf. Scholz (1991); lediglich 'merely'
cannot.
(544) a. Ach, ware ich bloB / nur / # lediglich reich!
oh were I only only merely rich
'Oh, if only I were rich!'
b. Ich habe bloB / nur / lediglich drei seiner
I have only only merely three of.his
'I only have three of his books.'
Bicher.
books
In the absence of an understanding of the difference between only/just and merely, these
data make one point: There is something about the meaning of only that has an
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inclination for occurring in optatives; yet it is not completely unconstrained. Let us now
review the problem that only poses in optatives.
6.2.1.2 A Compositionality Problem
The core problem with respect to only in optatives is that we are faced with a
compositionality problem. Consider a sketch of a standard lexical entry for only in (545)
(assuming for simplicity that all entries for only are scalar, cf. Jacobs 1983, Bayer 1996,
Klinedinst 2004, 2005, Krasikova & Zhechev 2006, Riester 2006, Beaver & Clark 2008).
In words, only presupposes that the modified proposition p (or a higher proposition on a
contextually provided scale) is true (the 'prejacent presupposition'), (545a), and it
presupposes that p is low on the contextually provided scale, (545b). If defined, only
asserts that no proposition that is higher than p is true, (545c). (See section 6.2.3 for more
details on this analysis.)
(545)a. ||onlyc||= XS.Xp.Xw: p(w) v 3q [q >s p -+ q(w)= 1] A AT LEAST
"Presupposition 1: The modified proposition or a higher scalar alternative is true."
b. MOST q E g(C) [q >s p] . LOWNESS
"Presupposition 2: The modified proposition is low on the salient scale."
c. -3q [q >s p -+ q(w)= 1] No MORE
"Truth Conditional Content: There is no higher scalar alternative that is true."
Under such a canonical view of only as 'exclusive', only is equivalent to 'nothing but' or
'nothing more than', which accounts for its meaning in declarative assertions, (546).
(546) a. Ich habe nur Hans gesehen. =
I have only Hans seen
'I have only seen Hans.'
b. Ich habe nur drei Apfel. =
I have only three apples
'I only have three apples.'
Ich habe niemanden au~er Hans gesehen.
I have nobody but Hans seen
'I have not seen anyone but Hans.'
Ich habe nicht mehr als drei Apfel.
I have not more than three apples
'I do not have more than three apples.'
275
What becomes clear instantly is that optatives do not convey such an exclusive meaning.
(547)a. If I had only seen John!
= I wish I had seen John.
# I wish I had not seen anyone but John.
(cf. #If I hadn't seen anyone but John!)
b. If I only had three apples!
= I wish I had three apples.
# I wish I did not have more than three apples.
(cf. #If I did not have more than three apples!)
c. If only it had rained!
= I wish it had rained.
# I wish nothing else but rain had occurred (e.g.
(cf. #If nothing had happened but rain!)
no thunder and lightning).
The intuition that optative only is not equivalent to an exclusive construction such as
nothing but or no more than is corroborated by the fact that in French seulement 'only'
can occur in optatives, but ne ... que 'nothing but' cannot.
(548) a. Si seulement Jean avait ecoute Marie!
if only Jean had listened.to Marie
'If only Jean had listened to Marie!'
b.* Si Jean n'avait que dcout6 Marie!
if Jean NEG'had ONLY listened.to Marie
Therefore, a compositionality problem arises that can be summarized as follows. If only
always has an exclusive reading, as given in (545), how can we account for only in
optatives where it does not seem to contribute exclusivity?
6.2.1.3 The Solution in Brief
To solve the present compositionality problem, I follow Guerzoni (2003) and argue that
many languages have two readings for only, which we can call ONLYi (or only1) and
ONLY2 (or only2). Guerzoni (2003) proposes that German has ONLY2, which is non-
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exclusive (at the level of assertion), truth-conditionally vacuous. I depart from Guerzoni
in assuming that the core contribution of ONLY2 is a lowness presupposition and that
ONLY2 may lack exclusivity altogether. The two lexical entries that I assume are given
below. Example (549) now accounts for the standard exclusive reading of only, as
illustrated in (546) for German and English.
(549)a. ||onlyi,c|l = XS.Xp.Xw: p(w) v 3q [q >s p -> q(w) = 1] A AT LEAST
"Presupposition 1: The modified proposition or a higher scalar alternative is true."
b. MOST q E g(C) [q >s p] . LOWNESS
"Presupposition 2: The modified proposition is low on the salient scale."
c. ,3q [q >s p -- q(w)= 1] AT MOST
"Truth Conditional Content: There is no higher scalar alternative that is true."
Contrastively, (550) accounts for the non-canonical reading of only that we see in
optatives cross-linguistically.
(550)a. ||only2,c||= kS.Xp : MOST q E g(C) [q>s p]. LOWNESS
"Presupposition: The modified proposition is low on the salient scale."
b. p IDENTITY
"Truth Conditional Content: only2 is truth-conditionally vacuous."
Essentially, the contribution of only in an optative amounts to marking the modified
proposition as low on a salient scale, typically the speaker's preference scale. An open
issue that I will not be able to address concerns the question of how ONLY2 and ONLY, are
composed from their meaning components. Given that, as I will show, both elements
seem to share a lowness presupposition, this presupposition may be at the semantic core
of only type elements. If we abbreviate the lowness presupposition of both only elements,
((549b)+(550a)) as LOw and the combination of at least presupposition and at most
assertion that ONLY1 exhibits ((549a+c)) as EXH (for exhaustivizer, the meaning that
underlies 'exactly') we can write generalizations as in (551 a+b).
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(551)a. only1 : {LOW, EXH} =>PF only
b. only2: {LOW} =>PF only
It is conceivable that exactly (as in I have exactly three apples versus I have only three
apples) is the spell-out of EXH on its own, but this is beyond the scope of my
investigation.
The following section motivates the proposal in (549)+(550) by introducing a
construction that to my knowledge has gone unnoticed in the past: Conditional clauses
with non-exclusive (thus optative-like) only in the antecedent, which convey (non-
evaluatively) that the antecedent proposition is likely to come about (which in many
cases amounts to saying that the antecedent proposition is 'easy to achieve'). I will call
this construction minimal sufficiency conditional.
6.2.2 The Missing Link: Minimal Sufficiency Conditionals
6.2.2.1 Two Readings for Only in Conditionals
In this section, I argue that German has two readings for only in conditional antecedents:
The standard exclusive reading and an additional reading, which I will call the minimal
sufficiency reading. The minimal sufficiency reading amounts to the lexical entry of
ONLY2 that I proposed above. In this reading, only merely triggers a presupposition that
the modified proposition is low on a salient scale. The clearest example to illustrate this
ambiguity is (552) (which, notably, lacks optative-like positive evaluation). Native
speakers of German share the intuition that (552a) has both the reading in (552b) and the
reading in (552c). (We will see that this intuition is also present in many other languages,
but -- alas -- not in English.) In the given example, (552c) is, in fact, the more natural
reading, unless more context is given (e.g. if more than two people are required to keep
the balance). I will first discuss German in some more detail to show that this is a reading
that really exists. I discuss a range of other languages in the next section, and I will
subsequently discuss English, which does not seem to allow for the reading in (552c).
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(552) a. Wenn nur zwei Personen einsteigen, wird das Boot sinken.
if only two persons get.in will the boat sink
lit. 'If only two persons get into the boat, the boat will sink.'
b. ONLYi reading:
If no more than two persons (i.e. < 3 people) get into the boat, it will sink.
C. ONLY2 reading:
If (at least) two persons (i.e. > 2 people) get into the boat, which is not a lot,
it will sink.
Given that this construction does not seem to have been noticed before, it is worth
pointing out that there is an abundance of naturally occurring conditionals that contain
only with an ONLY2 reading. A good recipe for finding such minimal sufficiency
conditionals is to search for constructions where only is followed by a negative DP
(niemand 'nobody' or keiner 'none') or universal DP (jeder 'every'), as this forces
sentential focus (cf. BUring & Hartmann's 2001 generalization), which disprefers
canonical ONLY 1 readings (plausibly due to its exhaustivity content). As indicated by the
paraphrases, the minimal sufficiency reading is the dominant reading in all of the given
examples. (A canonical reading for nur 'only' can be construed but is rather unnatural.)
Consider first two examples where nur 'only' is followed by niemand 'nobody', in (553).
(553)a. Der Verein (zur F6rderung des Zahlungsunwillens) hatte
the society for advancement of reluctance.to.pay had
Gesellschaftsveranderung auf seine Fahnen geschrieben und meinte diese
social.change on its flags written and thought this
zu erreichen, [wenn nur niemand seine Rechnungen bezahlte].
to achieve if only nobody his bills paid
'The society to support reluctance to pay was committed to social change and
believed to achieve it [if only nobody paid any bills].'
(Dietmar Sievers. 1996. 'Die Brfsewitz-Maschine'. In Wandler, Zeitschriftfur Literatur 19.)
paraphrase: (The society believed that) [for nobody to pay any bills] was an
easy means to achieve social change.
279
b. Es scheint immer
it seems always
noch Menschen zu geben, die meinen, die Neonazis









'There still seem to be people who believe the Neonazis would disappear
automatically [if only nobody pays attention to them].'
('Nazis sollen nicht unter sich bleiben. Zehntausende werden sich symbolisch und aktiv rechter
Demonstration in den Weg stellen.' Neues Deutschland. February 13, 2010)
paraphrase: (People believe that) [for nobody to watch] is an easy means to
make the Neonazis go away.
Consider now (554), an illustration where nur 'only' is followed by keiner 'none'.
(554) Das Ideal
the ideal
der Gleichheit ist das
of.the equality is the
Ideal
ideal
der Masse, die zufrieden







'The ideal of equality is the ideal of a population that is content [if only nobody
has more than the others].'
(Werner Jaeger. 1944/1973. 'Platos Gorgias: Der Erzieher als der wahre Staatsman'. In Paideia,
Vol.2, 704-743. Berlin: de Gruyter.)
paraphrase: (The ideal of equality is fulfilled in a situation where) [for
nobody to have more than the others] is an easy means to satisfy
the masses.
Finally, (555) shows two examples where nur 'only' is followed by jeder 'everyone'.




meinungen, die hier den
opinions that here the
des diskutierens ausmachten, [wenn nur jeder







'It was the differing opinions themselves that made discussions interesting here,
[if only everyone allowed everyone else to have a different opinion without
making it personal].'














paraphrase: [For everyone to allow everyone else to have a different opinion]
is an easy means to achieve an interesting discussion.
b. Context: Quite generally, people refuse to car-share, because they're convinced
that their own car doesn't make much of a difference.
[Wenn nur jeder so denkt], haben wir das Fiasko Berufsverkehr
if only everyone so thinks have we the fiasco work.traffic
jeden morgen.
every morning
'[If only everyone thinks like that], we already have the work traffic chaos
every morning.'
(online post on blogs.emeraldsecret.com, 12/21/2010)
paraphrase: [For everyone to think like that] is an easy means to create
catastrophical work traffic every morning.
Examples (553)-(555) witness the existence for such minimal sufficiency readings, but
naturally the question arises what exactly is going on here, which is why I will briefly
discuss some constructed examples.
First, we can devise an elimination procedure that brings out one or the other reading
at a time. Consider the constructed example in (556), which is ambiguous between the
two readings, as indicated.
(556) Wenn nur [zwei]F Leute kommen, spielen wir Siedler von Catan.
if only two people come play we Settlers of Catan
'If only two people come, we will play Settlers of Catan.'
a. ONLYI: [If no more than two people come], we will play Settlers of Catan
(because all other games require a larger group).
b. ONLY 2 : [If at least two people come, which is easy to achieve], we will play
Settlers of Catan.
The following examples show that we can eliminate one or the other reading by adding
discourse particles into the matrix clause. The canonical reading can be blocked by
inserting schon (lit. 'already') into the matrix clause, (557). (I will discuss schon
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'already' separately in section 6.2.4.) Similarly, the minimal sufficiency reading can be
blocked by inserting halt eben (approximately 'simply') into the matrix clause, (558).
(557) Wenn nur [zwei]FLeute kommen, spielen wir schon Siedler
if only two people come play we schon Settlers
'If only two people come, we'll already play Settlers of Catan.'








[zwei]FLeute kommen, spielen wir halt eben Siedler von Catan.
two people come play we halt eben Settlers of Catan
people come, we'll simply play Settlers of Catan.'
VONLYi / *ONLY2
We can also show that the two readings are available irrespective of the scope of nur
'only', by contrasting mit nur einer Person 'with only one person' and nur mit einer







Otto nur mit [einer]F





'If Otto comes with one guest, we will play Settlers of Catan.'
a. ONLY 1 : [If Otto does not bring more than one guest], we will play Settlers
of Catan (because all other games require a larger group).
b. ONLY2: [If Otto brings at least one guest, which is easy to achieve], we will
play Settlers of Catan.





Otto nur mit [einer]F
























Otto nur mit [einer]F
Otto only with one
Begleitperson
person
halt eben Siedler von Catan.
simply Settlers of Catan
'If Otto only comes with one guest, we will play Settlers of Catan.'
/ONLYI / *ONLY2
Similarly, we can construct examples where nur 'only' is placed PP-internally, i.e. scope
and (narrow) focus are limited to the numeral (e.g. Bayer 1996). Still, both readings are
available.
(562) Wenn der Otto [pp mit nur [einer]F Begleitperson]









'If Otto comes with only one guest, we will play Settlers of Catan.'
a. ONLYi: [If Otto does not bring more than one guest], we will play Settlers
of Catan (because all other games require a larger group).
b. ONLY2: [If Otto brings at least one guest, which is easy to achieve], we will
play Settlers of Catan.
Once again, schon 'already' and halt eben 'simply' disambiguate.
(563) Wenn der Otto [pp mit nur [einer]F Begleitperson]
























(564) Wenn der Otto [pp mit
if the Otto with
halt eben Siedler von
simply Settlers of
'If Otto comes with only
1 ONLYi / *ONLY2
nur [einer]F Begleitperson] kommt, spielen
only one person comes play
Catan.
Catan
one guest, we will play Settlers of Catan.'
Conversely, we can show that both readings of only are compatible with wide sentential
focus on the entire proposition. We can enforce wide focus on the entire clause by
placing jeder 'everyone' after nur 'only'. Once again, both the canonical ONLYi reading
and the minimal sufficiency ONLY2 reading are available; this time, we disambiguate by
means of the continuation. In the naturally occurring example (565a) the intended reading
is an ONLY2 reading, as witnessed by the presence of schon 'already' in the matrix clause.
Contrastively, the constructed example (565b) has an ONLYi reading (compatible with
halt eben 'simply').
(565)a. Wenn nur [jeder einmal etwas pro Seminareinheit sagt]F,
if only everyone once something per seminar.unit says
hatte man schon meist zwischen 10-20 Wortmeldungen
had one schon mostly between 10-20 requests.to.speak
'[If only everyone said one thing per seminar], it would already come to 10-20
contributions.'
(online post on www.aufmuken.at, 02/11/2010)
paraphrase: [For everyone to say one thing per seminar] is an easy means to
(ONLY2) achieve 10-20 contributions.
b. Wenn nur [jeder einmal etwas pro Seminareinheit sagt]F,
if only everyone once something per seminar.unit says
kommen wir mit unserem Projekt (halt eben) nie weiter!
come we with our project simply never further
'[If only everyone says one thing per seminar], we'll never make progress on
our project!'
paraphrase: [If nothing more happens than everybody saying one thing per




It is worth eliminating the scope of nur 'only' as a possible confound. We have already
seen in (559)-(565) that the overt position of nur 'only' and the size of the focus
constituent does not determine whether we get an ONLYI or ONLY2 reading. Could it be
that nur 'only' projects out of the if-clause that it appears in and takes scope over the
matrix clause or the entire conditional? Evidence that minimal sufficiency nur 'only'
does not take scope outside of the if-clause can is easily established; none of (566b-d)
convey the same as (566a).
(566) a. [Wenn nur [zwei]FLeute kommen], spielen wir schon Siedler.
if only two people come play we schon Settlers
'If only two people come, we'll already play Settlers.'
~ If at least two people come, which is easily the case, we will play Settlers.
b. Nur [wenn zwei Leute kommen], spielen wir (*schon) Siedler.
only if two people come play we schon Settlers
'Only if two people come, we'll play Settlers.'
~ Only if two people come, we will play Settlers.
c. [Wenn zwei Leute kommen], spielen wir nur (*schon) Siedler.
if two people come play we only schon Settlers
'If two people come, we'll only play Settlers.'
~ If two people come, we will play nothing but Settlers.
d. Nur, [Wenn zwei Leute kommen, spielen wir (schon) Siedler].
only if two people come play we schon Settlers
'Only, [If two people come, we'll already play Settlers].'
~ The only thing you're forgetting is: If two people come, we will play Settlers.
We are thus justified in concluding that German nur 'only' in if-clauses allows for two
readings, a canonical (negative/exclusive) reading ONLY, and a (positive) minimal
sufficiency reading ONLY2.
6.2.2.2 "Optative Only" is "Minimal Sufficiency Only"
In this section, I argue that optative only is an instance of minimal sufficiency only, i.e.
ONLY2. We have already seen above that an analysis of optative only as ONLYi does not
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give rise to the correct meaning. This alone is motivation for assuming that optative only
is ONLY 2, i.e. minimal sufficiency only, now that we know that such a reading exists.
However, we can make stronger arguments that optative only is ONLY2. The first
argument is based on the relative scope with respect to clausal adverbs. The second
argument is based on cross-linguistic correlations.
Let us first discuss the scope of only. We have seen that nur 'only' has both the
ONLYi reading and the ONLY2 reading in conditional antecedents, irrespective of its scope
and of the size of the focus constituent. However, one thing we have not looked at so far
is the scope of nur 'only' with respect to co-occurring sentential adverbs. If we insert
wieder 'again', we observe that ONLY2-readings are only possible if nur 'only' precedes
wieder 'again' and ONLYI-readings are only possible if nur 'only' follows wieder 'again'.
(567) a. Wenn wieder nur zwei Personen einsteigen, wird das Boot sinken.
if again only two persons get.in will the boat sink
lit. 'If once again only two persons get into the boat, the boat will sink.'
b. /ONLYi: If, once again, no more than two persons get in, the boat will sink.
c. * ONLY2: If, once again, at least two persons get in, the boat will sink.
(568) a. Wenn nur wieder zwei Personen einsteigen, wird das Boot sinken.
if only again two persons get.in will the boat sink
lit. 'If once again only two persons get into the boat, the boat will sink.'
b.* ONLY 1: If, once again, no more than two persons get in, the boat will sink.
c. v/ONLY 2 : If, once again, at least two persons get in, the boat will sink.
This pattern is, crucially, reproduced in optatives. Recall that optatives without any of the
prototypical particles (nur 'only', wenigstens 'at least', doch in German) are typically
deviant. If optative only is ONLY 2 , we predict that optative only must precede wieder
'again'. This is indeed the case (see also Rifkin 2000 for similar observations in English).
(569) a. Wenn nur wieder / # wieder nur zwei Personen einsteigen!
if only again again only two persons get.in
'If only, once again, two people get in!'
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b. Wenn nur wieder / # wieder nur zwei Personen eingestiegen waren!
if only again again only two persons get.in were
'If only, once again, two people had gotten in!'
The second argument that optative only is ONLY2 is based on cross-linguistic comparison.
For now, I will postpone a discussion of English, which I will come to in the next section.
We have already seen in chapter 2 that there are some languages that allow for optatives
with 'at least' but do not allow for optatives with 'only'. This gives rise to the following
interesting prediction. Languages that form optatives with 'only' should also (typically)
allow for ONLY2 readings. (English is an exception, as we will see.) Conversely,
languages that cannot form optatives with 'only' should also disallow ONLY2 readings.
Overall, this is exactly what we find. Consider first a sample of non-ONLY2 languages.
Brazilian Portuguese, Spanish, Greek and Catalan all disallow for only in optatives.
As predicted, none of these languages allows for ONLY2 readings.
(570) Brazilian Portuguese
a. Se s6/apenas duas pessoas entrarem neste barco, ele vai afundar.
if only two people enter in-this boat he will sink
lit. 'If only two people get on the boat, the boat will sink.' (/ONLYI / *ONLY2
VONLY1: The boat will sink if less than three persons get in.
* ONLY2: The boat will sink if more than one person get in.
b. Se ao menos /*s6/ *apenas o Joao tivesse ouvido a Maria!
if at least *only *only the John had listened.to the Mary
'If at least / *only John had listened to Mary!'
(571) Spanish
a. Si solo dos personas se montan en esa barca, se hundira
if only two people self get on that boat self will.sink
lit. 'If only two people get on the boat, the boat will sink.' (/ONLYi / *ONLY2)
b. Si (*solo) Juan hubiera (al menos) escuchado a Maria!
if *only Juan had.sub.past at least listened to Mary
'If at least / *only John had listened to Mary!'
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(572) Greek
a. An mono dhio anthropi anevun s'afto to plio, tha vuliaksi.
if only two people enter on-this the boat fut sink
lit. 'If only two people get on the boat, the boat will sink.' (/ONLYi / *ONLY2
b. An toulachiston / *mono
if at.least *only
'If John had at least / *only
o John iche akusi tin
the John.nom had.3sg listened the
listened to Mary!'
(573) Catalan
a. Si nomes pugen dues persones en aquesta barca,
if only get.in two people on that boat
lit. 'If only two people get on the boat, the boat will
b. Si almenys / *nomos haguds escoltat
if at.least *only had.subjunctive listened










Inversely, at least a subset of languages (excluding English) that allow for only in
optatives can also be shown to have ONLY2 readings. We have already seen this for
German, but it is worth showing that bloJ3 'only' behaves on a par with nur 'only', (574).
(574) German
a. Wenn bloB zwei Personen einsteigen, wird das Boot sinken.
if only two persons get.in will the boat sink










a. Se solo/solamente due persone salissero
if only two persons enter
lit. 'If only two persons get into the boat, the
b. Se solo/solamente John avesse ascc
if only John had liste
'If only John had listened to Mary!'
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su questa barca, affonderebbe
in this boat it.will.sink










shaxs-ein tel3ou 3a-ha-sh-shaxtoura, b-teghra'
person-dual got-3p on-this-the-boat, sink.ipfv.3sf
two persons get into the boat, the boat will sink.' (/ONLYi / VONLY2
b. (Ah,) law kent bass
oh if was.1s only
'If only I were rich!'
(577) Czech
a. Kdy-by jen dva
when-subj.3 only two
lit. 'If only two persons
lidi nasedli
people get(pptc)
get into the boat,
na tuto lod', potopila by se.
on this boat sink(pptc) subj self






(had) listened to Mary!'
Polish
a. Jesli tylko dwie osoby wejd4 na
if only two people enter on
lit. 'If only two persons get into the boat, the
b. Gdyby / Zeby tylko Jan (po)sluchal
if if only John listen.(perf.)pret.3sg.m
'If only John had listened to Mary!'
ten statek, to zatonie.
this ship then sink




a. Ako se samo dva noveka popnu na palubu, brod de potonuti.
if self only two man climb on deck ship will sink
lit. 'If only two persons get into the boat, the boat will sink.' VONLY1 / ONLY2
b. Da je samo Jovan poslusao Mariju!
that be.3sg only John listened Mary-acc
'If only John had listened to Mary!'








a. Dersom bara to personer gi.r i denna biten, sa synker'n
if only two people get in this boat then sinks'it
lit. 'If only two persons get into the boat, the boat will sink.' (?ONLYI / ONLY2
b. Om / Hvis han bare hadde kjort litt fortere!
if if he only had driven little faster
'If only he had driven a little faster!'
We thus find a strong correlation between the possibility of ONLY2 readings in non-
optative conditionals and the possibility of only in optatives. However, as anyone is
bound to notice, English does not comply with this generalization. I will thus address
English separately in the following section.
6.2.2.3 English is a language where minimal sufficiency is restricted
In the preceding section, we have established a correlation between the presence of
minimal sufficiency only in conditionals (also ONLY2) and optative only in a language.
English is a language that appears to blatantly violate this correlation, as shown in (581);
while if-only-optatives are the core examples of optative constructions in modern English
(cf. (581b)), ONLY2 readings are not generally available.
(581)a. If only two people get into the boat, it will sink.
/ONLYI: The boat will sink if less than three persons get in.
* ONLY2: The boat will sink if more than one person get in.
b. If only John had listened to Mary!
This is puzzling. However, I propose that minimal sufficiency only in English has
undergone a grammaticiziation process, where preference-orientation has become part of
the lexical entry. While languages like German, Czech, Lebanese Arabic, Polish, Serbian,
108 Interestingly, the dominant reading in Norwegian is one where the boat will sink if exactly two people
get in. This reading also emerges in Dutch if the word alleen 'only' is used as a translation for only.
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Norwegian and Italian employ only2, as given in (582), English only2 has become
onlyopr, hardwiring an additional presupposition, as given in (583)'09.
(582)a. ||only2,c||= XS.Xp: MOST q E g(C) [q>s p]. LOWNESS
"Presupposition: The modified proposition is low on the salient scale."
b. p IDENTITY
"Truth Conditional Content: only2 is truth-conditionally vacuous."
(583)a. ||onlyoPT,c|I = XS.Xp: MOST q E g(C) [q >s p] A LOWNESS
"Presupposition 1: The modified proposition is low on the salient scale."
b. S is a bouletic ordering. BOULETIC
"Presupposition 2: The contextually salient scale is a bouletic scale."
c. p IDENTITY
"Truth Conditional Content: onlYoPT is truth-conditionally vacuous."
Motivation for assuming a stricter link between only and optativity in English than in
other languages is the fact that English has more or less lost the ability of forming
optative clauses without only; in other words onlyopT has become an obligatory optative
marker in English and lost its non-optative uses.
This is supported by the following pattern. While most languages employ more than
one strategies of licensing optativity, English can only form optatives by means of only.
(584) a. Ach, wenn ich reich ware! German
b. Wenn ich nur reich ware!
c. Wenn ich wenigstens reich ware!
oh if I only at.least rich were
'If only I were (at least) rich!'
(585) a. Ah, law kent ghani! Lebanese Arabic
b. law kent bass ghani!
c. Ah, law kent ?al a'all ghani!
oh if was. Is only on.the least rich. 1 sm
'If only I were (at least) rich!'
109 As we will see, concessive at least shares the presupposition (583b), i.e. this is less exotic than appears.
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(586)a. Eh, da je Jovan poslusao Mariju! Serbian
b. Da je samo Jovan poslusao Mariju!
c. Da je Jovan barem poslusao Mariju!
oh, that be.3sg only John at.least listened Mary-acc
'If only John had at least listened to Mary!'
(587)a. # Oh, if John had listened to Mary! English
b. If only John had listened to Mary!
c. # If John had at least listened to Mary!
d. # If at least John had listened to Mary!
Furthermore, English still has residual ONLY 2 readings, in cases where a positive
evaluation is present, as in (588), which seems somewhat idiosyncratic.
(588) a. It was a remarkable performance, an inspiring example of what the busy man
of affairs can really accomplish [if he only applies himself].
(Thomas Wolfe. 1934. You Can't Go Home Again. New York: Harper & Row, p.255.)
b. According to [the American] dream, hard work, discipline and frugality will
bring success. Everyone can be a millionaire [if he only applies himself].
(Peter J. Leithart. 2006. "Death of a Salesman". In Omnibus III. Reformation to the Present,
ed. by Douglas Wilson and G. Tyler Fischer. Lancaster, PA: Veritas Press, p. 5 5 1)
c. Jenkins has made it to where he is by his own efforts. It only goes to show
what a good Welsh boy can do [if only he applies himself].
(Ken Jones. 1999. "Rugby Union: Jenkins kicks Wales into the reckoning". The Independent.)
To the extent that an example like (589) has an ONLY2 reading, a positive evaluation is
strongly implied, as indicated by the infelicitous continuation.
(589) If only two people had entered the boat, it would have sunk.
... # which of course I wouldn't have wanted!
We can thus safely conclude that only2 in English has undergone a grammaticization
process and become inherently preference-oriented / bouletic.
Do we find other languages that behave like English? It may be the case that English
is not isolated in its behavior. Languages that allow for only in optatives but do not
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appear to have ONLY2 readings in regular conditionals include Icelandic, Russian, Hebrew
and Finnish. However, I would like to briefly discuss Dutch to show that the data
sometimes diverge in ways that we currently cannot grasp an understanding of, and that
quite possibly involve factors of plausibility and discourse, and maybe prosody, which
cannot always be controlled for when eliciting translations and judgments. Example
(590a) shows that an ONLY 2 reading is unacceptable for many native speakers of Dutch in
the test example that I have used (though some native speakers accept an ONLY2 reading
in (590a)). Nevertheless, Dutch allows for only in optatives without restrictions, (590b).
(590) Dutch
a. Als maar twee mensen in deze boot stappen, zal het zinken.
if only two people in this boat step will it sink
lit. 'If only two persons get into the boat, the boat will sink.' (VONLYI /%ONLY 2
b. Als Jan (nou) maar naar Marie had geluisterd!
if Jan PRT only/but to Marie had listened
'If only John had listened to Mary!'
First of all, the ONLY2 reading seems to emerge if we add additional material, including al
'already'; this does however not entail that an ONLY2 reading is really available, as we
will see in our discussion of 'already', section 6.2.4.
(591)Als er maar twee mensen in deze boot stappen, zal het al zinken.
if there only two people in this boat step will it already sink
'If only two persons get into the boat, it will already sink.' (/ONLYi /ONLY2
Secondly, and more importantly, if we look beyond this constructed example, we do find
cases of Dutch conditionals that seem to contain minimal sufficiency only, and these
examples are generally accepted by native speakers. How do we find these examples?
Consider first the following naturally occurring German example, (592a). An important
intuition is that (592a) seems equivalent to the paraphrase in (592b), which uses as long
as instead of if only. Looking for conditionals with such readings is thus a good heuristic
to detect ONLY 2 readings.
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(592)a. Das Ideal der Gleichheit ist das Ideal der Masse, die zufrieden
the ideal of.the equality is the ideal of.the mass that content
ist, [wenn nur keiner mehr hat als der andere].
is if only nobody more has than the other
'The ideal of equality is the ideal of a population that is content [if only nobody
has more than the others].'
(Werner Jaeger. 1944/1973. 'Platos Gorgias: Der Erzieher als der wahre Staatsman'. In Paideia,
Vol.2, 704-743. Berlin: de Gruyter.)
b. Das Ideal der Gleichheit ist das Ideal der Masse, die zufrieden
the ideal of.the equality is the ideal of.the mass that content
ist, [solange keiner mehr hat als der andere].
is as.long.as nobody more has than the other
'The ideal of equality is the ideal of a population that is content [as long as
nobody has more than the others].'
The following four examples are slightly modified versions of natural occurrences (which
I found on google) 10. What we observe in each of these examples seems to be an ONLY2
reading, as ONLYi readings do not seem to make sense in these constructions. In none of
the examples is the proposition in the consequent contingent on whether something more
than the antecedent proposition happens (in which case it should not follow under an
ONLY1 reading), or not (in which case it should follow under an ONLY1 reading).
(593)a. De hoeveelheid water hoef niet zoveel te zijn, als maar al het
the quantity water needs not so.much to be if only all the
poeder goed nat wordt.
powder thoroughly wet becomes
'The quantity of water needs not to be so high, as long as all the powder is
thoroughly wetted.'
"'The quantity of water needs not to be so high, if nothing happens except
that all the podwer is thoroughly wetted.' (ONLYi reading)
110 Glosses and translations are courtesy of Erik Schoorlemmer (p.c.).
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b. Het begint met een keertje krabben, en voor je het weet sta je je
it begins with a time scratch and before you it know are you you
elk vrij moment het schompes te harken, als maar niemand het ziet!
every free moment all over to rake if only nobody it sees
'It starts out with a little scratch, but before you know what is happening you
are scratching yourself all over your body, as long as nobody sees it.'
#?? 'It starts out with a little scratch, but before you know what is happening
you are scratching yourself all over your body, if nothing more happens
than that nobody sees it.' (ONLYi reading)
c. Hessing moet zelf weten welk schoonmaakmiddel wordt gebruikt,als maar
Hessing must self know which detergent is used if only
geen schade wordt aangebracht aan de aluminium goederen in de hal.
no harm is done to the aluminium goods in the hall
'Hessing must know himself which detergent to use, as long as no harm is done
to the aluminium goods in the hall.'
:?? 'Hessing must know himself which detergent to use, if nothing else
happens except that no harm is done to the aluminium goods in the hall.'
(ONLY, reading)
d. Zoals al eens eerder op het forum was gezegd: als maar
as already once before in this forum was said if only
iedereen op OSX overstapt komen daar ook wel virussen voor.
everybody on OSX change come there too indeed viruses for
'As has been said before on this forum: as soon as everybody switches to OSX,
there will be viruses on that platform as well.'
#?? 'If nothing else happens but that everybody switches to OSX, there will
be viruses on that platform as well.' (ONLYi reading)
We can thus tentatively conclude that Dutch may exhibit ONLY2 readings after all, but
simply not in the constructed example that I discussed above, i.e. we need to be aware of
the risk of false negatives when applying our diagnostic for ONLY 2 readings.
Finally, before concluding this section, it is worth exploring the spectrum of only type
expressions in English a bit further. We know that German has at least two elements that
roughly mean 'only', namely nur 'only' and blojJ 'only'.We have seen that both of them
have an ONLYi reading and an ONLY2 reading (e.g. in examples (552) and (574) above). If
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we look beyond only, we discover that English just seems to have both readings as
well" 1. This has been previously observed in Coppock & Beaver (to appear), cf. (594).
(594) Just the thought of him sends shivers down my spine.
(Coppock & Beaver to appear)
VONLY1: Nothing but the thought of him sends shivers down my spine.
/ONLY 2 : The thought of him (and possibly other things) sends shivers down
my spine, and that's something rather minimal.
As shown in (595),just also seems to have ONLY2 readings (as well as ONLY, readings) in
conditionals' 12; we can thus conclude that just may be more typical from a cross-
linguistic perspective than only itself.
(595) a. But it does work reasonably well, and if you use it just once, you've saved
more than the purchase price. => ONLY 2 reading preferred
(http://www.amazon.com/Paylak-LK6-4-Watch-Sizing-Repair/dp/BOO15SHC8Y)
b. One good thing about pu-erh is that you can use the same cake over and over
for multiple infusions. If you use it just once, you're wasting tea. =* ONLY1
(http://www.face-natural.com/blog/natural-skin-care-articles/super-teas-for-natural-skin-care)
c. If just two people get into the boat, it will sink.
vONLY1: The boat will sink if no more than two persons get in.
vONLY2: The boat will sink if at least two persons get in, which is not a lot.
In line with the generalization that ONLY2 can be used in optatives, (596) shows thatjust
can indeed license optatives in English (see also Quirk et al. 1985).
(596) a. Oh, if he just knew how much we miss him!
(= I wish he knew how much we miss him!)
b. Oh, if just once I could be a guest in such a beautiful house!
(= I wish I could once be a guest in such a beautiful house!)
" I thank Liz Coppock for suggesting that just may have a reading similar to what I call a minimal
sufficiency reading.
112 Some speakers report that the ONLY 2 reading is hard to access in (595c), whereas other speakers find it
perfectly natural.
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We can thus conclude that languages differ internally as to which only type elements
have ONLY2 readings and which ones do not.
6.2.3 A Generalized OnIy2 for Optatives and Beyond
The plan now is to devise a uniform semantics for only in optatives and outside optatives.
In this section, I briefly review ideas from the previous literature that indicate that every
instance of only may be scalar in nature, as assumed in my entries for ONLYi and ONLY2
above. I then argue that lowness, which is the main contribution of ONLY2, cf. (598a), is
indeed the main effect of placing only in an optative.
(597)a. jjonlyi,cj|= XS.Xp.Xw: p(w) v 3q [q >s p -- q(w)= 1] A AT LEAST
"Presupposition 1: The modified proposition or a higher scalar alternative is true."
b. MOST q E g(C) [q >s p] . LOWNESS
"Presupposition 2: The modified proposition is low on the salient scale."
c. -3q [q >s p -> q(w)= 1] AT MOST
"Truth Conditional Content: There is no higher scalar alternative that is true."
(598)a. IIonly2,cI = XS.Xp : MOST q E g(C) [q >s p] . LOWNESS
"Presupposition: The modified proposition is low on the salient scale."
b. p IDENTITY
"Truth Conditional Content: only2 is truth-conditionally vacuous."
Traditionally, the distinction between 'scalar only' and 'exclusive only' (e.g. Altmann
1976, 1978 for German) was used to distinguish between cases like (599a+b), which
seem inherently scalar, excluding higher alternatives, and (599c), which seem to exclude
all alternatives and are thus not scalar.
(599) a. Sam is only a [detective inspector]F. (He is not a detective chief inspector.)
b. I only had [three]F cups of coffee. (I didn't have four cups.)
c. I only saw [Gene]F- (I didn't see anybody else.)
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An example that clearly illustrates that scalar, non-exclusive readings exist, and that only
can be ambiguous between a 'scalar reading' and an 'exclusive reading' is provided by
van Rooy (2002). The statement in (600) would be false under an exclusive reading, but
the general intuition is that it is true in the given context, which is evidence for a 'scalar'
reading of only in (600).
(600) Context: We are playing a card game against each other, and the goal is to win,
and winning depends exclusively on who has the highest card. The king of
diamonds is higher than the jack of hearts. You show me the king of diamonds
and ask: 'What do you have?' Although I have three cards in my hands, I say:
a. I only have [the jack of hearts]F. (=> This is the highest card I have)
(van Rooy 2002:156)
b. paraphrase: I have nothing higher than the jack of hearts.
Conversely, (601) is an example where only has an 'exclusive' reading, excluding all
alternatives.
(601) Context: The children played with our cards and all of the cards are dispersed in
the living room. We are searching for the lost cards and you have just found the
fourth card since we started. You say that you've found four now. I have found a
single card; I turn it around to look at it and say:
a. I only have [the jack of hearts]F. (=; This is the only card I have)
b. paraphrase: I have nothing except the jack of hearts.
In the recent literature, the view has become progressively accepted that all of the
examples in (599)-(601) are scalar and that they merely differ in the type of scale that
they select (cf. Jacobs 1983, Bayer 1996, Klinedinst 2004, 2005, Krasikova & Zhechev
2006, Riester 2006, Beaver & Clark 2008). Let me begin with the inherently scalar uses
of only, in (599a+b). The idea is that (599a) makes use of a non-logical scale, (602b), and
(599b) makes use of a totally ordered logical entailment scale, (603b).
(602) a. Sam is only a [detective inspector]F.
b. Scale: ... detective sergeant< detective inspector < detective chief inspector <...
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(603) a. I only had [three]F cups of coffee.
b. Scale: Ocups < I cup<2 cups<3 cups <4cups< 5 cups< ...
For the apparent non-scalar uses, the assumption is that we are dealing with a partially
ordered logical entailment scale, as given in (604).
(604) a. I only saw [Gene]F.
b. Sam + Gene + Ray
Sam + Ray Sam + Gene Ray + Gene
Sam Ray Gene
T
If we now assume the lexical entry in (597) for canonical only, we always get the right
result. Due to its at least presupposition, (597a), and its at most assertion, (597b), we get
the right results for declaratives. Nothing needs to be said for the totally ordered scales,
as in (605). In contrast, in the case of partially ordered entailment scales, the
exclusiveness of only is not directly conveyed, but follows as an entailment of
presupposition plus assertion, as in (606d), which derives from (606b) plus (606c).
(605) a. Sam is only a [detective inspector]F.
b. (AT LEAST) presupposition: Sam is at least a detective inspector.
c. (AT MOST) assertion: Sam is no more than a detective inspector.
(606) a. I only saw [Gene]F.
b. presupposition: I saw at least Gene.
c. assertion: I did not see Ray + Gene, Sam + Gene or Sam + Gene + Ray.
d. entailment: I did not see Ray or Sam.
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Analyzing the 'prejacent presupposition' (cf. Horn 1969) of only as an at least
presupposition derives the fact that the modified proposition is not presupposed in
questions if the scale is not an entailment scale (Horn 1969, Geurts & van der Sandt
2004, van Rooy & Schulz 2004, Klinedinst 2005), cf. (607a). With an entailment scale,
(607b), every higher alternative entails the modified proposition.
(607) a. Is Sam only a [detective inspector]F? j Sam is a detective inspeCtor.
b. Did you only see [Gene]F? = You saw Gene.
Evidence that so-called 'exclusive' readings are also scalar stems from two facts about
'exclusive' only. First, as Klinedinst (2005) points out, even 'exclusive' only cannot
exclude weaker alternatives (e.g. Rooth 1992:fn.2). (608a) entails (608b), but clearly does
not entail (608c).
(608) a. I only saw [Gene, Sam and Ray]F.
b. => I didn't see Chris and Annie.
c. * I didn't see Gene.
Second, 'exclusive' uses of only trigger the same 'scalar lowness' presupposition as the
more typical scalar readings, which further supports a view where only is always scalar.
Klinedinst (2005) shows this with the example in (609). In the given context, (609a) and
(609b) should be truth-conditionally equivalent; yet the continuation in (609a) is
infelicitous, indicating that only conveys some notion of 'lowness'.
(609) If the domain of relevant individuals is (John, Mary, Bill, Alex, Sue, Eric)
a. The meeting was only attended by [John, Mary and Bill]F,
# a surprisingly high turnout.
b. The meeting was attended by everyone except/but Alex, Sue and Eric,
a surprisingly high turnout.
(Klinedinst 2005)
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As this lowness component of only is the part that I am mainly interested in, it is worth
dwelling on this for a bit longer. First of all, what does it mean to be low on a scale?
Secondly, is this a presupposition or an implicature? Thirdly, is this really what we find
in the cases of optative only and ONLY2 that I am analyzing?
To answer the first question, Klinedinst (2005) shows that lowness is a relative
concept; there must be a sufficiently high number of salient alternatives that are higher on
the scale, as illustrated in (61 Oa) versus (61 Ob).
(610) Mary is an average student
a. The average score on the exam was a C. # Mary only got an [A-]F.
b. The average score on the exam was an A. Mary only got an [A-]F.
(Klinedinst 2005)
To answer the second question, Klinedinst (2005) shows that lowness projects from
downward entailing contexts, indicating that it is a presupposition and not an implicature.
He argues that a speaker who utters (611 b-d) invariably presupposes that Cal State is low
on a scale (here: a scale that measures the prestige of different universities according to
the speaker), as in the baseline example, in (611 a). Therefore, lowness must be a
presupposition. (These are Klinedinst's examples.)
(611) a. John only got his BA from [Cal State]F-
b. No faculty member here only graduated from [Cal State]F-
c. John doubts that Bill only graduated from [Cal State]F.
d. Did Bill only graduate from [Cal State]F? (I thought he was an excellent
student in high school/that his parents were very rich)
(Klinedinst 2005)
To answer the third question, I argue that only in optatives (and minimal sufficiency
conditionals) fulfills exactly this purpose: To mark that the modified proposition is low
on some relevant scale, which seems to correspond to an effort scale or desirability scale
- in other words, it is relatively easy to achieve, as compared to salient alternatives. More
301
concretely, I propose that if I exclaim (612a) or (612b), I always presuppose that (612c)
holds in the present context. (See also Biezma 201 lab, who has a similar view.)
(612) a. If only I had a Porsche!
b. If only I had a car!
c. ... this is all I need to be satisfied, i.e. I need nothing that's even better (such
as a Porsche with special equipment, etc)
The fact that the denoted proposition must be good enough to satisfy my needs follows
from the semantics of the exclamation operator EX, repeated in (613).
(613) For any scale S and proposition p, interpreted in relation to a context c and
assignment function g,
an utterance EX(S)(p) is felicitous iff Vq[THRESHOLD(c) >s q -* p >s q]
"EX expresses an emotion that captures the fact that p is higher on a (speaker-related) scale
S than all contextually relevant alternatives q below a contextual threshold."
where THRESHOLD(c) is a function from a context into a set of worlds / a
proposition that counts as high with respect to a relevant scale S.
Evidence for such a good enough requirement stems from the following contrast. If I
need a Porsche, I cannot exclaim an optative that settles for less. (Included are the
descriptive statistics of a brief survey to establish this contrast.)
(614) Context: I want to attend a famous, lavish ball, where many celebrities show up. It
is unfashionable to arrive at the ball in anything less than a Porsche. I don't even
have a car. When I look out of the window, I see my neighbor's Porsche. I
exclaim the following.
a. Oh, if only I also had a Porsche! (meani.5 = 4.39, sd = 0.78, n = 18)
b.# Oh, if only I also had a car! (meani.5 = 3.06, sd = 1.43, n = 18)
Evidence that if-only-optatives in English convey that I do not want more than what I
desperately need follows can be construed from the examples in (615) and (616). (615b)
is marked due to the fact that a Porsche is more than what I need to be satisfied in the
302
current context. Similarly, (616b) is marked, as the context is such that $1000 is perfectly
satisfactory and a million is much more than what I need.
(615) Context: I need to get from Boston to Providence as quickly as possible. To do
so, I need a car. Unfortunately I do not own a car. My neighbors have a car,
but it's a Porsche, so they wouldn't lend it to me. I exclaim the following.
a. Oh, if only I owned a car! (mean. 5 = 4.46, sd = 0.88, n = 13)
b.# Oh, if only I owned a Porsche! (mean,-5 = 2.54, sd = 1.20, n = 13)
(616) Context: I want to attend a famous, lavish ball, where many celebrities show
up. The admission fee is $1000 and I'm currently broke. On the evening of the
ball, I get really frustrated; when I see my neighbors leaving for the ball, I
exclaim the following.
a. Oh, if only I had a thousand dollars! (meanis = 4.31, sd = 0.86, n = 13)
b.# Oh, if only I had a million dollars! (mean15 = 2.46, sd = 1.13, n = 13)
Examples like (617) initially appear to challenge the generalization that my analysis
captures. However, at closer inspection, they are fully compatible with it. Given human
nature, there is always something better that we can imagine, and the scalar
presupposition of only merely needs to hold with respect to a contextually determined set
of alternatives.
(617) a. If only I were the richest man in the world! (=> I don't want more than that.)
b. If only I were God! (=> I don't want more than that.)
To support my analysis, let me briefly review evidence that the availability of an ONLY2
reading in conditional antecedents is independent from the choice of scale.
First, consider an example of a partially ordered logical entailment scale in (618). As
indicated, a minimal sufficiency reading is available here" 3 .
113 Naturally, as in English, an ONLY, reading is also available, cf. (i).
i. If he's only using his [right]F hand, he won't achieve much.
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(618) a. Context: John has dry skin on both of his hands, so he decided not to do the
gardening. As the weeds are starting to take over, he decides to do the
gardening, but using only his right hand That'sfine, because...
Wenn er nur seine [rechte]F







'If he's only using his right hand, he'll already get a lot done.'
b. scale: both hands
left hand right hand
T
c. paraphrase: If John uses at least his [right] hand, which is easy to achieve,
he'll already make a lot of progress.
Similarly, a totally ordered entailment scale allows for a minimal sufficiency reading,
illustrated for German" 4.
(619) a. Context: You are planning to tour Italy and you have three days to see Rome.
You ask me for advice on where to go. I respond:
Wenn du nur [drei]F Tage in Rom verbringst, wirst





'If you only spend three days in Rome, you'll already experience a lot.'
... < two days < three days < four days < five days < ...
c. paraphrase: If you spend at least [three] days in Rome, which is not much,
you'll make a lot of nice experiences.
Finally, consider a case of a pragmatic scale. Once again, a minimal sufficiency reading
is available".
114 Again, an ONLY, reading is available as well, cf. (ii).





(620) a. Context: John got his BA from a community college, and he's in doubt whether
it will be any good for his future career.
Wenn er seinen BA nur von einem Community College bekommen
if he his BA only from a community college received
hat, wird er (schon) viel erreichen.
has will he schon much achieve
'If he only received his BA from a community college, he'll already achieve a
lot.'
b. scale: ... < community college < Cal State < UCLA < ...
c. paraphrase: If John got his BA at least from a [community college], which is
easily achieved, he'll already achieve a lot in his life.
We can conclude that the availability of a minimal sufficiency (ONLY 2) reading is
independent from the choice of scale, i.e. a uniform approach to only is possible, which
posits both ONLYi and ONLY2 as separate entries for only, independent from the scale that
they combine with'1 .
6.2.4 Why Only2 is not Op + Only1
A predecessor of my ONLY2 is Guerzoni's (2003) only2, which was posited to account for
German auch nur 'even' (lit. 'also only') constructions. A question that arises at this
point is whether minimal sufficiency only in conditionals is an instance of ONLYI in the
scope of a higher operator. Specifically, there are two construction types that we may
suspect to underlie ONLY2 readings, like (621a) - the relevant ONLY2 paraphrase seems
equivalent to the meaning that arises from even + only, as in (621b-d), and to the
meaning that arises from already + only, as in (621e).
115 Contrast this with an ONLY, reading, as given in (i).
i. If John only got his BA from [a community college]F, he'll have a hard time getting into
a good PhD program.
116 It is not clear whether ONLY 2 shares the at least component of ONLY1 or the at most component of ONLY 1
in any way. As far as the current empirical scope is concerned, no notion of exclusivity or exactly seems to
be conveyed by ONLY2-
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(621) a. Wenn nur zwei Personen einsteigen, wird das Boot sinken.
if only two persons get.in will the boat sink
lit. 'If only two persons get into the boat, the boat will sink.'
paraphrase of ONLY2 reading: 'It only takes two people to sink this boat.'
b. Selbst wenn nur zwei Personen einsteigen, wird das Boot sinken.
even if only two people get.in will the boat sink
'Even if only two persons get into the boat, the boat will sink.'
c. Sogar wenn nur zwei Personen einsteigen, wird das Boot sinken.
even if only two people get.in will the boat sink
'Even if only two persons get into the boat, the boat will sink.'
d. Auch wenn nur zwei Personen einsteigen, wird das Boot sinken.
also if only two people get.in will the boat sink
'Even if only two persons get into the boat, the boat will sink.'
e. Schon wenn nur zwei Personen einsteigen, wird das Boot sinken.
already if only two people get.in will the boat sink
'Even if only two persons get into the boat, the boat will sink.'
The question that needs to be asked is whether ONLY2 constructions always involve some
additional null operator (corresponding even or already), and more specifically, whether
ONLY2 readings could compositionally derive from ONLYi and such a null operator. This
would possibly entail that optatives always contain a null operator amounting to even or
already, which would be an important insight into the semantics of optatives. I will
address this issue in the present section and argue that there is evidence that ONLY2
readings are not contingent on some additional operator in the clause. While optatives
cannot contain an overt even or already operator, (622)+(623), I argue that they do not
contain a covert variant thereof either.
(622) a. Wenn ich nur reich ware!
if I only rich were
'If only I were rich!'
b. #Selbst / #Sogar/ #Auch / #Schon wenn ich nur reich ware!
even / even / also / already if I only rich were
'#Even / Already if only I were rich!'
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(623) a. If only I were rich!
b.# Even if only I were rich!
6.2.4.1 Why Only2 is not Even + Onlyi
In this section, I will explore the even-if-only hypothesis, which can be stated as follows:
Minimal sufficiency conditionals contain canonical only (my ONLYi above) in the scope
of a covert even type operator. By extension, the even-if-only hypothesis posits that
optatives with only, which I have argued to share properties of minimal sufficiency
conditionals, contain canonical only in the scope of a covert even type operator. This may
entail that all optatives contain a covert even type operator.
Initial motivation for such an approach stems from the fact that ONLY 2 type readings
can be emulated in English (which does not have a designated ONLY 2 use of only) by
placing canonical only (ONLYi) into the scope of even. This is illustrated in (624).
Example (624a) without even does not allow for a minimal sufficiency reading in English
(as opposed to other languages such as German), whereas (624b) with an overt even does
allow for a minimal sufficiency reading. So, the question is whether the apparent
existence of ONLY2 in German-type languages is an artifact of placing ONLYi into the
scope of EVEN.
(624) a. If only two people get into this boat, it will sink.
'If less than three people get into this boat, it will sink.'
# 'If at least two people get into this boat, it will sink.'
b. Even if only two people get into this boat, it will sink.
/ 'If at least two people get into this boat, it will sink.' (= ONLY2)
To proceed, I first briefly review a recent analysis of even-if-conditionals (see Rawlins
2008 and references therein), namely Guerzoni & Lim (2007). I then show that neither
minimal sufficiency conditionals nor optatives seem to be lend themselves to an analysis
as even-if-conditionals.
Guerzoni & Lim (2007) focus on Pollock's (1976) observation that there are two
types of even-if-conditionals, as given in (625). So-called 'introduced-if conditionals,
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like (625a), imply the truth of their consequent, whereas so-called 'standing-if
conditionals, like (625b) do not.
Even if the bridge were standing I wouldn't cross.
Even if John drank [F one ounce] of whiskey she would fire him.
(Guerzoni & Lim 2007, from Bennett 1982)
'introduced-if
'standing-if
Guerzoni & Lim construct a more minimal pair, which is given in (626).
a. Even if his relatives visit, he will feel miserable
('let alone if they don't, #but if they don't he'll be happy)
=> He will feel miserable no matter what.
b. Even if ONE of his relatives visits, he will feel miserable
(#let alone if they don't, /but if they don't he'll be happy)
7 He will feel miserable no matter what.
(Guerzoni & Lim 2007:fn.1)
'introduced-if
'standing-if
It can be shown easily that the minimal sufficiency construction that we are interested in
falls into the 'standing-if category, as it does not imply the truth of the consequent;
example (627a) can be successfully followed up by (627b) (and not by (627c)).
(627) a. Even if only two people get into this boat, it will sink.
b. ... /but, of course, if only one person gets into this boat, it will stay afloat
c. ... # let alone if they don't.
y The boat will sink no matter what.
Example (628b) makes an analogous point for minimal sufficiency conditionals without
even.
(628) a. Wenn nur zwei Personen einsteigen, wird das Boot sinken.
if only two persons get.in will the boat sink
lit. 'If only two persons get into the boat, the boat will sink.'





b. ... also darf nur eine Person einsteigen.
so may only one person get.in
'Therefore, only one person may get in.'
# The boat will sink no matter what.
We have thus learned that we should compare ONLY2 constructions and only-optatives to
'standing-if conditionals (which do not imply the truth of the consequent), and we can
henceforth disregard 'introduced-if conditionals (which do imply the truth of the
consequent). We observe, in accordance with what Guerzoni & Lim observe for
'standing-if conditionals, that the implicature of minimal sufficiency constructions is
that any number of people higher than two will cause the boat to sink in (627)+(628), i.e.
only two is the smallest amount of people that will suffice to sink the boat.
On the theoretical side of things, Guerzoni & Lim argue that 'introduced-if
conditionals involve verum focus, whereas 'standing-if conditionals involve focus on an
overt focus constituent. We will thus be concerned with the latter. Guerzoni & Lim's
analysis of even assumes that it is a propositional operator, which quantifies over focus
alternatives (following Rooth 1985, 1996); furthermore, even is truth-conditionally
vacuous and merely introduces two presuppositions, one of which is scalar, and one of
which is additive. The meaning of even, (629), is illustrated in (630).
(629) ||evenI(C)(p)(w) is defined iff
3q E C [q # p & q(w) = 1] & ADDITIVITY
"Presupposition 1: There is another true focus alternative."
Vq E C [q # p --+ p <likely/expected q] SCALARITY
"Presupposition 2: The modified proposition is the most unlikely alternative."
If defined, then ||even|(C)(p)(w) = P(w) ASSERTION
"Truth Conditional Content: even is truth-conditionally vacuous."
(Guerzoni & Lim 2007, paraphrases are mine)
(630) a. Gil invited even [F Mac].
b. Assertion: Gil invited Mac.
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c. Scalar Presupposition: Mac was the least likely (most noteworthy) person
among the contextually salient people for Gil to invite.
d. Existential Presupposition: Gil invited at least one contextually salient
person other than Mac.
(Guerzoni & Lim 2007)
Guerzoni & Lim assume, following Lycan (1991, 2001), that even takes scope over the
entire conditional. This is supported for German by the observation that even type
elements must be left-peripheral (whereas already, which I discuss in the next section,
can be medial in the matrix clause). Consider first three equivalents of English even in
(631a), (632a) and (633a). As indicated, sogar 'even' in (631b) and selbst 'even' in
(632b) cannot be placed clause-medially in the matrix clause. Example (633) with
additive auch 'even' is less clear, though, as indicated, it is not evident that (633b) and
(633a) are equivalent as they stand.
(631) a. Sogar wenn nur zwei Personen einsteigen, wird das
even if only two persons get.in will the
'Even if only two people get in, the boat will sink.'
b.#Wenn nur zwei Personen einsteigen, wird das Boot
if only two persons get.in will the boat
(632) a. Selbst wenn nur zwei Personen einsteigen, wird das
self if only two persons get.in will the
'Even if only two people get in, the boat will sink.'
b.#Wenn nur zwei Personen einsteigen, wird das Boot






wenn nur zwei Personen einsteigen, wird das
if only two persons get.in will the
if only two people get in, the boat will sink.'
nur zwei Personen einsteigen, wird das Boot
























In sharp contrast, (634b) and (634a) are roughly equivalent; I will discuss these in the
next section.
(634) a. Schon wenn nur zwei Personen einsteigen, wird das Boot sinken.
already if only two persons get.in will the boat sink
'Already if only two people get in, the boat will sink.'
b. Wenn nur zwei Personen einsteigen, wird das Boot schon sinken.
if only two persons get.in will the boat already sink
'If only two people get in, the boat will already sink.'
Having thus corroborated Guerzoni & Lim's view that even takes scope over the entire
conditional, we can look at the next step in their analysis. Guerzoni & Lim assume that
even-if-conditionals of the type that interest us exhibit focus on the number word (a
degree expression in their analysis). They derive the following analysis. First, the focus
alternatives in (635b) are generated, and then the meaning of even in (629) is applied, as
in (636).
(635)a. Even if John drank [F one ounce] of whiskey she would fire him.
b. focus alternatives:
{that if John drank one ounce of whiskey she would fire him,
that if John drank one and half ounce of whiskey she would fire him,
that if John drank two ounces of whiskey she would fire him
that if John drank a pint of whiskey she would fire him,... }
(slightly adapted from Guerzoni & Lim 2007, emphasis mine)
(636)a. Assertion: If he drank one ounce of whiskey she would fire him.
b. Existential Presupposition:
3q [q E~ (635b) & q # {if John drank one ounce of whiskey she would fire him}
& q(w)=1]
c. Scalar Presupposition:
It is less likely that she would fire John if he drank one ounce of whiskey than if
he drank any other amount of whiskey.
(slightly adapted from Guerzoni & Lim 2007, emphasis mine)
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Let us see how this translates to even-if-conditionals that contain only. Can we assume
that both even and only co-associate with focus on 'two' in (637a) and thus derive the fact
that (637a) seems equivalent to (637b)? As it stands, Guerzoni & Lim's (2007) proposal
requires the focused numeral to be the lowest element on the scale, which is clearly not
given in (637a). In their footnote 11, they suggest that in cases like (638) even associates
with focus on exactly/only and generates focus alternatives based on elements of a
semantically similar type.
(637) a. Even if only [two]F people get into this boat, it will sink.
b. If at least [two]F people get into this boat, it will sink.
(638) Even if John drinks exactly/only one ounce of whiskey she would fire him.
(Guerzoni & Lim 2007)
For the sake of the argument, let us assume that this is right, and use not more than as a
logical equivalent for only (an intended simplification). We then generate the focus
alternatives in (639), and by virtue of (629), generate the meaning in (640) for (637a).
(639) (that if no more than two people get into this boat, it will sink,
that if more than two people get into this boat, it will sink}
(640) a. Assertion: If no more than [tWO]F people get into this boat, it will sink.
b. Existential Presupposition:
3q [q E (640b) & q {if no more than two people get into this boat, it will
sink} & q(w) =1]
c. Scalar Presupposition:
It is less likely that the boat will sink if less than three people (= no more than
two) get in than if at least three people (= more than two) get in.
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Clearly, the analysis in (640) does not quite capture the meaning of (637a), under which
it is equivalent to (637b). However, I assume that the meaning of (637a), paraphrased in
(637b) is derived from (640) by virtue of a scalar implicature, as sketched in (641).
(641) If no more than [two]F people get into this boat, it will sink.
"implicates If at least [twO]F people get into this boat, it will sink.
Such a scalar implicature follows from scale reversal in the antecedents of conditionals
(cf. von Fintel 1999, as discussed by Guerzoni & Lim 2007); (642a) entails (642b) -
therefore, for the speaker to state (642b) instead of (642a) gives rise to a standard scalar
implicature that (642a) is false, deriving (641).
(642) a. If less than two people get into this boat, it will sink.
b. => If less than three people get into this boat, it will sink.
This seems to approximate the right result for English even-if-only conditionals. I will not
be concerned with a refinement of this analysis, as I now wish to evaluate whether this is
the right analysis for ONLY2 readings without even, and for only-optatives.
The core argument against an even-if-only approach to ONLY2 and optative only stems
from the following observation. The possible scope and focus of canonical only and
optative only differs as follows. While optative only can combine with broad sentential
focus, (643a), canonical only is more constrained, as shown in (643b). It is plausible that
only in (643a) uses a pragmatic scale or a partially ordered entailment scale, as in (643c),
where all contextually salient propositions are relevant alternatives. While we do not
currently understand why canonical only cannot combine with the scale in (643c)' 17 , it is
evident from the ill-formedness of (643b) that such a constraint holds.
(643) a. If only nobody had more than everyone else!
b.# Only nobody has more than everyone else.
117 The inability of ONLY1 to combine with such a scale may be due to its exclusive component, though it is
not clear how we can derive this.
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c. nobody has more than everyone else + everyone is rich
nobody has more than everyone else everyone is rich
T
Moving on to languages that employ ONLY2, we have seen that ONLY2 can also combine
with sentential focus, shown in (644a); crucially, even-if-only constructions disallow for
this, (644b-d), which indicates that they employ ONLYi, and corroborates that ONLY2 does
indeed exist separately from ONLYi.
(644)a. Wenn nur keiner mehr hat als die anderen, sind sie zufrieden.
if only nobody more has than the others are they content
'If only nobody has more than the others, they are content.'
b.* Selbst wenn nur keiner mehr hat als die anderen, sind sie zufrieden.
even if only nobody more has than the others are they content
'Even if only nobody has more than the others, they are content.'
c. * Sogar wenn nur keiner mehr hat als die anderen, sind sie zufrieden.
even if only nobody more has than the others are they content
'Even if only nobody has more than the others, they are content.'
d.* Auch wenn nur keiner mehr hat als die anderen, sind sie zufrieden.
also if only nobody more has than the others are they content
'Even if only nobody has more than the others, they are content.'
Notably, this argument carries over to English. If a combination of even and canonical
only gave rise to a true ONLY2 reading, as observed in (644a) (and presumably in the
optative in (645a)), then (645b) should be grammatical, contrary to fact.
(645) a. If only nobody had more than everyone else!
b.* Even if only nobody had more than everyone else, people would be content.
These observations support a view where ONLY 2 does exist as a separate element,
whereas even + only configurations may always involve ONLYI - illustrated in (646).
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(646) a. Wenn nur zwei Personen einsteigen, wird das Boot sinken.
if two persons get.in will the boat sink
'It only takes two people to sink this boat.' (lit. 'If only two people get in ... ')
b. Selbst/Sogar/Auch wenn nur zwei Personen einsteigen, wird es sinken.
even even also if NLYi two people get.in will it sink
'Even if only two persons get into the boat, the boat will sink.'
In turn, these data support a view where there is no covert even type operator in minimal
sufficiency conditionals or optatives. In the following section, I will turn to a more
serious concern, which amounts to a second type of reductionist approach: Could it be
that ONLY2 readings derive from a combination of ONLYi and 'marginality already'?
6.2.4.2 Why Only2 may not be Already + Onlyi
In the preceding section, we have seen that there are good arguments against treating
ONLY2 as a compositional result of combining ONLYi and EVEN. The core argument was
based on the fact that ONLY 2 can combine with wide sentential focus, (647a), whereas
ONLYi, which plausibly co-occurs with even type elements shows restrictions on doing
so, (647b), especially in combination with even. What we see in (647c) is that clauses
with schon 'already' and minimal sufficiency only are however well-formed; (647c) and
(647d) are roughly equivalent. The questions that emerge can be stated as follows. First,
what is the semantics of schon 'already' in such minimal sufficiency conditionals?
Second, could it be that apparent ONLY2 readings are a consequence of placing ONLYi in a
conditional that also contains already? Third, could it be that (647a) (and optatives
clauses with only) contains a covert already combined with canonical ONLYi? As I show
below, this concern is much more serious than the concern raised in the preceding
section.
(647) a. Wenn nur keiner mehr hat, sind sie zufrieden.
if only nobody more has are they content
'If only nobody has more, they are content.'
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b.* Selbst / Sogar / Auch wenn nur keiner mehr hat, sind sie zufrieden.
even even also if only nobody more has are they content
'Even if only nobody has more, they are content.'
c. Schon wenn nur keiner mehr hat, sind sie zufrieden.
already if only nobody more has are they content
'Already if only nobody has more, they are content.'
d. Wenn nur keiner mehr hat, sind sie schon zufrieden.
if only nobody more has are they already content
'If only nobody has more, they are already content.'
As we have seen above, schon 'already' is nearly always possible in minimal sufficiency
conditionals. I will now review evidence that suggest that schon 'already' may be an
obligatory component in minimal sufficiency conditionals (either overtly or covertly) and
raise some issues for drawing this conclusion. The next section will then discuss the
meaning of schon 'already' and how we can make sense of the patterns that we observe
herein.
First of all, strong evidence that minimal sufficiency only may always involve
already stems from cases of minimal sufficiency conditionals in which schon 'already' is
indeed obligatory, (648). Interestingly, these are cases where the minimal sufficiency if-
only-clause is right-peripheral. So, if there are cases where schon 'already' is obligatory
for a minimal sufficiency reading, should we conclude that minimal sufficiency only
always combines with a (possibly covert) already?
(648)a. Ich freue mich ?#(schon), [wenn mir nur jemand sagt, dass er mich mag].
I please me schon if me only someone says that he me likes
'I'm already happy if only someone tells me that he likes me.'
MSC reading ~ I'm already happy if someone tells me that he likes me, which is not
much to ask for.
b. Es ist ?#(schon) schlecht, [wenn es nur ein paar Minuten regnet].
it is schon bad if it only a few minutes rains
'It's already bad if it only rains for a few minutes.'
MSC reading ~ It's already bad if it rains briefly, which happens quite easily.
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c. Es hatte mich?#(schon) gefreut, [wenn du mir nur einen Brief
it had me schon pleased if you me only a letter
geschrieben hattest].
written had
'It would already have made me happy if you had only written me one letter.'
MSC reading ~ It would have already made me happy if you had written me one letter,
which is not much to ask for.
I would like to challenge such a conclusion with two pieces of evidence. First, the facts in
(648) are counterbalanced by the observation that minimal sufficiency conditionals allow
for conditional inversion, but disallow it in the scope of schon 'already', so not all ONLY2-
containing conditionals allow for overt schon 'already' to be in a position above ONLY 2.
Example (649) shows the baseline examples without conditional inversion; (650) shows
that minimal sufficiency only is possible in a V I-antecedent with schon 'already' medial
to the matrix clause, (650a), but not with schon 'already' clause-initial, (650b). (We
cannot test these cases for right-peripheral antecedents, as these are marked in such
constructions, cf. Reis & W6llstein 2010.) If minimal sufficiency only always emerged as
an occurrence of ONLYi in the scope of already, the unacceptability of (650b) should be
puzzling. There is no evident reason why (650a) and (650b) should not be equivalent (in
the same way in which (649a) and (649b) are equivalent).
a. Wenn er mich nur angerufen hitte, ware ich s
if he me only called had were I al
'If he had only called me, I would already be content.'
b. Schon wenn er mich nur angerufen hitte, ware
already if he me only called had were







(650) a. Hitte er mich nur angerufen,
had he me only called
'Had he only called me, I would alr
b.?*Schon hitte er mich nur
already had he me only













A second piece of evidence against the strong hypothesis that minimal sufficiency
conditionals always involve schon 'already' stems from examples such as (651)." While
(651) clearly contains minimal sufficiency nur 'only', schon 'already' seems impossible
in any of the conceivable positions.
(651) es sind (#schon) gerade die unterschiedlichen meinungen, die hier
it are schon exactly the differing opinions that here
(#schon) den reiz des diskutierens ausmachten, (#schon) [wenn nur
schon the appeal of.the discussing created schon if only
jeder jedem seine meinung gelassen hat, ohne persnlich
everyone to.everyone his opinion left has without personally
zu werden].
to become
'It was the differing opinions themselves that made discussions interesting here,
[if only everyone allowed everyone else to have a different opinion without
making it personal].'
We can thus conclude that there is evidence that schon 'already' may be obligatory
(overtly or covertly) in minimal sufficiency conditionals, but there is also evidence
against such a view.
Let us consider another piece of evidence. We notice that minimal sufficiency
readings can be made available in Portuguese, a non-ONLY2 language, by means of
inserting ja 'already'.
(652) a. Se 6/a enas duas pessoas entrarem neste barco, ele vai afundar. Port.
if only two people enter in-this boat he will sink
lit. 'If only two people get on the boat, the boat will sink.'
/ The boat will sink if less than three persons get in.
* The boat will sink if more than one person get in.
b. Se 6/a enas duas pessoas entrarem nesse barco, ele ' afunda.
if only two people enter in-this boat he already sinks
lit. 'If only two people get on the boat, the boat will sink.'
v The boat will sink if more than one person get in.
This is a modification of a naturally occurring online post on www.heute.de, from 1/10/2009.
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This is a striking observation, which may suggest that ONLY2 is a result of combining
ONLY1 with already. However, if we look past Portuguese, there is good evidence against
drawing such a conclusion. First of all, in Spanish, ya 'already' barely improves the
relevant construction, (653).
(653) Spanish
a. Si olo dos personas se montan en esa barca, se hundira
if only two people self get on that boat self will.sink
lit. 'If only two people get on the boat, the boat will sink.' (VONLY1 / *ONLY 2)
b. ?? Si olo dos personas se montan en esa barca, se hundira
if only two people self get on that boat already self will.sink
lit. 'If only two people get on the boat, the boat will already sink.' (??ONLY2)
In Greek, idhi 'already' requires a change in tense and aspect and only yields a slight
improvement as well, (654).
Greek
a. An o dhio anthropi anevun s'afto to plio, tha vuliaksi.
if only two people enter on-this the boat fut sink
lit. 'If only two people get on the boat, the boat will sink.' (VONLYI / *ONLY2)
b.??An on dhio anthropi anevenan, to plio iche 'dh' vuliaksi
if only two people got-on(impf), the ship had already sunk
lit. 'If only two people got on the boat, the boat had already sunk.' (??ONLY2)
Finally, in Catalan, ja 'already' does not improve the respective construction at all, (655).
(655) Catalan
a. Si om6 pugen dues persones en aquesta barca, s
if only get.in two people on that boat s
lit. 'If only two people get on the boat, the boat will si
b. ?* Si o pugen dues persones en aquesta barca,
if only get.in two people on that boat
lit. 'If only two people get on the boat, the boat will
enfonsari.
nf.will.sink









This suggests that Portugueseja 'already' may have a special status of containing an even
component that Spanish ya 'already', Greek idhi 'already' and Catalanja 'already' lack.
A language that seems to behave like Portuguese may be Czech, even though it is an
ONLY2 language. What is interesting about Czech is that different complementizers
license minimal sufficiency only to a different extent. While kdyby 'if(subj)' is perfectly
fine with ONLY2, jestli 'if' disallows this reading, and kdyi 'if / pokud 'if' only
marginally allow for it.
(656) Czech
a. Kdy-by jen dva lidi nasedli na tuto lod', potopila by se.
if-subj only two people get(pptc) on this boat sink(pptc) subj self
lit. 'If only two people got into this boat, it would sink.' /'ONLYI / /ONLY2
b. Jestli jen dva lidi nasednou na tuto lod', potopi se.
if only two people get(prpf) on this boat sink(prpf) self
lit. 'If only two people get into this boat, it will sink.' /IONLY 1 / *ONLY 2
c. Kdyz jen dva lidi nasednou na tuto lod', potopi se.
if only two people get(prpf) on this boat sink(prpf) self
lit. 'If only two people get into this boat, it will sink.' /ONLY 1 / ??ONLY 2
d. Pokud jen dva lidi nasednou na tuto lod', potopi se.
if only two people get(prpf) on this boat sink(prpf) self
lit. 'If only two people get into this boat, it will sink.' /ONLYi / ?ONLY2
This contrast completely disappears if we insert uz 'already', which uniformly makes
available an ONLY2 reading. This suggests that 'already' can sometimes give rise to an
ONLY2 reading that would not otherwise be available. At the same time we can only
explain the contrasts in (656) and lack thereof in (657) if we assume that (656a) contains
true ONLY 2 , whereas (657b-d) are instances of ONLYi, where already has coerced an
ONLY 2 -like reading.
(657) Czech
a. Kdy-by jen dva lidi nasedli na tuto lod', ui by se potopila.
if-subj only two people get(pptc) on this boat already subj self sink(pptc)





jen dva lidi nasednou na tuto
only two people get(prpf) on this
only two people get into this boat, it will
c. Kdyi jen dva lidi nasednou na tuto
if only two people get(prpf) on this
lit. 'If only two people get into this boat, it will
d. Pokud jen dva lidi nasednou na tuto
if only two people get(prpf) on this





















#ONLYi / /ONLY 2
Further evidence against decomposing ONLY2 into ONLYi + ALREADY stems from
exclusive paraphrases. The examples in (658) and (659), which employ a negative,
exclusive paraphrase suggest that adding schon 'already' barely brings improvement,
different from what we might expect if ONLY2 compositionally arises from placing an
exclusive in the scope of already.
(658) Maximally one person can get into the boat
a.# Wenn nicht mehr als zwei Personen
if not more than two persons
'If no more than two persons get into the
einsteigen, wird das Boot
get.in will the boat
boat, the boat will sink.'
=> only reading: 'To stay afloat, more than two persons must get in.'
b.?? Wenn nicht mehr al zwei Personen einsteigen, wird das Boot chon
if not more than two persons get.in will the boat already
sinken.
sink
'If no more than two persons get into the boat, the boat will already sink.'
(659) Maximally one person can get into the boat
a.# Wenn weniger als drei Personen einsteigen, wird das Boot
if less than three persons get.in will the boat
'If less than three persons get into the boat, the boat will sink.'
sinken.
sink




b.?? Wenn eni er al drei Personen einsteigen, wird das Boot chon
if less than three persons get.in will the boat already
sinken.
sink
'If less than three persons get into the boat, the boat will already sink.'
In sum, we have seen good reasons to assume that schon 'already' plays a substantial role
in minimal sufficiency constructions even though it does not need to be made overt. At
the same time, we have seen that it would be premature to conclude that schon 'already'
is obligatory in minimal sufficiency constructions, and in fact I argued that ONLY2
readings are available without 'already'. The core question that arises can be posited as
follows. How do we account for the observed interactions between ONLY2 readings and
the presence of schon 'already'? The following section discusses the meaning of schon
'already' and provides an analysis that accounts for its interaction with ONLY2.
6.2.4.3 Understanding the interactions of Only 2 and Already
This section addresses the question of how we can understand the interactions of only and
already in minimal sufficiency constructions. I will first discuss the meaning of already
and then focus on its contribution to minimal sufficiency constructions.
Much of the literature on already (and its counterpart still) focus on temporal
readings, (660), and local readings, (661) (Ltbner 1989, 1999, Mittwoch 1993, Van der
Auwera 1993, Michaelis 1996, Krifka 2000, Greenberg 2009).
(660) temporal still/already
a. At 5AM, Sam was still sleeping.
b. At 5AM, Annie was already awake.
(661) local still/already
a. Ventimiglia is still in Italy
b. Menton is already in France.
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However, the use of already (and possibly still) in minimal sufficiency conditionals
seems to fall in the category of 'marginality already/still' (K6nig 1977, Michaelis 1993,
Ippolito 2007), (662)+(663). This is the construction I will be focusing on.
(662) marginality still/already
a. A: Tell me about sedans, compact and subcompact cars. Are they safe?
B: Well, sedans are definitely safe. Compact cars are still safe.
Subcompacts start to get dangerous.
(Ippolito 2007:21, emphasis mine)
b. A: Tell me about compact and subcompact cars. Are they safe?
B: Compact cars are safe. Subcompacts are already dangerous.
(Ippolito 2007:23, emphasis mine)
(663) marginality still/already
Paul ist noch gemdBigt. Peter ist schon radikal.
Paul is still moderate Peter is already radical
'Paul is still moderate. Peter is already radical.'
(K6nig 1977:183)
What unifies the three uses of still and already is their scalarity; these particles always
serve to localize the modified proposition with respect to (a threshold on) some salient
scale. Furthermore, in all three uses, the particles indicate proximity to a threshold on that
scale (e.g. the point of waking up, the point of crossing the border, the standard for what
it means to be radical). They differ in their choice of scale. Temporal still/already make
reference to time intervals, local still/already make reference to distance on some local
axis, marginality still/already make reference to a threshold on a qualitative scale (i.e.
how safe/dangerous does a car have to be to count as safe/dangerous? How moderate/
radical does a person have to be to count as moderate/radical?)
Focusing on English even-if conditionals, which emulate minimal sufficiency
conditionals, the constructed examples in (664) approximate the kind of construction we
are interested in. How can we understand these constructions?
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(664) a. Even if only two people enter this boat, it will already sink.
b. Even if you only donate one dollar, you're already helping us.
First of all, it is worth pointing out that such clauses are not the same type of clauses as
the even-if clauses that Barker (1991) and Ippolito (2007) study.
(665)a. Even if Bill pays me $200, I'm still not going to do it.
b. Even if he had studied, he would still have failed.
(Barker 1991: 23,29)
As shown in (666), the latter type of even-if clause fall into the 'introduced-if category
(where the consequent is entailed), (666a), and not into the 'standing-if category (where
the consequent is not entailed, cf. Guerzoni & Lim 2007), (666b). Therefore, trying to
posit a connection there would be a red herring.
(666)a. Even if Bill pays me $200, I'm still not going to do it.
(/let alone if he doesn't, #but if he doesn't, I will)
=> I'm not going to do it no matter what.
b. Even if you only donate one dollar, you're already / still helping us.
(#let alone if you don't, /but if you don't, you're not)
You're helping us no matter what.
As we know that already/still are scalar elements, what scale is involved in minimal
sufficiency conditionals? The scale that seems to be involved whenever still/already
occur in conditionals of the type that interests us is a scale of sufficiency, as illustrated by
means of the paraphrases in (667). As it is not evident that the behavior of already
distinguishes between simple unmarked conditionals and even-if-only conditionals, I will
look at both in the following examples.
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(667) a. (Even) if (only) ten people enter this boat, it will already sink.
= An amount of ten people is already enough to sink this boat.
b. If nine people enter this boat, it will still stay afloat.
= An amount of nine people is still not enough to sink this boat.
Let us now try to understand how to best analyze such constructions.
What we know about marginality still and already can be loosely summarized as
follows. First of all, under their marginality reading, x is still P and x is already P convey
that x has the property P, but that x is close to the threshold of not having the property.
The standard view that temporal, local and marginality uses of still/already are truth-
conditionally vacuous presupposition triggers is supported by the entailments in (668)
and (669).
(668) a. Paul is already radical. entails Paul is radical.
b. Paul is still radical. entails Paul is radical.
(669) a. (Even) if (only) ten people enter, this boat will already sink.
entails An amount of ten passengers is sufficient to sink this boat.
b. If ten people enter, this boat will still sink.
entails An amount of ten passengers is sufficient to sink this boat.
Second, still and already differ in their perspective; still is appropriate when it is under
discussion whether x is P, (670b)+(67 1 b), whereas already is appropriate when it is under
discussion whether x is not P, (670a)+(671a).
(670) a. Peter is still moderate. Paul is already radical. => focus on being moderate
cf ? Peter is very radical. Paul is already radical.
b. Paul is very radical. Paul is still radical. => focus on being radical
cf ? Peter is still moderate. Paul is still radical.
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(671) a. If nine people enter, this boat will not yet sink, but if ten people enter, this
boat will already sink.
cf ? If twenty people enter, this boat will definitely sink. If ten people enter,
this boat will already sink.
b. If twenty people enter, this boat will definitely sink. If ten people enter, this
boat will still sink.
cf ? If nine people enter, this boat will not yet sink, but if ten people enter,
this boat will still sink.
Third, there are good reasons to view all instances of still as duals of already (cf.
(672)+(673)), i.e. whichever analysis we devise for still should also entail an analysis for
already (Loebner 1989, 1999; against Mittwoch 1993, Van der Auwera 1993).
(672) a. still p -,already -p
Peter is still moderate. = It is not the case that Peter is already radical.
b. already p = -still -p
Paul is already radical. = It is not the case that Paul is still moderate.
(673) a. (Even) if (only) ten people enter, this boat will already sink.
= It is not the case that if ten people enter, this boat will still stay afloat.
b. If ten people enter, this boat will still sink.
It is not the case that if as little as ten people enter, this boat will already
stay afloat.
So, how should we analyze these occurrences of still/already and how do they interact
with the semantics of minimal sufficiency conditionals?
My analysis develops ideas from Michaelis (1993) and Ippolito (2007). Consider first
a simple case of marginality still/already. What an analysis needs to account for are two
meaning components: marginality (i.e. closeness to a threshold) and perspective (i.e. the
whether we are interested in whether something is the case or not).
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Compact cars are still safe.
described situation:
threshold (such that anything above it counts as safe)(674)
(675) Compact cars are already safe.
described situation:
above it counts as safe)
In brief, the insight from K6nig (1977), Michaelis (1993) and Ippolito (2007) is that
marginality still/already are presupposition triggers that give rise to an additive
presupposition, (676b-i) and (676c-i), and a marginality presupposition, (676b-ii) and
(676c-ii).
(676) a. If defined, listill q>1|c'g = Ialready q>|cg = I|q)c'g
b. l|still q>|cg is defined iff
(i.) there is a salient alternative V that has the same property (e.g. being
moderate, being safe, ... ) ADDITIVITY
(ii.) on a salient scale (e.g. political moderation, safeness, ... ), P is close to
the contextual threshold. MARGINALITY
c. Ialready >j'cg defined iff
(i.) there is a salient alternative V that has the opposite property (e.g.
moderate * radical, safe * dangerous, ... ) ADDITIVITY
(ii.) on a salient scale (e.g. political moderation, safeness, ... ), CP is close to





As our main focus is on already (and not on still), I will now focus exclusively on
already in minimal sufficiency conditionals, narrowing the scope of discussion a bit.
Consider (677); if we assume that an antecedent proposition of only two people get in is
equivalent to exactly two people get in, we can write possible alternatives of the
antecedent proposition as p = n persons (for p = exactly two persons get in). What seems
to be relevant for schon 'already' is whether the antecedent is sufficient for the
consequent in the standard conditional sense. (p => sink is an abbreviation for the
standard truth-condition of a conditional, i.e. in all closest p-worlds, the boat is sinking.)
(677) a. Wenn (nur) zwei Leute einsteigen, wird das Boot schon sinken.
if only two people get.in will the boat already sink
'(Even) if (only) two people get in, the boat will already sink.'
b. described situation: threshold (such that anything above it counts as sufficient)
p = 1 ersonp 2pesnp 3pros
SUFFICIENT
perspective prejacent proposition
As indicated, a unification of schon 'already' in minimal sufficiency conditionals and
marginality already as in (675) is possible according to our intuitions. As shown in (678),
schon 'already' conveys closeness to a threshold.
(678) Context: We all know that two people are enough to sink this boat.
Wenn (nur) funf Leute einsteigen, wird das Boot (#schon) sinken.
if only five people get.in will the boat already sink
'(Even) if (only) five people get in, the boat will (#already) sink.'
And as shown in (679) versus (680), the perspective is on alternatives that are below the
threshold.
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(679) a. Wenn eine Person einsteigt, wird das Boot noch nicht sinken.
if one person get.in will the boat not yet sink
'If one person gets in, the boat will not yet sink.'
b. (Aber) wenn (nur) zwei Personen einsteigen, wird das Boot schon sinken.
but if only two people get.in will the boat already sink
'(But) if (only) two people get in, the boat will already sink.'
(680) a. Wenn ftinf Person einsteigen, wird das Boot definitiv sinken.
if five person get. in will the boat definitely sink
'If five persons get in, the boat will definitely sink.'
b.# (Aber) wenn (nur) zwei Personen einsteigen, wird das Boot schon sinken.
but if only two people get.in will the boat already sink
'(But) if (only) two people get in, the boat will already sink.'
Ippolito (2007), focusing on occurrences of still/already as in (681), posits a semantics
for marginality already/still that treats these elements as additive presupposition triggers
that have the semantics of adjectival modifiers (of type <<e,<d,et>>,t>, cf. Kennedy &
McNally 2005). Her semantics is given in (682) (adapted from Ippolito 2007:24).
(681) a. Compact cars are still fairly safe; subcompacts start to get dangerous.
b. Compacts are already safe.
(Michaelis 1993:223, 230)
(682)a. ||stillJ|4' = Xx.XP<d<et>>: 3y # x [3d[C(d) and P(y) > d]] . ADDITIVITY
"Presupposition: There is a salient alternative of which the same property holds."
3d[C(d) and P(x);> d]] POS
"Truth Conditional Content: The degree to which P holds of (x) is above the
contextual standard."
b. ||alreadyll'' = XX.XP<d<et>>: 3y 0 x [3d[C(d) and Ap(y) > d]] . ADDITIVITY
"Presupposition: There is a salient alternative of which the antonym property holds."
3d[C(d) and P(x) > d]] POS
"Truth Conditional Content: The degree to which P holds of (x) is above the
contextual standard."
where Ap is the antonym of a gradable adjective P (i.e. a gradable predicate that
uses the same scale with an inverse ordering relation)
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There are several reasons to diverge from Ippolito's analysis. First of all, the cases of
already in minimal sufficiency constructions that I discussed to not lend themselves to an
analysis in terms of degree predication (unless we treat the conditional modal as a
gradable predicate, which we may model in terms of Villalta 2007). Secondly, it is not
evident how Ippolito's additive analysis in (682) derives the fact that marginality
already/still conveys closeness to the relevant threshold.
I will instead pursue a semantics closer to Guerzoni & Lim's (2007) view on even,
which makes the following assumptions. First of all, schon 'already' in minimal
sufficiency constructions takes scope over the entire conditional, i.e. it combines with a
proposition. Secondly, as foreshadowed by the sketch in (677), we can assume that schon
'already' quantifies over alternatives which roughly correspond to the focus alternatives
of only in the antecedent clause. We can then model additivity as a presupposition that
there is a focus alternative, which is false, and we can model marginality as a
presupposition that of all true focus alternatives, the modified proposition is the strongest.
I propose that schon 'already' does not lexically associate with focus , but rather retrieves
salient alternatives from the context (cf. Beaver & Clark 2008). For instance, it seems
possible to have schon 'already' in an implicitly conditionalized matrix clause, such as
(683B) (which seems to have the same relevant alternatives as (677)). This should not be
possible if schon 'already' lexically associated with focus.
(683) A: Ist es in Ordnung, wenn nur zwei Leute einsteigen?
is it in order if only two people get.in
'Is it ok if only two people enter the boat?'
B: Nein, weil dann wird das Boot schon sinken.
no because then will the boat already sink
'No, because the boat will already sink in such circumstances.'
We can roughly posit a semantics for marginality schon 'already' as follows (which is
very close to Guerzoni & Lim's 2007 view on even) 19.
119 This analysis for marginality already in minimal sufficiency conditionals shares with Ippolito's (2007)
analysis of concessive still (in (i)+(ii)) the idea that already is a propositional operator.
i. John studies all night, and he still failed the test.
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(684) Ialreadyll(C)(p)(w) is defined iff
3q E C [q f p & q(w) = 0] & (NEGATIVE) ADDITIVITY
"Presupposition 1: There is a false contextually given alternative."
Vq E C [[q # p & q(w) = 1] -+ p <ikely/expected q] MINIMAL SUFFICIENCY
"Presupposition 2: The modified proposition is the least likely of all true alternatives."
If defined, then Ialreadyll(C)(p)(w) = p(w) IDENTITY
"Truth Conditional Content: already is truth-conditionally vacuous."
This analysis is illustrated for our core example in (685).
(685) a. Wenn (nur) zwei Leute einsteigen, wird das Boot schon sinken.
if only two people get.in will the boat already sink
'(Even) if (only) two people get in, the boat will already sink.'
b. C (provided by the context) = {the boat will sink if one person gets in,
the boat will sink if two persons get in,
the boat will sink if three persons get in, ... }
c. Assertion:
If two people get in, the boat will sink.
d. Scalar (Minimal Sufficiency) Presupposition:
All other true alternatives ({if three persons get in the boat will sink, if four
persons get in the boat will sink, ... }) are more likely than the prejacent (if
two people get in, the boat will sink).
e. (Negative) Additive Presupposition:
There is at least one false alternative (if one person gets in, the boat will sink).
ii. Even if the doctor tells him not to, Harry will still run the marathon.
(Ippolito 2007:25)
However, Ippolito's analysis does not seem to carry over to the phenomenon under discussion. She argues
that still in (ii) presupposes that it is less likely [that Harry runs the marathon if the doctor tells him not to]
than [that Harry runs the marathon if it's not the case that the doctor tells him not to]. Treating already as
the dual, this would predict that (iii) presupposes that it is more likely [that the boat sinks if only two
people get in] than [that the boat sinks if it's not the case that only two people get in]. This is clearly not the
case.
iii. Even if only two people get in, this boat will already sink.
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Notably, my analysis also accounts for the occurrence of schon 'already' as a discourse
particle in German (cf. Thurmair 1989, Ormelius-Sandblom 1997). Consider Thurmair's
(1989) example in (686). If we assume that the statement nothing is ok (or, as I more
conservatively suggest, zwieback is ok) is a salient alternative to cauliflower casserole is
ok in (686a), we derive the right meaning in (686d-e) and also derive the deviance of
(686b), given that meat is ok is (in a meat-eating culture) assumed to be more likely than
cauliflower casserole is ok.
(686) In a culture that highly values eating meat and typically does not consider
vegetables to be a real meal.
Him: Soll ich morgen Blumenkohlauflauf machen oder was mit Fleisch?
'Shall I make cauliflower casserole or something with meat?'
a. Her: Blumenkohlauflauf ist schon okay.
cauliflower.casserole is schon ok
'Cauliflower casserole will do.'
b. Her: ? Fleisch ist schon okay.
meat is schon ok
'Meat will do.'
(Thurmair 1989:152,fn.73)
c. C (provided by the context) = {zwieback is ok,
cauliflower casserole is ok,
meat is ok, ... }
c. Assertion:
Cauliflower casserole is ok.
d. Scalar (Minimal Sufficiency) Presupposition:
All other true alternatives ({meat is ok, ... }) are more likely than the prejacent
(cauliflower casserole is ok).
e. (Negative) Additive Presupposition:
There is at least one false alternative (zwieback is ok).
So, how do only and already interact in conditionals? First of all, this analysis is
compatible with the observation that minimal sufficiency only (i.e. ONLY 2) is not a
compositional result of ONLYI in the scope of already. After all, already is simply a
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presupposition trigger like even that has the purpose of reinforcing the minimal
sufficiency flavor of a minimal sufficiency conditional. Secondly, we have an
understanding why already in combination with ONLY 1 does sometimes give rise to an
ONLY 2-like reading. In its semantics, already is very similar to even, and it is plausible
that the ONLY 2-like reading can arise as an inference from already + ONLY1 just as much
as it can from even + ONLY1. The fact that schon 'already' can occur in minimal
sufficiency conditionals that do not allow for selbst 'even' or sogar 'even', (687)+(688),
may simply follow from the fact that the latter must lexically associate with focus and
sometimes fail to do so, whereas schon 'already' inherits its alternatives from the context.
(687)a. Schon/*Selbst/ *Sogar wenn nur keiner mehr hat, sind sie zufrieden.
already even even if only nobody more has are they content
'Already / *Even if only nobody has more than everyone else, they are content.'
b. Wenn nur keiner mehr hat, sind sie schon/ *selbst/ *sogar zufrieden.
if only nobody more has are they already even even content
'If only nobody has more than everyone else, they are already / *even content.'
(688) a. Schon/Selbst/Sogar wenn nur zwei Leute einsteigen, sinkt das Boot.
already/even/even if only two people get.in sinks the boat
'Even if only two people get in, the boat will sink.'
b. Wenn nur zwei Leute einsteigen, sinkt das Boot schon/*selbst/*sogar.
if only two people get.in sinks the boat already/even/even
'If only two people get in, the boat will already sink.'
So, how do only and already interact in minimal sufficiency conditionals? In the standard
case, (689a), only and already reinforce each other. While only indicates that the
antecedent proposition is low on some salient scale, already indicates that the conditional
asserts the strongest true alternative (i.e. the antecedent proposition is only just about
sufficient for the consequent proposition to follow).
(689) a. Wenn (nur) zwei Personen einsteigen, wird das Boot (schon) sinken.
if ONLY2 two persons get.in will the boat already sink
lit. 'If (only) two persons get in, the boat will (already) sink.'
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b. Assertion:
'All of the closest possible worlds in which two persons get into the boat are
worlds in which the boat sinks.'
c. Contribution of ONLY2:
Of all the focus alternatives {one person gets in, two persons get in, three
persons get in, four persons get in, ... }, which are ordered on a scale (here:
totally ordered entailment scale), the modified proposition (two persons get
in) is relatively low.
d. Contribution ofALREADY
In the set of all contextually salient alternatives {that the boat sinks if one
person gets in, that the boat sinks if two persons get in, that the boat sinks if
three persons get in, ... }, there is at least one false alternative, and the
modified proposition (that the boat sinks if two persons get in) is the strongest
true alternative.
So why could schon 'already' ever be obligatory in German minimal sufficiency
conditionals, as in (690), which sharply contrasts with (691).
(690) a. Es ist schon schlecht, [wenn es nur ein paar Minuten regnet].
it is schon bad if it only a few minutes rains
'It's already bad if it only rains for a few minutes.'
b.* ONLY, reading: It is bad if it does not rain for more than a few minutes.
> Rain is good. (E rain)
c. /ONLY2 reading: It is bad if it rains, even if it only rains for a few minutes.
=> Rain is bad. (0l -rain)
(691)a. Es ist schlecht, [wenn es nur ein paar Minuten regnet].
it is bad if it only a few minutes rains
'It's bad if it only rains for a few minutes.'
b./ONLYi reading: It is bad if it does not rain for more than a few minutes.
= Rain is good. (0 rain)
c.* ONLY 2 reading: It is bad if it rains, even if it only rains for a few minutes.
=> Rain is bad. (0, rain)
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I propose that this pattern is due to the pragmatic maxim Maximize Presupposition (Heim
1991). I assume that (691) does in fact have both readings, but the ONLY2 reading is
blocked by virtue of a scalar implicature; an ONLY2 reading requires that the matrix clause
is understood as it is just about bad, which is stronger in terms of entailment than it is
bad. (The statement p is just about bad entails p is bad, but it is not the case that p is bad
entails p is just about bad.)
(692)a. It is just about (= schon) bad that p. =: It is bad that p.
b. It is bad that p. yl It is just about (= schon) bad that p.
c. scalar implicature:
it is bad that p implicates -[it is just about (= schon) bad that p]
This implicature may not arise (or at least be easier to cancel) if the if-clause precedes the
matrix clause, which accounts for the fact that we find obligatory schon 'already' mainly
in left-peripheral matrix clauses.
What we expect to see is that less categorical predicates than bad, which entail
sufficiency in the relevant sense, may not give rise of the same type of ONLY2-blocking
scalar implicature. This is indeed the case, as shown in (693). In (693a), be glad gives
rise to the scalar implicature -be just about glad, thus blocking an ONLY 2 reading in
absence of schon 'already'. In contrast, (693b) contains the more gradable be content,
which does not seem to imply - be just about content; therefore an
easily accessed in the absence of schon 'already'.
(693) a. Ich ware ?#(schon) froh, [wenn du mir nur einmal
I were schon glad if you me only once
'I would already be glad if you had written me once.'
intended: I would be glad if you had written me at least
much to ask for. (ONLY2 reading)
b. Ich ware (schon) zufrieden, [wenn du mir nur einmal
I were schon content if you me only once
'I would already be glad if you had written me once.'
ONLY2 reading is more
geschrieben
written
once, which is not
geschrieben
written
intended: I would be content if you had written me at least once, which is not






So, should we assume that optatives contain a covert schon 'already'? I believe we can
safely conclude that such an assumption is unwarranted. For one, in optatives there is no
overt matrix clause that may give rise to a scalar implicature that blocks an ONLY 2
reading. On the other hand, we have already seen that optatives are much more
felicitously described as utterances of the be content type than as utterances of the be
glad type. We can thus conclude that optatives truly contain ONLY2, which we have seen
to independently exist in minimal sufficiency conditionals. So, what impact does ONLY 2
have in optatives? This is addressed in the next section.
6.2.5 Mitigating Expressives: On the role of Only2 in Exclamations
The most intriguing effect of only in optatives is that it first appears to license optativity,
and second disambiguates between optative exclamations and other types of
exclamations. Let me first discuss the former property. In many languages, 'only' (under
the reading that I have argued to be ONLY2) is one of various elements that can license an
optative interpretation for an if-clause. Elements that license optativity include 'only', 'at
least' and interjections, though sometimes an initial sigh or a particular intonation (e.g.
verum focus, cf. Rosengren 1993) is also sufficient. If-clauses without any marking are
typically deviant, as in (694d) or (695d). How does only fulfill this licensing role?
(694) a. Ach, wenn ich reich ware! German
b. Wenn ich nur reich ware!
c. Wenn ich wenigstens reich ware!
d.# Wenn ich reich ware!
oh if I only at.least rich were
'If only I were (at least) rich!'
(695)a. Eh, da je Jovan poslusao Mariju! Serbian
b. Da je samo Jovan poslusao Mariju!
c. Da je Jovan barem poslusao Mariju!
d.# Da je Jovan poslusao Mariju!
oh, that be.3sg only John at.least listened Mary-acc
'If only John had (at least) listened to Mary!'
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I postpone a discussion of the licensing property of particles to section 6.5. In section 6.5,
I argue that prototypical elements such as interjections and particles serve as cues for
optative exclamations due to their property of eliminating different competing readings of
multiply ambiguous utterances. As a consequence, general principles of successful
communication entail that speakers will typically use (694a-c) or (695a-c) to convey an
optative, and (694d) / (695d) will be understood as the antecedent of a fragmentary
hypothetical conditional. This will typically give rise to ill-formedness of (694d) and
(695d), unless contextual information overrides the pragmatic inference and makes an
optative reading available.
In the reminder of this section, I focus on the disambiguating effect of nur 'only' in
exclamations, to show how a particle like this can bring out an intended reading by
eliminating a possible alternative. First of all, consider two utterances that are ambiguous
between a polar exclamative reading (under which they express surprise) and an optative
reading (under which they express desire). (696a), which is in the subjunctive, can be
uttered in a context in which the speaker knows that under certain counterfactual
circumstances Anna would have given Otto the book; in such a context, it gets the
reading in (696b), expressing shock or dismay at this fact. Similarly, (696a) can be
uttered in a context where the speaker knows that Anna didn't give Otto the book, but
wishes she had done so; in such a context, it gets the reading in (696c), expressing a wish
for this to have taken place.
(696) a. Hitte die Anna dem Otto doch tatsachlich das Buch gegeben!
hadsubj the Anna to.the Otto doch indeed the book given
lit. Hadsubj Anna indeed given Otto the book!
b. polar exclamative reading:
'[It's shocking that] Anna would have indeed given Otto the book!'
c. optative reading:
'If only Anna had given Otto the book!'
(developed from Scholz 1991:132-133)
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Similarly, the indicative example in (697a) can be uttered in a context where we know
that Otto was working all night and yet he managed to wake up in time; in such a context,
it expresses surprise and admiration for the fact that he didn't oversleep, as in (697b).
Contrastively, (697a) can be uttered in a context where we know that Otto was working
all night and we are waiting for him to show up and catch an early train with us. In this
context, (697a) has the reading in (697c), where it expresses hope or desire for Otto to not
have overslept and show up in time.
(697)a. Mein Gott, dass der Otto nicht verschlafen hat!
my God that he Otto not overslept has
lit. My God, that Otto didn't oversleep!
b. polar exclamative reading:
'[It's shocking that] Otto didn't oversleep!'
c. optative reading:
'[I hope that] Otto didn't oversleep!'
While context is usually sufficient to disambiguate between the readings in (696b+c) and
(697b+c), adding nur 'only' into this construction is a grammatical means of
disambiguation. The crucial generalization is illustrated in (698) (a modified version of
(696)) and (699) (a modified version of (697)). If we add nur 'only' into either of these
examples, the polar exclamative reading disappears and only the optative reading
remains.
(698) Hatte die Anna dem Otto doch nur tatsachlich das Buch gegeben!
hadsubj the Anna to.the Otto doch only indeed the book given
lit. Hadsubj Anna only indeed given Otto the book!
* '[It's shocking that] she would have indeed given him the book!' (polar excl.)
'If only she had given him the book!' (optative)
(699) Mein Gott, dass der Otto nur nicht verschlafen hat!
my God that he Otto only not overslept has
lit. My God, that Otto didn't oversleep!
* '[It's shocking that] he doesn't oversleep!' (polar excl.)
v '[I hope that] he doesn't oversleep!' (optative)
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The puzzle that arises is how to account for this generalization. What we can observe is
that there is no incompatibility of ONLY2 and surprise as such, as (700b+c) are as
wellformed as (700a). (Based on the discussion of schon 'already' in the preceding





nur zwei Leute einsteigen, bin ich
only two people get.in am I
if only two people get in, I'm already happy.'
b. Wenn nur zwei Leute einsteigen, schockiert
if only two people get.in shocks
'Even if only two people get in, I'm already shocked.'
c. Wenn nur zwei Leute
if only two people
'Even if only two people get
einsteigen, tiberrascht
get.in surprises













(701) Context: I expected for nobody to show up
Es schockiert mich schon, dass nur eine
it shocks me already that only one





So how could we possibly account for the disambiguating effect of nur 'only' in
exclamations?
Reconsider our entries for EX and ONLY 2 , in (702) and (703).
(702) For any scale S and proposition p, interpreted in relation to a context c and
assignment function g,
an utterance EX(S)(p) is felicitous iff Vq[THRESHOLD(c) >s q -+ p >s q]
"EX expresses an emotion that captures the fact that p is higher on a (speaker-related) scale
S than all contextually relevant alternatives q below a contextual threshold."
where THRESHOLD(c) is a function from a context into a set of worlds / a





(703)a. ||only2,c||= XS.Xp: MOST q E g(C) [q >s p]. LOWNESS
b. p IDENTITY
A first possibility for deriving the disambiguating effect of ONLY2 would be to connect it
to the type of scale that EX combines with. One may conjecture that ONLY2 in EX-
utterances ends up having its scale argument co-bound (and thus co-referent) with the
scale argument on EX. This is plausible if scale arguments, which are provided by the






Scale-matching may require for the scales of ONLY 2 and EX to be identical. In regular
minimal sufficiency conditionals, no such scale-coreference is required, as ONLY2 is the
only element with a scale argument that they contain. It is thus plausible that it is the
scale-matching that gives rise to the disambiguating effect of ONLY2 in EX-utterances.
Specifically, one may conjecture that it is the nature of the scale in polar exclamatives (an
inverse likelihood scale) that blocks ONLY2.
However, once again, the next step is not trivial. First, consider the meaning that we
derive for the optative reading of (705a), in (705b+c). Given that nur 'only' here may be
assumed to associate with sentential focus, the alternatives for ONLY2 are constrained
mainly by the context; if the alternatives are as given in (705d), then (705c) will be
satisfied.
(705) a. Mein Gott, dass der Otto nur nicht verschlafen hat!
my God that he Otto only not overslept has
lit. My God, that Otto didn't oversleep!
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b. EX => an utterance of (705) is felicitous iff Vq[THRESHOLD(C) >speaker-preferences
q -+ Otto-didn't-oversleep >speaker-preferences q]
c. ONLY2 = Most contextually salient alternatives are such that they are




Otto didn't oversleep and Otto bought breakfast for everyone,
Otto didn't oversleep and the weather is nice, ... }
What do we predict for the (non-existent) surprise reading of (705)? As shown in (706),
no conflict is predicted to arise. It thus follows that scale-matching alone is not a
satisfactory means of accounting for the disambiguating effect associated with ONLY2.
(We will however see that scale-matching may be involved in optatives that contain 'at
least'.)
(706) a. Mein Gott, dass der Otto nur nicht verschlafen hat!
my God that he Otto only not overslept has
lit. My God, that Otto didn't oversleep!
b. EX => an utterance of (706) is felicitous iff Vq[THRESHOLD(c) >speaker-unlikelihood
q -+ Otto-didn't-oversleep >speaker-unlikelihood q]
c. ONLY 2  => Most contextually salient alternatives are such that they are




Otto didn't oversleep and Otto bought breakfast for everyone,
Otto didn't oversleep and the weather is nice, ... }
Let us explore a different venue. We have seen that Dutch maar 'only' occurs in
optatives and also has a minimal sufficiency reading, (593). Van der Wouden (1997)
proposes that maar 'but' is a positive polarity item that cannot be in the scope of an anti-
additive operator (contrasting with the negative polarity item ook maar 'also but, any',
which must be in the scope of an anti-additive operator), cf. Szabolcsi (2004). As we
have seen, maar 'but' seems to have ONLY 2 readings and license optatives, the following
question arises. Can we derive the disambiguating effect of nur 'only' and maar 'but' in
optatives from polarity? I suggest that we can. Anti-additivity is defined as follows.
(707) a. A function f is antiadditive iff f(a v b) = fa A fb.
b. No one walks or talks = No one walks and no one talks
(Szabolcsi 2004:414)
Do different choices of scalar arguments for EX imply different properties with respect to
antiadditivity and polarity licensing? I suggest that they do. Let us first look at
desirability (which I assumed to be involved in optatives). If a or b is desirable, it is not
necessarily the case that a is desirable and b is desirable, as the conjunction, a and b,
may not be desirable. This is summarized in (708) and supported by the intuition that the
statements in (709) are not contradictory. In other words, desirability is not antiadditive.
(708) It is desirable that John or Mary comes.
f It is desirable that John comes (no matter what)
and it is desirable that Mary comes (no matter what).
(given that John and Mary may hate each other)
(709) a. It is desirable that Bob or Ann comes, but it is not desirable that both come, as
they hate each other.
b. It is [desirable that Bob or Ann comes], but it is not independently [desirable
that Bob comes] and [desirable that Ann comes], as Bob and Ann hate each
other. (Ann's coming is only desirable if Bob does not come and vice versa.)
Contrastively, can we show that unlikelihood (which I assumed to be involved in polar
exclamatives) is antiadditive? This is not immediately obvious if we look at probability
theory (e.g. if we assume that p is unlikely translates to the probability of p is smaller
than 33%). On the one hand, it is clearly the case that if a or b is unlikely, then a is
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unlikely and b is unlikely, but on the other hand, if a is unlikely and b is unlikely, it does
not necessarily follow that a or b is unlikely. The crucial question is thus what
'unlikelihood' means when we are dealing with polar exclamatives. How do we measure
'subjective unlikelihood' (which we seem to be dealing with)? If the relevant scale is best
conceived of as a scale of shockingness (i.e. if subjective unlikelihood is a function of
shockingness), anti-additivity does seem to be one of its properties. The clauses in (710)
feel contradictory, indicating that shockingness might well be anti-additive, as
summarized in (711)120. Under such a view, probability theory would simply not capture
the notion of subjective unlikelihood (i.e. shockingness).
(710) a. ??It is shocking if John or Mary comes, but it is not shocking if John comes and
it is not shocking if Mary comes.
b.??It is shocking if John comes and it is shocking if Mary comes, but it is not
shocking if John or Mary comes.
(711) It is shocking if John or Mary comes.
= It is shocking if John comes and it is shocking if Mary comes.
So, by virtue of scale selection, polar exclamatives should be anti-additive environments,
(711), while optatives should not be, cf. (708). This predicts not only that ONLY2 should
be bad in polar exclamatives, but it also predicts that NPIs should be bad in optatives. We
already know that the latter is the case, see chapter 4 (cf. Gartner 2010). Reconsider the
example (712).
(712)a. Mensch, dass dieser Kandidat einmal einen Fdrderpreis erhalten hat!
man that this candidate once a grant received has
'Man, that this candidate has once received a grant!'
120 This naturally raises the question of how to deal with (700) and (701). The intuition seems to be that
schon 'already' is obligatory in these examples. This might indicate that we are actually dealing with a
combination of 'already' and ONLYi, which we have seen to give rise to apparent ONLY 2 readings in Czech
and Portuguese.
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b. scenario for optative reading
We are auditioning different candidates for a new job. So far, none of our
candidates has ever received a grant. We are tired and desperate and really hope
that the candidate who is about to enter has received a grant at least once.
paraphrase: '[Let's hope] that this candidate has once received a grant!'
c. scenario for polar exclamative reading
We are auditioning different candidates for a new job. Our last candidate was a
complete disaster and we consider him completely incompetent. However, he
has received a grant once in his career, which shocks us. After he leaves, we
express our shock (and dismay) at this fact.
paraphrase: '[It's shocking] that this candidate has once received a grant!'
As shown in chapter 4, inserting an NPI appears to eliminate the optative reading.
(713) Mensch, dass dieser Kandidat je(mals) einen Fdrderpreis erhalten
man that this candidate ever a grant received




V polar exclamative reading
Similarly, we have seen that inserting ONLY2 eliminates the polar exclamative reading.
(Naturally, (714) is well-formed if only has the exclusive ONLY1 reading.)
(714) Mensch, dass dieser Kandidat nur einen
man that this candidate only 2 a
'Man, that this candidate has received a grant!'
v optative reading
* polar exclamative reading
Frderpreis erhalten
grant received





(715)# Mensch, dass dieser Kandidat nur je einen F6rderpreis erhalten hat!
man that this candidate only2 ever a grant received has
'Man, that this candidate has received a grant!'
* optative reading
* polar exclamative reading
Another construction that confirms the generalization that ONLY2 and NPIs are in
complementary distribution is the adversative construction in (716). While such
constructions seem to freely employ ONLY2 12 1, they do not allow for NPIs either, (717). (I
should remark that this raises a question of which scale such constructions employ, as
undesirability should be anti-additive.)
(716) a. TOYBOY... wenn ich das nur schon lese. Warum diese Abwertung?
toyboy if I that only already read why this degradation
'Toyboy... [I already get annoyed] if I just read this. Why this degradation?'
(forum comment on http://top.de/21 xP-Ihr-neuer-Lover-ist-gerade-mal-24)
b. "Aus angeblich sichern Quellen.... ", ha, wenn ich das nur schon lese...
from allegedly safe sources ha if I that only already read
"'From allegedly reliable sources", ha, [I feel sick] if I just read this...'
(forum comment on http://www.bunte.de/stars/victoria-und-david-beckham-
fuer-ihre-kleine-prinzessin-tun-sie-alles-kommentareaid_23833.html)
c. Meinl einigt sich aussergerichtlich; wenn ich das nur lese
Meinl agrees self out-of-court if I that only read
'Meinl comes to an extrajudicial settlement; [I get angry] if I just read this ... '
(http://www.be24.at/blog/entry/63273 1/meinl-einigt-sich-aussergerichtlich-
wenn-ich-das-nur-lese)
(717) # Wenn ich das je(mals) lese!
if I that ever read
'If ever I read this!'
121 In (716), an exclusive ONLY, reading, ifIdo nothing but read this, seems inapplicable.
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We can thus conclude that the disambiguation effect of ONLY 2 in EX utterances seems to
be due to its positive polarity. In this sense, the use of ONLY2 is a grammatical means of
eliminating different readings of EX utterances, such as a polar exclamative reading. Note
that the presence of concessive 'at least' in optatives (cf. section 6.3) is further evidence
that optatives are positive polarity environments, as 'at least' is not licensed in negative
polarity environments, cf. Rullmann & Nakanishi (2009).
An open question that I wish to mention concerns the origin of the positive polarity
that I attribute to ONLY2. Why would ONLY2 be a positive polarity item? How could we
derive this property? What is clear is that many discourse particles seem to be positive
polarity items to a stronger or lesser extent. Looking at German, discourse particles can
quite generally not occur in the scope of negation, as shown in (718a) versus (718b) for
ja, doch, wohl and eben (see also Thurmair 1989).
(718) a. Es ist (ja / doch / wohl / eben) niemand gekommen.
it is ja doch wohl eben nobody come
'Nobody came [ja / doch / wohl / eben].'
b. Niemand ist (*ja/ *doch / *wohl / *eben) gekommen.
nobody is *ja *doch *wohl *eben come
'Nobody came.'
As all of these particles plausibly share the property of ONLY2 that they are truth-
conditionally vacuous, I conjecture that truth-conditional vacuity may be one of the
122possible causes of positive polarity
6.2.6 Interim Summary
In this section, I have proposed an analysis for only in optatives. I argued that only in
conditionals generally gives rise to two readings, the canonical exclusive ONLY, reading
and a non-canonical ONLY2 reading, in which it merely marks lowness on a salient scale. I
discussed the existence of minimal sufficiency conditionals, which contain ONLY2 in their
m It is worth pointing out that even if truth-conditional vacuity is a potential cause of positive polarity, it
does not automatically follow that it is a sufficient condition for positive polarity. In other words, there
might be truth-conditionally vacuous elements that do not classify as positive polarity items.
346
antecedent, and I showed that ONLY2 does not arise compositionally from interpreting
ONLYi in the scope of EVEN or ALREADY. Finally, I argued that the disambiguating effect
of ONLY2 in EX utterances is its positive polarity. Due to the inverse likelihood scale that
they select, polar exclamatives are anti-additive and thus disallow for ONLY2. An
utterance that is ambiguous between an optative reading and a polar exclamative reading
can thus be disambiguated by means of inserting ONLY 2. In the following two sections, I
discuss at least and doch, two further elements that are cross-linguistically prototypical
for optatives. The upcoming discussions are naturally shorter, as I will be drawing on
insights from the present section.
6.3 On At Least and Compromises
This sub-chapter is dedicated to another property of optative constructions - the
prototypical connection to at least. The core observation can be summarized in two steps.
First, we notice that cross-linguistically optatives employ elements that roughly mean 'at
least', as illustrated in (719)123 for Serbian. (We will see more examples soon.)
(719)a. Da je Jovan makar poslusao Mariju! Serbian
that be.3sg John at.least listened Mary-acc
'If at least John had listened to Mary!'
b. Makar je Jovan poslusao Mariju.
at.least be.3sg John listened Mary-acc
'At least John listened to Mary.'
Second, we observe that the connection between optativity and at least is far from
coincidental. Apart from the fact that, as we will see, a wide range of languages exhibit
this connection, we can also observe the inverse connection when looking at some
diachronic evidence. Historically, the Middle Greek optative marker makdrie 'happy,
favorable (vocative)' became a loan word into several European languages, Including
123 It is worth pointing out that (719b) is not an entirely innocent example as it stands, as we are dealing
with at least that takes propositional scope, a fact that will become crucial in this sub-section.
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Italian, Romanian, Serbian, Slovenian, Old Spanish and Occitan (Diez 1887, Buchi
2008)124. The Modem Greek cognate makari only has an optative meaning:
(720) Makari o John na akusi tin Mary! Modern Greek
MAKARI the John subj listened the Mary.acc
'If only John had listened to Mary!'
Importantly, as we have seen in (719) above, there are languages such as Serbian (but
also Romanian and Slovenian), where the cognates of Greek makari have newly acquired
an 'at least, even' component, not present in the Greek original. This is particularly
insightful as these languages have still partly or fully maintained the original optative
function of makari, as shown in (719) above, which illustrates both uses.
We thus find a two way connection. On the one hand, at least is cross-linguistically a
prototypical marker of optativity. On the other hand, there is evidence that diachronically
pure optative markers such as Middle Greek makdrie have acquired the additional
meaning of at least. But why? - The core puzzle to be addressed in this chapter is how to
account for the strong correlation between AT LEAST and optativity.
In what follows, I first illustrate the degree to which this puzzle holds, by surveying a
core set of languages that apparently employ canonical at least in optatives, in section
6.3.1. I then introduce intriguing data from languages that superficially do not seem to
pattern as nicely, in section 6.3.2. I conjecture that such languages may have designated
lexical items to express the meaning of so-called concessive at least and proceed to
review our current knowledge on concessive at least in section 6.3.3. Finally, in section
6.3.4, I argue that optative at least is always concessive at least and that the initial puzzle
arises because many languages exhibit an ambiguity in the lexical item that they use.
124 In Ancient Greek, makarid can be used to address someone as in o makarie Kriton 'my dear Crito!'
(from Plato's dialogue Crito), or more generally, o makarie 'my good sir, my dear sir' (cf. Liddell, Scott,
Jones, accessible online at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/). This suggests that (o) makarie in
optatives may actually mean 'Oh dear!'
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6.3.1 At Least or not At Least? - Unearthing a cross-linguistic connection
The purpose of this section is to survey evidence that another prototypical particle that we
find in optatives is at least. As a starting point, we notice that some languages use the
same element in optatives that we find in (721). I will illustrate these first and state the
puzzle that we need to solve. I will then show that there are other languages that use an
element that appears to mean 'at least' but cannot be used in (721). I discuss these
languages next; I will then draw some generalizations and proceed to an analysis.
(721) a.
b.
There are at least 5 apples in this bag.
In the traffic accident, there were at least 5 casualties.
Languages that use an element in optatives that can also be used in (721) (and similar
constructions) include German, Icelandic, Czech, Serbian/Croatian, Italian, Spanish,
Portuguese, Catalan, Greek and Hebrew. As we will see, German is however a borderline
case, as we can use the optative at least only (to a limited extent) in (721 a) and not in













wenigstens auf Maria gehdrt hitte!
at.least to Maria listened had
aspoii Honza poslechl Marii!
at.least Honza listened.pst.ptcp Marie.acc
Jovan barem (po)slusao Mariju!
John at.least listened Mary-acc
avesse almeno ascoltato Maria
had at.least listened.to(past.subj) Mary
hubiera al menos escuchado a M
had.sub.past at least listened to M
menos o Joao tivesse ouvido a M

























h. An toulachiston o John iche akusi tin Mary!
if at.least the John.nom had.3sg listened the Mary.acc
i. lu John haya le-faxot makSiv le-Mary!
if.cf John be.past.3sg to-less listen.pres.3sg to-Mary
j. Ef J6n hef~i a6 minnsta kosti hlusta6 i Mariu!
if John had at least choice listened toMary




Relevant examples that show that we are dealing with the same at least that we find in
(721) are given below. (Native speakers of German will already notice a slight
dispreference for wenigstens 'at least', coupled with the intuition that wenigstens 'at
least' conveys a positive evaluation. I will come back to this, as it is crucial for my














sem Sack sind ?wenigstens / mindestens fUnf Apfel.
bag are at.least at.least five apples
tasce je asponi pet jablek.
.loc bag.loc is.sg at.least five.nom apples.gen.pl
j torbi ima barem pet jabuka. S
bag have.3s.pres at.least five apples




































o manzanas en esta bolsa.
apples in this bag
magis nessa/nesta cesta/sacola.
apples in.this bag
ha almenys cinc pomes.
have at.least five apples
tulachiston tesera mila.
3sg at.least four apples
le-faxot arba'a tapux-im
at-least four.masc apple.masc-pl








Importantly, these languages can also use this element in contexts that do not imply a
positive evaluation. German is an exception here, which, as indicated above, will become
relevant later.
(724) a. Bei dem Unfall gab es mindestens
at the accident gave it at.least
b. Pfi te nehode zemielo aspo n
at that accident died.sg.neut at.least
c. U sabra6ajnoj nesredi je bilo
in traffic accident was be.3s.past
/#wenigstens zehn Tote. German
at. least ten dead
pet lidi. Czech
five people
barem pet irtava. Serbian/Croatian
at.least five casualties
d. Nell' incidente automobilistico ci sono stati almeno 5 vittime. Italian
in.the'accident car there are been at.least 5 victims
e. En el accidente de trifico,hubo al menos cinco victimas. Spanish
in the accident of traffic there.was at least five victims
f. No acidente de carro, ao menos cinco pessoas morreram. Portuguese
in.the accident of car at least five people died
g. En l'accident de cotxe hi va haver almenys cinc accidentats. Catalan
in the'accident of car there aux have at.least five casualties
h. Sto aftokinitistiko atixima, skotothikan tulachiston pende anthropi. Greek
in-the car accident were.killed at.least five people
i. be-te'unat ha-drax-im hayu le-faxot xamiSa harug-im Hebrew
in-accident the-way-pl exist.masc-pl at-least five.masc casualty.masc-pl
j. I bilslysinu voru ab minnsta kosti fimm dau6sf6ll. Icelandic
in car-accident were at least choice five casualties
'There were at least 5 casualties in the traffic accident.'
Let me now move on to a broader range of languages, which pattern in a slightly different
way. I then proceed to propose a solution for this puzzle.
6.3.2 At Least the plot thickens...
This is a good place to dwell on German for a moment. German differs from the other
languages surveyed above in that wenigstens 'at least' (as opposed to mindestens 'at
least') implies a positive evaluation, (725) (an observation shared by Gast 2011). In the
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next section, I take this to be an indication that the at least in optatives is an instance of
Nakanishi & Rullmann's (2009) concessive at least, which conveys a positive evaluation
of the modified proposition.
(725) a. Bei dem Unfall gab es wenigstens / mindestens
at the accident gave it at.least at.least
'There were at least five survivors in the accident.'
b. Bei dem Unfall gab es #wenigstens / mindestens
at the accident gave it at.least at.least





While Serbian (and Croatian) barem 'at least' does not seem to have this property, it
appears that makar 'at least' may have a tendency towards a concessive at least reading,
as it is somewhat marked in the negative context.
(726)a. Da je Jovan makar poslusao Mar
that be.3sg John at.least listened Mar
'If at least John had listened to Mary!'
b. U sabradajnoj nesredi je bilo bar
in traffic accident was be.3s.past at.le
'There were at least five casualties in the acci
c. Barem /??makar 5 studenata nije po
at.least at.least 5 students did-not pa
'At least 5 students didn't pass the exam.'
d. Makar je Jovan poslusao Mariju.
at.least be.3sg John listened Mary-acc
'At least John listened to Mary.'
iju!
y-acc





In light of German and Serbian, it seems adequate to generalize and assume that at least
in optatives is always concessive at least in the above languages. While I cannot give a
detailed discussion of each individual language and will largely focus on German as a
case study, the following languages further support this view.
Extending the empirical scope, we find languages in which the at least in optatives





that the optative at least occurs in one or more of the following contexts. First, it
sometimes occurs in negative or modal contexts (where it is equivalent to English even);
or, second, it sometimes occurs as a complementizer meaning 'although' (which indicates
a semantic connection to German doch and Dutch toch, which I discuss in section 6.4.
However, the element that occurs as optative at least can always also have the function of
Nakanishi & Rullmann's (2009) concessive 'at least'. Importantly it often falls into more
than one of these categories within a language, as we see below, indicating a fundamental
connection between such meanings as the meaning of 'even', the meaning of 'although'
and the meaning of concessive at least125. Let me review a number of languages in turn.
Let us start with Russian. First of all, we observe that xotja 'at least' occurs in
optatives, (727a), but is ungrammatical in the neutral at least cases that I tested above, cf.
(727b+c).
(727) a. Esli by Vanja xotja by poslusha-1 Mash-u! Russian
if subj Vanja.nom at.least subj listen-past.m.sg Masha-acc
'If at least Vanja had listened to Masha!'
b. V etoj muke po krajnej mere / kak minimum / *xotja chetyre jabloka.
in this bag at least as minimum at.least four apples
'In this bag, there are at least four apples.'
c. V avarii pogiblo po krajnej mere / kak minimum / *xotja pjat' chelovek.
in accident died at least as minimum at.least five men
'At least five people died in the car accident.'
Strikingly, we do find cases where xotja 'at least' can occur meaning at least, (728a+b),
and as Ionin (2001) remarks, xotja 'at least' is bad in non-emotive clauses. This leads me
to conjecture that xotja 'at least' like German wenigstens 'at least' only has a concessive
reading, in accordance with the analysis that I posit below for at least in optatives. I will
come back to this later.
125 See Rullmann & Nakanishi (2009) on the connection between even and at least.
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(728) a. (Xotja by) ODIN mal'6ik videl KAZDUJU devo'ku.
at.least one boy saw every girl
'At least one boy saw every girl.'
(Ionin 2001:26, Stepanov & Stateva 2009:178, emphasis mine)
b. Bud' xot' nemnogo vnimatelen.
be at.least a.little attentive
'Be at least a little attentive.'
(Iordanskaja & Mel'euk 2004:17, emphasis and glosses mine)
c. Nu on xotj/xotja by vyigral chto-to!
well he.nom at.least won:m.sg something
'Well, at least he won something!'
Even more interestingly, xotja 'at least' also has the concessive meaning 'although, even
though', (729), which shows a transition from being an AT LEAST type element to a DOCH
type element. We will see the relevance of this observation in the next chapter.
(729) a. Moi druz'ja nikogda nicego ne citajut. Xotja eto ne sovsem tak.
my friends never nothing not read although this not entirely so
'My friends never read anything. Well, that's not quite true. [...]'
(Neeleman & Titov 2009:516, emphasis mine)
b. He has already read (at least some of The Fortress once)...
Xotja on ne do-aita-l do konca.
even.though he not PF-read-PST.3s until end
'Even though he did not finish it.'
(Altshuler 2010:78, emphasis and context line mine)
c. Cemodan tjai6lyj/gkij, xotja i ne oven'
suitcase light/heavy although prt not very
'The suitcase is light/heavy, although not very.'
(Lordanskaja & Mel'euk 2004:9, emphasis and glosses mine)
Russian thus fits the picture that we have constructed so far; xotja 'at least' seems to
share semantic content both with concessive at least and with German doch (a contrast
marker).
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Let us now have a look at Polish. Polish also seems to employ a variant of 'at least' in
optatives that exclusively has the concessive reading. As shown in (730), co najmniej 'at
least' must be used in order to achieve the intended neutral reading; chociat 'at least' is
possibly but entails a positive evaluation of the event - it only has the concessive reading.
(730) a. Gdyby / Zeby Jan chociai (po)sluchal Marii! Polish
if if John at.least listen.(perf.)pret.3sg.m Mary.gen.nom.f
'If at least Jan had listened to Mary!'
b. W torbie sq co najmniej / (#)chociai cztery jablka.
in bag are at least at.least four apples
co najmniej => 'In this bag, there are at least four apples.'
chocias = 'Luckily, there were four applies in the bag.'
c. W wypadku (samochodowym) bylo co najmniej / (#)chociai pied ofiar.
in accident car was at least at.least five casualties
co najmniej => 'At least five people died in the car accident.'
chociaz = 'It is good that there were five casualties (more would have
been better).'
The fact that chociaz 'at least' has a concessive reading is further supported by the fact
that the most natural context for chocias is in clauses like (731).
(731) No, chociai cos wygralismy Polish
well at.least something won.2pl.past
'Well, at least you won something.'
As with Russian xotja 'at least', Polish chociaz 'at least' (which is possibly a cognate)
exhibits semantic drift and can also be used to mean 'although'.
(732) a. Kupil cukier, chociai mial go w domu. Polish
bought sugar although had it in home
'He bought sugar, although he had it at home.'
(http://pl.wiktionary.org/wiki/chociat, verification courtesy of Bartosz Wiland)
b. Jan nie dostal pracy, chociai chial.
John not got job although tried
'John didn't get the job, although he tried.'
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Finnish and Romanian are somewhat more difficult to integrate into our present picture.
Let me first briefly review Finnish. First of all, we observe that edes 'at least', which is
the 'at least'-type item that we find in optatives, (733a), also has a use as an even-type
NPI, cf. (733c) versus (733b). It does not occur in canonical 'at least' contexts, (733b+d).
(733) a. olisi-pa John edes kuunnellut Maria!
be.cond-PA John at.least listen Mari.part
'If only John had at least listened to Mary!'
b. tassa pussissa on ainakin / vahintan /*edes
this.iness bag.iness is.3sg at.least at.least at.least
'There are at least four apples in this bag.'
c. tassa pussissa ei ole edes neljaa omenaa
this.iness bag.iness not be even four apple.par
'In this bag, there are not even four apples.'
d. Auto-onnettomuudessa kuoli ainakin/vahintaan/*edes
car-accident.iness died.3sg at.least/at.least/at.least










In modal contexts, edes 'at least' can have both an EVEN-type interpretation (if it is in the
scope of negation), (734a), as well as an AT LEAST-type interpretation (if it is not in the
scope of negation), (734b). Finally, we see that edes 'at least' again also has a concessive
at least meaning, (734c); it is thus an element that only expresses concessive at least and
not canonical at least.
(734) a. Ala edes kuvittele! Finnish
don't even think.imperative
'Don't you even/*at least think!'
b. Voisit edes lahettaa hanelle kortin.
can.cond at.least send him.all card.gen
'You could at least/#even send her/him a card.'
(http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/edes, verification courtesy of Mikko Kupula)
c. No, voitti(han) han edes jotakin.
well win(prt) he at.least something
'Well, at least he won something!'
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Romanian patterns very much like Finnish, with macar, the optative 'at least'-type
element, (735a) also behaving as an NPI, (735c) versus (735b+d).
(735) a. Dacd Jon micar ar fi ascultat de Mary! Romanian
if Jon at.least had listened of Mary
'If only John had at least listened to Mary!'
b. Sunt cel putin/ *macar patru mere in punga asta.
are at least at.least four apples in bag this
'There are at least four apples in this bag.'
c. Nu am nici mAcar 4 mere.
not have not even four apples
'I don't even have four apples'
d. In accidentul de masina au fost cel putin / *micar cinci accidentati.
in the.accident of car have been at least at.least five casualties
'In the car accident, there were at least five casualties.'
Again, if we look past the initial examples, we see instantly that macar 'at least' can
occur outside of NPI-licensing contexts, with the meaning of concessive at least, (736).
This again indicates that macar 'at least' has the meaning of concessive at least, but not
the meaning of canonical at least.
(736) Micar a castigat ceva! Romanian
at.least has won something
'At least he has won something!'
So, it does seem in place to draw an overall conclusion that all of the languages discussed
above employ an AT LEAST in optatives that can also mean AT LEAST in other contexts -
either (in many languages) canonical AT LEAST, or (in German, Russian, Polish, Finnish
and Romanian) concessive AT LEAST. I propose that AT LEAST in optatives is always an
instance of concessive AT LEAST. This conclusion will be backed up further in the next
sections.
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6.3.3 The Missing Link: Concessive At Least
The purpose of this section is to review our knowledge of concessive at least and to make
the connection between concessive at least and optative at least. Nakanishi & Rullmann
(2009) discuss the ambiguous nature of English at least. They argue that English at least
has two readings, which they call its epistemic reading, (737), and its concessive reading,
(738).
(737) epistemic at least 126
||at leastl(C)(p)(w) is defined iff
3w'[Epist(w,w') A 3q E C [q> p A q(w') = 1]] UNCERTAINTY
"CI / Presupposition: The speaker is unsure whether a higher scalar value holds or not."
If defined, then
||at leastl(C)(p)(w) = 1 iff 3q E C [q > p A q(w) = 1] ASSERTION
"Truth Conditional Content: The modified proposition or a higher scalar value holds."
(slightly modified from Nakanishi & Rullmann 2009, paraphrases are mine)
(738) concessive at least
||at leastll(C)(p)(w) is defined iff
Vr,r' E C [r' > r + r' is preferred to r] BOULETIC SCALE
"CI / Presupposition 1: Relevant alternatives are ordered according to preference."
3q E C [q> p] BETTER ALTERNATIVE
"CI / Presupposition 2: There is a salient alternative that is more preferable than p."
3q E C [q < p] WORSE ALTERNATIVE
"CI / Presupposition 3: There is a salient alternative that is less preferable than p."
If defined, then
||at leastl(C)(p)(w) = p(w) ASSERTION
"Truth Conditional Content: Concessive at least is truth-conditionally vacuous."
(slightly modified from Nakanishi & Rullmann 2009, paraphrases are mine)
126 Nakanishi & Rullmann (2009) treat the uncertainty contribution as a conventional implicature, whereas I
treat it as a definedness condition. In the scope of my project, this distinction is not at stake, which is why I
uniformly model such non-truth-functional meanings as definedness conditions / presuppositions. Note:
Nakanishi & Rullmann (2009) acknowledge Krifka (1999), Geurts & Nouwen (2007) and BUring (2008) as
the basis of their analysis.
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The core difference is that epistemic at least conveys epistemic uncertainty as to which
focus alternative holds, (739a), whereas concessive at least conveys a commitment to the
expressed proposition, coupled with a positive evaluation, (739b).
(739)a. Mary on at least a silver medal. (epistemic)
=> The speaker is uncertain about what medal Mary won.
b. Mary didn't win a gold medal, but at least she won a silver medal. (concessive)
=> Although winning a silver medal is less preferable than winning a gold
medal, a silver medal is satisfactory.
(Nakanishi & Rullmann 2009)
Let me briefly review the properties of concessive at least and then proceed to argue that
optative at least is always concessive at least.
First of all, Nakanishi & Rullmann argue that languages differ in which lexical items
have an epistemic reading and which lexical items have a concessive reading. They
present the overview in (740), where E stands for epistemic reading and C stands for
concessive reading.
(740) language item only E E or C only C
English at least 
-
at the very least -
Dutch tenminste 
-




(Nakanishi & Rullmann 2009)
In light of this distinction, I will argue that the languages that exhibit optative at least
always employ concessive at least in optatives, i.e. the element that we seen in optatives
either has both readings or only the concessive reading, (741).
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(741) language item only C E or C




Spanish al menos - V
Portuguese ao menos - /
Catalan almenys - /
Greek tulachiston - /
Hebrew le-faxot -
German wenigstens / -
Serbian/Croatian makar / -
Russian xotja / -
Polish chociaz / -
Finnish edes / -
Romanian macar / -
While this will not be useful for our investigation (given that English does not allow for
at least in optatives), Nakanishi & Rullmann (2009) present the data set in (742), which I
report as it is useful for the reader to probe her/his own intuitions.
(742) a. Mary won at least a silver medal.
b. Mary at least won a silver medal.
c. At least Mary won a silver medal.
d. Mary won a silver medal at least.





Much more importantly, as we will be employing this as a diagnostic for concessive
readings, Nakanishi & Rullmann show that epistemic readings are odd whenever we
know that the higher values on a salient scale do not hold, (743)+(744).
(743) a. # Mary didn't win a gold medal, but she won at least a silver medal.
b. Mary didn't win a gold medal, but at least she won a silver medal.




(744) a. # Mary doesn't have three children, but she has at least two. (only E)
b. Mary doesn't have three children, but at least she has two. (/C)
(Nakanishi & Rullmann 2009)
The following examples briefly illustrate four further properties of concessive at least,
which I will come back to later.
First, utterances with concessive at least entail the denoted proposition, which is not
the case with epistemic at least.
(745) a. Mary is at least an associate professor. (E)
Mary is an associate professor.
b. At least Mary is an associate professor. (C)
=> Mary is an associate professor.
(Nakanishi & Rullmann 2009)
Second, concessive at least conveys that higher values are preferable over lower values,
which is not the case for epistemic at least.
(746) a. Mary fired at least five employees. (E)
=> No preference.
b. At least Mary fired five employees. (C)
=> Better to fire more employees.
(Nakanishi & Rullmann 2009)
Third, concessive at least conveys that the speaker (or another salient attitude holder) is
'settling for less', in a way in which epistemic at least does not convey this.
(747) a. Phelps won at least eight gold medals. (E)
=> Neutral.
b.# At least Phelps won eight gold medals. (C)
=> Winning eight gold medals falls short of an intended goal or standard.
(Nakanishi & Rullmann 2009)
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Fourth and finally, concessive at least maintains the same scalar implicature that we find
in clauses without at least.
(748) a. Mary wrote at least four novels. (E)
=> No scalar implicature.
b. (At least) Mary wrote four novels. (C)
=> Mary didn't write more than 4 novels.
(Nakanishi & Rullmann 2009)
The next section is dedicated to connecting optative at least to Nakanishi & Rullmann's
concessive at least.
6.3.4 A Generalized Concessive At Least for Optatives and Beyond
The proposal that I wish to defend is that optative at least always has the semantics of
concessive at least, as given in (749). I differ from Nakanishi & Rullmann (2009) in
assuming that at least combines with a contextually provided scale argument S. This has
the advantage that we now have a means of identifying the scale on EX with the scale
argument of at least, and it further allows us to connect S on at least to different attitude
holders.
(749) ||at leastc||g' = XS.p:
S is a bouletic ordering A BOULETIC
"Presupposition 1: The contextually salient scale is a bouletic scale."12
3r E g(C) [r >s p] A 3q E g(C) [p >s q] . SECOND CHOICE
"Presupposition 2: With respect to the relevant preferences, p is good but not optimal."
p IDENTITY
"Truth Conditional Content: Concessive at least is truth-conditionally vacuous."
127 Recall that in English, optative only seems to have acquired such a presupposition as well, as shown in
(583).
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The assumption that optative at least is an instance of concessive at least has several
implications. Most crucially, it implicates that optatives will always use an at least type
element that has either only a concessive reading or both a concessive reading and an
epistemic reading; optatives will never use an at least type element that has only an
epistemic reading. We have already seen in the section before last that Russian, Polish,
Romanian, Finnish, German and Serbian have at-least-optatives that employ a
specialized concessive at least. The core question that now arises is the following. We
know that many languages (like Spanish, Portuguese, Catalan, etc) use the same at least
in epistemic at least contexts and in optatives. Is there evidence that in all these
languages said at least type element also has a concessive reading? I will discuss this in a
moment. But first, it is worth casting a second look at German, which is the main object
language in this dissertation. What we find is that German exhibits roughly the pattern
that we expect. First, we see that wenigstens 'at least' has a concessive reading, whereas
mindestens 'at least' has only an epistemic reading, cf. (750a). Second, we see that
wenigstens 'at least' has only a concessive reading; the positive implicature (it is good
that...) cannot be canceled, cf. (750b). So we can conclude that German has both a
designated concessive at least (wenigstens) and a designated epistemic one (mindestens).
(750)a. Er hat keine Goldmedaille gewonnen, aber wenigstens / #mindestens
he has no gold.medal won but at.least(C) at.least(E)
eine Silbermedaille.
a silver.medal
'He didn't win a gold medal, but at least he won a silver medal.'
b. Bei dem Unfall gab es #wenigstens / mindestens finf Tote.
at the accident gave it at.least(E) at.least(C) five deads
'There were at least five casualties in the accident.'
As expected, only the concessive at least can be used in optatives, whereas the purely
epistemic at least is incompatible.
(751) a. Wenn Hans wenigstens eine Bronzemedaille gewonnen hatte!
if Hans at.least(C) a bronze.medal won had
'If at least Hans had won a bronze medal!' (optative)
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b.# Wenn Hans mindestens eine Bronzemedaille gewonnen hatte!
if Hans at.least(E) a bronze.medal won had
'If Hans had won at least a bronze medal...' (incomplete conditional)
Note that zumindest 'at least' is an interesting in-between case, as it does have a
concessive reading, (752a), as well as an epistemic reading, (752b), yet it is not sufficient
to license optativity, (752c). I interpret this as indicating that prototypical optative
particles must in many cases be able to disambiguate between a conditional reading and
an optative reading, and zumindest 'at least' is too frequently used in the epistemic non-
concessive sense to achieve this feat.
(752) a. Er hat keine Goldmedaille gewonnen, aber zumindesteine Silbermedaille.
he has no gold.medal won but at.least a silver.medal
'He didn't win a gold medal, but at least he won a silver medal.'
b. Bei dem Unfall gab es zumindest funf Tote.
at the accident gave it at.least five deads
'There were at least five casualties in the accident.'
c.??Wenn Hans zumindest eine Bronzemedaille gewonnen hatte!
if Hans at.least a bronze.medal won had
'If at least Hans had won a bronze medal!'
After this brief discussion of German, let us review the languages discussed above to
show that the evidence is consistent with an analysis that assumes that they all use
concessive at least in optatives (and not epistemic at least). Specifically, we have seen
above that languages like Spanish, Portuguese, Catalan, etc, use an element in optatives
that does have an epistemic at least reading. I now show that the same element always
also has a concessive at least reading. The following examples from Hebrew, Greek,
Czech and Spanish indicate that this is the case128
128 Note that this diagnostic is not perfect. The examples in (i)+(ii) show that Finnish edes does not pass
these diagnostics even though it clearly has a concessive at least reading, as in (iii). We thus need to be
careful not to overrate false negatives. (Another language that yields false negatives here is Portuguese.) I
interpret these facts as indicating that concessive at least may sometimes just be blocked by a more specific
concessive construction type.
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(753)a. lu John haya
if.cf John be.past.3sg




lo zaxta be-medalyat zahav, aval le-faxot hi
not won in-medal gold but at-least she
zaxta be-medalyat
won in-medal
'Mary didn't win a gold medal, but at least she won a silver medal.'
c. le-Mary eyn SloSa yeladim, aval le-faxot
to-Mary not.exist three children but at-least



















nevyhrila zlatou medaili, ale vyhrila aspon stfibrnou.
neg:won gold medal but won at.least silver
didn't win a gold medal, but at least she won a silver medal.'
nemi tfi deti, ale
neg:has three children but
doesn't have three children, but
mi aspon dve.
has at.least two
at least she has two.'
(755)a. An tulachiston o John iche akusi
if at.least the John.nom had.3sg listened
















'Mary didn't win a gold medal, but at least she won a silver medal.'
i. Mari ei voittanut kultamitalia, mutta han voitti sentaan/*edes hopeaa
Mari.nom neg win goldmedal, but she won nevertheless/*at.least silver
ii. Marilla ei ole kolmea lasta, mutta hanella on (niita) sentaan/*edes kaksi
Mari.ades neg be three children.part,but she.ades is (them)nevertheless/*at.least two
iii. no, voitti(han) han edes/sentaan jotakin













c. I Maria dhen echi tria pedhja, ala tulachiston echi dhio.
the Maria not has three children but at.least has two












gano una medalla de oro, pero al





'Mary didn't win a gold medal, but at least she won a silver medal.'
c. Maria no tiene tres hijos, pero
Maria not has three sons but
'Mary doesn't have three children, but
al menos tiene dos.
at least has two
at least she has two.'
At this point it is worth showing that this test also works for languages that have an
exclusively concessive at least in optatives. We have seen above that Romanian has an
element macar 'at least', which occurs in optatives but otherwise does not appear to have
the meaning and function of at least (epistemic at least, that is); at the same time it can
occur in negative contexts, meaning even.
(757) a. DacA Jon micar ar fi ascultat de
if Jon at.least had listened of











four apples in this
mere in punga asta.
apples in bag this
bag.'
c. Nu am nici micar 4 mere.
not have not even four apples







If macar 'at least' really has the semantics of concessive 'at least', we expect it to occur
in the prototypical contexts from Nakanishi & Rullmann (2009). This prediction is











'Mary didn't win a gold medal, but at least she won a silver medal.'
b. Maria nu are trei copii,
Maria not has three children
'Mary doesn't have three children,
dar micar are
but at.least has
but at least she has
Similarly, Polish chociaz 'at least', which we saw to occur in optatives, clearly passes the
test.
a. Gdyby / Zeby Jan chociaz (po)sluchal
if if John at.least listen.(perf.)pret.3sg.m
'If at least Jan had listened to Mary!'
Marii! Polish
Mary.gen.nom.f
nie zdobyla ziotego medalu, ale chociat zdobyla srebrny.
not receive gold medal but at.least receive silver




dzieci, ale ma chociai dwoje.
children but has at.least two
children, but at least she has two.'
We thus have conclusive evidence that optatives employ concessive at least (as opposed
to epistemic at least). The next section now addresses the role of concessive at least in
optatives.
6.3.5 Mitigating Expressives: On the role of At Least in Exclamations
What is the role of concessive at least in optatives? In this section, I argue that it
















information that the speaker considers the expressed proposition satisfactory, but not
optimal. This follows from the 'settling for less' component of the semantics of
concessive at least that Nakanishi & Rullmann (2009) observe, cf. (760).
(760) ||at leastc||g''= IS.p :
S is a bouletic ordering A BOULETIC
"Presupposition 1: The contextually salient scale is a bouletic scale."
3r E g(C) [r >s p] A 3q E g(C) [p >s q] . SECOND CHOICE
"Presupposition 2: With respect to the relevant preferences, p is good but not optimal."
p IDENTITY
"Truth Conditional Content: Concessive at least is truth-conditionally vacuous."
Focusing on German, we can easily illustrate that this component is present. Consider the
following scenario from Villalta (2007); Victoria (the speaker) hopes that Sofia will bring
chocolate cake to her picnic. Victoria's second choice is apple pie and she really hates ice
cream.
(761) preferences beliefs
most desirable .----- chocolate cake ...... most unlikely / least likely
..... apple pie ........................ *
least desirable ice cream --------.......-------- most likely / least unlikely
(adapted from Villalta 2007:102+103)
What the optative-at-least-as-concessive-at-least analysis predicts is that we should be
able to use wenigstens 'at least' if and only if the wish that we express is for the second
choice, namely apple pie. By virtue of the fact that a better option must be available, it
should not be possible to use wenigstens 'at least' to express a wish for the first choice,
which would be the optimal scenario.
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This is indeed the case. As shown in (762), wenigstens 'at least' can be used when we
express a wish for apple pie, (762b), but not when we express a wish for chocolate cake,
(762a). Naturally, a wish for vanilla ice cream is independently deviant, (762c).
(762)a. Ach, wenn sie doch / ?nur / #wenigstens einen Schokokuche
oh if she doch only at.least an chocolate.cak
'If only she had brought an chocolate cake!'
b. Ach, wenn sie ??doch / nur / wenigstens einen Apfelkuchen
oh if she doch only at.least an apple.cake
'If only she had brought an apple cake!'
c. Ach, wenn sie #doch /#nur / #wenigstens Vanilleeis
oh if she doch only at.least vanilla.ice.cream











Note that, as predicted by my approach, the contributions of different particles add up
(they do not cancel each other). So, any optative that contains wenigstens 'at least' ends
up being a 'compromise optative' where the speaker is settling for less. This accounts for
the fact that in (763a+b) only a wish for an apple cake is permissible and not a wish for
chocolate cake.
(763)a. Wenn sie doch wenigstens einen Apfelkuchen/#Schokokuchen gebracht hitte!
if she doch at.least an apple.cake/#chocolate.cake brought had
'If only she had brought an apple pie/chocolate cake!'
b. Wenn sie nur wenigstens einen Apfelkuchen/#Schokokuchen gebracht hatte!
if she only at.least an apple.cake/#chocolate.cake brought had
'If only she had brought an apple pie/chocolate cake!'
How is the 'settling for less' presupposition of wenigstens 'at least' satisfied in an
optative? It follows from the semantics of concessive at least that there must be a salient
proposition in the context that is more desirable to the speaker. This accounts for the fact
that at-least-optatives are typically perceived to be deviant in an out-of-the-blue context.
(764) Wenn ich doch / nur / #wenigstens reich ware!
if I doch only at.least rich were
'If only I were rich!'
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The salient more preferable proposition can be introduced overtly, e.g. by means of a
separate optative, as shown in (765) or, a more natural example, in (766).
(765) a. Ach, wenn ich doch nur allmachtig und berUhmt ware!
oh if I doch only omnipotent and famous were
'If only I omnipotent and famous!'
b. Oder wenn ich wenigstens reich ware!
or if I at.least rich were
'Or at least if only I were rich!'
(766) Ach, wenn sie doch einen Schokokuchen gebracht hatte!
oh if she doch an chocolate.cake brought had
'If only she had brought an chocolate cake!'
Oder wenn sie wenigstens einen Apfelkuchen gebracht hatte!
or if she at.least an apple.cake brought had
'Or if at least she had brought an apple cake!'
However, while the better alternative can be overtly given, it is sufficient for such a better
proposition to be independently salient in the context, as shown in (767).
(767) Erst viertel auf zehn? ... Mir kommt vor, ich sitz' schon drei Stunden in dem
Konzert. Ich bin's halt nicht gewohnt ... Was ist es denn eigentlich? Ich muB das
Programm anschauen ... Ja, richtig: Oratorium! Ich hab' gemeint: Messe. Solche
Sachen gehbren doch nur in die Kirche! Die Kirche hat auch das Gute, daB man
jeden Augenblick fortgehen kann. - Wenn ich wenigstens einen Ecksitz hitt'! -
Also Geduld, Geduld! Auch Oratorien nehmen ein End'! Vielleicht ist es sehr
sch6n, und ich bin nur nicht in der Laune.
'Only quarter to ten? ... I feel like I've been sitting in this concert for three hours.
Well, I'm not used to it ... What is it anyway? I'll have to look at the program ...
Yes, of course: An oratorio! I meant: A mass. Such things belong into a church!
A church also has the advantage that one can leave at any time. - If at least I had
a corner seat! - So, patience, patience! Even oratorios end at some stage! Maybe
it's very nice, and I'm just not in the mood.'
(A. Schnitzler: Leutnant Gust)
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At this point we can now ask: How does wenigstens 'at least' act as a licensor of
optativity? As with nur 'only', I argue that wenigstens 'at least' has two functions: First,
it can eliminate competing readings for an ambiguous utterance. Second, by virtue of its
inherently bouletic and preference-oriented nature, it can make an optative reading
salient. Example (768), which is, in the absence of wenigstens 'at least' ambiguous
between an optative interpretation and a polar exclamative interpretation, is
disambiguated by virtue of wenigstens 'at least'.
(768) a. Hatte die dem (doch) wenigstens tatsachlich das Buch gegeben!
hadsubj she him doch at.least indeed the book given
lit. Hadsubunctive she at least indeed given him the book!
b. 'If only she had at least given him the book!' opt.
c.* '[It's shocking that] she would have at least given him the book!' p. exc.
This follows if wenigstens 'at least' has a scalar argument with a definedness condition
that the contextually salient scale is a bouletic scale and the scales on EX and AT LEAST
must be co-bound, as in (769), cf. section 6.2.5. Given that concessive AT LEAST requires
its scale to be bouletic, the scale on EX will also end up being bouletic, eliminating a
polar exclamative reading (under which EX combines with an inverse likelihood scale).
Again, AT LEAST "licenses" optativity by virtue of eliminating competing readings. This
further strengthens a view under which prototypical optative elements license optativity




binds AT LEAST Si
Note that the proposal in (769) supports the idea above that (467) and (468b) are factive
optative clauses, as they are exclamations that contain wenigstens 'at least'.
6.3.6 Interim Summary
The goal of this section was to show that the connection between AT LEAST and optativity
is cross-linguistically wide-spread and follows from a uniform analysis of optative at
least and concessive at least. The function of at least in optatives is to show a willingness
to compromise and at the same time to emphasize the speaker's desperation in the actual
situation (which is undesirable). This is achieved by virtue of the settling for less
component of concessive at least.
6.4 Wenn ich doch konnte... - A uniform approach to the particle doch
The third prototypically optative particle that I discuss in this dissertation is German
doch, which also licenses optativity, as shown in the following example (contrasting it
with Dutch toch, a close counterpart).
(770) a. Als Jan toch eens naar Marie had geluistered! Dutch12 1
if Jan TOCH once to Marie had listened
'If only Jan had listened to Marie!'
b. Wenn Otto doch auf seine Mutter gehrt hatte! German
if Otto DOCH to his mother listened had
'If only Otto had listened to his mother!'
(771) a. Je kunt toch nergens heen. Dutch
you can TOCH nowhere to
'You can't go anywhere, for sure.' (de Vriendt et al. 1991)
b. Du kannst doch nirgends hin. German
you can DOCH nowhere to
'You can't go anywhere, for sure.'
129 Dutch differs from German in that toch only occurs in optatives in combination with eens (literally
'once'). De Vriendt et al. (1991) compare Dutch eens to German mal, which also occurs in optatives
(typically in non-counterfactual variants), cf. Scholz (1991). I will not discuss this in detail here.
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While German doch and Dutch toch may seem rather exotic, I conjecture that the contrast
meaning that they convey is rather typical for optatives. For instance, we have already
seen that the Polish concessive at least, chociaz 'at least' also has a use as a
conjunction/complementizer, meaning 'although'.
(772) a. Gdyby / Zeby Jan chociai (po)sluchal
if if John at.least listen.(perf.)pret.3sg.m
'If at least Jan had listened to Mary!'
b. Jan nie dostal pracy, chociaz chial.
John not got job although tried
'John didn't get the job, although he tried.'
Marii! Polish
Mary.gen.nom.f
Similarly, German doch has a use as a complementizer/conjunction, meaning roughly
'however'.
(773) Hans hat den Job nicht gekriegt, doch er hat
Hans has the job not gotten doch he has
'Hans didn't get the job; however, he did try.'
versucht. German
tried
For now, I will focus on German, but I maintain that the analysis in this section may be
applicable to other languages as well. The analysis I argue for is shown in (774).
(774) ||dochc|I|' "= Xp:
3q E g(C) [p # q &- [p(w) A q(w)]] A CONFLICT
"Presupposition 1: The modified proposition is in conflict with a salient alternative."
p n Doxspeaker(w) = 0 v ,p n Doxspeaker(w) = 0 . FAMILIARITY
"Presupposition 2: The modified proposition is resolved (as true or false)."
p IDENTITY
"Truth Conditional Content: doch is truth-conditionally vacuous."
(based on Grosz 2010, Kratzer & Matthewson 2009)
The next section reviews facts on doch in declarative statements. I then proceed to posit a
uniform analysis for doch in optatives and declaratives.
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6.4.1 Truth and Conflict - the role of unstressed doch
The discussion in this section is based on Grosz (2010, 2011). I will only review some
aspects of the discussion in Grosz (2010, 2011) and I refer the reader to these papers for
additional information. First of all, we are only interested in the unstressed version of
German doch, cf. Abraham (1991), Biritny (2009), Doherty (1985, 1987), Jacobs (1991),
Karagjosova (2001, 2004, 2008), Lindner (1991), Ormelius-Sandblom (1997), Repp
(2009), Thurmair (1989) and Zeevat (2003), as this is the element we find in optatives.
(775)a. Wenn Otto doch auf seine Mutter geh6rt hatte! German
if Otto DOCH to his mother listened had
'If only Otto had listened to his mother!'
b.#Wenn Otto DOCH auf seine Mutter geh6rt hatte!
if Otto DOCH to his mother listened had
'If only Otto had listened to his mother!'
It can be shown that unstressed doch in declaratives has two functions; the first function
is to mark its complement proposition as 'familiar / old / given / shared / uncontroversial'
and the second function is to convey some notion of 'contrast / correction'. In this sense,
Grosz (2010) argues that we can approximate the meaning of doch as in (776).
(776) For any sentence p, Ildoch p|4 (where c is the utterance context) is only defined if:
a. The speaker in c takes p to be firmly established in we and therefore assumes
that it is safe to discard -p as a possible answer to the question of whether p
or -p holds in we.
(based on Kratzer & Matthewson's 2009 meaning ofja)
b. There is a contextually salient proposition q, such that
i. q is a focus alternative ofp
ii. the current utterance context c entails -, [p and q]
(cf. Abraham 1991, Biritny 2009, Doherty 1985, Ormelius-Sandblom 1997)
If defined, Ildochp = |4 II0.
(Grosz 2010)
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The factivity component of doch in declaratives, (776a), can be inferred from contrasts
such as the following. The particle doch (on a par with German ja) is used in declaratives
whenever the modified proposition is old information and presupposed to be true.
(777) a. Context: Speaker and hearer are both well aware that the hearer has been to
Paris before, and the speaker wants to make this fact salient in order to follow
up on it.
Du warst ja / doch / #DOCH / #0 schon in Paris.
you were ja doch #DOCH #0 already in Paris
'You've [ja / doch / #DOCH / #0] already been to Paris.'
b. Context: The hearer is an amnesiac and believes that she has never been to
Paris. The speaker doesn't know whether the hearer has been, and discovers
an old flight ticket to Paris with the hearer's name on it.
Du warst #ja / #doch / DOCH / 0 schon in Paris.
you were #ja #doch DOCH 0 already in Paris
'You've [#ja / #doch / DOCH / 0] already been to Paris.'
(Grosz 2010)
The contrast/conflict component of doch, (776b), manifests itself in examples such as the
following.
(778) a. Jan muss nicht kochen. Er hat doch abgewaschen.
Jan needs not cook he has doch washed.up
'Jan doesn't need to cook. He [doch] washed up.'
b. presuppositions triggered by doch:
i. The speaker takes [p Jan washed up] to be firmly established in we.
ii. There is a contextually salient focus alternative ofp, namely [q Jan needs
to cook], and the current utterance context entails , [pg Jan washed up
and Jan needs to cook]
(Grosz 2010)
(779) a. Context: I wake up on a Sunday at 6AM, because the neighbors are drilling.
Heute ist doch Sonntag!
today is doch Sunday
'Today is [doch] Sunday!' (roughly: 'But today is Sunday!')
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b. presuppositions triggered by doch:
i. The speaker takes [p today is Sunday] to be firmly established in we.
ii. There is a contextually salient focus alternative ofp, namely [q today it's
ok to drill], and the current utterance context entails , [,&q today is
Sunday and today it's ok to drill]
(Grosz 2010)
Grosz (2010) argues that doch conveys contradictoriness between the modified
proposition p and the salient alternative q (rather than simple contrast). The idea is that a
doch utterance will always pick the most salient focus alternative from the immediately
preceding context, and that a sequence of -(q) -- doch(p) will always be understood as
-(q) because doch(p), where q is the salient alternative for p. This assumption is
motivated by our intuitive understanding of sequences such as (778), though we currently
do not have a theory of discourse flow that explains for this connection. Crucially, the
idea is that unstressed doch is illformed in (780), because the presupposition that Hans
cannot be both atheist and liberal/green fails in a context where we actually expect that
someone (e.g. Hans) who is an atheist is also liberal/green. At this point, it is worth
pointing out that the extension to optatives also works if doch expresses simple contrast
as opposed to contradictoriness. I will thus no longer dwell on this issue here.
(780) a. So gut wie jeder Atheist ist liberal und grUn. Hans ist die Ausnahme.
as good as every atheist is liberal and green Hans is the exception
Er ist nicht liberal. Er ist nicht grin. -- Er ist (#doch) Atheist!
he is not liberal he is not green he is doch atheist
'As good as every atheist is liberal and green. Hans is the exception. He is not
liberal. He is not green. -- He is (#doch) an atheist!'
b. problematic presuppositions triggered by doch:
i. The speaker takes [p Hans is an atheist] to be firmly established in we.
ii. There is a contextually salient focus alternative ofp, namely [q Hans is
liberal and green], and the current utterance context entails , [p&q Hans is
an atheist and Hans is liberal and green]
(Grosz 2010)
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In brief, what we observe is that doch has a mediating role with respect to established
truth (i.e. what the speaker takes to be established) and conflict (i.e. some proposition in
the context that contradicts what the discourse participants should assume to be correct,
according to the speaker).
Crucially, at first sight doch in optatives seems fundamentally distinct from doch in
declaratives. While declarative doch implies the truth of the modified proposition (it is
veridical), (781 a), optative doch has exactly the inverse property: It implies the falsity of
the modified proposition, (78 1b). One may thus generalize to the worst case scenario and
posit a specialized "optative doch", which only occurs in optatives.
(781) a. Context: I wake up on a Sunday at 6AM, because the neighbors are drilling.
Heute ist doch Sonntag!
today is doch Sunday
'Today is [doch] Sunday!' (roughly: 'But today is Sunday!')
=> it is presupposed to be true that today is Sunday
b. Ach, ware heute doch Sonntag!
oh were today doch Sunday
'Oh, if only today were Sunday!'
=> it is presupposed to be false that today is Sunday
Grosz (2011) argues that a unified analysis for declarative doch and optative doch is
nevertheless desirable, and proposes that optatives and declaratives are different speech
acts. Consequently, declarative doch presupposes that the modified proposition is
established to be true, whereas optative doch presupposes that the modified proposition is
established to be desired by the speaker. In the following section, I pursue a different
analysis, based on a paradigm not considered in Grosz (2011). The idea is that doch is
always the same element and it simply presupposes non-contingency, i.e. it presupposes
that the modified proposition is either true or false, but it cannot be unresolved for doch
to be well-formed.
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6.4.2 Doch or not Doch? - On the benefits of a uniform approach
I propose that unstressed doch uniformly has the analysis in (782), where the conflict
presupposition is more or less kept the same as in the preceding section. The familiarity
component has, however, been weakened to a disjunction: What is relevant for doch to be
used is that the modified proposition must be either true or false according to the speaker;
doch cannot be used if it is unresolved whether its complement proposition is true.
(782) ||dochc|','= p :
3q E g(C) [p # q &- [p(w) A q(w)]] A CONFLICT
"Presupposition 1: The modified proposition is in conflict with a salient alternative."
p n Doxspeaker(w) = 0 v , p n Doxspeaker(w) = 0 . FAMILIARITY
"Presupposition 2: The modified proposition is resolved (as true or false)."
p IDENTITY
"Truth Conditional Content: doch is truth-conditionally vacuous."
(based on Grosz 2010, Kratzer & Matthewson 2009)
What is the evidence for the definition in (782)? We have already seen that the conflict
component can be observed in declaratives; it is evident that optatives always involve a
conflict between what is the case (or what might be the case) and what is desired.
The burden of proof is thus on the familiarity component. What is the evidence for
such a disjunctive statement of familiarity? The crucial evidence stems from a broader
perspective on exclamations, like the one I have adopted. Looking at dass-exclamations,
we observe that doch is good in counterfactual optatives, (783a), and in factive polar
exclamatives, (783b); contrastively, doch is ill-formed in non-counterfactual non-factive
optatives, (783c). This follows if doch requires the modified proposition to be non-
contingent, i.e. to be established as either true or false (in the utterance context).
(783) a. Dass Hans doch nur rechtzeitig gekommen ware!
that Hans doch only in.time come were
'If only Hans had come in time!'
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b. Dass Hans doch glatt rechtzeitig
that Hans doch outright in.time
'[I'm surprised] that Hans came in time!'
c. Dass Hans (*doch) nur rechtzeitig
that Hans *doch only in.time





This observation is independent from the shape of the modified utterance. V1-variants
also allow for doch. (We have already seen that non-counterfactual non-factive optatives
do not allow for a V I-variant.)
a. Ware Hans doch nur rechtzeitig
were Hans doch only in.time
'If only Hans had come in time!'
b. Ist Hans doch glatt rechtzeitig
is Hans doch outright in.time
'[I'm surprised] that Hans came in time!'
c. * Ist Hans doch nur rechtzeitig
is Hans doch only in.time







A unified approach also allows us to account for the attested distribution of doch in if-
clauses. The particle doch is only possible in if-clauses that either presuppose that the
modified proposition is true (or may be true), i.e. in so-called factual conditionals, (785b),
or that the modified proposition is false, e.g. in optatives, (785c). It should be pointed out
that this truth/falsity presupposition is a necessary condition for acceptability of doch in
an if-clause, but not a sufficient condition. The particle doch is nevertheless impossible in
canonical subjunctive/counterfactual hypothetical conditional if-clauses (cf. Coniglio
2009, who treats doch as a root clause phenomenon; see also Bayer 2001). For now, I
conjecture that the impossibility of doch in such if-clauses derives from a failure of doch
to access the speaker's knowledge states in such a (structurally low) position'".
130As a consequence, doch must differ from MoodcF in this respect, which is licensed in such if-clauses.
"'
3 Alternatively, the presupposition of truth or falsity that I posit may derive from a more general







(785) a. Wenn Karl doch gewonnen hatte ... dann hatten wir gefeiert!
if Karl doch won had then had we celebrated
'If Karl [doch] had won ... then we would have celebrated!'
b. factual conditional reading:
Since in certain counterfactual circumstances Karl would have won (which we
all know to be true), we would have celebrated under said circumstances!
c. counterfactual optative reading3:
I wish Karl had won (which we all know to be false)! We would have
celebrated!
(Grosz 2011)
I have shown that a weak FAMILIARITY component, as well as a CONFLICT component,
seem to be present in the semantics of unstressed doch both in optative and non-optative
utterances. It thus appears desirable, both for empirical reasons and for reasons of
parsimony, to assume a uniform entry for doch, which is compatible with both utterance
types.
6.4.3 Anguish, Strength and Desirability: On the role of doch in Exclamations
What does doch contribute to an optative? In contrast to nur 'only' and wenigstens 'at
least', doch does not eliminate a polar exclamative reading. Recall that (786) has both an
optative reading and a polar exclamative reading.
(786) a. Hatte die dem tatsachlich das Buch gegeben!
hadsubj she him indeed the book given
lit. Hadsubiunctive she only indeed given him the book!
b. 'If only she had given him the book!' opt.
c. '[It's shocking that] she would have only given him the book!' p. exc.
Matthewson 2009) - this is possibly not satisfied in hypothetical counterfactual conditionals, which are
typically used to discuss what-if situations. See also Grosz (2011) for an alternative perspective on this
issue.
132 This example glosses over the fact that I have argued the optative variant of (785a) to involve two
separate, possibly unconnected utterances, reflected by a perceived intonational break in the locus of '...'
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By contrast, nur 'only' and wenigstens 'at least' disambiguate towards an optative
reading, as shown in (787) and (788).
(787) a. Hitte die dem nur tatsachlich das Buch gegeben!
hadsubj she him only indeed the book given
lit. Hadsubiunctive she only indeed given him the book!
b. 'If only she had given him the book!' opt.
c.* '[It's shocking that] she would have only given him the book!' p. exc.
(788) a. Hitte die dem wenigstens tatsachlich das Buch gegeben!
hadsubj she him at.least indeed the book given
lit. Hadsubunctive she at least indeed given him the book!
b. 'If only she had at least given him the book!' opt.
c.* '[It's shocking that] she would have at least given him the book!' p. exc.
The particle doch cannot do so. In (789), the optative reading and the polar exclamative
reading are still both available.
(789) a. Hitte die dem doch tatsachlich das Buch gegeben!
hadsubj she him doch indeed the book given
lit. Hadsubiunctive she doch indeed given him the book!
b. 'If only she had at least given him the book!' opt.
c. '[It's shocking that] she would have at least given him the book!' p. exc.
In fact, we find that doch sometimes disambiguates towards a polar exclamative reading
when the competing optative reading is non-counterfactual.
(790) a. Dass Hans jetzt tatsachlich rechtzeitig gekommen ist!
that Hans now indeed in.time come is
lit. 'That Hans came in time now!'
b. 'If only Hans did indeed come in time now!' opt.
c. '[It's remarkable] that Hans did indeed come in time now!' p. exc.
(791) a. Dass Hans jetzt doch tatsachlich rechtzeitig gekommen ist!
that Hans now doch indeed in.time come is
lit. 'That Hans came in time now!'
b. * 'If only Hans did indeed come in time now!' opt.
c. '[It's remarkable] that Hans did indeed come in time now!' p. exc.
This comes with some surprise, given that doch is prototypical and frequent in
(counterfactual) optatives (cf. Scholz 1991). So what is the function of doch in optatives
(and exclamations quite generally)? What we observe is the following contrast. While
optatives and polar exclamatives are compatible with unstressed doch, degree
exclamatives are incompatible with this particle.
a. HAtte der doch tatsachlich getanzt!
hadsubj he doch indeed danced
lit. Hadubiunctive he [doch] indeed danced!
b. 'If only he had indeed danced!'
c. '[It's shocking that] he would have danced!'
Po;
a. Mensch, hatte der (#doch) (aber/vielleicht) (#doch)
man hadsubj he #doch but/maybe #doch
lit. Hadu iunctive he [but/maybe] danced!






Unfortunately, it is difficult to construct minimal pairs, as V1 -polar exclamatives seem to
require some element like tatsdchlich 'indeed' or glatt 'outrightly' (cf. Scholz 1991),
while V1-degree exclamatives disallow for such elements. The closest to a minimal pair
that we can construct is given in (794). Here, (794a) with aber 'but' only has a degree
exclamative reading, whereas (794b) with doch only has a polar exclamative reading.
(794)a. Hat der aber / #doch wirklich nochmal Schwein gehabt!
has he but #doch really again pig had






b. Hat der doch / #aber wirklich nochmal Schwein gehabt! polar excl.
has he doch #but really again pig had
'[I'm shocked that] he was lucky again!'
It is thus clear that unstressed doch is only ever compatible with a polar exclamative or
optative reading and never with a degree exclamative reading.
I conjecture that the main function of doch in exclamations is to emphasize a polar
contrast: In optatives, there is a clear-cut contrast between what is desired and the
negation thereof, namely that which is the case. This is illustrated in (795) for an optative.
(795) Hatte der Otto doch nur getanzt!
hadsubj he Otto doch only danced
lit. Hadsubiunctive Otto [doch] indeed danced!
what is desired: Otto danced.
what is the case: - Otto danced
On analogy, a polar exclamative expresses a polar opposition between what is the case
and what was to be expected, as shown in (796).
(796) Hat der Otto doch glatt getanzt!
has he Otto doch outright danced
lit. Otto [doch] indeed danced!
what is the case: Otto danced.
what would have been expected: - Otto danced
We can conjecture that degree exclamatives simply fail to mark a polar contrast, which is
roughly illustrated in (797): The surprising contrast is not between p and -p, but between
a degree that is surprisingly high and a set of degrees that would have been less
surprising.
(797) Hat der Otto (#doch) (aber /vielleicht) getanzt!
has he Otto doch but maybe danced
lit. (Boy,) did Otto dance!
what is the case: Otto danced to a surprisingly high degree d
what would have been expected: Otto danced to some less surprising degree d'
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In this sense, the function of doch is to emphasize a polar contrast, and specifically, in
optatives, it is to emphasize the contrast between what is the case and what is desirable.
This is consistent with the assumption that doch requires its complement proposition to
be either false or true: It may be pragmatically suboptimal to emphasize conflict between
something that may or may not be the case and its polar opposite.
6.4.4 Interim Summary
The goal of this section was to complete our overview on the prototypical particles that
we find in optatives by investigating German doch (the analysis for which should also
carry over to Dutch toch). I proposed that a uniform analysis is possible and desirable for
unstressed doch in declaratives as well as in optatives. The core components of doch are
the marking of its complement proposition as non-contingent (i.e. true or false) and the
presupposition that this proposition is in conflict with some salient alternative (often its
polar opposite).
6.5 Elementary Particles - On Cues and Pragmatic Resolution
Concluding our section on optative particles, I would like to sketch a generalized analysis
of the function of particles in speech act resolution. Specifically, what we find is that
there are different particles associated with different types of utterances. The focus so far
was on doch, nur 'only' and wenigstens 'at least' and their cross-linguistic counterparts.
What we observed was that these particles both license optatives and disambiguate
between different speech acts. Their optativity-licensing property is illustrated in (798).
As indicated, (798) is deviant in the absence of any prototypical particle.
(798) Ware ich #(doch / nur / wenigstens) reich!
were I doch only at.least rich
'If only I were rich!'
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Looking at other constructions in a particle-rich language like German, we find other
particles that have similar functions. In V1-degree exclamatives, we find aber 'but' and
vielleicht 'maybe', which help license the exclamative reading, (799a). In adversative
constructions, which express a negative evaluation, we find schon 'already' and auch
'also', which also contribute to the well-formedness of these constructions, (799b+c).
(799) a. Mensch, bist du aber / vielleicht bl6d! degree exclamative
man are you but maybe stupid
'Boy, are you ever stupid!'
b. Mein Gott, wenn ich das schon hre! schon adversative
my God when I that already hear
'[I get angry] when/if I hear this!'
c. Mensch, wenn du auch so unfreundlich bist! auch adversative
man if you also so unfriendly are
'[It is bad] that/if you're so unfriendly!'
We have already seen how such particles may help disambiguate between different
readings for one and the same utterance. So, how do such particles help license different
speech acts?
As I have argued in detail for doch, nur 'only' and wenigstens 'at least', such
particles are typically truth-conditionally vacuousm1 3 . They convey semantic content at a
non-truth-conditional level. I propose that their speech act licensing function comes about
as follows. First, the particles must be compatible with a particular utterance type, and
make a felicitous contribution. As we have seen, nur 'only' in optatives marks that the
desired proposition is low on the speaker's preference scale, and thus makes the
contribution of marking modesty and desperation, i.e. the speaker conveys that 'this is
really not much to ask for'. Similarly, wenigstens 'at least' in optatives reinforces the
bouletic orientation of the utterance and conveys that the speaker is settling for less, i.e.
the speaker conveys that she is willing to compromise. Finally, doch in optatives
reinforces the polar orientation of the utterance (i.e. the contrast between what is desired
133 It is easy to see how this extends at least to schon 'already' in (799b) and to auch 'also' in (799c).
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and what is the case); by using doch, the speaker emphasizes the conflict between wish
and reality. Each of these particles thus makes a contribution to an optative, which may
be characterized in terms of reinforcement and strengthening. By using these particles,
the optative becomes more expressive.
Second, the particles in question will typically act as disambiguators. Not all
utterance types are equally compatible with all types of particles. This gives rise to a
situation where accumulating particles is a means of cumulatively disambiguating. Let
me illustrate. Example (800) is multiply ambiguous, allowing for four conceivable
readings. (For the sake of argumentation, I assume that all four readings are equally well-
formed, which is naturally not the case - a fact that derives from the present discussion.)
(800) a. Hatte es geregnet...
had it rained
lit. 'Had it rained...'
b. conditional antecedent reading: Had it rained, I would have stayed home.
c. optative reading: I wish it had rained.
d. polar exclamative reading: I'm surprised that it would have rained.
e. degree exclamative reading: Boy, would it have rained.
The particle doch is only possible in clauses that directly access the speaker's doxastic
state (via Doxspeaker(w)). While this is possible in a factual conditional antecedent, it is not
possible in a hypothetical conditional antecedent (cf. Coniglio 2009). Crucially,
conditionals with conditional inversion do not seem to allow for a factual reading (cf.
Reis & W611stein 2010); therefore, placing doch into the clause in (800) eliminates the
reading as a conditional antecedent. Similarly, we have seen that doch is not compatible
with a degree exclamative reading. By adding doch, we thus reduce the possible readings
to polar exclamative and optative, as shown in (801).
(801) a. Hitte es doch geregnet...
had it doch rained
lit. 'Had it rained...'
386
b. * conditional antecedent reading:
c. optative reading:
d. polar exclamative reading:
e. * degree exclamative eading:
Had it rained, I would have stayed home.
I wish it had rained.
I'm surprised that it would have rained.
Boy, would it have rained.
If we now add nur 'only', the only remaining reading is an optative reading, as we have
seen that polar exclamative readings are incompatible with ONLY 2 -
a. Hatte es doch nur geregnet...
had it doch only rained
lit. 'Had it rained...'
b. * conditional antecedent reading: H
c. optative reading: I'
d. * polar exclamative reading: I'
e. * degree exclamative eading: B
ad it rained, I would have stayed home.
wish it had rained.
m surprised that it would have rained.
oy, would it have rained.
We can thus show transparently how accumulation of particles is a means to
disambiguate potentially ambiguous utterances. But how could particles ever become
obligatory (or quasi-obligatory)? I argue that this is a conspiracy, which can be captured
as follows.
Given that particles are a reliable means to disambiguate and single out a particular
desired reading, we find ourselves in a situation that can be described as follows (first
discussed in Grosz 2011). If we make standard assumptions on rational discourse
participants (cf. Lewis's 1969 signaling games), particles can be viewed as speech act
cues (or, more neutrally: cuesfor different utterance types). In many situations, a speaker
has to decide whether to use cues (e.g. for optativity) and the hearer has to decide how to
interpret an utterance that lacks such cues (and is thus underspecified for different
possible readings). In any such situation, the most successful strategies on part of the
speaker and hearer are those where the speaker always uses one or more of the
appropriate cues and the hearer always interprets cue-less utterances as the most
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(802)
unmarked ones. In the case of (803), different cues can give rise to different (marked)
readings, shown in (804). However, there is no designated cue for a conditional reading.
a. Ware ich reich...
were I rich
lit. 'Were I rich...'
b. conditional antecedent reading:
c. optative reading:
d. polar exclamative reading:
e. degree exclamative eading:
Were I rich, I would travel the world.
I wish I were rich.
I'm surprised that I would be rich.
Boy, would I be rich.
(803)
(804)
It thus follows that the most successful strategy for a speaker will be to use these cues
whenever applicable, as the hearer will revert to the unmarked (conditional) reading in
the absence of any cue. This accounts for the perceived deviance of (805): The hearer
will always understand this to be a fragmentary conditional and thus interpret it as an
incomplete utterance.
(805) #Ware ich reich!
were I rich
lit. 'Were I rich...'
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a. Ware ich doch tatSACHlich reich!
were I doch indeed rich
'[I'm surprised] that I would indeed be rich.'
b. Ware ICH vielleicht reich!
were I maybe rich
'Boy, would I be rich!'
c. Ware ich doch nur REICH!
were I doch only rich




This informal analysis can be formalized in terms of a signaling game (Lewis 1969:130-
133), sketched as follows. Assume that speech act cues are costly and thus only used
when this increases the expected utility for the speaker and/or the hearer 3 . If we assume
that utterances like (803) and (805) are truly ambiguous between at least two readings
(one of which may be the unmarked one), the following consequence arises. If the
context biases a reading strongly enough to practically eliminate the alternative reading
(which we could implement in terms of prior probabilities), then no cues are necessary
and, due to their costliness, cues are in fact dispreferred. This accounts for the marginal
possibility of cue-less optatives. However, whenever there is no such powerful bias in
favor of one reading or the other, it will always be preferable on part of the speaker to use
speech act cues in order to maximize successful disambiguation and thus maximize
successful communication. In other words, the prototypicality of prototypical optative
particles is a consequence of a conspiracy, which stems from the disambiguating effect of
these particles in conjunction with strategies to maximize successful communication.
Similar considerations apply to other areas where particles are used. For instance,
imperatives (which typically have a command reading and a permission reading) can be
disambiguated towards a permission reading in German by means of the particle ruhig.
(806) a. Komm herein! German
come in
'[I order you to] come in! / [I allow you to] come in!'
b. Komm ruhig herein!
come ruhig in
'[I allow you to] come in! / *[I order you to] come in!'
It is a direct prediction of the present proposal (and, may I say, quite intuitive) that ruhig
is used more often when the context does not independently disambiguate between a
command intention and a permission intention on part of the speaker. Unfortunately, it is
beyond the scope of the present project to explore whether this prediction carries out.
134 assume that both speaker and hearer aim at maximizing successful communication and at the same
time aim at minimizing effort in production and in parsing.
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7. Summary and Conclusion
In this dissertation, I proposed an analysis for so-called optative constructions that aimed
at answering three separate questions. First, how does desirability arise in optatives?
Second, how is mood information encoded and what is its role in determining the form of
optative utterances? Third, what is the role of prototypical optative particles?
I answered the first question by positing a generalized exclamation operator, which
not only accounts for optatives, but also for so-called polar exclamatives. The idea that I
presented is that the exclamation operator forms a direct link between grammatical
expressions and emotional/affective behavior; by virtue of this exclamation operator, the
speaker directly expresses an emotion rather than describing it.
I proposed an answer for the second question that assumes that semantic mood (such
as counterfactuality and factivity) is encoded in a Mood head, the content of which co-
determines both morphological mood marking on the finite verb and the overt material
that we find in C. Such a view allows us to account for different types of exclamations in
a uniform way, irrespective of their different semantic mood and different syntactic form.
For the third question, I outlined a system that assumes that different prototypical
particles are truth-functionally vacuous presupposition triggers that have three different
functions. First, by virtue of their core lexical semantics, they modulate the meaning that
the speaker conveys when uttering a sentence; in the case of exclamations, their main
function is to further specify the emotion that is conveyed, e.g. by adding a notion of
desperation or willingness to compromise. Secondly, particles serve to disambiguate
clauses that are multiply ambiguous, e.g. ruling out a polar exclamative reading in favor
of an optative reading. Thirdly, by virtue of their disambiguating effect, particles end up
functioning as a reliable strategy for marking and thus licensing a particular intended
speech act. The proposal that I presented extends beyond optatives and provides us with a
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